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ABSTRACT
THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL:
A STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS FORMATION
by
Najwa Hanna Makhoul
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Febru-
ary, 1978.
This thesis examines the emergence of a Palestinian proletariat in
Israel in light of a historically-held commitment by the Zionist movement
to an exclusive Jewish proletariat in Palestine. This commitment derives
from socialist Zionism, identified here as the ideological/theoretical
foundation and plan of action underlying the capitalist settler-colonial
social formation that Israel represents.
The study involves identifying the causes underlying the current
proletarianization of Palestinians by Israeli capital and the implica-
tions this process may have on the class struggle. It hypothesizes that
this process creates an objective basis for potential proletarian alli-
ance between Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews.
The theoretical background for this analysis is the law of uneven de-
velopment and the method is dialectical materialism.
The starting point of this thesis is the view that development is
the outcome of the contradictory unity of the forces of production and
the relations of production in which the latter predominates. This unity
involves interaction between objective forces (material conditions) and
subjective forces (theory, social consciousness, etc.).
The relations of production which predominate the development pro-
cess are class relations. They are thus relations to economic, political
and ideological apparatuses by which the boundaries of social classes are
defined.
In Israel today, the proletarianization of Palestinians is an aspect
of class formation which was prohibited under the historical domination
of socialist Zionist relations of production. It, therefore, involves
transformation of these relations in the three spheres (economic, politi-
cal and ideological). Evidence from this study suggests that this as-
pect of class formation represents the synthesis of qualitative change
in the relations of production and quantitative change in the degree of
development of the productive forces characterizing Israel in the after-
math of the 1967 War.
Expressing themselves in the integration and subordination of Pales-
tinian labor to Israeli capital, these changes represent the subordina-
tion of the sectarian "laws" of unevenness inherent in the exclusivist
nature of Zionism to the secular laws of unevenness inherent in capital-
ist accumulation on a world scale.
It is concluded that these changes provide an objective basis for
Israeli-Palestinian joint class struggle.
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INTRODUCTION:
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND DESIGN
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Introduction
Since the late sixties, the presence of Palestinian-Arab labor in
Jewish work places has become a prominent feature in Israel. The mas-
sive penetration of male and female Palestinian workers from Arab vil-
lages in Israel and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into the Is-
raeli labor market is a quite new phenomenon, even with regard to Pales-
tinian-Arabs who are citizens of Israel. In 1974, 84 percent of the ac-
tive citizen Palestinian labor force were wage earners, compared with
only 39 percent in 1963. The size of Palestinian-Arab employees in
Jewish work places almost doubles when workers from the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip are included. 2
Another related and a more strikingly new phenomenon is the pene-
tration of Israeli-Jewish capital itself (including kibbutz capital) into
Palestinian-Arab villages and towns seeking employment of cheaper labor,
specifically females. This spatial mobility of Jewish capital into Arab
residential places contrasted with the daily commuting of Arab labor into
Jewish work places is a more recent feature distinctive of the post-19
73
period of persistent economic and political crisis.3
These two phenomena defy a long history of the "boycott of Arab
labor" advocated and practiced by the Zionist movement in Palestine. The
"boycott of Arab labor" has been historically rationalized by an explicit
commitment to the creation of an exclusive Jewish working class in Pales-
tine. Accordingly, Jewish settlers were to refrain from employing native
Palestinian-Arab labor and employ only Jewish labor, In this sense,
Zionist settler-colonialism in Palestine (unlike the typical settler-
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colonial experiences elsewhere in the world) is characterized by the
urge not to exploit the native producers but rather replace them,
This commitment to an exclusive Jewish proletariat derives from
Labor-Zionism, the hegemonic ideological foundation underlying Jewish
colonial settlement in Palestine, Labor-Zionism, specifically socialist
or proletarian Zionism as formulated by Ber Borochov, has identified
the imperative of exclusive Jewish proletarianization by Jewish capital
and hence, the emergence of Jewish class struggle for the actualization
of Zionism -- the foundation of a Jewish nation State.4
The massive integration of Palestinian labor into Israeli employ-
*
ment may signify Palestinian proletarianization., Palestinian-Arabs
penetrating into the Israeli labor market are most likely to occupy pro-
letarian class locations, and therefore increase the number of Jews and
Arabs jointly belonging to the working class and sharing a common class
interest. If that is the case, Palestinian employment by Israeli-Jewish
capital may provide an objective basis for a potential cross-national
proletarian alliance among Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs.
A history of boycott and replacement of Arab labor by Jewish set-
tlers in Palestine makes the current merger of Israeli-Jewish and Pales-
tinian-Arab labor force a first historical opportunity for the potential
*
Proletarianization refers here to the transformation of pre-capi-
talist producers into a class of modern wage-workers, This involves
the separation of producers from the means of production and their inte-
gration into productive, manual, non-supervisory capitalis employment.
Proletarianization refers also to the potential development of revolu-
tionary consciousness and hence, the creation of contradictions in the
dominant mode of accumulation in the struggle for a socialist alterna-
tive, This concept is discussed further in Chapter III,
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of joint struggle on class lines to supercede conflicting national as-
pirations. It is a first opportunity in the sense that joint class strug-
gle among Jewish and Arab toilers in Palestine has been practically im-
possible owing to the simple fact that their class interests were utter-
ly counterposed under the historical hegemony of proletarian Zionism.
Only this phase in Palestinian-Israeli history seems to allow for a grow-
ing Arab-Jewish proletariat which has the potential for becoming the
leading class (ruling class) in a socialist transformation of the rela-
tions of production currently prevalent in "Greater Israel".
In light of the historical commitment to exclusive Jewish proletar-
ianization, the hiring of Palestinian-Arabs by Israeli-Jews confuses the
Israeli public. It appears contradictory with the Labor-Zionist ideals
they have internalized, and is also believed to seriously endanger the
political security of the Jewish State they immigrated from the world
over to create and support. The proletarianization of Palestinians in
Israel is, therefore, paradoxical.
In this paradoxical context, the question is: What is it that has
recently compelled the Israeli ruling class (against its Labor-Zionist
ideology and what it historically believed to be a political security
risk) to finally remove previously established obstacles and allow for
the massive inflow of Palestinian labor into Jewish work places, even
inside the kibbutz and the moshav, the strongholds of Labor-Zionism?
One way of treating this question is to simply point out the pool
of cheap Palestinian labor made available to the Israeli ruling class
in the aftermath of the 1967 war as an explanation for the integration
of Palestinians into production organized by Israeli capital.
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This interpretation, in fact, coincides with the position expressed
by the doves in the Labor Party who therefore advocate the returning of
the populated occupied territories, as well as with the Israeli public
opinion, as will be demonstrated by this study, A historical review of
Palestinian proletarianization since the early years of Jewish settle-
ment in Palestine (Chapter III) illustrates the fact that the non-pro-
letarianization of Palestinians in the past (when the Zionist slogan,
"1boycott of Arab labor", was fanatically practiced) was associated pre-
cisely with the abundance of cheaper native Palestinian labor. Even
after the 1948 war, when the majority of Palestinian producers were ex-
pelled from what was to become Israel, cheap Arab labor remained abun-
dantly available inside Israel, The Zionist "conquest of land" through
purchase and/or expropriation for Jewish settlement before and after the
establishment of the Jewish State was constantly associated with the dis-
placement of peasants, creating Palestinian labor surplus.
When West Galilee and the Small Triangle were annexed in 1949, Is-
rael imposed Martial Law and activated the Emergency Regulations to regu-
late the mobility of Palestinian-Arab populations of these two regions
and prevent their employment in Israeli-Jewish work places. These ob-
stacles were only removed in the early sixties during the construction
boom. This reservoir of Arab labor was then temporarily, yet massively
mobilized into Israeli production.5
By contrast, the persisting integration of Palestinians on a mas-
sive scale into employment by Israeli-Jewish capital challenges the pre-
vious interpretation as too simplistic. It also urges our inquiry to be
more directed towards the demand side and less towards the supply side of
17
Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor market. It is the demand
for, not the supply of, Palestinian labor that presents a new yet an am-
biguous fact.
A challenge posed by this ambiguity thus far is to identify the
major causes underlying the emerging demand for Palestinian labor in
Israel, a demand that has become most prominent since the 1967 war, We
emphasize, in particular, causes that involve structural changes; i.e.,
transformation in the relations of production. This emphasis derives
from the conviction that changes in the relations of market-exchange,
that is, in the sphere of distribution, are determined by changes in the
sphere of production, In addition, the emphasis on structural transfor-
mation, as opposed to factor analysis, is determined also by the practi-
cal objective of this study. This involves the assessment of possible
implications of the massive participation of Palestinians in the Israeli
labor market on long-term political development.
Focussing on the relations of production may reveal the extent to
which the emerging demand for Palestinian labor in Israel today is struc-
tural or merely conjunctural. If Palestinian labor in Israel represents
merely a transitory labor, it makes no sense to talk about long-term
political implications. In this sense, our research problem is neces-
sarily two-fold: practical and explanatory. And although distinct,
these two aspects of the study are essentially complementary. Their
theoretical methodological treatment tends also to overlap, as illus-
trated below.
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II. Practical Aspects of the Study
A. Rationale
This aspect focuses on the effects Palestinian labor penetrating
Israel's labor market may have on objective conditions favoring and op-
posing the potential for cross-national proletarian alliances among Is-
raeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs.
The current controversy within the Palestine liberation movement,
the Israeli public, and the international community concerning a Pales-
tinian State in the West Bank and Gaza highlights the relevance of the
question posed above. No State or a State and what kind of State will
substantially, yet differently, affect the participation of Palestinians
in Israel's labor market and the terms of exchange involved. This gives
a sense of urgency to this study before the present conditions are ser-
iously altered. Findings may be of some use to political strategy and
positions.
A class analysis of Palestinian participation in Israel's labor
market may help in identifying criteria for the assessment of whether or
not the establishment of a Palestinian State in this conjuncture is a
progressive step. The criteria can thus be the extent to which the es-
tablishment of a Palestinian State is likely to promote or retard the
possibility of Jewish-Arab proletarian alliance as a basis for genuine
solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem.
Our research question is thus political in character, The challenge
is how to answer it scientifically, We do not pretend to know how, yet
we feel urged to try because most important questions faced in life are
political, and avoiding them is ignoring the real world,
19
Political question, however, can be adequately treated only through
the integration of theory and practice, Therefore, our study can only be
an attempt to systematize an approach to this kind of question but not to
seek an adequate answer, Another serious limitation of this work lies in
the fact that it is arbitrarily confined to examining only objective con-
ditions of cross-national proletarian alliances, This leaves out subjec-
tive conditions that are indispensable for the actualization of such al-
liances.
B. Objective Conditions for Cross-national Proletarian Alliances
Class alliance is the opposite of class polarization. Both concepts
are related to political class positions within society or between classes
of different societies. Class society is usually polarized into dominant
and dominated classes. Classes within one pole usually form alliances
against classes in the other pole. Alliance among the dominant classes
is often referred to as the "power bloc" and among the dominated classes
6
as the "people". Classes are often divided into class-fractions.
Fractions of the same class coincide with important economic differ-
entiations and can, therefore, take important and distinct roles as social
forces. Alliances can, thus, develop between the fractions of different
classes, including the dominant and dominated. When such alliances oc-
cur, these classes and fractions do not dissolve into one another. 8
Classes and fractions in alliance do not dissolve into one another
because their boundaries (class locations) are structurally determined
by the objective place in the production process and the social formation
as a whole. This involves political-ideological domination/subordination,
Class alliance denotes political class position which is specific to the
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conjuncture; that is, not structurally and objectively determined.
Class position is thus distinguished from the structurally deter-
mined class location by which class interest is defined and hence, fixing
the horizon of the class' struggle.9 The class' position and interest
may or may not coincide. Class alliance, which is a political class posi-
tion, may or may not be based on shared class locations and hence, com-
monality of class interests.
Unlike the objective determination of class interest, class position
is subjectively determined by the state of consciousness. Class conscious-
ness depends greatly on political practices of social classes through the
ideological and repressive apparatuses of the State. It refers to the
ideology guiding classes in their political practices. The class' con-
sciousness is false when it does not correspond with its interest. Al-
liances between classes may occur on the basis of false consciousness.
It is the dominated class that is likely to be exposed to false con-
sciousness through the ideology of the dominant class, because (using
Marx's words):
"...the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the
ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material
force for society is at the same time its ruling intellectual
force. The class which has the means of material production
at its disposal has control at the same time over the means
of mental production." 10
This is articulated in the relation of ideological-political domina-
tion/subordination materialized particularly in the State apparatuses.
Moreover, the ruling class is constantly compelled to ideologically ap-
peal to the producing class in an attempt to postpone the imposition of
an alternative to the prevailing order.
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Once it touches the masses, false or genuine ideology itself be-
comes a mobilizing material force and as such it may alter the objective
conditions determining the class' location and hence, interest. In this
study, Zionism is a case in point. It is conceived as a form of sectar-
ian bourgeois nationalism, class consciousness that corresponds to the
class interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie. Once it touched the Jewish,
predominantly petty bourgeois masses, it became a mobilizing material
force transforming large numbers of them into pioneer settlers for cre-
ating new material conditions capable of altering, and not merely re-
storing, the class origins of those who were mobilized by it,
Even as a false ideology, Zionism (specifically its proletarian
postulate, formulated precisely to appeal to the petty bourgeois masses
under the displacement effects of monopoly formation) mobilized these
masses to act on behalf of the bourgeoisie and create the material foun-
dations of the bourgeois Jewish State.
The alliance between the Jewish bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie
was by no means based on commonality of class interests. It was, rather,
the outcome of the specific conjuncture: material conditions of Jewish
life in the metropolis, peculiar to a transitional phase. The transition
from competitive capitalism to the age of monopoly capital, characterized
rather by monopolistic competition.
Under the conditions specific to the time and place, Jewish big capi-
tal needed a State of its own to intervene on its behalf in the face of
monopolistic competition, and Jewish petty capital needed security against
the displacement effects of monopoly formation, Zionism, as the ideo-
logical expression of the Jewish bourgeoisie for a bourgeois nation State,
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happened then to be in coincidence with the needs of the Jewish petty
bourgeoisie. This coincidence, however, must not be taken to signify
commonality of class interests. As a matter of fact, the interests of
the two classes were contradictory: the class interest of the Jewish
bourgeoisie lay in monopoly formation, while the very survival of the
Jewish petty bourgeoisie as a social class threatened to extinction by
the formation of monopoly capital. This argument is the subject of
Chapter II.
Two points are to be concluded from Zionism: first, that a class
alliance which belongs to the sphere of conjunctural class positions can
transform the class location which is structurally determined and hence
affect the class interest. This seems to contradict a point made earlier
regarding the undissolving of class or class fraction into one another
through alliance, It may be a feature peculiar to settler-colonialism.
This point, however, may be taken to highlight the dialectics of the sub-
jective and the objective forces in the development process: how speci-
fic material conditions give rise to particular forms of consciousness
and how consciousness can then become a mobilizing material force and
transform the initial material conditions from which it arises.
Second, that alliances between classes that do not share common
class interests are necessarily conjunctural, as they do not resolve ob-
jective contradictions inherent in their distinct class interests which
fix the horizon of the class' struggle, given that classes exist only in
class struggle,
In other words, alliances of classes that share no commonality of
class interests represents necessarily a contradictory unity. The objec-
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tively determined contradictions involved in this unity tend to ultimate-
ly assert themselves and hence, defy the essentially conjunctural allian-
11
ces.
The present study seeks to examine objective conditions related to
class alliance in a peculiar context: not between different classes of
the same nationality but rather between classes of different nationali-
ties with contradictory national aspirations who may share common class
interests as the exploited classes. It seeks to examine objective condi-
tions for potential cross-national alliance on proletarian class lines
between Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab producers who are subjected
to direct exploitation by one and the same nationally ruling class.
It is a question of alliance between classes from different social
formations characterized not only by a relation of domination/subordina-
tion, but also by deformation and replacement of one by the other.
1 2
Examining the objective conditions for potential cross-national pro-
letarian alliance among Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs refers, in
this study, merely to the terrain of class location. These are distin-
guished here from the subjective condition indispensable for actual pro-
letarian alliance which rather refers to the terrain of class position
and the conjuncture.1 3
Concretely, examining the objective conditions for proletarian al-
liances in this context is examining the formation of a Palestinian work-
ing class by Israeli-Jewish capital, assuming the existence of a Jewish
working class exploited by the same ruling class,
Formulated more precisely, Palestinian-Arabs penetrating the Israeli
labor market promote the objective conditions for cross-national prole-
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tarian alliance if they are actually entering proletariat class locations
and are predominantly joining, not replacing, Jews in the social division
of labor. Expressed differently, if they represent an increase in the
number of Arabs and Jews who jointly belong to the working class and
hence, share common class interests. This is examining the possibility
of a developing commonality of class interest.
This question may sound irrelevant under other conditions. The whole
notion of proletarian internationalism is based on the assumption of com-
monality of proletarian class interests across national boundaries. This
notion is increasingly reinforced by the essential internationalization
of capital, including the international socialization of the labor pro-
cess and the productive forces (the international firm).
Under the concrete and specific conditions of Palestine, the rele-
vance and rationale for the question formulated as such derives from the
fact that the class interests of the native Palestinian-Arab producers
and Jewish producers have been utterly counterposed under Zionist settler
colonialism and more specifically under the hegemony of its proletarian
ideology: the commitment for the formation of exclusively Jewish producing
classes in Palestine, which in practice meant the deformation and replace-
ment of the native producing classes.
Since the 1920s, much left-Zionist and Communist efforts have been
invested in the direction of creating an alliance between Arab and Jewish
toilers in Palestine. Not only that these efforts have not materialized
in any expressions of actual class solidarity, but also that they could
have at best developed class alliance between the two groupings only
in the sense of contradictory class unity, Objectively contradictory
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class interests do not simply dissolve without structural changes in the
social relations of production. It is our basic thesis that such changes
have occurred in the 1967 war.
If it is found that the new material conditions characteristic of
the post-1967 war are, in fact, giving rise to commonality of class in-
terest among a substantial number of Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jewish
producers, we then have a solid objective base for politicization in the
direction of cross-national proletarian alliance in the sense of class
unity.
It is on this basic thesis that the link between the practical pur-
pose of this research and the imperative of employing dialectical mater-
ialism as the method of investigation lies. This link derives from the
view that class locations are structurally determined by places in the
production process and by ideological-political relations in the social
formation at large.
Since this study involves merely the formation of a Palestinian work-
ing class and not class formation in general and the objective conditions
for proletarian, but not other class, alliance, it is only necessary to
identify the criteria for proletarian class locations, defining the boun-
daries of the working class.
C. Determination of Proletarian Class Locations: The Boundaries
of the Working Class
From an historical materialist perspective, identifying the boundar-
ies of social classes is crucial for interpreting the world and for chan-
ging it. Social classes are not mere analytical abstractions or empty
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categories. The concept "social class" corresponds to real social for-
ces with distinct interests and thus historical missions, Classes emerge
as social forces in the class struggle inherent in the social organiza-
tion of production. Social classes exist only in class struggle and it
is class struggle that makes history. It matters, therefore, a great
deal how classes are conceptualized and what social positions are placed
within the boundaries of a particular class.
Answering the question posed as such, social classes are groupings
of social agents defined principally but not exclusively by their place
in the production process, which embraces the labor process, the produc-
tive forces and the relations of production. Social class is defined by
its place in the social division of labor as a whole. This includes
political and ideological relations, Class locations are thus structur-
ally determined by the objective place in the social division of labor;
and class interest is defined by the class determination which fixes the
horizon of the class' struggle.1 4
The question of who belongs to which class involves identifying cri-
teria defining the boundaries of social classes. The more division of
15
labor there is, the more vague and controversial these boundaries become.
The controversy gets especially heated when the proletariat class loca-
tions are concerned. Some argue that although not all proletarians are
wage-workers, all wage-workers are proletarians.16 This position derives
from the view that it is essentially the separation from the means of pro-
duction that defines the proletariat,
Others argue that virtually all wage-laborers should be considered
members of the working class, 7 Underlying this position is the premise
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that it is essentially the coersive "freedom" to sell one's own labor
power that defines the proletariat. Accordingly, wage labor is the de-
termining criterion of proletarian class locations,
In contrast with both arguments, still others argue that although
18
all proletarians are wage-workers, not all wage-workers are proletarians.
Implicit in this view is that the separation from the means of production
and wage-labor are necessary but not sufficient criteria for defining
proletarian class locations. Accordingly, the proletariat is defined by
specific form(s) of wage-labor. What forms of wage-labor are proletarian
is also controversial. Some Marxists argue that only productive (produces
surplus value directly) labor is proletarian;19 other Marxists argue that
not only productive labor is proletarian.20
Before entering the controversy regarding what wage-labor is prole-
tarian, let us first conclude the initial debate on the more general cri-
teria.
Of course, the three different arguments have different implications
on the size of the proletariat. The proletariat is the largest by the
first criteria, as it includes all non-owners regardless of whether they
perform wage-labor or not. There is a good reason for this criteria in
the Third World, where the majority of the population is displaced peas-
antry with no access to employment, and is maintained this way precisely
subject to the logic of capitalist accumulation. They are dispossessed
and made free of property relation but not "free" to sell their labor
power. This can be more appropriate a criterion in defining proletarian
class position than in defining proletarian class location, which is ob-
jectively determined by the class antagonism inherent in the very creation
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of surplus value.
Moreover, it follows from this argument that the great majority of
the Palestinian population has become proletarian since its expulsion
from Palestine and that the Palestinian refugee camps have been proletar-
ian communities, The proletariat, however, is the exploited class under
capitalist relations. The class exploited within particular dominant re-
lations of production is the class which, under these relations of produc-
tion, performs what is defined to be productive labor. Under pre-capital-
ist relations, the performers of productive labor can be owners. Under
capitalist relations, however, only non-owners can perform productive la-
bor; all non-owners are not thereby proletarian. Furthermore, exploitation
under capitalist relations is the appropriation of surplus labor in the
form of surplus value; proletarians are, therefore, only those engaged di-
rectly in the production of surplus value, and only by wage-labor can sur-
plus value be created. All wage-earners do not thereby produce surplus
value.
Thus far, we identified theoretical reasons against the first and sec-
ond arguments and in support of the third. According to the third criteria,
however, the size of the proletariat shrinks substantially depending on the
specificity of the form(s) of wage-labor that defines the working class.
At this level, the controversy regarding the defining criteria of proletar-
ian class locations gets more tense.
All Marxists agree that manual workers directly engaged in the produc-
tion of physical commodities for private capital fall into the working
class,21 There is no such agreement about any other category of wage-earn-
ers. Some Marxists argue that only productive manual workers belong to the
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proletariat.22 Others, like A. Szymanski, argue that the proletariat in-
cludes low-level, routinized white collar employees as well.23 Harry
Braverman, the advocate of the proletarian location of clerical labor,
maintains that "while the working class in production is the result of
several centuries of capitalist development, clerical labor is largely
24the product of the period of monopoly capitalism.... Clerical work as a
capitalist labor process and clerical worker as proletariat in new form.2 5
At this point, the controversy enters another level of complexity,
focusing mainly on why productive labor? What labor is productive? Whe-
ther or not the new wage-earning groupings who belong to the mushrooming
service sector belong also to the proletariat.
As summed up by Jan Gough:
"In his theories of surplus-value, Marx defined productive
labor under capitalism as labor which produces commodity value
and hence surplus value for capital; this excludes all labor
which is not exchanged against capital, self-employed propri-
etors-farmers, artisans, handicraftsmen, tradesmen, profes-
sionals, all other self-employed -- are according to this defi-
nition not productive workers because their labor is not ex-
changed for capital and does not contribute directly to the
increase of capital. Even more, they fall outside of the dis-
tinction between productive and unproductive labor, because
they are outside the capitalist mode of production." 26
This is, in fact, a distinction between capitalist productive labor and
non-capitalist productive labor. This is inadequate. For our purpose, it
is equally important to draw the line between productive and unproductive
labor under capitalist relations.
Poulantzas argues that in Marx's analysis, the working class is de-
fined not by wage-labor (purchase and sale of labor power) but by produc-
tive-labor (which, under capitalism, means labor that directly produces
surplus-value), Therefore, it is only those earners who depend on produc-
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tive capital that produces surplus-value. Wage-earners who depend on the
sphere of the circulation and realization of surplus-value do not form part
of the working class, since these forms of capital and the laborer who de-
pends on them do not produce surplus-value.
2 7
For Poulantzas, the working class is defined by the fundamental class
antagonism within capitalism between direct producers, who are separated
from the means of production and produce the social surplus product in the
form of surplus-value, and the bourgeoisie, who own the means of produc-
tion and appropriate surplus-value. Accordingly, unproductive wage-earners
while clearly not members of the bourgeoisie, do not contribute to the
production of surplus-value, Thus, they are not directly exploited in the
form of dominant capitalist relation of exploitation and so, Poulantzas
argues, cannot be included in the working class.
2 8
The arguments with regard to the boundaries of the working class
have focused, thus far, on economic criteria. But social classes are de-
fined not only by economic, but also by political and ideological criteria
as well. It is in Poulantzas' analysis that this point is most seriously
considered. Perhaps the most distinctive premise underlying Poulantzas'
analysis is that classes are structurally determined, not only at the eco-
nomic level, but at the political and ideological levels as well. While
it is true that the eocnomic place of the social agents has a principal
role in determining social classes, their position in ideological and poli-
tical relations of domination and subordination may be equally important.
Based on all these theoretical considerations, Poulantzas" basic conclusion
is that only manual, non-supervisory workers who produce surplus-value di-
rectly (productive labor) should be included in the proletariat.29
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Productive, manual, and non-supervisory labor categories are the cri-
teria by which Poulantzas defines proletarian locations only in the pro-
duction process. Agreeing with him, however, classes are determined prin-
cipally but not exclusively in the production process.30 Relations of
ideological-political domination/subordination outside the production pro-
cess are included in the objective determination of class location.
In Poulantzas' words:
"The determination of classes involves political and ideological
relations... .Political and ideological relations are material-
ized and embodied as material practices in the State apparatuses
.... The analysis of social classes can only be undertaken in
terms of their relationship with the apparatuses, and with the
State apparatuses in particular." 31
This emphasis on the ideological-political relations of domination/subordi-
nation in the objective determination of class location is an important
innovation in Marxist theory, attributed to the Althosgerian Structuralist
school from which Poulantzas comes. The significance of this innovation
(the structural criteria of the determining of class location) lies in
transcending the controversial "class-in-itself"/"class-for-itself" dichot-
omy, a dichotomy that, although it is often erroneously attributed to
Lucas, in fact originated in Marx's writing.32 Although it contradicts
the class struggle paradigm, that classes exist only in class struggle, it
is class struggle that makes history.
Despite the importance of this innovation, and in contrast with his
criteria of proletarian locations where he is very definite and specific
about the labor categories that are and are not proletarian, his structural
criteria regarding the political and ideological relations of domination/
subordination remains vague and unspecified.
It is not clear, for example, what Poulantzas means by the social
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division of labor, how he distinguishes it from the production process,
and whether he equates it with the social formation, the site of class
struggle and formation.
Can it possibly mean that relations to the ideological-political ap-
paratus, outside the production process, may in some cases predominate?
More concretely, is it likely that productive, manual, non-supervisory
employees may belong to different social classes because one segment is
ideologically and/or politically dominant and the other segment is subor-
dinate by virtue of their differential relations to the State apparatus?
This question remains also unanswered by Poulantzas. It brings to mind the
notion of "contradictory class location" developed by Erik Olin Wright; and
denoting that social agents can belong simultaneously to different class
location. We reject this notion on the basis that it negates the concept
of social classes as social forces with distinct interests that are objec-
tively determined by the location and which fixes the horizon of the class'
struggle. Classes can take contradictory class positions but contradictory
class locations undermine the concept of class and class struggle.
To answer the question posed above, it is our position that the struc-
tural criteria (ideological-political relations to the State apparatus)
do not affect the objective determination of class location -- the boundar-
ies of social classes as such. It rather affects intra-class differentia-
tion, meaning here the objective determination of class fractions. Further-
more, Poulantzas does not specify what kind of relation to the State appar-
atuses or degree of political-ideological domination/subordination defines
the boundaries of different social classes, specifically the proletariat.
Moreover, he does not specify the relation between the objective determina-
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tion of proletarian class location in the production process (the economic
criteria), on the one hand, and the objective determination of proletarian
class location in the social division of labor (the structural criteria),
on the other.
What does it concretely mean that classes are determined principally
but not exclusively in the production process? The structural criteria of
the objective determination of class location is especially significant for
studying the formation of a Palestinian working class in Israel. Specifi-
cally in determining the class location of Arab and Jewish productive,
manual, non-supervisory employees. It is crucial for defining and assess-
ing the development of commonality of class interests as an objective con-
dition for potential cross-national proletarian alliances. This criteria
is so important to our analysis precisely for reasons inherent in the pecul-
iar context of this class formation, namely, settler-colonialism. A form
of capitalist-foreign domination settler-colonialism involves the trans-
plantation of a dominant social formation in the heart of a dominated one.
In this particular case, it involves even the deformation, replacement, and
then reintegration of the latter by means of military occupation. Moreover,
this is an essentially sectarian settler-colonial social formation, in
which the State is Jewish and so are even the economic apparatuses (the
Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and the Histadrut - General Feder-
ation of Hebrew Workers).3 3
Initially, these apparatuses came to exist precisely in order to cre-
ate the economic/material "base" for the Jewish State "superstructure".
And they continued to operate as exclusively Jewish economic apparatuses
after the creation of the State of Israel,
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Poulantzas' emphasis on the structural determination of class loca-
tion in terms of political and ideological relations which only exist inso-
far as they are materialized in such apparatuses, is thus most appropriate
for this context and indispensable for the class analysis undertaken. This
is only one of two reasons underlying our choice of Poulantzas' criteria of
the determination of proletarian class location to be employed in this
study.
The second reason derives, not from the specificity of the concrete
contextual conditions, as in the case in the former reason. It rather de-
rives from the nature of our research question. Given that a main objec-
tive of this study is to examine the extent to which Palestinian workers
penetrating the Israeli labor market improve the objective conditions in
terms of entering proletarian locations and representing an increase in
shared proletarian class locations, then it is our research strategy to
use the criteria likely to give the most conservative estimates. The valid-
ity of our conclusions is greater in the case of underestimation than over-
estimation of the actual size of shared locations.
Poulantzas' criteria, defining the boundaries of the working class
even exclusively in terms of place in the production process, is the most
narrow and it is seriously criticized by Marxists, for it substantially
reduces the size of the working class. 3 If by this criteria our findings
indicate a tendency towards the improvement of the objective conditions
for potential proletarian alliances, then findings by any other criteria
are likely only to reinforce the validity of this conclusion.
In the case that findings by this criteria prove to the contrary,
that Palestinian labor penetrating the Israeli labor market does not repre-
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sent an increase in the number of shared proletarian class locations, then
the question of what is the most correct criteria becomes imperative.
To summarize, in this study we use Poulantzas' criteria of proletarian
class location: only productive, manual, non-supervisory labor categories
in the productive process, considering also political and ideological re-
lations.
We do not agree with his conceptualization and use of the relationship
between the production process and the social division of labor. We view
the division of labor as an outcome, not a determinant, of class struggle
and class formation. The production process is more comprehensive than,
and is the reproduction site of, the social division of labor. The produc-
tion process is the unity of the productive forces, the relations of pro-
duction and the labor process, The labor process refers to the technical
division of labor which is, in turn, reproduced in the social division of
labor, subject to the interaction between the forces and relations of pro-
duction. Locations in the social and technical divisions of labor (i.e.,
in the productive process) are affected by differential locations in the
social formation, the site of class struggle, and hence, class formation.
In the production process -- the social organization of production, the
relations of production predominate. In a sense, the production process
depends on the dominant mode or production of social relations of produc-
tion in the social formation. We employ the structural criteria for ex-
amining not class location, but rather the class segmentation into class-
fractions subject to differential locations in the social formation as a
whole, specifically with regard to ideological-political domination/sub-
ordination. This is speaking of the internal structure of the working
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class.
D. Hypotheses and Further Specifications of the Question
As far as the practical aspects of this study, five hypotheses are
examined:
(1) The majority of Palestinian-Arabs penetrating into the Israeli
labor market in the post-1967 era enter predominantly proletarian class
locations. That is, they are employed in productive, manual, non-super-
visory labor categories.
(2) The Palestinian-Arabs penetrating into the Israeli labor market
tend to predominantly replace Jews in the technical division of labor (the
occupational/industrial structures of employment).
(3) In the social division of labor (the production process), Pales-
tinian-Arabs penetrating the Israeli labor market tend to predominantly
join Jews in proletarian class location (a promoting tendency).
(4) Some segments of the proletarian employees in Israel tend to
benefit indirectly from surplus-value created by other segments (an impend-
ing tendency).
(5) The more Palestinian-Arabs occupy proletarian locations in Is-
rael's social division of labor, the more favorable become the objective
conditions for potential cross-national proletarian alliances. This hypo-
thesis is based on the assumption that there is a Jewish working class in
Israel and on the fact that the size of the Palestinian labor force em-
ployed in Israel is relatively small (in 1974, only 15 percent of total). 3 5
For examining these hypotheses, we need to find out where the Pales-
tinians penetrating the Israeli labor market are placed in the production
process -- this includes their place in the technical and the social divi-
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sions of labor simultaneously; that is, the concrete as well as the social
forms of labor they perform: if the trend is predominantly that of Pales-
tinian-Arab labor filling in vacancies in the manual, non-supervisory pro-
ductive positions, from which Jewish labor is moving upward into mental,
supervisory unproductive positions in the same industries and/or economic
sectors; also, if Arab labor is replacing Jewish labor, moving horizontally
from less into more economically and/or politically strategic sectors and
industries; and especially if the less strategic sectors contribute direct-
ly to capital accumulation in the more strategic ones. Then, it would be
concluded that the absorption of Palestinian labor in Israel promises no
possibility for cross-national proletariat alliances,
On the other hand, if the predominant trend is that of joining, or a
combination of joining and replacing, it is likely that the more Palestin-
ian labor is absorbed in the Israeli labor market, the greater will be the
number of Israelis and Palestinians inside Greater Israel who share prole-
tariat class positions; and thus, the better are the prospects for cross-
national class alliances.
The content of our hypotheses can be expressed more concretely in the
following empirical questions:
First, through their penetration into the Israeli labor market, are
Palestinian-Arab workers joining or replacing Israeli-Jewish workers in the
Israeli social division of labor? In other words, is the pattern predomi-
nantly that of concentration of Arab wage-earners in manual, non-supervisory
productive (produce surplus-value directly) labor categories, and of Jewish
wage-earners moving out into non-productive, supervisory, mental labor cate-
gories? It is what position in the social division of labor they occupy
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rather than in what occupations within what industries or sectors they are
absorbed that is the crucial empirical question we seek to answer. This
is especially correct in the absence of indirect economic exploitation
through inter-industry linkages.
Second: is the penetration of Palestinians into the Israeli labor
market associated with a horizontal mobility of Jewish labor across indus-
tries? If so, what are the directions of this mobility? Are Palestinian
workers predominantly filling vacancies created by Jewish labor mobility
or predominantly joining Jewish labor in the same industries? This ques-
tion must be examined both in periods of economic boom as well as crisis.
In what industries do Palestinians seem to concentrate? In mixed indus-
tries, where Arabs and Jews are employed, do Arabs and Jews tend to occupy
different concrete and social forms of labor? Are there industries that
are closed to Palestinian labor? For example, the arms industry is most
likely (if for nothing more than security considerations) to prohibit the
employment of Arab labor. How does that affect the size of shared prole-
tarian class locations?
Third: it is important to identify the source and forms of capital
that employ Arabs. It is not sufficient to examine to what labor category
within mixed sectors and industries Arab labor belongs and in which indus-
tries it is concentrated and from which it is excluded. It is further im-
portant to examine the nature of the linkages prevalent among industries
in which Arab labor is absorbed and those closed for Arabs and open for
Jews alone. Do Jewish workers in closed sectors benefit directly from
surplus-value created by Arab workers in other industries?
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It would not be sufficient to find that in the production process
Palestinians seem to occupy proletarian places and represent an increase
in the size of proletarian locations in the production process that are
shared by Jews and Arabs, It is necessary to examine the extent to which
these shared locations are internally segmented and by what criteria.
For this purpose, we try to identify by what source of capital each popu-
lation group tends to be employed, and where they are located in relation
to ideological-political domination/subordination.
By answering these five questions posed above, we illustrate the for-
mation of a Palestinian working class in Israel. Unless the forces under-
lying this process are identified, it remains unclear whether what appears
to be class formation is, in fact, a structural change and therefore per-
manent, not temporary.
III. Explanatory Aspects of the Study
A. Theory and Method:
As a study of development and class formation, dialectical materialism
is the most appropriate theoretical/methodological frame of analysis. Dia-
lectical materialism is the method which identifies the laws of motion as
ones that lay in the unity of materially-contradictory tendencies inherent
in the essence of phenomenon, both social and natural.3 5
From this perspective, development is conceived to be not a linear
process, but rather as the successive disclosure of objective (not logical)
contradictions. Dialectical materialism, thus, rejects both the notion of
linearity and the notion of equilibrium.
Class formation may denote reproduction, expansion, liquidation, or
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ascendency of class or class fraction, Class formation takes place in
class struggle, the motor force of history. Class formation, therefore,
necessarily involves change in both quantitative and qualitative terms.
It involves quantitative change in the degree of development of the pro-
ductive forces at the disposal of society, and qualitative change in the
relations of production dominant in society. The interaction between the
forces of production and the relations of production is thus the context
in which class formation occurs. This interaction represents necessarily
a contradictory unity of materially opposing tendencies in which the rela-
tions of production predominate. The formation of classes as social for-
ces in class struggle signifies a new balance of forces, the emergence of
new historical phases.
The development of a new historical phase means change in the condi-
tions of the material life of a social formation ("society"). These con-
ditions are essentially determined by the way people go about procuring
their means of subsistence (food, clothing, housing, and instruments of
production, etc.), i.e., by the method used for maintaining and reprodu-
cing their existence; that is, the dominant mode of production. Each
successive historical phase is characterized by the dominance of a new
form in the existing mode of production, or of a new mode. A mode of pro-
duction consists of two components: the productive forces (labor, instru-
ments of labor, skill, technology, etc.) and relations of production (the
way in which people and things are related (as expressed in the patterns
of ownership and the division of labor, etc.). Expressed in these terms,
development can be said to be the byproduct of the interaction of the pro-
ductive forces and relations of production. For social formation to re-
41
produce itself, it is imperative that its productive forces constantly
grow. But the self-reproduction of a social formation is essentially the
reproduction of the existing relations of production characterizing the
prevailing social order. An essential incompatability, therefore, emerges
between the state of development and the requirements of society's produc-
tive forces, on the one hand, and on the other, its existing relations of
production. It follows that in the necessary course of production and
class struggle, the relations of production and the state of development
of the productive forces change, culminating in the emergence of new
epochs. Put differently, in G. Arrighi's words:
"It is by focussing on relations of production and the degree
of development of the productive forces that we can show the
differentia specifica of different epochs." 36
It is our central thesis that the year 1967 represents the beginning
of a new epoch in terms of transformation in the relations of production
and the state of development of Israel's productive forces. The emer-
gence of this new epoch denotes class formation of which the proletarian-
ization of Palestinians in Israel is only an aspect, It is in this con-
text that we place the subject of our analysis.
To elaborate, in Israel, the 1965 recession, lasting until the eve
of the 1967 war, represents the point beyond which Israel's productive
forces could no longer develop within the constraint of the existing re-
lationships of production governed by the rules of Labor-Zionism, rules
designed to lead towards competitive capitalism based on Jewish capital
and labor, and hence to appeal to the Jewish petty bourgeoisie as van-
guards of Zionism. This period represented a deep structural crisis
in the relations of production. Along with the development of the State
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and by virtue of relations to its apparatuses' new bourgeois, class frac-
tions were emerging, yet fettered by the fact that Israel could no longer
provide for capital accumulation and reproduction of the newly dominant
relations of production within the constraints of her existing material
base. The fetter had to burst out, Israel had to integrate and subordi-
nate less developed forms of production, pre-capitalist economic forma-
tions, The Six Day War represented the unfettering of the fetter: it
gave a progressive outlet to an absolutely ripened contradiction. This
outlet was progressive in the sense of transforming the relations of
production, promising further development of the productive forces and
hence, the emergence of a new epoch. The 1967 war was thus the expres-
sion of interaction between the relations and the forces of production
in the transition into a new historical phase. The emerging phase was
new in terms of the change in the relation of production and the quanti-
tative change in the degree of development of the productive forces it
embodied. The higher degree of development of the productive forces
which were at the disposal of Israel's ruling classes in the aftermath
of only a six-day war was in territorial expansion (embracing commodity
and capital market as well as a reservoir of cheap labor); accumulation
of high level technological know-how, specifically in military-related
research and development; massive inflow of investment capital accompanied
by massive inflow of scientifically-trained Jewish immigrants. It is
the very requirements for further development of these productive for-
ces under the transformed relations of production that can explain the
proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel. It is not accidental,
therefore, that the proletarianization of Palestinians historically
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cross-wound by Zionist practices in Palestine, unwinds precisely follow-
ing the 1967 war. It is neither accidental that the war itself had also
occurred in that particular conjuncture. The association between the
1967 war and the unfolding of Palestinian proletarianization by Israeli
capital is not one of cause and effect. This association rather denotes
that the causes underlying both the burst of the war and the proletarian-
ization of Palestinians lie in ghe specificity of the relationship of
the productive forces and the relations of production in that particular
time and space.
An explanation of the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel
today requires that forces underlying the emerging demand for Palestin-
ian labor in the Israeli economy be identified and examined against
forces that seem to have had historically impeded this process.
Such an explanation is sought in the logic of capitalist accumula-
tion, specifically the essentially uneven development of capitalism in-
herent in the fundamental tendency of the organic composition of capital
to rise.37 The rising tendency of the organic composition of capital in-
volves the intrinsically contradictory relationship between capital and
labor. It also denotes the contradictory unity of the forces and the
relations of production under capitalism and clearly presents capital as
essentially a relation, not a thing. It is this tendency, accompanied
by the necessary competition involved in capitalist accumulation that
explains why capitalist development is intrinsically uneven; leads to-
wards concentration and centralization, speeds up class formation, and
requires the integration of less developed economic formations and their
subordination to more developed ones, which the essential international-
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ization of capital is all about.3 8
B. Labor-Zionism
This is one postulate in Zionism which embodies the rationale for
prohibiting the employment of Palestinian-Arab labor by Jewish capital in
times past. 3 9 This rationale being an explicit ideological commitment to
self-labor and exclusive Jewish proletarianization by Jewish capital in
Palestine.
Labor-Zionism was also the guiding ideological/theoretical founda-
tion of Jewish settlement in Palestine, as expressed in the actual his-
torical practices of the Zionist movement; its slogans, specifically the
"conquest of Hebrew labor" and the "boycott of Arab labor"; the consti-
tutions of its institutions, specifically the Histadrut and the Jewish
National Fund. The Labor-Zionist ideology also became hegemonic after
the establishment of the State, embodied in the ruling Labor Party and
remained hegemonic until post-19 67, reflecting itself in deepening crisis
-- an internal "dovish"/"hawkish" polarization over the controversy of
integrating the occupied territories and Palestinian labor. A polariza-
tion that finally culminated in the descendancy of the Labor Party from
the power bloc and the ascendancy of the annexationist Likud Party.
4 0
Labor-Zionism is thus of immense relevance to our study of the
present proletarianization of Palestinians by Israeli-Jewish capital.
To be more precise, it was Ber Borochov who pointed out the impera-
tive of exclusive Jewish proletarianization or colonization through
class struggle in Palestine for the actualization of Zionism, Borochov-
ism is known in the Zionist tradition as the Marxist theory of Zionism;
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it is referred to as the socialist or the proletarian left of Labor-
Zionism. As put by Arthur Hertzberg: "A theory of Zionism that was ex-
pressed solely in terms of dialectical materialism was still lacking,
and it was provided by Ber Borochov."41 We argue that this is quite ac-
curate as far as the strategy Borochov formulates,
Viewed as such, uneven development becomes the unifying theme in the
study of the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel. It involves
not only the forces underlying the present demand for Palestinian labor
in Israel, but also the forces underlying the "boycott of Arab labor",
hence the non-proletarianization of Palestinians in the past, namely,
Labor-Zionism. This is one postulate of Zionism that emphasizes the
imperative of self-labor for the implementation of Zionism: the founda-
tion of a bourgeois nation-state, and that it is precisely this strategy
that constitutes the yeast of what is culminating today, among other
things, in the proletarianization of Palestinians.
In this study, Borochovism is analyzed in the context of uneven de-
velopment: as a consciousness or theory arising from material conditions
subject to the uneven development of capitalism, on the one hand, and on
the other, as a development strategy implementable only on uneven capi-
talist development lines, because Borochovism is bourgeois in character.
It is a development strategy aimed at the formation of Jewish social
classes and, hence, Jewish class struggle, i.e., Jewish relations of
production as a material "base" for a bourgeois Jewish State "superstruc-
ture". In this sense, Borochovism is perhaps the most comprehensive
development plan in history. Furthermore, it incorporates dialectical
materialism in the formulation of an objectively capitalist development
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strategy. This reinterpretation of Borochovism is the subject of the fol-
lowing chapter. We outline it here only to point out the methodological
rationale. Underlying our choice of the Borochovist Labor-Zionist formula-
tion are the following:
(1) We wish to argue that Labor-Zionism is essentially bourgeois
and implementable only on capitalist development lines, and it is our re-
search strategy, therefore, to show that Borochovism, the very extreme left,
which in fact incorporates dialectical materialist methods, is itself bour-
geois in character.
(2) This way, we try to expose the apparent and misleading logical
contradiction that the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel against
the historically ideological commitment for exclusive Jewish proletariani-
zation presents to the Israeli public and other observers of this process.
We try to expose it as an objective contradiction emerging precisely from
the implementation of Borochovism. That is, treating from a dialectical
materialist perspective the classical development planning question: the
question of disparities between planning objectives and consequences. In
planning theory, this question is treated mechanically, in terms either of
logical contradiction (inconsistency in the theory and/or plan), or of
implementation error. At best, explanations are sought in incongruities
between the theory and the environmental world in which the theory was
practiced.42 The possibility of objective contradiction emerging from the
unity of materially opposing tendencies suggested by the dialectical mater-
ialist method is not subject ot consideration.
Our analysis of Borochovism focuses precisely on identifying the
materially contradictory tendencies, the unity of which it objectively
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embodies. The objective materially contradictory tendencies inherent in
socialist Zionism (Borochovism) lie in its simultaneously capitalist and
sectarian character, that it embodies capitalist relations of production
which are also exclusively Jewish. This is quite different from the radical
critique of Borochovism, which points out inconsistencies between theory
and reality and, at best, the logical contradiction and objective infeasi-
bility of the essential unity of Zionism and socialism, which it is claimed
to embody.43 We argue that the underlined, however, are not the materially
contradictory tendencies objectively embodied in socialist Zionism; no
socialist element or tendency is embodied in "socialist" Zionism. Social-
ist Zionism is objectively bourgeois,
This is to indicate the methodological value for development theory
that can be derived from the analysis of Borochovism in this study: this
is applying the dialectical materialist method to a case study of a de-
velopment plan (or theory of action) which, itself, incorporates the dia-
lectical materialist method.
(3) Furthermore, this is also an exercise in class-analysis of the
content of development plans/theories independently of the planner's inten-
tion.
(4) Borochovism is an appropriate case for illustrating the rota-
tion and unity of the economic, the political, and the ideological in the
development process, or, using Engel's words, that:
"...political, religious, philosophical, etc., development is
based on economic development. But all these interact upon
one another and also upon the economic bases. It is not that
the economic situation is cause solely active, while every-
thing else is only passive effect, there is rather interac-
tion on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately
always asserts itself," 44
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(5) Finally, the analysis of Borochovism in the context of this
study clearly exposes the relations between objective forces and subjective
forces in the development process: how specific material conditions give
rise to a particular form of consciousness, in turn affects material condi-
tions. Concretely, this will illustrate how the inevitable consolidation
of capitalism on a world-scale gives birth to Labor-Zionism in Diaspora,
and in Israel puts an end to it. From illustrating the latter, it would
follow that the story of the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel
and the story of the rise and decline of Labor-Zionism are two faces of
the same coin.
All the points mentioned above as the underlying methodological ration-
ale for the choice of Borochovism are imperative for comprehending causes
and implications of the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel today.
IV. The Limits of the Study
A. Limits of Subject
Transplanted as a sectarian settler-colonial formation in Palestine,
Israel represents a unique capitalist development case. Development liter-
ature based on the analysis of concrete development processes in Third
World countries, advanced capitalist countries, or socialist countries,
has, if any, very little relevance to the Israeli case. The uniqueness
of Israel's development, in turn, limits the extent to which generaliza-
tions can be validly made from this study. This problem, however, is
offset by the essentially practical purpose of the study, Any practical
use that this study may have depends largely on the extent to which it
captures the specificity of the concrete conditions involved.
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In advance, we emphasize that as a study of only one aspect of class
formation, namely, the formation of a Palestinian working class, this re-
search, despite its practical orientation, is of little value to political
practice unless complemented by an up-to-date analysis of other aspects of
class formation in Israel and of the class distribution of Palestinians
in Israel and exile,4 5
B. Limits of method
The theoretical background for this study is dialectical materialism,
a paradigm which is universally applicable. Despite this, our task pre-
sents a methodological problem, namely, the theoretical concepts available
in relevant literature have not been developed in analysis of the novel
settler-colonial formation which Israel represents, Therefore, these con-
cepts must be reworked for the concrete case being studied. While this is
necessary in any concrete case, the settler-colonial social formation is
not one which has been analyzed elsewhere.
In the literature developed in the analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli
context we are unaware of an adequate treatment of this problem and the at-
tempt to provide more appropriate concepts. The fact that this study is,
itself, done abroad in a context alien to its content, does not allow for
development of such concepts.
These limits of method may, yet, involve a positive effect in the
sense that only in the context of the general or universal can the specific
be more adequately comprehended. Further, it is only when the specific is
analyzed in terms of generalizable concepts that it may become of value to
general theory.
50
C. Limits of Data
Along with the previous methodological problems is one associated with
the empirical task necessarily undertaken. Namely, that the available data
is not gathered and organized under the guidance of Marxist theory. Its
content and structure is bourgeois-empiricist. Therefore, principles of
selection must be generated, limits of data for the purpose of argument
must be defined througout this study, and methodological adaptations to
these limits may be invented.
The first empirical task that flows from this question is to locate
the sites of class transformation involved and to identify the populations
moving into and out of these sites.
Of the usually-available empiricist data, most appropriate for this
task are detailed cross-tabulations of population groups and an industry-
by-occupation matrix for years before and after 1967. This data item is
not available in Israeli statistical sources.46 We thus try to compensate
for this item by using a variety of less appropriate employment figures
and reliance on qualitiative analysis.
The fact that information on the military industry is by-and-large
classified imposes a serious limitation on the analysis of the most influ-
ential sector of the economy, which is expected to have special, although
indirect, bearing on the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel.
Because of the limitations of the empirical data, we have to be inno-
vative in reconstructing it so that it reveals information relevant to
class analysis. An example is e scale system (Chapter VI) that reveals
the internal structuare of the working class. This is also a method of
identifying the possibility of indirect economic exploitation among prole-
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tarian workers. It is developed precisely for the Israeli context and on
the basis of its specificity incorporating, however, aspects of the general
Marxist theory.
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V. Organization of the Study
Chapter II:
Introduces the reader to the rise of Labor-Zionism in the context of
settler-colonialism in general, in response to the development of capitalism.
We examine the socialist Zionist theory as conceptualized by Ber Borochov,
exposing the bourgeois objective of its "proletarian" face and identifying
the instrumentality of labor in furthering the aspirations of a faction of
the Jewish petty bourgeoisie to become, itself, a national bourgeoisie.
The point of this chapter is to demonstrate that Borochovist socialist Zion-
ism is essentially a theoretical model for the formation of Jewish class, not
classless, society in Palestine. Specifically, Jewish class struggle, which
theoretically provides for the Jewish definition of the State and for its
emergence as an organic manifestation of this class struggle.
The essence of this chapter is, therefore, to outline the ideological
and political peculiarity of the context in which Palestinian proletarianiza-
tion, the subject of this study, is occurring.
Chapter III;
As the first chapter sheds light on Labor-Zionism in theory, this chap-
ter sheds light on Labor-Zionism in practice, providing an historical over-
view of three phases of Palestinian proletarianization since the beginning
of Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine.
In the first and second phases, Palestinian proletarianization is im-
peded mainly by ideological and political mechanisms, respectively. In
phase three, Palestinian proletarianization unfolds, subject to uneven de-
velopment, defying previous ideological and political considerations,
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Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII are the core chapters of the thesis. Each, in
a different way, carries forward the analysis at its explanatory level (iden-
tifying the forces generating demand for Palestinian labor) and simultaneous-
ly, at its practical level (assessing the objective conditions promoting and
impeding cross-national proletarian alliance).
Chapter IV:
Characterizes the nature of Israel's labor force, its sources, ethnic
composition, sites of reproduction of its labor power, how the different
segments affect the development of the productive forces and transform the
relations of production.
Central to this chapter is an account of the merging of the military
and civilian and the shift into high technology production. We describe how
the overdevelopment of the military productive forces in 1967 resulted in
the militarization of the entire economy; how productivity requirements and
effects increased the division of labor, and the urge for intensive exploita-
tion (relative rate of surplus value); and how the shift into arms industry
was determined by the type of labor in supply and how it was, in turn, to
determine the type of labor in demand. We also describe the relation
between militarization and the growing demand for Arab labor in the manual,
non-supervisory, productive labor categories. Attention is also given to
the growing contradictions; the conflicting investment versus Aliyah incen-
tives; and how these contradictions, in effect, promote and impede common-
ality of class interest among Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in Israel.
Chapter V:
Examines the differential location of the various segments of Israel's
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labor force in the technical and the social divisions of labor, with the
objective of determining their class locations; the extent to which Pales-
tinian employees in Israel are actually entering proletarian class locations
jointly with, or replacing, Jewish proletariat; how they respond to economic
crisis and boom and the extent to which their current locations in Israel's
employment and class structures are transitory or permanent; and finally,
the extent to which the number of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews sharing
proletarian class location is increasing in the last decade, hence increas-
ing the prospects for cross-national ethnic alliance.
As we examine the dynamics of the employment structure of the various
segments of the labor force in different periods of time, specifically be-
fore and after the 1967 War, and prior to and after the 1973 War, we get a
sense of what has affected the growth and decline of demand for Palestinian
labor in Israel.
Chapter VI:
A tentative rough model of the social organization of production, con-
sumption, and reproduction peculiar to Israel. This chapter, therefore,
focuses on the structural determination of class location beyond the social
division of labor (as seen in the previous chapter) in the social formation
as a whole. Here, we are examining the internal segmentation of the working
class, subject to differential locations in the social formation. This
chapter points out objective conditions that, in the present conjuncture,
retard and reduce the prospects for cross-national ethnic proletarian al-
liance.
Chapter VII:
This chapter points out transformations in the relation of production
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in response to th essential internationalization of capital and concomitant
with the penetration of Palestinian labor. It focuses on the concentration
of industrial capital and transformations in the rural frontiers. These
transformations are likely to offset the effect of proletariat segmentation
with regard to the material prerequisites for proletarian alliance. They
signify secularization of the relations of production were dictated by the
sectarian Labor-Zionist ideology. Secularization can only affect more
favorably the material prerequisites for cross-national proletarian alli-
ance.
Chapter VIII:
Conclusions of thesis. What was and was not achieved of the objectives
we set for ourselves in this study. The findings regarding the determinants
of the current proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel, and the objec-
tive conditions promoting and impeding cross-national proletarian alliance.
Emerging questions for future research.
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter I
1. The significance of these figures gets more exposed when we consider
the following:
(a) That 1963 was the peak of the construction boom during which Arab
citizens were mobilized for the first time into productive employment
and on a massive scale.
(b) That in 1974, only 39.5 percent of the Arab citizens belonged to
the labor force, owing to high birth rates which kept the population
young, as well as to the relatively low rates of female participation.
This may indicate potential surplus labor.
(c) We must also take note of the fact that Arabs do not control their
sources of employment. They are almost invariably dependent on em-
ployment by Jewish capital. The growing size of Palestinian-Arab
employees in Israel is, therefore, an expression of growing demand
for Arab labor among Jewish employers.
2. 78,400 citizen Palestinian wage earners computed by subtracting Jew-
ish employees from total employees, as appears in Statistical Abstract
of Israel, 1975. And 68,000 non-citizen Palestinian wage-earners in
Israel. This figure includes only the officially registered workers.
It excludes illegally smuggled labor totalling around 15,000, as docu-
mented in Chapters III and V.
3. Kibbutz and private captial in Arab villages in Israel are analyzed
in Chapter VII.
For confirming the penetration of Israeli investment capital into the
occupied territories, see, for example, a recent study by Brian Van
Arkadie, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza
Strip Economies Since 1967, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, 1977.
4. This is my own interpretation of the Borochovist formulation of Zion-
ism, fully explicated in Chapter II.
5. For references, see, for example:
. Yoram Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, 1960.
. Sabri Jiryi, The Arabs in Israel, Monthly Review Press, 1976.
. Henry Rosenfeld, Hiam Hayoo Falahim, 1964.
6. Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, N.L.B., London,
1975, p. 24. In Marx's and Engel's political analysis, the concept
of "power bloc" indicates the particular contradictory unity of the
politically dominant classes or fractions of classes as related to a
particular form of the capitalist state (from N. Poulantzas, Politi-
cal Power and Social Classes, 1975, p. 234.).
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7. N. Poulantzas, "On Social Classes," New Left Review, No. 78, 1973,
p. 38.
8. Poulantzas, Classes,., op.cit., p. 24.
9. Ibid.
10. Karl Marx, "The German Ideology," in Selected Works, Vol. 1, London,
Lawrence and Wishart, 1962, p, 47. Quoted from Vicente Navarro, The
Political Economy of Social Security and Medical Care in the USSR,
Unpublished Manuscript, 1975.
11, Examples from history are abundant. A classical example is the alli-
ance between the Kuo Ming Tang, representing feudalism, and the peas-
ant and proletariat in the early stages of China's Revolution.
12. "A social formation is dominated and dependent when the articulation
of its specific economic, political, and ideological structure ex-
presses constitutive and asymmetrical relationships with one or more
other social formations which enjoy a position of power over it."
Manuel Castells, La Question Urbane, Paris, 1972, pp. 62 ff. Quoted
by Poulantzas, op.cit., p. 43.
13. The subjective conditions for actual proletarian alliances involves
revolutionary proletarian consciousness (ideology) and an autonomous
party of class struggle.
14. Poulantzas, op.cit., p. 24.
15. This problematique is very concretely illustrated in a study of the
boundaries of social classes in the United States by Erik Olin Wright,
"Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," in New Left Re-
view, No. 98, August, pp. 3-42.
16. For an example, see Jomo Sundaram, Class Formation in Malaya: Capi-
tal, the State and Uneven Development (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
Harvard University, Department of Sociology, December, 1977).
17. For example, Francesca Freedman, "The Internal Structure of the Pro-
letariat," Socialist Revolution, No. 26.
18, Poulantzas, Classes..,op.cit., and "On Social Classes," op.cit.
19, Ibid.
20. Harry Braverman, (3) Labor and Monopoly Capital - the Degregation of
Work in the Twentieth Century, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974.
21. Based on the review of the various Marxist positions by Wright, op,
cit.
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22. Poulantzas, opcit.
23. For example, A.L. Szymanski, "Trends in the American Working Class,"
Socialist Revolution, No. 10.
24. Braverman, op.cit., p. 348.
25. Ibid., p. 355.
26. Ian Gough, "Marx's Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labor," in
New Left Review, No. 76, November-December, 1977. Quoted in Braver-
man, ibid., p. 411.
27. Poulantzas, op.cit., p. 94.
28, Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 14,
30. Ibid., p. 25.
31. Ibid.
32. In Marx's words:
"Economic conditions had at first transformed the mass
of the people of the country into workers. The combina-
tion of capital has created for this mass a common situ-
ation, common interests, This mass is thus already a
class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In
the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases,
this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a
class for itself. The interests it defends become class
interests. But the struggle of class against class is
a political struggle."
From Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, quoted by Poulantzas,
Political Power...op.cit., p. 59.
33. In 1959, Arab citizens were allowed access to membership in the His-
tadrut, mainly for access to Kupat Holim (Sik Fund), the nation-
wide health care system over which the Histadrut exercises full mono-
poly. Arabs, however, are not likely to become partners in the His-
tadrut as capital.
34. One example of a serious opponent is given in Wright, op.cit.
35. For a reference, see, for example, Henry Lefebvre, Dialectical Mater-
ialism.
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36. G. Arrighi, "The Relationship between the Colonial and the Class
Structures: A Critique of A,G, Frank's Theory of the Development
of Underdevelopment" (U.N. African Institute for Economic Develop-
ment and Planning, Dakar, Senegal: Mimeograph, 1971). Quoted by
Sundaram, op.cit., p. 365.
37. In neo-classical economic theory the rising tendency of the organic
composition of capital is referred to as increase in the ratio of
constant to variable capital, C , This is further elaborated in the
following chapter. v
38. Concentration, centralization, and internationalization of capital
as manifestation of the essential uneveness of capitalist develop-
ment are treated in Chapter VII and thesis conclusions.
39. Other postulates of Zionism are known as spiritual or religious Zion-
ism, represented in Chaim N. Bialik poetry and in Achad Ha'am,
"Shalosh Matanot" story, etc, It is interesting that only this part
of Zionism was included in the curriculum of Arab schooling in Is-
rael. Probably the explicitly political postulates of Zionism were
avoided by the Israeli Ministry of Education and/or the Minorities
Department of the Ministry of Interior, in order not to raise the
question of teaching modern Palestinian history, which was absolute-
ly prohibited, hoping that the "Israeli-Arabs" would soon forget and
become "good" citizens.
Other postulates of Zionism are referred to as bourgeois Zionism
(Herzl) to distinguish them from Labor-Zionism. For a reference
on the various postulates, see for an example, Arthur Hertzberg,
ed., The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader, Atheneum,
New York, 1971.
40. The concept of "hegemony" was introduced by Gramsci to account for
the political practices of dominant classes in developed capitalist
formations. The field of this concept is the political class strug-
gle in a capitalist formation. Thus, in locating the relation of
the capitalist state to the politically dominant classes, we can say
that it is a state with a hegemonic class leadership (direzione).
The concept of hegemony can be applied to one class or to a fraction
of a class within the power bloc; this hegemonic class or fraction
is, in fact, the dominant element of the contradictory unity of the
politically "dominant" classes or fractions forming the power bloc.
When Marx speaks of the "exclusively dominant" fraction, while at
the same time admitting the political domination of several frac-
tions, he precisely attempts to isolate within the power bloc the
hegemonic fraction.
As it applies to the political practices of the dominant classes,
the concept of hegemony further indicates how, in their relations to
the capitalist state, the political interests of these classes are
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constituted as representatives of the "general interest' of the body
politic, i.e,, the people/nation, which is based on the effect of
isolation on the economic, (Based on Poulantzas, ibid., pp. 137,
140, 141, 237,)
41. Hertzberg, op.cit., p. 353.
42. This is how I was exposed to the treatment of this question during
my training in development planning in the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning at MIT. Especially so in the Ph.D. Seminar on
Research and Methodology (1974-1975).
43. An example of the radical critique I am referring to is Arie Bober,
The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism, New York, 1972,
pp. 148-149; 154-155.
44. Letters from F. Engels to J. Bloch, 21 September, 1890, in Karl
Marx and Frederick Engel's Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1963,
p. 498, quoted from Navarro, op.cit.
45. H. Hanegbi, M. Machover, and A. Orr, "The Class Nature of Israel,"
in Bober, op.cit., is a good beginning, raising an issue of great
importance but as it stands is an extremely inadequate analysis of
class formation in Israel.
46. Except for an aggregate industry-by-occupation matrix in Labor Force
Survey (1972 and 1974) but even this is not cross-tabulated by popu-
lation groups,
CHAPTER II
LABOR-ZIONISM/SETTLER-COLONIALISM
AND
THE UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM
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Introduction
In this chapter we wish to argue that Zionism is a Jewish conscious-
ness arising from material conditions of Jewish life in Diaspora subject to
uneven development of capitalism. This consciousness corresponds to the
class interest and aspirations of the Jewish bourgeoisie in the transition-
al phase of capitalism in the metropolis from its stage of competition to
the stage of monopoly: the need for a Jewish State to intervene on its
behalf in the face of monopolistic competition.
The rise of Zionism coincides with the rise of capitalist settler-
colonialism that emerged from the process of monopoly formation in the
late nineteenth century, specifically from the displacement effects of
capital combination, swallowing small capital and hence, undermining the
material conditions of the petty bourgeoisie as a social class,
Capitalist settler-colonialism, as in the case of Rhodesia, for exam-
ple, is distinguished here from pre-capitalist settler and non-settler
colonialism during mercantilism (as was the case in white settler America
and Australia). Capitalist settler colonialism is seen as one of three
forms of foreign domination that emerged subject to the logic of capitalist
accumulation on a world scale. The other forms are colonialism, featuring
the age of competitive capitalism and neo-colonialism, featuring the age
of monopoly. Settler-colonialism is a form featuring the transitional
phase in-between the two stages of capitalism.
That Israel constitutes a settler-colonial social formation is not
the subject of our debate but its starting point. This essentially set-
tler-colonial character is the necessary context for understanding Zionism
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as a territorial solution to the Jewish question defined in terms of land-
lessness. The essentially settler-colonial character of Zionism was ex-
plicitly identified even by Ber Borochov, the founding father of "socialist"
Zionism. From Borochov's Selected Writings:
"The Jewish problem migrates with the Jews... .Emigration alone
does not solve the Jewish problem.... For that reason, Jewish
immigration and any other national immigration tend towards
compact settlements ....The Jewish petty bourgeoisie and working
masses are confronted by two needs. The impossibility of pene-
trating into higher levels of production creates the need for
concentrated immigration into undeveloped country. Instead of
being limited to the final levels of production, as is the case
in all other countries, the Jews could, in a short time, assume
the leading positions in the economy of the new land. Jewish
migration must be transformed from immigration into coloniza-
tion. This means a territorial solution of the Jewish problem."
(emphasis mine)
Moreover, indicating the imperative of colonial settlement for the
realization of Zionism, Borochov adds:
"From a political point of view, propaganda is less productive
than action. Create facts and more facts -- that is the corner-
stone of political strategy ....The practical colonization work
in Palestine... has created those facts which have paved the road
for our present status. No matter how small and weak the Jewish
colonies might be, no matter how great the shortcomings in their
system of colonization -- they did more towards enlightening the
Jewish nation than a thousand beautifully-worded programs and
diplomatic negotiations. A fallen shomer plays a greater role
in the realization of Zionism than all declaration." 1
The review of settler-colonialism in this chapter is thus not to demon-
strate Israel's settler-colonial character, but rather to put Israel as a
settler-colonial phenomenon in the proper and more general historical con-
text of uneven development of capitalism on a world scale. Placing the
theoretical/ideological foundation of Israel in the context of monopoly
formation as a manifestation of uneven development, of the rising tendency
of the organic composition of capital, is also identifying the material
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conditions under which Zionism becomes a mobilizing material force capable
of creating new material conditions, the transplantation of Israel in Pales-
tine.
We argue, however, that only one postulate of Zionism that proved to
become a mobilizing material force, namely Labor-Zionism, became so only in
the Borochovist formulation, (Recall from the previous chapter our metho-
dological rationale for selecting Borochovism out of all other postulates.
of Zionism.)
It is our purpose in this chapter to identify the reasons that made
Borochovism a mobilizing material force: the material conditions from which
it rose, tne materialist approach it embodied and the material conditions
it was formulated to create. In this kind of analysis we intend to illus-
trate and highlight the interaction between objective forces (material con-
ditions) and subjective forces (theory, ideology) in the development of
Borochovism and, accordingly, Israel.
Before entering the analysis of Borochovism itself, let us make a few
points:
(a) That Zionism in all its postulates is essentially political.
The distinction between spiritual/religious Zionism versus political Zion-
ism is a false distinction. From its inception, the Zionist idea was the
idea of a Jewish State. This point is best documented by Maxime Rodinson,
Israel: A Colonial Settler State? The distinction between political and
religious Zionism is a tactical and pragmatic one, regarding what appeals
more to the Jewish masses who were to be mobilized for actualizing the
idea.
(b) That Zionism in all its postulates is essentially _bourgeois con-
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sciousness; the idea of a bourgeois Jewish State. In this sense, the
distinction between bourgeois Zionism and Labor, socialist or proletarian
Zionism is false also. The difference between the socialist/proletarian
Zionism and other formulas is a strategic one, concerning the implementa-
tion strategy by which the Zionist idea - bourgeois Jewish State - can be
actualized.
We also try to demonstrate that the distinction between left-wing and
right-wing Labor-Zionism is irrelevant in the sense that Borochovism, the
extreme left of Labor-Zionism, is objectively bourgeois.
(c) We argue further that the only development strategy for the im-
plementation of the Zionist idea was Borochovism. There were proposals re-
garding the territory in which the Jewish State was to be established
(Herzl) but none other than Borochov provided a theory of action, a develop-
ment strategy based on a systematic understanding of the material prerequi-
sities for the existence of a State which is essentially bourgeois and Jew-
ish.
(d) That the Borochovist strategy was bourgeois in character, it can
lead only to development on capitalist lines. This can be so independently
of its architect's intention and for that matter of his class origin and
position subject to class struggle, not to metaphysical determinants.
Further, it can be so independently of the paradigm to which it ex-
plicitly adheres. Also, independently of the terminology and methodology
incorporated in its formulation. It can also be bourgeois independently
of the fact that it had a petty bourgeois appearance and thus appealed to
and mobilized the petty bourgeoisie, not the bourgeoisie. By the latter,
we mean that the Jewish petty bourgeoisie had falsely adopted Zionism and
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internalized it as its own consciousness or ideological "sub-ensemble".
Zionism does not represent the genuine consciousness of the petty bour-
geoisie. Borochovism, however, is a formulation of a bourgeois strategy
in terms that appeal to the petty bourgeois tendencies and class interest,
specifically reproduction of the past or bourgeois transformation of its
petty bourgeois origins.
In The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation, Abram Leon makes
a strong case for Zionism as being the class consciousness of the Jewish
petty bourgeoisie.
Although agreeing with him in the past, now after completing the
analysis of Borochovism in the preceding chapter, we come to realize that
this view is imprecise. It is hard not to be misled by Borochov that his
represents the class interests of the "proletarizing" Jewish petty bour-
geois masses, although it is much easier to realize that it is not prole-
tarian. It helps to clarify here some confusion awaiting the reader in
our argument on this point: although Zionism in all its forms originates
in the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie, in all its postulates it
appeals to the fraction of the petty bourgeoisie aspiring to become bour-
geois. However, the Borochovist formula coincides with and appeals to
the aspiration of a wider range of the petty bourgeoisie, including those
aspiring to restore their class origins or simply to seek secure prole-
tarian employment.
The novel interpretation of Borochovism that is to be presented here
identifies the role of self-labor in his strategy for actualizing the
Jewish State. We see the essence of Borochovism and its distinctive fea-
ture as being the imperative of Jewish proletarianization by Jewish capi-
67
tal, namely, Jewish capitalist relations of production; i,e,, Jewish
class struggle, specifically Jewish antagonism between a Jewish prole-
tariat and a Jewish bourgeoisie as the material prerequisites for a State
which is Jewish and bourgeois, It is for this emphasis on exclusive Jew-
ish proletarianization and class struggle that it is often interpreted
as proletarian in character, and we argue that it is precisely for these
reasons that it is bourgeois in character.
We further argue that it is precisely in this task that it is pre-
cisely this strategy that derives from dialectical materialism. From the
formal structure of the Marxist conception of the rise of the bourgeois
State, but transposed to utterly different conditions from those depicted
in the historical materialist account of the rise of the bourgeois social
formation. In effect, Borochov was seeking to simulate a process of de-
velopment using insights of a dialectical materialist kind.
This analysis of Borochov's socialist or proletarian Zionism provides
for a different interpretation of the emphasis on replacing, as opposed
to exploiting, the indigenous labor force which is said to distinguish
Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine from other cases of settler-
colonialism (say, South Africa), and which has special bearing on the pro-
letarianization of Palestinians in the past. It also sheds a new light on
the underlying causes of Palestinian proletarianization in the present.
In the following, we try to show how Borochovism constitutes a development
plan for Israel's sectarian settler-colonial social formation, as a neces-
sary background for identifying current formations that are related to the
proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel today.
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II. Settler Colonialism and the Uneven Development of Capitalism
In the classical and recent Marxist theoretical writings on the de-
velopment of capitalism and modern colonial policy there is very little ex-
plicit reference to settler colonialism. These writings focus mainly on
two other capitalist forms of foreign domination, specifically, colonialism
and neo-colonialism.1
In Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, one finds only
indirect hints to the settler colonial phenomenon as peculiar to a transi-
tional phase in the development of capitalism.2 It is probably owing to
its transitionality that this phenomenon is given very little attention in
the Marxist theoretical literature. These indirect hints, however, provide
sufficient guidance for constructing a theory of settler colonialism.
As in the cases of modern colonial and neo-colonial policy, the histori-
cal material origins of settler colonialism lie in contradictions generated
by the internal laws of capitalist accumulation. Put differently, is to
say that the denominator of all three forms of modern colonialism mentioned
above is the essentially uneven development of capitalism; this is by no
means to say that colonialism is a phenomenon peculiar to the capitalist
mode of production. As Lenin puts it in 1919:
"Colonial policy and imperialism existed before this latest
stage of capitalism and even before capitalism. Rome, founded
on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and achieved imperialism...
Even the colonial policy of capitalism in previous stages is
essentially different from the colonial policy of finance
capital." 3
This is to emphasize the specificity, not only of capitalist colonial-
ism, but also of the colonial form peculiar to each stage in the develop-
ment of capitalism. Both the colonial phenomenon as well as the stages
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(periodization) of capitalism are viewed here as manifestations of the es-
sential unevenness of capitalist development: In its early competitive
stage following the Industrial Revolution, capitalism gave rise to classi-
cal colonialism, characterized by the actual presence of colonial adminis-
tration; an extension of the capitalist state apparatus in the metropolis.
The colonial state in the colony as strictly administrative, its top posi-
tions being monopolized by metropolitan colonial administrators, both civil-
ian and military, relying on indigenous semi-feudal and tribal leaders as
collaborators in the pursuit of raw material and surplus-value extraction
in behalf of the metropolitan bourgeoisie.
Competitive struggle among capitalists becomes, itself, an agent of
concentration; "free" competition thus leads into monopoly formation, its
very opposite. The emergence of monopoly capitalism represents a differ-
ent stage in the development of capitalism, said to be the highest.
In its highest stage, the stage of monopoly, capitalism gave rise to
a new form of foreign domination concomitant with or following decoloni-
zation. To distinguish it from capitalist colonialism in the previous
stage, it is called neo-colonialism. This is capitalist, as opposed to pre-
capitalist, imperialism. It is characterized precisely by the absence of
colonial state superstructure. Political, economic, and ideological domi-
nation/subordination exercised directly through the alliance between clas-
ses formed by earlier colonialism in pre-capitalist social formations and
the international bourgeoisie. Neo-colonialism, thus, operates under the
very guise of political independence in the post-colonial nation-states,
subordinating them to its ultimate objective, the internationalization of
capital.4
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It is precisely this transition (from capitalism of competition to
capitalism of monopoly) that provided the objective and subjective condi-
tions for the rise of settler colonialism. The three forms of modern
colonial policy thus correspond to three different periods in the develop-
ment of capitalism; settler colonialism, however, unlike classical colonial-
ism and neo-colonialism, corresponds to a period which is essentially tran-
sitional. Does it, therefore, follow that the actual settler colonial
formations in Africa and the Middle East, for example, are necessarily
transitional phenomena? In other words, does this transitional origin put
in question the long-term viability of settler colonialism? Are the cur-
rent transformations in the balance of forces within white settler colonial
regimes in Africa and in the class nature of Israel indicative of transen-
dance of settler colonialism, as it is becoming historically superfluous
and potentially an impediment to the restoration of the international
hegemony of U.S. monopoly capital, shaken in the seventies?
For examining any of these questions, it is imperative to have a
closer look at the specific aspects of uneven development that gave rise
precisely to this settler colonial form, and more importantly, the essence
of unevenness in capitalist development and specificity of cases.
A. Capitalist Uneven Development
The unevenness of capitalist development is rooted in two fundamental
tendencies inherent in the logic of capitalist accumulation:
(a) the rising tendency of the organic composition of capital;
(b) the falling tendency of the rate of profit.
The two tendencies are seen by Marx as inversely related, hence con-
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stituting what he calls the Theory of the Law, said to explain the intrin-
sically uneven development of capitalism.
This Theory of Law can be summed up in the following:
The value of any commodity produced under capitalist conditions can
be broken down into three component parts: constant capital (C), variable
capital (V), and surplus value (S).
C + V + S = Total Value
From this basic formula, three ratios are derived:
First, the rate of surplus value defined as the ratio of surplus
value to variable capital and is denoted by S':
S
= S' = Rate of Surplus Value
V
The rate of surplus value is the capitalist form of what Marx calls the
rate of exploitation, that is to say, the ratio of surplus labor to neces-
sary labor.
Second, a measure of the relation of constant to variable capital in
the total capital used in production. Marx calls this relation the organic
composition of capital. This relation can be indicated most conveniently
by the ratio of constant capital to total capital (Q):
C
= Q = Organic Composition of Capital
Third, the rate of profit defined as the ratio of surplus value to
total capital outlay (P):
= P = Rate of Profit
C+V
For the capitalist, the crucial ratio is the rate of profit. In
mathematical language, the rate of profit is a function of the rate of
surplus value and the organic composition of capital. Remembering the
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definitions above, S = S/V, Q = C/(C+V), and P = S/(C+V), it follows, by
simple manipulation, that
P = S' (1-Q)
From this, it follows that if we assume the rate of surplus value (S')
to be constant, the rate of profit (P) varies inversely with the organic
composition of capital. Since Q displays a rising trend in the course of
capitalist development, there must be at least a tendency for P to fall.
This, very briefly, is the substance of what Marx calls the Theory of the
Law (Vol. III, Chapter XIII). He enumerates, however, six 'counteracting
causes' which 'thwart and annul' the general law of the falling rate of pro-
fit, leaving to it merely the character of a tendency.5
This "Theory of the Law," although reduced into a mere tendency, is
still very controversial among Marxists. One of the most profound argu-
ments against it is Sweezy's theoretical and empirical demonstration that
changes in the rate of surplus value may compensate, or even overcompensate,
for the effects of the rising organic composition of capital, hence the
possible undermining of the falling tendency of the rate of profit.6 As
Antipode states: "In Monopoly and Capital, Baran and Sweezy have tried to
revise Marxism by substituting a "tendency for the surplus to rise" for
the classical 'falling tendency of the rate of profit."
Despite the controversy (surrounding more the falling tendency of the
rate of profit and less the rising tendency of the organic composition of
capital) this "law" remains to be the key for understanding the essentially
uneven capitalist development. Unevenness takes the form of class struggle
between capital and labor that emerges gradually and inevitably from the
rising tendency of the organic composition of capital, without which accumu-
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lation does not occur. Also, of competitive struggle among capitalists
which in turn increases the socialization of production that culminates in
the multi-national firm and an international division of labor. Stimulated
by these two simultaneous tendencies, this competitive struggle leads to
capital combination, hence the displacement of small capitalists. It is
less the Law, per se, and more the "counteracting causes" that reduce it
into mere tendency that concerns our analysis.
Marx points out the cheapening of elements of constant capital, inten-
sity of exploitation, depression of wages below their value, relative over-
population, and foreign trade. Lenin emphasizes the export of capital and
the formation of monopoly; others emphasize state intervention and trade
unions, etc. Knowing how these actually operate exposes not only the es-
sence of modern colonial policy in its three various forms, but also the
periodization, or stage development, of capitalism.
Two of these counteracting causes, i.e., monopoly formation and the
growth of relative overpopulation are of special significance for explain-
ing specifically the rise of settler colonialism.
B. The Transition from Competitive Capitalism to the Imperialist Stage
This transitional phase, lasting from the end of the 19th century up
to the inner-war period, is, according to Lenin, characterized by "unstable
equilibrium between competitive capitalism and monopoly capitalism." One
of the prominent features in the passage between these two stages in the
development of capitalism is the displacement of the small capitalist and
the petty bourgeoisie from their previously strategic positions in the
social division of labor, resulting in the growth of "relative overpopula-
tion." This growth of "surplus" population (superfluous to the newly domi-
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nant mode of accumulation), precisely through monopoly formation, becomes
the foremost steering factor for secessionist settler colonialism. Seces-
sionist settler colonialism, therefore, conforms both with the struggle of
the petty bourgeoisie and small capitalist against extinction, and the im-
perative of political stability for metropolitan big bourgeoisie in the
face of increased intensity of internal contradictions in monopoly capital.
Hence comes the urge to export this potentially risky "surplus" population
to settle new lands. To substantiate the latter, it is best to quote Cecil
Rhodes (after whom white settler colonial Rhodesia is named), expressing
his imperialist ideas in 1885:
"I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a
meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches,
which were just a cry for 'bread', 'bread', 'bread', and on
my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than
ever convinced of the importance of imperialism.... My cher-
ished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in
order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom
from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire
new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new
markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and
mines..." 7
A French bourgeois writer, developing and supplementing these ideas of
Cecil Rhodes, writes that social causes should be added to the economic
causes of modern colonial policy:
"Owing to the growing difficulties of life which weigh not
only on the masses of the workers, but also on the middle
classes, impatience, irritation and hatred are accumulating
in all the countries of the old civilisation and are becoming
a menace to public order; employment must become for the
energy which is being hurled out of the definite class channel;
it must be given an outlet abroad in order to avert an explo-
sion at home." 8
The quotations above do clearly express the vested interest of the
metropolitan bourgeoisie in secessionist-settler colonialism. This, however,
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goes counter to the prevalent view of white settlers' secession as the re-
sult of antagonistic struggle between the settlers and their mother metro-
politan countries. In his article, "White Settler Colonialism and the
Myth of Investment Imperialism," Arghiri Emmanuel provides an example of
this view. Emmanuel emphasizes "the antagonism between the white settlers
and imperialism" as an alternative to the Marxist theories of modern colo-
nial policy. He points out the latter's "failure to recognize a third fac-
tor that intervenes between imperialists and colonies, the colonialists
themselves," implying the emerging of the settlers' colonialism indepen-
dently of monopoly formation, and counter to the interests of imperialism.
He therefore asserts, "whatever the motivating forces behind this adventure,
the advanced capitalist world did not receive any supplementary benefit
from the direct administration of these new territories." Emmanuel attri-
butes settler colonial secession to the mere aspirations of the settlers:
"This motive force proper to colonialism is none other than the colonials
themselves." Otherwise, "why was imperialism so bitterly opposed to the
white settlers' secession?" he asks. Providing a concrete example, he
writes: "Israel is a secessionist colonial state. Its foundation was the
object of a long and bloody struggle with England."9
Not only does Emmanuel miss the point in emphasizing the secession
of the settlers over and above the colonial settlement itself, but he also
presents an argument which is historically inaccurate, as will be seen
later. He errs in taking the settler community as the starting point of
his analysis, trying to relate it to financial imperialism versus imperial-
ism of trade.
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That is why the starting
point of his theory of settler colonialism becomes the aspirations of the
settler community in the colony, not the contradictions arising in the
metropolitan country; and giving rise to the settler community in the
first place. Stated in his words: "The settler community could not come
to terms with anything: neither with the trusts nor with the metropolitan
country....It could be saved only by secession from the metropolis, and by
setting up an independent 'white' state. The settlers did not fail to ap-
preciate that this was the case, and soon gave it the concrete form of an
explicit demand."10 Indeed, none more than the case of Israel, which he
used to support his argument, refutes this very argument.
As put very well by Fawwaz Trabulsi,
"At its inception, the Zionist movement set up a State-
superstructure [the Zionist Congress]...the Zionist aim
was to find the territory and people for this 'State-
superstructure' to rule.... In fact, the whole process of
Zionist colonization is one in which this 'State-super-
structure' acquired its economic 'base' in Palestine." 11
Secession from the metropolis and setting up an independent Jewish
State was never the expression of the settlers' conditions and aspirations.
The Zionist idea of an independent Jewish State existed prior to the Yishuv
(the Jewish settler community in Palestine). That the Zionist idea was
always meant to be a colonial settler state is thoroughly documented by
one of the foremost Mideast scholars, Maxime Rodinson.1 2
Putting colonial settlers' secession in the context of an essential
antagonism between the settler community and the metropolis, and therefore
equating it with the liberation struggle, is a falsification of history.
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This claim, however, is very instrumental, given that colonial set-
tlers' secession took place precisely during the period of decolonization
through a genuinely progressive struggle for national independence in the
colonies. Entertaining the notion of a "bloody struggle" with the mother
country is, thus, a mere manipulation of the sentiments of the time, to
give a progressive flavor of the hour to colonial settlers' secession; hence,
the mobilization of sympathy and recognition.
Emmanuel correctly de-emphasizes the direct economic benefits that im-
perialist capitalism was to gain from settler colonialism, and rightly em-
phasizes the trade element to supercede the financial capital market objec-
tive in the case of settler colonial policy following decolonization. He
errs, however, in viewing settler colonialism as detrimental to the objec-
tives of monopoly capitalism: "On the economic plane, the settler community
constituted a dead weight--if not a parasitic and harmful element..."13
The servitude of imperialist capitalism is not restricted to directly
economic and immediate gains as the extraction of raw material and high sur-
plus value prevalent in the earlier capitalist colonialism.
In what ways does settler colonialism serve the objectives of monopoly
capitalism? And why does the metropolitan bourgeoisie actually sponsor the
takeover of new lands although they are directly unprofitable enterprises?
Paul Sweezy (speaking of British settler colonialism in Africa) eloquently
answers:
"Though English capitalists may have little to gain through
annexation by their own country, they may have much to lose
through annexation by [others]....As soon as rivals appear on
the scene, each country must make every effort to protect its
position against the incursions of others. The result may be
a net loss... .What is important is not the loss or gain com-
pared to the pre-existent situation, but rather the loss or
gain compared to the situation which would have prevailed had
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a rival succeeded in stepping in ahead....This is a prin-
ciple of wide application in the economics of monopoly...
may appropriately be referred to as the principle of pro-
tective annexation. Closely related...is the urge to annex
territories.. .of little or no present value, nevertheless
may become valuable in the future. This may be called the
principle of anticipatory annexation. Protective and anti-
cipatory annexations played a very important part in the
late nineteenth century scramble for still unclaimed parts
of the earth's surface. Finally, we must not forget consi-
derations of strategic nature... the need for well-placed
land and sea bases, lines of communication..." 14
Complementing Lenin's argument, which attributes these annexationist
"transitional forms of national dependence or informal imperialism" to the
antagonistic struggle between the fractions of metropolitan bourgeoisie and
to the competitive struggle among monopolies themselves, all stemming from
the internal logic of capitalist accumulation. Sweezy's argument highlights
an inseparable dimension, i.e., the strategic geographic locations of these
settler colonial enterprises in relation to existing and/or potential inter-
national undertakings. For example, British takeover of South Africa and
Rhodesia to guarantee a route for East India's company. In the case of
Zionist colonial settlement and its strategic location regarding British
imperialism, the point is very well put by Emile Touma in The Roots of the
Palestine Problem,15 and by many other historians.
It must be further remembered that the transformation from capitalism
to capitalist imperialism is not only economic; it has also political and
ideological dimensions.
Agreeing with Kemp, the economic conflict between the big combines only
becomes comprehensible when seen in relation to the struggle between states:
"The epoch of the newest capitalism shows us that certain
relations are being established between capitalist combines,
based on the economic division of the world, while parallel
with this and in connection with it, certain relations are
being established between political alliances, between states,
on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the
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struggle for colonies, of the struggle for economic terri-
tory." 16
Further, as Lenin puts it: "The non-economic superstructure set up on
the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulates the
striving for colonial conquest." He quotes Hilferding, saying: "Finance
capital does not want liberty, it wants domination."1 7
On the basis of findings by the American writer, Henry Morris, in The
History of Colonization, Lenin concludes:
"... that it is precisely after that period [of the enormous
expansion of colonial conquests, 1860-1880] that the boom
in colonial annexations begins, and that the struggle for
the territorial division of the world becomes extraordinarily
keen. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that capitalism's
transition to the stage of monopoly capitalism, to finance
capital, is bound up with the intensification of the struggle
for the partition of the world." 18
International competition between monopolies urged the curving out of
colonial possessions as exclusive reserves. Territories were being acquired
not only for their actual, but also for potential, use, as we mentioned
earlier. This competitive struggle, with its economic roots, was intensified
by the non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance
capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulating the striving for colonial
19
conquest.
Distinctive of this phase are other transitional or contradictory de-
velopments, referred to by Lenin as the "semi-colonial states" and considered
by him as transitional forms, typical examples of the "middle stage". Also,
countries that are officially and politically independent, but which are, in
fact, enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence. 2 0
Lenin correctly emphasizes the ideological influences that went with
imperialism: nationalism, racialism, political reaction, etc., which were
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transmitted into the labor movement itself by its right-wing leaders, justly
called "social imperialists", "socialists in words and imperialists in
deeds." 2 1
In his book, The Territorial Development of the European Colonies, A.
Supan states
that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries
has completed the seizure of the unoccupied territories
on our planet. For the first time, the world is completely
divided up, so that in the future only redivision is pos-
sible; territories can only pass from one "owner" to
another, instead of passing as unowned territory to an
"owner". 22
Supan's analysis applies perfectly to the handing of Palestine by the
British colonial powers to the Zionist colonial settlers. It applies most
accurately, despite the systematic effort by leaders of the Zionist movement
to distort this fact, popularizing the slogan: "Palestine, a land without
people, for the Jews, a people without land." 2 3
Integrating and complementing the above, our theory
views settler colonialism as the historical byproduct of the uneven develop-
ment of capitalism in the passage from the competitive stage to the stage of
monopoly capital; an expression of transitionally coinciding aspirations of
the petty bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie. The coincidence of these as-
pirations abroad viewed precisely as the result of their essentially antago-
nisitic class interests at home, in the beginning of capital combination
within metropolitan boundaries.
It is the petty bourgeoisie's struggle against extinction in the face
of monopoly formation, and the monopolies' vested interest in political sta-
bility at home, plus their competitive struggle abroad for control of stra-
tegic routes to international undertakings, goods/capital markets, and spheres
of influence in the pursuit of capitalism's extended reproduction, that under-
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ly the competability of these conflicting class interests in relation to set-
tler colonial enterprises.
Formulated as such, we explain settler colonialism (including secession
from mother countries) in the context of alliance, not antagonism, between
the settler community and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. It points out expli-
citly the crucial role of settler colonialism (so strategically located), at
least transitionally, in furthering the internationalization of capital; in
the self-reproduction of capitalism as a world order. Put this way, colonial
settlement is conceived simultaneously as a result of, and as an instrument
for, capitalism's imperative to externalize the effects of its main contradic-
tions; to transfer them from the "center" to the "periphery". That is why,
in order to accumulate, capitalism necessarily needs a periphery.2 4
Correcting Marx, Rosa Luxemburg emphasizes primitive accumulation to be
not only a prior stage of capitalist accumulation, but as something needful
throughout its maturity.25 This conceptualization also highlights more than
any previous reference the centrality of the class determination of the petty
bourgeoisie in the rise of settler colonial phenomena.
The latter point carries special significance in the analysis of Jewish
settler colonialism in Palestine (given the class locations of Diaspora Jewry),
as demonstrated later on. In order to clarify this further, it seems necessary
to identify the nature of class struggle in the transitional phase.
Monopoly formation involves two simultaneous processes:
(1) Concentration of capital refers to the increase in the quantity of
capital under each one's control; this in turn makes possible an
enlarged scale of production and is necessarily the result of accumu-
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lation. "Concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises,"
says Lenin, "represents one of the most characteristic features of
capitalism....Concentration of production, however, is much more
intense than the concentration of workers, since labour in the
large enterprises is much more productive."2 6
The latter point is very important for understanding the underlying
causes of displacement and growth of "relative" overpopulation in
the transition from competition to monopoly.
(2) Centralization of capital refers to the combining of capital al-
ready in existence. This process differs from the former in that
it only presupposes a change in the distribution of capital already
at hand and functioning; its conglomeration in fewer and fewer hands,
following the law of the sea, "the big fish eating the little." As
Marx puts it, "Capital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single
hand because it has in another place been lost by many."27 This is
centralization proper, as distinct from accumulation and concentra-
tion.
Some contemporary economists distinguish between these two processes as
"capital-widening" and "capital-deepening".28 Classical writers refer to both
processes of monopoly formation as "capital-combination". 29
"Combined production," defines Lenin, is "the grouping in a single enter-
prise of different branches of industry, which either represent the consecu-
tive stages in the working up of raw materials.. .or are auxiliary to one ano-
ther. 30
According to Lenin, the increase of concentration of production and of
capital to the extent that it leads to monopoly, the merging or coalescence of
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banking with industry--this is the history of the rise of finance capital and
what gives the term "finance capital" its content. The precise time for this
transformation is the beginning of the twentieth century. Quoting Jeidels,
"It was the crisis [of 1900] that enormously accelerated and intensified the
process of concentration of industry and banking, consolidated that process,
for the first time transformed the connection with industry into the monopoly
of big banks, and made this connection much closer and more active."31 This
is how bank capital, i.e., capital in money, is transformed into industrial
capital, i.e., finance capital, controlled by banks and employed by industrial-
ists.
The transformation in the role of the banks is an essential feature in
monopoly formation. The original function of banks is to serve as intermedi-
ary in the making of payments, transforming inactive money capital into active
capital that produces profit.
The "affiliated" bank is one of the important features of modern capital-
ist concentration. Large-scale enterprises not only completely absorb small
ones, but also "join" them to themselves, subordinate them, bring them into
their "own" group or concern by having "holdings" in their capital or by con-
trolling them through a system of credit, etc.32
Interpreting Marx and Engels, Kemp sums up the dynamics of transition
from capitalism of competition to capitalism of monopoly in the following
words:
"From competitive struggle itself, and the process of centrali-
zation and concentration of capital which accompanied and flowed
from the compelling forces of the laws of accumulation, a few
large capitals would tend to replace many small ones. The tech-
nical innovations which the capitalists in the course of compe-
titive struggle were forced to make, by increasing outlays of
fixed capital, tended in the same direction and meant the exclu-
sion of small capitals altogether from some fields." 33
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The emergence of monopoly was further facilitated by changes in the
structure of ownership associated with the joint stock company and the finan-
cing of industry through the stock exchange and the credit system. The ac-
tual rate and character of the transition to the new type of capitalism
varied in the different countries. In Germany, the pace and extent of combi-
nation and cartelization were especially remarkable. In Britain, as Lenin
admitted, monopoly tendencies were slower in showing themselves, partly owing
to the fact that the priority of British industrial development meant that
competitive structures and habits were deeply rooted, while in later develop-
ing Germany, large-scale industry grew up in close association with monopolis-
tic practices. Nevertheless, if the development was slower in Britain, it was
by no means absent. In fact, there were no exceptions. Throughout the conti-
nent, including Russia, as well as in the rapidly growing economy of the
United States, there was a great increase in the number of cartels, combina-
tions and trusts towards the end of the nineteenth century. Free competition
was driven from one field to another. Despite the continued existence of
"free" competition in many sectors, it had lost, and lost irrevocably, the
virtually undisputed sway which it had once exercised.3 4
"When monopoly appears in some branches of industry," says Lenin, "it
increases and intensifies the stage of chaos inherent in capitalist production
as a whole..." 3 5  "Capitalism arrives at the threshold of the widest sociali-
zation of production... .The process of technical invention and improvement,
in particular, is becoming socialised."36 This leads us into the importance
of the bourgeois nation-state intervention on behalf of the bourgeoisie,
hence the rise of nationalism as bourgeois ideology and the counteracting
utopian ideologies in the pursuit of restoring the old-style capitalism based
on the small producer and owner-entrepreneur. The latter was strongly criti-
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cized by Lenin, not only as utopian, but also as it ran directly contrary to
the "socializing" tendencies of modern monopoly capitalism and was conse-
quently "reactionary".
In his own words, "...The immense progress of humanity, which achieved
this socialization, goes to benefit the speculators... .On these grounds, re-
actionary petty bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism dream of going
back to "free", "peaceful", and "honest" competition." 3 7
Changes in the banking system, "the transformation of numerous modest
intermediaries into a handful of monopolists, represents one of the funda-
mental processes in the transformation of capitalism into capitalist imperial-
ism."38 In Germany, in particular, emphasizes Kemp, on the basis of Lenin's
analysis, the big banks promoted industrial enterprises and their nominees
occupied supervisory or controlling positions in many firms. By concentra-
ting in their hands the bulk of money capital of capitalists, farmers, small
businessmen and others, the banks inevitably tended to become no longer the
servants of industry but its masters. In Germany, the banks carried out
functions which had formerly been performed by the stock exchange by dealing
directly in company shares. The era of "finance capital" had begun, in which
control lies increasingly with men whose special powers derive from specifi-
cally financial control and manipulation--particularly control of money capi-
tal placed at their disposal by rentier shareholders. The rise of finance
capital to do away with the role of money capital sheds light on the dis-
placement of the petty bourgeois money lenders from their positions in the
social division of labor, with the emergence of monopolies
The latter threatening with equal ruthlessness the small
capitalists. Monopoly formation, therefore, represents not only struggle
within the bourgeoisie in the process of their class fractionalization (into
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the commercial bourgeoisie, the industrial bourgeoisie and the financial
bourgeoisie), but also class struggle (between capital and labor) in the
forms of embourgeoisement/proletarianization, displacement of workers by
machines for higher concentration of production, and struggle between the
capitalists and the pre-capitalist-petty bourgeoisie, threatened with ex-
tinction in the form of proletarianization or marginalization--forceful
joining of the "surplus" population--explains the interest of the petty
bourgeoisie to undertake the actual implementation of the secessionist
colonial settlement as an immunization against proletarianization, hence
the reproduction of its class-location, and/or opportunity for embourgeoise-
ment of the settlers through proletarianization of the native population in
the annexed territories.
Now that we have constructed a theoretical frame for analyzing settler
colonialism in general as it emerges from the uneven development of capital-
ism, we are ready to examine the specificity of settler colonialism in Pales-
tine.
III. Settler Colonialism in Palestine
It is said that Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine differs essen-
tially from the typical settler and non-settler colonial forms in that it
aims not to exploit, but rather to replace native labor. This difference
is often pointed out to highlight the progressive character of settler
colonialism in Palestine, and is attributed to its underlying Labor-Zionist
ideology.
Labor-Zionism, known as the "socialist" or "proletarian" blend in
Zionism, represents the culmination of all previous proposed territorialist
solutions to the Jewish question. Using Don Schon's planning terminology,
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Labor-Zionism constitutes the "theory-of-action" for Jewish settlement in
Palestine.39
We argue that Labor-Zionism does neither in theory nor in practice con-
stitute a proletarian socialist alternative. It is sufficient to examine
Labor-Zionism in the context of settler colonialism elsewhere in order for
its proletarian mythology to be exposed.
In his Marxist interpretation of the Jewish question, Abram Leon does
argue and document the petty bourgeois character
of Zionism in general.40 We go one step further to emphasize that Labor-
Zionism, in particular, represents the ideological sub-ensemble of the Jewish
petty bourgeoisie threatened with extinction in the transition of capitalism
from its competitive stage to the stage of monopoly. This essentially petty
bourgeois ideology does, at least transitionally, coincide with the objec-
tives of the combining Jewish and non-Jewish big capital in metropolitan
countries. The primary objective of which is the essential internationali-
zation of capital.
Once we demonstrate the Labor-Zionist-based Jewish settlement in Pales-
tine as a petty bourgeois alternative, we focus on the characteristics
that distinguish it from other settler colonial cases. For that matter, we
in fact reinforce the popular argument whcih attributes the peculiarity of
Zionist settler colonialism to its labor ideology.
Contrary to this argument, however, we maintain that settler colonial-
ism in Palestine, distinguished by its labor ideology, differs from other
settler colonial forms (Rhodesia, South Africa, etc.) not in its socialist,
compared with the other's capitalist, orientation; the real difference lies
rather in the unsecularity of the Zionist settler colonial project (its
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Jewish sectarianism), and in its intended evolutionary character.
This study departs from other conventional and Marxist interpretations
of Labor-Zionism in that it takes very seriously the notion of evolution
as compared with merely a settler enterprise.
We argue that it is the labor blend in Zionism that gives Jewish set-
tler colonialism its evolutionary, hence peculiar, character, and the State
of Israel its Jewish definition. Without the principle and practice of
"self-labor", interpreted often as "Hebrew-work", a Jewish State can never
emerge. Given that, by definition, the State is a relation of struggling
social classes.41 To be Jewish, there has to be Jewish class-struggle,
hence the existence of Jewish class society, i.e., Jewish social formation,
the site for Jewish classes to be formed and reproduced in class-struggle.
Not realizing the evolutionary element in the Labor-Zionist model of
settler colonialism is, indeed, belittling the Borochovist genius. It is
interpreting Labor-Zionism at this comprehensive level of social formation,
ultimately, after the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel today is
documented, that the impediment of Palestinian proletarianization in the
past, and the implications of its occurrence in the present, can be compre-
hended.
The centrality of this evolutionary notion implicit in Labor-Zionism,
which gives Jewish settler colonialism in Palestine a peculiar character,
exposes also the significance of foreign capital penetration into post-1967
Israel. It unravels the real implications of this simultaneous large-scale
penetration of foreign subsidiaries and Palestinian labor, on the
viability of the State of Israel as a Jewish State.
For a fuller development of this argument, we examine three issues:
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(a) How Borochov defines the Jewish question and what he proposes for a solu-
tion; (b) the class interest to which the Borochovist solution corresponds;
(c) the instrumentality of labor in socialist-Zionism.
A. The Borochovist Conception of the Jewish Question (1900)
According to Borochov:
"Jewish production was characterized by the predominance of
the element of human labor over the element of nature, and
of mental over physical labor. It was basically invested in
the production of variable not constant capital (i.e., in
consumer goods). Historically, the greatest concentration
of traditional occupations of the Jews is in the category of
final level of production (needle-trade, baking, printing),
and secondly, in the tertiary-middle level of production
(chemical, leather, paper industries), but rarely in primary
level of production and in basic industry.... The prevailing
law in Jewish economics is that the concentration of Jewish
labor in any occupation varies directly with the remoteness
of that occupation from nature." 42
On the basis of the above characterization of the Jewish employment
structure in Diaspora, Borochov concludes that the Jews were "abnormal" peo-
ple, for their class structure resembled an "inverted pyramid"4 3 marked by
two anomalies: the absence of a working class and the absence of a territory
of their own. The solution is, therefore, building a Jewish working class
on a Jewish land, Palestine.
Central to his analysis of the Jewish question are the problems of
"displacement" and "proletariatizing masses", concomitant with disintegrating
feudalism in East Europe and decaying competitive capitalism in the West.
It becomes more evident throughout his analysis that his basic concern lies
more in the displacement of Jewish masses from their traditional petty bour-
geois positions threatened by proletarianization, and less in the displace-
ment of Jewish proletariat by more competitive labor or owing to anti-semi-
tism.
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Most characteristic of the Borochovistic socialism is establishing the
peculiarity of the position of the Jewish proletariat and the proletarizing
masses in the face of capitalist displacement effects. In this regard, he
sees Jewish masses more vulnerable than others, as they suffer also from iso-
lation resulting from their ex-territorialization. Their displacement, there-
fore, is likely to continue with the further development of capitalism, reach-
ing even more acute measures.
In the final analysis, Borochov explains the displacement of Jewish
masses under capitalism as one emerging from the interaction between the
"conditions of production" and the "forces of production", thus formulating
in these terms his theory of national conflict, said to derive from a mater-
ialist conception of history. And it is in these terms that he defines the
Jewish question as a national not a social one, arguing:
"The character of the relations of production depends on
the state of the forces of production and their development
is primarily dependent on the natural conditions which man
must face in his struggle for existence of the above-men-
tioned conditions of production, the natural non-social
factors predominated firstly." 44
Considering his theory of the national question as a parallel to Marx's theory
of the social question, Borochov argues:
"As the class struggle assumes the character of a social
problem wherever the development of the forces of produc-
tion disturbs the constitution of the relations of produc-
tion... the same is true of the national struggle...the
national problem therefore arises when the development of
the forces of production of a nationality conflicts with
the state of conditions of production...the most vital of
the material conditions of production is the territory.
The territory is furthermore the foundation on which rise
all other conditions of production." 45
He goes one step further to assert that, owing to this national con-
flict resulting from the "abnormal conditions of production" the Jews in the
Diaspora cannot take part in class struggle as their continuous displacement
91
makes impossible their proletarianization and as their national consciousness
obscures class consciousness. His 'doctrine" of nationalism and class strug-
gle reaches its culmination in identifying a kind of antagonism between the
class consciousness and the national consciousness of a given group, asserting:
"...under normal conditions of production the class antagonisms become more
acute, whereas under abnormal conditions of production, they abate somewhat."
Given the Jews' abnormal conditions of production,
"...the capitalist system [Borochov continues] engendered
the national question not merely for the bourgeoisie alone,
but also for all other classes of society, since each class
in one way or another was affected by this international
competition. Fundamentally, the territory is of value to
them all as the base of the conditions of production... The
proletariat and the proletarizing masses have no direct in-
fluence on international politics. The only means of ex-
panding the work-sphere is the peaceful emigration to foreign
lands... .The proletarizing masses... are interested even more
than the proletariat in retaining the integrity of their
national work-place.... The abnormal conditions of production
tend to harmonize the interests of all members of a nation...
but they also hinder the development of the relations of
production and the class struggle, because the normal develop-
ment of the mode of production is hampered." 46
In concluding the Borochovist conception of the Jewish question, we
must pause here to identify his mistake and illustrate the deficiencies
of his putative historical-materialist perspective.
All existing critics of Borochovism focus by-and-large on the incongru-
ities between his Marxist theory and the way in which it was practised. We
argue that nothing is Marxist about Borochov's formulation of the Jewish
question except for the terminology.
In his own words, quoted above, Borochov makes explicit that the Jewish
displacement problem, as well as the malformed socio-economic structure, are
predetermined by factors and not social forces and even by natural, non-
social factors," that is, remoteness from nature. This remoteness predomi-
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nates firstly, deforming the conditions of production, hence the resulting
incompatability with the state of the production forces.
All these factors operate, in Borochov's conception, independently from
the relations of production; the latter has relevance only to the class con-
flict, which is in turn obscured by the absence of territory.
Although Borochov's characterization of the Jewish socio-economic struc-
ture and the peculiar effects of capitalist development on the Jewish masses
are accurate indeed, his analysis of these characteristics is the inverse
of historical materialism. The "conditions of production" concept that Boro-
chov claims to invent is a distored version of the Marxist concept of "condi-
tions of material life of society", i.e., the social being from which men's
consciousness arises. Although initially influenced by natural environment,
these conditions are explicitly viewed in historical and dialectical material-
ism to be determined by the method of procuring the material means of subsis-
tence that is the mode of production of material values indispensible for the
existence and reproduction of society. The mode of production corresponds to
a state of social productive forces at the disposal of society and the rela-
tions of production in a given historical conjuncture. This is to say, social
productive forces are not a function of these conditions but their very de-
terminants. He employs not the materialist conception of history but,
rather, the theory of factors "which dismembers the activity of social man
and pictures its various aspects and manifestations as distinct forces that
supposedly determine the historical movement of society."48 Borochov com-
mits a profound mistake in claiming that his conception of the Jewish ques-
tion derives from historical materialism while reducing the materialist con-
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ception of history to mere "economic materialism" or, more appropriately,
"territorial materialism", according to which an economic or, say, territorial
factor "operates of its own accord, without the intervention of man", negating
the role of the social relations forgetting that economic relations are them-
selves "a function of the social productive forces." Borochov
denies the Jews their very history; the history of class struggle, the Jewish
modes of social relations they have entered in the process of procuring their
means of subsistence for centuries, and the developmental effects of this pro-
cess. He therefore implicitly suggests that the social being of Jews has
historically remained constant, determined merely by a single factor--ex-ter-
ritorialization, indicating not the slightest comprehension of dialectical
materialism. This richness of Jewish history, scientifically documented in
Leon's Marxist interpretation of the Jewish question, points to the limita-
tions of Borochov's utterly undialectical materialist conception of history.
By way of contrast with him, Leon interprets the Jewish question and the rise
of Zionism by going much deeper into Jewish history to explain why the Jewish
masses are overwhelmingly petty bourgeois, that is, how the inverted pyramid-
like structure emerged, a point that Borochov starts with but never explains.
To give an example of how Jewish history can be accurately analyzed,
let us examine Leon's study as summed up by Nathan Weinstock:
"Proceeding from Marx's comments on the fact that the secret
of Jewish survival resides in Jewish history, Leon developed
his concept of the people-class as the key to Jewish history.
It is the role fulfilled by the Jews during their history
which provides the explanation of their survival as a dis-
tinct community. Analyzing the successive economic functions
assumed by the Jews in the pre-capitalist era, under manufac-
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turing and industrial capitalism and finally under imperialism,
the author succeeds in unravelling the various Jewish modes
of existence corresponding to those stages in social history
....He leads us through the intricate maze of the Jewish saga,
describing the growth of modern anti-semitism generated by
the incapacity of crisis-ridden capitalism to integrate the
Jewish masses from Eastern Europe who had been evicted from
their traditional occupations by the disintegration of feudal
economy." 49
Unlike Leon, Borochov provides us with rationalizations for his territor-
ialist solution, but not with an explanation of the Jewish question.
As stated in the Communist Manifesto, it is the essence of the
Marxist materialist conception of history that "the history of all hither-
to existing society is the history of class struggle."51 Denying this
social force in explaining the displacement of the Jewish masses under
capitalism, or at best, reducing it to economic manifestation, is in-
deed a fundamental distortion of historical materialism, despite his
consistent adherence to this paradigm. Moreover, in relation to the
displacement problem, Borochov loudly points out "excess energy" as
the "tragedy of the Jewish people" under capitalism. He does not ex-
plain this phenomenon but, again, uses it to justify the need for
transferring the excess energy (surplus population) to new lands; a
notion that forces us to recall Cecil Rhodes' rationale for settler-
colonialism, expressed earlier in this chapter. He simply raises
anti-capitalist slogans for furthering capitalist causes.
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A genuine materialist conception -of history otherwise explains the ex-
cess energy phenomenon in terms of the state of productive forces at the dis-
posal of society and the nature of the dominant relations of production; reach-
ing an entirely different conclusion regarding a remedy.
Starting with Leon's theory of the People class and the historical ten-
dency of Jewish concentration in petty bourgeois class-locations, specifically
trade professions,52 then recall Marx provides a partial explanation in his
law of development, which states: "The degree of development of merchants'
capital is inversely proportional to the degree of development in industrial
capital."53 Marx is even more explicitly to the point in his following re-
marks:
"Historically, the form of industrial profit arises only
after capital no longer appears alongside the independent
worker...the trading peoples of antiquity, like the gods
of Epicurus in the spaces between the worlds, or rather
like the Jews in the pores of Polish society. Most of the
independent trading peoples or cities attained the magnifi-
cent development of their independence through the carrying
trade [author's emphasis] which rested on the barbarity of
the producing peoples between whom they played the role of
money (the mediators). In the preliminary stages of bour-
geois society, trade dominates industry; in modern society,
the opposite...capital arises only-where trade has seized
possession of production itself and where the merchant be-
comes producer, or the producer mere merchant." 54
In these observations from economic history is a powerful explanation of
Jewish displacement and of the "excess-energy tragedy" concomitant with the
very rise of capitalism. In fact, both Marx and Engels had already explicitly
stressed the tendency of this traditional petty bourgeoisie to be undermined
with the establishment of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production
and its reproduction.
In his theory of imperialism, Lenin demonstrates the intensification of
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this tendency in the transition from that stage of competition to imperialist
capitalism. We have already discussed the effects of concentration and cen-
tralization of capital in the process of monopoly formation on small capital-
ists and the petty bourgeoisie, more specifically, how the new role of banking
in the age of finance capital erases the role of money lender and displaces
money capitalists.
Finally, the explanation of this tendency culminates in the observation
expressed by Leon Trotsky, where he says:
"Capitalism has ruined the petty bourgeoisie at a much
faster rate than it has proletarianized it. Furthermore,
the bourgeois state has long directed its conscious policy
toward the artificial maintenance of petty bourgeois strata.
At the opposite pole, the growth of technology and the
rationalization of large-scale industry engenders chronic
unemployment and obstructs the proletarianization of the
petty bourgeoisie... .However, the artificial preservation
of antiquated petty bourgeois strata no-wise mitigates the
social contradictions, but on the contrary, invests them
with an especial malignancy and together with the permanent
army of the unemployed, constitutes the most malevolent ex-
pression of the decay of capitalism." 55
The latter quote explains not only the excess-energy problem but also what
Borochov defines as the "utter impossibility of Jewish proletarianization"
in Diaspora.
All the above observations and theories have in common their reference
to the state of social productive forces and the capitalist relations of pro-
duction as the forces underlying the displacement problem facing the petty
bourgeoisie in general, and the Jewish masses in particular.
Providing this explanation, these analyses lead to the conclusion that
the roots of the Jewish question lie in the very laws of capitalist accumula-
tion, not in landlessness, as Borochov tries hard to lead us to believe.
The genuine materialist conception of history leads us to the
conclusion that a lasting solution to the Jewish question lies essentially
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in the transcendence of the dominant mode of accumulation, as the case is for
the emancipation of humanity at large. The Borochovist conception of the
Jewish question leads to the conclusion that the only solution to the Jewish
question lies in re-establishing the bond with land from which Jews have been
liberated, through class struggle, much earlier than other people; advancing
the essentially social nature of the problem and its fundamental solution;
a point in the transformation of humanity's problem, expected to be reached
through capitalism as its ultimately progressive contribution to history.
For Borochov, however, the only remedy was Zionism, as a territorialist
solution to the national and class questions of landless people; that is, set-
tler-colonialism "through class struggle". "Socialism," he says, "is our
goal but Zionism is our immediate need... .Class struggle is the road to both."
Negated in his interpretation of the peculiarities of Jewish society,
class struggle becomes central-to his strategy forschanging those peculiari-
ties, as demonstrated in the last section. In the following section, however,
we try to demonstrate the petty bourgeois, non-proletarian class origin of
socialist-Zionism.
B. The Class Interest to Which Borochovism Corresponds:
Having sketched the decline of East European Jewry from the nineteenth
century onwards, as we noted in the previous section, Abram Leon "explains
the development of the Zionist utopia as an ideological reflection on the
problems of the declassed Jewish petty bourgeoisie, supplanted in the economy
by the rising indigenous middle class and deprived of all prospects in the
framework of decadent capitalism."56 We argue that nothing in the Borocho-
vist theory of socialist Zionism disproves Leon's identification of the petty
bourgeois class origin of Zionism in general. This is to say, in other words,
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that proletarian or socialist Zionism by no means correspond to the class
interest of the Jewish proletariat, as it is misinterpreted to do, but rather
to that of the Jewish bourgeoisie and, in effect, the bourgeoisie itself.
Before we develop this argument, it will help to point out the following:
First, that one's class interest is determined by one's class-location,
that is, by one's objective place in the relations of production and reproduc-
tion of society's material values. Class interest is to be distinguished
from class position, that is, one's actual political commitment, determined
rather by one's sugjective consciousness. One's actual class position may
not correspond to one's real class interest owing to false ideology. (See
Chapter III for further discussion on this issue.)
Second, that all ideologies are class ideologies. The ideology of a
particular social group is determined by its place in the class determina-
tion within a particular formation (feudalist, capitalist, or other).
Third, the peculiarities of the class determination and ideological
characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie as they are central to the point of
this chapter. In Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, Nicos Poulantzas charac-
terizes the class determination of the petty bourgeoisie as follows:
"In the relations of production, the place of the tradi-
tional petty bourgeoisie includes both small-scale produc-
tion and small-scale ownership. Small-scale production
essentially consists of forms of artisan production, or
small family business, where the same agent is both owner
and possessor of his means of production, as well as the
direct producer. There is here no economic exploitation
properly so-called, in so far as these forms of production
do not employ wage-labour, or at least only do so very oc-
casionally. Labour is chiefly provided by the actual
owner or by the members of his family, who are not remun-
erated in the form of a wage. This small-scale production
draws profit from the sale of its goods and through the
overall redistribution of surplus-value, but it does not
directly extort surplus value. Small-scale ownership
chiefly involves retail trade in the circulation sphere
where the owner of the trading stock, helped by his family,
99
provides the labour, and again only occasionally employs
wage-labour.
"In the commonplace of these two groupings of the traditional
petty bourgeoisie in the relations of production lies the
fact that the direct producer is in each case himself the
owner of the means of labour; i.e., in the combination of
ownership with the absence of direct exploitation of wage-
labour. This petty bourgeoisie does not belong to the capi-
talist mode of production but to the simple commodity from
which was historically the form of transition from the feudal
to the capitalist mode." 57
As far as ideology is concerned, given its place in the class determina-
tion of a capitalist formation, the petty bourgeoisie has, in the long run,
no autonomous class position; no ideology of its own. As the two basic clas-
ses are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the only real class ideologies
are, therefore, those of these two basic classes, which are in fundamental
political opposition; that is, the only ideological ensembles with a specific
coherence and that are relatively systematic are those of the dominant bour-
geois ideology and the ideology connected to the working class. 5 8
As far as the petty bourgeoisie is concerned, we simply speak merely of
what Poulantzas refers to as a petty bourgeois ideological "sub-ensemble"
formed by the effects of the (dominant) bourgeois ideology on the specific
aspirations of the petty-bourgeois agents that are the function of their spe-
cific class determination. In Poulantzas' words:
"The petty bourgeois sub-ensemble is, in other words, a
terrain of struggle and a particular battlefield between
bourgeois ideology and working class ideology, though with
the specific intervention of peculiarly petty bourgeois
elements. This terrain is in no way a vacant site, but is
encircled right from the start by bourgeois ideology and by
petty bourgeois ideological elements." 59
These characterizations of the petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble
and its formation leave very little doubt in our minds as regards the petty
bourgeois character of Borochovism, as it simultaneously adheres, both to
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proletarian and bourgeois ideologies. This, indeed, culminates most accurately
in Borochov's assertion of the "organic unity of socialism and Zionism" as the
essence of his doctrine; the attempt to unite the two fundamentally opposite
aspirations: proletarian internationalism (socialism) and sectarian bourgeois
nation-statism (Zionism).
Moreover, "even when the petty-bourgeois sectors adopt working-class
positions," says Poulantzas, "they often do so by investing them with their
own ideological practices."60 This explains, on the level of political arti-
culation, why left-wing socialist-Zionist political parties, specifically
Hashomer Hatsair prior -to Statehood, and MAPAM in Israel, have sometimes
adopted a working-class position to invest in their own ideological practices;
especially for the purpose of promoting aliyah, hence the realization of Zion-
ism. This is to say that the conjunctural adoption of proletariat positions
by political formations of Borochovism (left-Zionist parties) may not imply
that these formations essentially articulate the class interest of the prole-
tariat; this is even more true when such positions were taken inconsistently
as the case with left-Zionist parties.
Poulantzas indicates further
"...that certain ideological elements specific to the
petty bourgeoisie may themselves have their effects on
the working class' ideology, and because of the particu-
lar class determination of the petty bourgeoisie. This
happens in a manner different to that in which bourgeois
ideology acts, This is even the main danger that permanent-
ly threatens the working-class. It may take the form of
convergence and a malformation of these elements with
working-class ideology, particularly the form of petty-
bourgeois socialism, but also... the forms of anarcho-syn-
dicalism and revolutionary syndicalism, which can all af-
fect the working-class." 61
Such petty bourgeois socialism and anarcho-syndicalism can be said, in the
case of socialist-Zionism, to be configurated in the forms of the collective
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kibbutz, the co-operative moshav and the trade union federation (Histadrut).
It is again to be emphasized that such forms are not necessarily to promote
the proletarian cause. It is simply wrong to infer from the socialist appear-
ance and image of the kibbutz, a socialist essence. It is a well-documented
fact that these so-called socialist institutional arrangements were primarily
instruments of colonization serving the interest of the petty bourgeoisie,
not the revolutionary Jewish proletariat. For example, it was clearly indi-
cated already in 1920 by the statement of the program adopted in the first
convention of Histadruth Ha'ovdim (General Federation of Jewish Labor):
"In the first instance, the Histadruth considers its duty
to create a new type of Jewish worker, and to see to it that
while colonization is developing, the Jewish worker who came
into being as a result of this very colonizing process, shall
be assured the place he deserves. The Histadruth includes
all toilers who live by their own labor without exploiting
others; it regulates all matters concerning the working class
in the fields of trade union activities, colonization and
education with the aim of building a Jewish workers' commun-
ity in Palestine." 62
This statement makes it explicit that from its very inception, the
Histadruth was never meant to foster a socialist alternative in Palestine.
This statement testifies to the acceptance of a capitalist society within
which the Histadruth provides labor; "building a Jewish workers' community
in Palestine' does not negate the existence of a capitalist class; it may
precisely provide for the very condition of capitalas the existence of wage
labor is the very condition for capital. In this sense, the Histadruth is
primarily to foster the embourgeoisement of a fraction of the de-classed
Jewish petty bourgeoisie, as well as the restoration of other fractions, as
it does not negate self-labor. Most important , as regards wage-labor, is
the explicit emphasis of the Histadruth program to foster the creation of a
Jewish labor aristocracy: "to see to it that the Jewish worker shall be as-
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sured the place he deserves." This is a very strategic component in settler
colonialism. In this sense, one of the Histadruth roles is to impede the de-
velopment of a revolutionary labor movement in Palestine, to pacify the his-
torical role of the Jewish working class, reducing it from a social force in-
to a sterile "workers' community".
It is interesting to know that the Histadruth defines "worker" in terms
of eligibility to Histadruth membership, the principal qualification for which
is "the ideological belief in non-exploitation of labor."63 Nothing is more
characteristic of the petty bourgeois utopia than such a slogan; this defini-
tion of the worker, as opposed to the worker defined in terms of the class
struggle, is most indicative of the petty bourgeois socialism.
To substantiate the predominance of petty bourgeois elements in the
Histadruth, it helps to mention that the 1943 distribution of Histadruth
membership by industry or occupation shows that Histadruth members as percent
of total employment is the largest among the self-employed; for example, 89.4%
of the total employed in agricultural (kibbutz and moshav) labor settlements,
as compared to 66.7% among hired agricultural laborers; 80% of the self-em-
ployed farmers on privately-owned farms, compared to 53% of clerical employees,
etc.64
It is of significance also to notice the emphasis on the belief, not
the practice. This way, the Histadruth can be both the trade union symboli-
zing the belief in the non-exploitation of labor, and simultaneously the sec-
ond largest employer (i.e., exploiter of wage labor) in the country.65
More discussion regarding the truth about the Histadruth and the kib-
butz and moshav will follow later in the present chapter and the coming one.
For unravelling the petty bourgeois character of these Labor-Zionist configur-
ations and exposing the mythology of their proletarianism, it is best to make
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the comparison between the Labor-Zionist program and the Gotha program of
the German Labor Party, strongly criticized by Marx as a petty bourgeois non-
proletarian program. Not unlike the Labor-Zionist movement,
"...the German Workers' Party, in order to pave the way
to the solution of the social question, demands the estab-
lishment of producers' co-operative societies with state
aid under the democratic control of the toiling people.
The producers' co-operative societies are to be called into
being for industry and agriculture in such dimensions that
the socialist organization of the total labor will arise
from them." 66
Moreover, in retrospect we see that it is mainly in the Jewish
petty bourgeoisie, that was in effect mobilized by Labor-Zionism, neither the
proletariat nor the bourgeoisie have chosen to immigrate into Israel as the
class interests of both classes, despite and because of their essential antago-
nism, have in common their cosmopolitanism. This fact has been recently docu-
mented by, among others, Allon Gal, one of the strongest believers in Borocho-
vism.
By now, we have established that socialist-Zionism has all the features
of the universal petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble. To sum up the
characterization of this ideological sub-ensemble is to point out that they
are essentially a function of the petty commodity form, as they (small shop-
keepers, artisans, etc.) are at the economic level simultaneously distinguished
from, and have points in common with, both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
(they do not belong to capital as such, yet they are strongly attached to
their property, and they are owners of their means of production, yet are
themselves direct producers). This polarization often has effects at the
ideological level, specifically in Poulantzas' words,
"...an ideological aspect that is anti-capitalist but in
the 'status quo' fashion. This is against 'the rich', but
the traditional petty bourgeoisie are often afraid of revo-
lutionary transformation of society, since this grouping
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fiercely holds onto its (small) property and is afraid of
being proletarianized. It makes sharp demands against the
monopolies, since it is gradually itself being ruined and
eliminated by monopoly capitalism, but these often aim at
restoring 'equal opportunity' and 'fair competition', which
is how the fantasies of the petty bourgeoisie pictures the
past stage of competitive capitalism. What this petty bour-
geoisie often seeks is change without the system changing....
Afraid of proletarianization below, attracted toward the
bourgeois above, these petty bourgeois agents also aspire to
become bourgeois..." 68
All these features are indeed distinctive of Borochovist Labor-Zionism
arising in 1900, precisely in the transition from capitalism of competition
to capitalism of monopoly; essentially seeking refuge for the Jewish petty
bourgeoisie from extinction through proletarianization in the face of monopoly
formation. The proletarizing Jewish masses are central to Borochov's concern.
"The proletarizing masses... are interested even more than the proletariat in
retaining the integrity of their national work-place."6 9
Now that we identified what it is that in socialist Zionism, despite
its proletarian mask, is essentially a petty bourgeois ideological feature,
it helps to identify what is essentially git proletarian about Labor-
Zionism. What are the essential characterizations of a genuinely proletarian
ideology that are absent in Borochovism as theory and program?
One way of answering this question is to compare the Borochovist solu-
tion to the Jewish question with that of the cosmopolitan school of Jewish
socialism led by Ahron Lieberman. As Borochovism is said by S. Levenberg, a
leading socialist-Zionist, to be "a spiritual revolt aginst [among other
things] the imitation of the cosmopolitan school of Jewish socialism." 7 0
Expressed in the Record of the Society of the Hebrew Socialists of Lon-
don in 1876, the solution to the Jewish question is conceived as follows:
"We are convinced that the present order, which holds
sway everywhere, is ruthless and unjust. The capitalists,
rulers and clergy, have taken unto themselves all human
rights and property and have enslaved the working masses
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through the power of their money.... The liberation of humanity
can be achieved only through a basic change in the political,
economic, and social relations--by uprooting the existing
order and constructing in its place a new society based on
socialism which will abolish injustice and domination of capi-
tal... .We Jews are an integral part of humanity and cannot
be liberated except through the liberation of all humanity.
The liberation of humanity from misery and slavery can be
achieved by the workers only if they unite in a struggle
against their despoilers, destroy the existing order, and
replace it by the reign of labour, justice, freedom, and the
fraternity of mankind. The workers of Europe and America have
united in various societies to achieve their aim and are pre-
paring for a revolution, for the establishment of the reign
of labour socialism. Therefore, we, the Children of Israel,
have decided to affiliate ourselves with this noble Alliance
of Labour." 71
For the Lieberman's Cosmopolitan School of Jewish Socialism, the solu-
tion, thus, lies in the radical transformation of the dominant mode of accumu-
lation, and the establishment of a world socialist order; that is, the dis-
truction of the reign of capital and its replacement by the reign of labor.
Contrary to it, Borochovist proletarian-Zionism assumes the capitalist order
to remain intact, in the heart of which Zionist petty bourgeois socialism is
to be transplanted and nurtured.
Finally and most importantly, while Lieberman's proletarian socialism
assumes the dictatorship of the proletariat, Borochov's proletarian-Zionism
assumes instead, and aspires for, the establishment of a democratic republican
order. Statehood, therefore, must not be viewed as an external variable
undermining the Borochovist socialist order (kibbutz order) as the apologetics
of Borochovism argue. The establishment of a Jewish Republic, a Jewish State,
was the very objective of socialist-Zionism as well. It was advocated by
Borochov himself where he explicitly says:
"The World War is progressing from its imperialist phase to
its revolutionary phase....It is most certain that England
will conquer Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria....If so, a
Jewish Republic in Palestine is destined to come." 7 2 (my emphasis)
One cannot, therefore, attribute Statehood to revisionist Zionism and
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blame Statehood for undermining the genuinely socialist Jewish order in
Palestine, as proponents of Borochovism often argue.
As Poulantzas indicates: "The traditional petty bourgeoisie has often
been a pillar of the 'democratic republican' order and essential component of
left-wing Jacobinism or even petty bourgeois socialism..."73
In his critique of the Gotha Programme (in 1875) of the Socialist Demo-
cratic Working Party of Germany, founded by Lassalle, and of French Proudhon-
ism, Marx points out the petty bourgeois, non-proletarian character of these
programs, as they have no mention of the dictatorship of the proletariat; that
is, the political transition period from State to no-State.74
With this position in mind, how can one then consider Borochovism a pro-
letarian ideology and program when it was nothing but a development model for
guaranteeing the evolutionary emergence and reproducibility of a bourgeois
Jewish State by means of Jewish labor. While proletarian socialism aspires
precisely for the withering-away of the state, proletarian Zionism is precise-
ly the very strategy for realizing the idea of a bourgeois state, even with
a sectarian character.
C. The Instrumentality of Labor in Zionism
The essence of this essay is to point out the Borochovist genius in
recognizing the imperative of labor, hence class struggle, for the realization
of Zioni3m. We recognize the fact that this labor strategy for implementing
the Zionist idea, the State, is truly derived from a materialist conception
of history. We emphasize it is neither Borochov's definition of the Jewish
question nor his territorialist solution to it that derive from a genuine
materialist conception of history; it is only his implementation strategy
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of labor that derives from the paradigm of class struggle; and it is precise-
ly on this level that Borochovism differs from other Zionist postulates, and
even from other settler-colonial "planners" and petty-bourgeois socialist
"programmers".
Borochov seems to have comprehended the Marxist
conception of the State as a relation of struggling social classes and not
as a thing; an enterprise. He, in other words, seems to grasp the relation
between political class struggle and the State superstructure. Ironically,
however, he then uses this historical materialist conception of the State in
the pursuit of creating conditions for the Jewish State to emerge in a more
historical manner, yet through managerial manipulations.
Metaphorically, Borochov conducted a backward simulation of the forces
that historically give rise to the State, from which he derives a dynamic
managerial model for the development of a Jewish State in Palestine; that is,
transplanting Jewish social formation by means of Jewish labor, from which
the Jewish State was to arise.
We must remember that the Jewish State in Palestine is the configuration
of an idea, the Zionist idea, translated in material conditions other than
those which, in the first place, gave birth to the Zionist idea. It is,
therefore, very different from the historical state which emerges from mater-
ial forces within the particular society in which the State is a regulating
factor.
Borochov's contribution to Zionism lies in the attempt to give an his-
torical character to an essentially ahistorical state, and most importantly,
in assuring, by virtue of regulating Jewish class struggle in a Jewish social
formation, that it is historically predetermined to be a Jewish State.
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To proceed more systematically, we start with the Marxist theory of
the State, specifically, the bourgeois State; then we show how Borochov mani-
pulates this theory.for formulating a bourgeois, not a proletarian, strategy.
(a) The Marxist Conception of the Statet
On the origins of the State, Frederick Engels says:
"It [the State] is a product of society at a certain stage of
development; it is the admission that this society has become
entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it
has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is power-
less to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms and clas-
ses with conflicting economic interests might not consume them-
selves and society in a fruitless struggle, it became necessary
to have a power seemingly standing above society that would
alleviate the conflict, and keep it within the bounds of "order";
and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above
it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the State." 75
As quoted above, Engels points out the existence of a relation between
the State and political class domination and the political class struggle.
He also shows that the relation of the State to political class domination
reflects the ensemble of the contradictions of society.
The term society seems to refer here to the concept of social formation
defined by Poulantzas as:
S...a complex unity of instances [the economic, political and
ideological]... .A social formation which is historically deter-
mined consists of an overlapping of several modes of production,
one which holds the dominant role, and it therefore presents
more classes than the pure mode of production.... Social forma-
tions are in actual fact the sites of the reproduction process;
they are the nodes of uneven development of the relationship of
modes and forms of production within the class struggle." 76
In this sense, the State as defined by Engels is related to the contra-
dictions peculiar to the various levels of a formation, but only in so far as
it represents the place where the articulation of these levels is reflected
and where their contradictions are condensed. It is the admission of "the
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contradiction of society with itself."
The State as Marx puts it is "the official resume of society." For
him, "the political State, within the limits of its form, expresses sub spe-
cie rie publicae all the social conflicts, needs and interests."7 8
Not unlike Engels and Marx, Lenin also characterizes the political (in-
cluding the State and political class struggle) as "a concentrated expression
of economics." The State, for him, appears to be the place in which we can
decipher the unity of structures and from which we can derive our knowledge
of this unity:
"The only field in which this knowledge can be gained is that
consituted by the relation of all the classes and strata of
the population to the State and the government; i.e., the 79field constituted by the relation of all classes to each other.
In this sense, the State is the "official representative" of society,
as Engler calls it. Representative, here, is interpreted by Poulantzas in
the sense of the place where the unity of a formation is deciphered; still in
this sense, the State is also "the place where the ruptural situation (situa-
tion de rupture) of this unity can be deciphered."8 0
It is in this sense that the State is a relation, not a thing; more pre-
cisely, a condensed relation. This relation between the State and the articu-
lation which specifies a formation originates, according to Poulantzas, pre-
cisely in the fact that the State has a function of "order" in political class
conflicts, and also of global order as the cohesive factor of unity. The
State prevents the political class conflict from breaking out in so far as
this conflict reflects the unity of a formation; the State, in other words,
prevents classes and "society" from consuming themselves. That is, it prevents
the social formation from bursting apart.
Viewed dialectically, the relation of the "base" to the "superstructure",
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according to Poulantzas, emphasizes the formulation of the State as "the
organization of maintaining both the conditions of production and the condi-
tions for the existence and functioning both of the unity of a mode of pro-
duction and of a formation."81 Poulantzas, here, is not different from Buk-
harin who, in his Theory of Historical Materialism formulates the conception
of a social formation as "a system of unstable equilibrium inside which the
State plays the role of regulator."8 2
The global function of the State as the cohesive factor in a formation's
unity (common to the various Marxist conceptions of the State quoted above)
takes on different forms depending on the mode of production and social for-
mation under consideration.
According to Poulantzas,
"This function of the State, becoming a specific function,
specifies the State as such in the formations dominated by the
CMP [Capitalist Mode of Production] characterized by the speci-
fic autonomy of instances [the political, economic, and ideolo-
gical] and by the particular place which is then allotted to
the region of the State. This characteristic autonomy is the
basis of the specificity of the political: it determines the
particular function of the State as the cohesive factor of the
levels which have gained autonomy." 83
It is to be emphasized that despite this relative autonomy, the State
continues to be a relation and does not become a thing in itself. In fact,
the function of the State as the cohesive factor in a formation's unity, which
makes it the place in which the contradictions of the instances are condensed,
becomes still clearer when we consider that an historically determined social
formation is characterized by an overlapping of several modes of production,
specifically during a period of transition from the dominance of one mode to
the dominance of another. We are then in the presence of "a true relation of
forces" between the various modes of production present and the permanent
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dislocation of formation's instances. The role of the State, the cohesive
factor of this complex overlapping of various modes of production, is deci-
sive here. The State's specific efficacity, understood precisely as the
general cohesive function of a formation's unity, exists permanently in
every formation where different modes of production overlap. This is parti-
cularly important in the capitalist formation, where the dominant CMP stamps
the domination of its structure on the various modes of production present,
and in particular, stamps on them relative autonomy of instances, resulting
in a clearer separation between the spheres of economic, ideological and poli-
tical.8 4
This analysis of the relation of social formation's overlapping modes
of production to the function of the State, and of the relative autonomy of
the instances (including the political, i.e., the State) becomes essential
for comprehending the role of Labor-Zionism, specifically the practices of
self-labor and Hebrew work, in the creation of Jewish social formation with
more than one mode of production for the emergence of the Jewish State as a
cohesive factor of the newly transplanted social formation. Furthermore,
Poulantzas' analysis explains why it was necessary to create a capitalist
Jewish social formation in order for the Jewish State to exercise relative
autonomy, a necessary guarantee for the State to serve world Jewry, specifi-
cally the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and not only the class interest of the
becoming national bourgeoisie.
Before we go to examine the strategy of the State in socialist-Zionism
in light of the Marxist conception of the State, it is necessary to bring up
a final point about the latter, which is of special relevance to our conclu-
sion; this is the relation of the State and revolution.
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Lenin demonstrates that the double power characteristic of State struc-
tures (as a factor of cohesion in formation's unity and as the place in which
the ruptural situation of this unity, or in which contradictions of instances
are condensed) constitutes one of the essential elements of the revolutionary
situation. That is why he considers the basic problem of every revolution to
be that of State power. In this case, the objective of political practice is
the State as a factor maintaining the cohesion of the unity of the formation.
Political practice produces transformations, the objective of which is the
State as the nodal structure in which this unity breaks, in so far as it is
a cohesive factor. It is in this sense that the State can be viewed as a fac-
tor for producing new unity and new relations of production; that is, a new
historical phase.
It is only through dialectical materialism that the State can be compre-
hended this way: simultaneously, a factor of cohesion of-a formation's unity
and the place in which the contradictions of the various levels of a formation
are condensed; and therefore, the place in which we can break the unity and
articulation of a formation's structures.
As Poulantzas precisely puts it:
"It is from this relation between the State as a cohesive factor
of a formation's unity and the State as the place in which the
various contradictions of the instances are condensed, that we
can decipher the problem of the relation between politics and
history. This relation designates the structure of the politi-
cal both as the specific level [instance] of a formation and as
the place in which its transformations occur: it designates the
political struggle as 'motive power of history' having as its
objective the State, the place in which contradictions of in-
stances... are condensed." 85
Inside the structure of several levels dislocated by uneven
development, the State has the particular function of constituting the factor
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of cohesion between the levels of a social formation. This is precisely the
Marxist conception of the State as a factor of 'order' or 'organizational
principle' of a formation, and as the "regulating factor of its global disequi-
librium as a system," not the passive instrument in the hand of a class or
fraction.
It is in this sense that the State is not a thing but a relation, more
exactly, the condensation of a balance of forces.
Unlike the instrumentalist conception of the State as a subject or a
thing, in both cases of which the relationship of the State to the classes is
seen as a relation of externality and the relative autonomy of the State as
something absolute. In the Marxist conception of the State as a relation, the
relative autonomy of the State is inscribed in its very structure, in so far
as it is a function of the class struggle and class contradictions as they are
expressed and concentrated, in a specific manner, within the State itself.
(b) Jewish Labor as a Strategy for a Jewish State:
According to Nachman Syrkin, a leading writer in socialist Zionist
thought, "Borochov was the first to apply a socialist ideology to Labour-Zion-
ism. Labour-Zionists thus become socialist Zionists."86
In this statement one can easily replace the word "ideology" with the
word "terminology" without any major distortion of content. Tt is Borochov's
emphasis on "class struggle" that makes his Zionism mistaken for socialism"
Syrkin's state-
ment also makes explicit that Labor-Zionism is not identical with socialist
Zionism; Borochovism. The latter is accurate; all political postulates of
Zionism emphasized the notion of Jewish labor. A.O. Gordon, for example, a
revisionist who rejects socialist principles that seem contrary to the Zionist
objective, is also the very person known to develop into creed the idea of
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self-labor. In his words:
"...a people that has become accustomed to every mode of life
save the national one -- the life of self-conscious and self-
supporting labour -- such a people will never become a living,
natural, labouring people unless it strains every fiber of its
willpower to attain this goal. Labour is not merely the factor
which establishes man's contact with land and his claim to the
land; it is also the principal force in the building of a na-
tional civilization. We have to make labour... the foundation
on which our whole undertaking is based. Only when we raise
labour as such to the height of an ideal...shall we be healed....
We need fanatics of labour, in the most exalted sense of the
word." 87
In these words, Gordon points mainly to the claim of the land as the
motive underlying the ideal of self-labor, which he seems to derive from the
"land to the tiller" rationale. He also emphasizes the link between the notion
of labor and the building of a national civilization. Obviously, Gordon's re-
ference is to the realization of a territorial base.
Similarly, in 1912, evaluating the colonization efforts in the preceding
thirty years, and criticizing "the lovers of Zion" approach to colonization,
based on the use of indigenous Palestinian labor, Achad Ha'am, a leading Zionist
writer, says:
"...the basis of my state is the rural masses -- the workers
and the poor farmers who live by cultivating the fields whether
it is their own small lots or the large tracts of the 'superior'
class. The rural masses of Eretz Israel are not our own at
present.... It is well known that at present the work in the set-
tlements is done mostly by the Arabs of the neighboring villages....
One hope, however, is left for us -- those young workers who came
ready to give their life for the national ideal, to acquire posi-
tions of work and to create in our existing settlements of the
future those Jewish country masses which are not there as yet.
Not for nothing do we find lately that the problem of the work-
ers is practically the central problem of the Jewish community.
All feel that it is not merely a workers' problem, but also a
problem concerned with the aims of Zionism as a whole. If the
workers do not succeed in solving this problem, it will be a
sign that the national ideal is incapable of creating those
inner powers so necessary for our cause... .We shall have to make
peace with the idea, then, that our country-population in Eretz
Israel...will forever remain a 'superior' cultural minority
whose power will lie in its brain and capital, and with the idea
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that the large country-masses whose strength lies in the work
of their hands will not be our own even then. And this would
completely change the nature and aims of Zionism...." 88
In these words, Achad Ha'am, like Gordon, also expresses the impor-
tance of the Jews' return to the soil, to manual labor, regardless of being
wage-earners or self-employed. He is indifferent to the question of exploi-
tation of Jewish labor, as long as there are Jewish rural masses as a basis
for the Jewish State; Jewish workers who cultivate the land, and therefore
acquire the right to it. Unlike Gordon's mechanical view of the role of
Jewish labor in Zionism, Achad Ha'am views this role in a more historical
way. Without productively laboring Jewish workers, "the national ideal is
incapable of creating those inner powers so necessary for our cause...."
This is a much more dynamic conception of the labor strategy in Zionism.
Achad Ha'am, however, leaves unclear why and how this is a condition for the
cause of Zionism. The only thing that is made absolutely clear in both
Gordon's and Achad Ha'am's ideas is the role of Jewish labor in the realiza-
tion of Zionism through acquiring the right to land by working the land.
In Borochovism, the notion of labor in the Zionist strategy is a much
more profound one. In The Role of the Proletariat in the Realization of Ter-
ritorialism,89 Borochov refers not merely to territorial gains, and speaks
not only of self-labor, but also of productive labor under capitalism, that
is, he speaks specifically of the role of the proletariat, of exploited mod-
ern wage workers in the realization of territorialism, that is, the Zionist
solution to the Jewish question within a bourgeois nation-state. This is
different from the emphasis on self-labor (non-exploitation of other labor)
merely for claiming the land. The difference between Borochov's and the
latter is, indeed, the difference between the two Zionist slogans: "The Con-
quest of Jewish Land" (Kibbush Hakark'a, or Ha'adamah) and "The Conquest of
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Hebrew Labor" (Kibbush Ha'avobah Ha'evrit).
For Borochov, not by labor and land alone the Zionist aim, i.e., the
Jewish State, is realizable, but also necessarily by Jewish class struggle.
It is, perhaps, precisely this notion in Borochovism that misleads Syrkin to
conclude that Borochov applies socialist ideology to Labor-Zionism, thus con-
verting Labor-Zionists into socialist Zionists. Borochov emphasizes not only
self-labor but essentially Jewish proletarianization in Palestine, and Jewish
proletarianization by means of Jewish capital; this is how Jewish class strug-
gle can develop. Unlike Achad Ha'am's emphasis on the necessity to have Jew-
ish workers toiling the land as self-employed farmers, or as wage employees
even by Arab landlords, Borochov is very specific about his own notion of labor
in Zionism; his main concern is Jewish proletarianization by Jewish capital,
and not by Gentiles in Diaspora or by the indigenous inhabitants of the colony.
This is one of the reasons why he strongly rejected the idea of Jewish coloni-
zaiton in any country ruled by an advanced capitalist power.
As "necessary requirements" characterizing the territory where the Jewish
social formation to be restored, Borochov emphasizes "the state owning the
territory must be of an undeveloped capitalist economy... that in the country
there will already be a Hebrew settlement there for some time and ready for
proletarianization;" and among the "desired requirements" that "it will not
have gold and precious stones; the local population will be cultureless to that
degree as to be influenced by our cielture, yet also sufficiently cultured,
namely conservative, that it would not "jump" too fast into a capitalist econ-
omy."90 It is not Jewish proletarianization per se that Borochov argues is
"utterly impossible" in Diaspora, but more specifically Jewish proletarianiza-
tion by Jewish capital; with the rising of the organic composition of capital,
manifested in the introduction of new machinery, technical innovation, the
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Jewish capitalist tends to lay-off Jewish workers and replace them with Gen-
tiles, a tendency which Borochov condemns as "Jewish anti-Semitism" of the
assimilationist Jewish bourgeoisie. In his words:
"...The Jewish manufacturer who is about to become a big
capitalist wants to sever, as soon as possible, his relations
with the Jewish community from which he emerged. He does it
for two reasons. He wants to conquer the Gentile market and
be on the same footing with the Gentile manufacturer. His
Jewishness is in this respect a disadvantage, since his com-
petitors refuse to recognize him as equal. He is, therefore,
eager to display his goyish (non-Jewish) patriotism... He is
anxious to employ Gentile workers and managers, to as great
an extent as possible, restrict his commercial intercourse
to Gentiles because he wants to identify himself with his
Gentile competitor and rid himself of Jewish public control....
The Jewish employer, upon introducing steam power into his fac-
tory (the symbol of large-scale production), substitutes the
Gentile for the Jewish worker." 91
In these words, Borochov is emphasizing the impossibility of the develop-
ment of Jewish capitalist/proletariat class relations in Diaspora; and there-
fore of political class struggle in Jewish life of the Galut, Jewish class
struggle remains "economic class struggle". He is not, however, denying Jewish
proletarianization by Gentile capital. As a matter of fact, Borochov cannot
deny the latter, as he explicitly asserts that his Zionism expresses the objec-
tive movement and interests of an already existing Jewish working class, and
not that of a potential one, and it is from this very "starting point" that he
claims his is a proletarian Zionism. This assertion, as Bober points out,
"occupies such a central position in Borochovist theory that without it the
theory loses even its formal claim as proletarian Zionism and becomes ordinary
Zionism."9 2
Defending this point, Borochov explicitly states:
"If it were the case that the interests of the Jewish bour-
geoisie and of the masses standing on the verge of proletarian-
ization led them to territorialism, while the interests of the
Jewish proletariat were not connected with territorialism,
then there would be no grounds for saying that the future of
the entire Jewish people is also the future of the Jewish prole-
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tariat. One should not take as the starting point the general,
national future and deduce the future of the proletariat from
it. On the contrary, one should start with the interests of
the proletariat, and from this arrive at the future of the
nation as a whole... .From the starting point of the interests
of the militant Jewish proletariat and from our view of it as
the Vanguard of the Jewish Future, we deduce territorialism for
the Jewish people as a whole." 93
This is not the place to assess the extent to which Borochov's assertion
that his Zionism represents and derives from the interest of the Jewish prole-
tariat is reliable or that he is simply giving a progressive rationalization
and excuse for an essentially reactionary territorialist solution. What con-
cerns us here is merely the fact that he recognizes the existence of a Jewish
proletariat in Diaspora. This in turn refutes his previous assertion as regards
"the utter impossibility of Jewish proletarianization in Diaspora." It is so,
unless what he really means is, again, the utter impossibility of Jewish prole-
tarianization by Jewish capital, emphasized in a previous quote. In that case,
our interpretation of Borochov is reinforced; that he recognizes the imperative
of having a Jewish proletariat and a Jewish bourgeoisie relation if a bourgeois
Jewish State is to be realized. And, given the impossibility of Jewish prole-
tarianization by Jewish capital in Diaspora, he concludes the inconceivability
of an emerging Jewish State in Diaspora, hence, the conviction for territorial-
ism.
Borochov seems to realize, in light of the Marxist conception of the
State, the need for a purely Jewish class struggle as necessary material condi-
tions for such a State to emerge, and that in Diaspora Jewish life, such condi-
tions are non-existent and cannot develop. In light of historical materialism,
he concludes also that the condition of a purely Jewish class antagonism is a
Jewish social formation, as a site for Jewish classes co-existing in irrecon-
cialable antagonisms and condensed contradictions, and the Jewish State, fol-
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lowing Engels' conception of the State, as a product of Jewish society at a
certain stage of development. Borochov realized that a Jewish State can emerge
only as a product of Jewish society, in the sense of social formation consis-
ting of an overlapping of several modes of production, the site of the repro-
duction process of Jewish social classes and contradictions, the nodes of un-
even development of the relationship of modes and forms of production within
the class struggle. The conditions for a bourgeois Jewish State is a
Jewish social formation in which the capitalist mode of production has a domi-
nant role.
It is by virtue of his scientific Marxist conception of the State (as a
relation of struggling social classes, as a cohesive factor of formation's
unity and as the place in which the various contradictions of the formation's
levels are condensed) that Borochov presumably recognizes the imperative of
territorialism and its essential identity with Zionism. A Jewish territory is
correctly identified as a condition for Jewish society; that is, a Jewish so-
cial formation, the thing that the Jewish community in Diaspora was not (except,
maybe, for the Jewish ghettos). This is precisely what made the Jews in Dias-
pora unlike the British in Britain and the French in France. However, the Jew-
ish bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, with the development of monopoly, needed
a State to intervene on behalf of their capital, yet uncombined; they needed a
State which is Jewish, as France is French and Britain is British. These aspir-
ations do necessarily require "starting from scratch", the acquiring of a Jew-
ish territory on which a Jewish social formation can form so that a Jewish
State will "organically" rise from its very contradictions. The purely Jewish
class struggle is, therefore, imperative in Borochov's vision of Zionism. The
notion of class struggle is, in Borochovism, identified as a socialist con-
cept, and instead of saying that Jewish class struggle is the condition for an
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organic rise of a Jewish State, Borochov misleadingly asserts the "organic
unity of Zionism and socialism." It is, therefore, not surprising that cen-
tral to his theory of nationalism and class struggle is the need of the Jewish
proletariat for a territory of its own in order to be able to wage political
Jewish class struggle; otherwise, the Jewish proletariat in Diaspora can only
participate in political class struggle which is not purely Jewish, and under
such conditions the energy of the Jewish proletariat is diverted from the Jew-
ish cause, from giving rise to a Jewish State; and can contribute only to cos-
mopolitan socialism against which Borochovism is a revolt.
To make the point clearer, is to emphasize that Borochov's territorial-
ism is distinguished from territorialism in other postulates of Zionism. His
is a much more profound concept, referring to the creation of an historical
context, from which the Jewish State is to emerge, as if organically, not
merely national territory on which to establish Jewish State apparatuses.
Borochov's territorialism refers to a specific territory with the potential of
restoring the lost Jewish social formation in a modern form, where the Zionist
enterprise will definitely transform into national evolution, providing for an
evolutionary rise of, and a basis of continuity for, the Jewish State. So that
the Jewish State would be an organically rooted one and not mere enterprise,
he therefore rejects territory in which a Jewish social formation cannot be re-
stored or developed (such as advanced capitalism, where Jewish capital is like-
ly to employ Gentile labor, and Jewish labor is likely to be either self-em-
ployed or the employee of Gentile capital). Similarly, he rejects the idealist
territorialist solution represented in the "lovers of Zion" movement, led by
Levanda and Lilienblum, who advocate the transformation of "the Galut middle-
men into a people of farmers in Palestine," a territorialist postulate adopted
later by the Jewish bourgeoisie, as expressed in Pinsker's Auto-emancipation
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and Herzl's The Jewish State. Borochov rejects such a "sterile" colonization,
as it is not based on class struggle. The notion of evolution is central to
Borochovism and distinctive of it. It is directly linked to the organic rise
of the Jewish State from a Jewish social formation formed precisely through
colonization by class struggle; that is, colonization aiming at classed, not
classless, society. This is to say, the "yishuv" (the Jewish settlers' com-
munity in Palestine prior to the establishment of the State) has to be segmen-
ted by classes, Jewish classes, if it is to give rise to a State which is Jew-
ish. Borochov condemns the earlier settlement schemes, not for their exploi-
tation of labor but for exploiting non-Jewish labor, as that will not allow
for Jewish classes to form, and more precisely, for the class struggle in
Palestine to be Jewish; in that case, Zionism will remain an enterprise and the
Jewish State will never become an evolutionary product of Jewish society.
Territorialism, thus, in Borochov's Zionism is essentially nothing but
an evolutionary rise to a Jewish State. In his words:
"...In the course of time, Zionism will transform itself
from an enterprise of a group of idealists to a national
undertaking... .At that time, the inner historical necessity
of Zionism will be centered no more on the external forces
but on the internal forces of the people. For a long time
the Zionist movement will have the character of an enterprise
[referring to early settlement of Hovevi Zion], but in the
future it will become an evolutionary movement. This will
only occur if our people are settled on their land and are
able to shape their own destiny. When our movement ceases
to be an enterprise and becomes the evolution of a renais-
cent Judaism, Zionism as we know it will complete its present
development." 94
Notice the emphasis on restoring the past, the desire to turn back the wheels
of history, most characteristic of the petty bourgeois ideological sub-ensemble.
We notice also the emphasis on class struggle in a double-fold meaning, simul-
taneously adhering to the aspirations of both the bourgeoisie and the proletar-
iat, most expressive of the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie.
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Since class struggle occupies such a centrality in Borochovism and dis-
tinguishes it from all other postulates of Zionism, and gives Borochovism its
socialist mask, it is imperative for our analysis to re-examine and unravel
the real context of the class struggle that Borochov attaches to his Zionism.
(a) The Borochovist Notion of Class Struggle:
Correctly identifying class struggle as the means to achieve both Zion-
ism and socialism, Borochov incorrectly concludes the essential unity of the
latter. There is an essential difference in the content of class struggle
peculiar to each of the two contexts. The difference is not merely between
an engineered class struggle proposed for the realization of Zionism, for
giving rise to a bourgeois State, and an historical class struggle emerging
from an already existing social formation, not from a potential one yet to be
established. The main difference is, indeed, between class struggle in the
pursuit of a bourgeois State, as in Borochov's Zionism, and class struggle in
the pursuit of a proletarian alternative, that is, for imposing the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, culminating in the withering away of the State.
The notion of class struggle claimed to distinguish Borochovism as a
socialist Zionism is precisely the notion that, in actuality, distinguishes
Borochovism as capitalist Zionism, and more accurately, as scientific capital-
ist Zionism, that derives precisely from historical materialism. Yes, Boro-
chovism is the scientific approach to the development of a bourgeois Jewish
State, the key to which is Jewish class struggle which can only exist in a
Jewish social formation dominated by a capitalist mode of production. Boro-
chovism is invertedly derived from historical materialism; specifically, from
the Marxist theory of the State. It provides the prescription which guaran-
tees the definitional viability of the State-to-be as Jewish and as bourgeois,
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simultaneously. None other than Borochovist Zionism does, indeed, guarantee
the emergence of a State which is, scientifically, both bourgeois and Jewish.
In a real, historical sense, the Jewishness of the State depends on
the extent to which it constitutes the condensation of Jewish class antago-
nisms, that is, a condensed relation of struggling Jewish social classes;
the extent to which it is the "official representative" of a Jewish classed
society, the place in which the "ruptural situation" of a Jewish formation's
unity lies; a true relation of Jewish social forces, a regulator of disequi-
libriums, inherent in a Jewish social formation. Without all these material
conditions, no Jewish State can emerge, and no established State apparatus
can be said to be essentially, and by definition, Jewish; even if the State
apparatus itself is staffed exclusively with Jews. That would be merely a
Jewish State apparatus, i.e., a Jewish administration imposed on, and organi-
cally linked to, a non-Jewish base, with the constant presence of a non-
Jewish potential State ready to emerge from the contradictions of the non-
Jewish base and to easily overthrow the Jewish colonial administration.
This is precisely how the post-colonial State emerged from under classical
colonial administration, expressing the irreconcilable contradictions and
antagonisms within the dominated indigenous social formations (specifically,
as colonialism steered up class formation in the colonies) and forcing the
withering away of colonial State apparatuses: decolonialization.
Similarly, white settler-colonialism in South Africa, Rhodesia, etc.
resulted in a white settler-colonial rule and hegemony, but not a white
settler-colonial State, regardless of the fact that the State apparatus is
mainly staffed by white settlers, as the State is not a thing but a relation.
The principal contradictions and antagonism in South Africa's social forma-
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tion, whose unity and condensation the State represent are not merely those
internal to the white settlers' community but, on the contrary, mainly inter-
nal to the mixed social formation. The existence of the white settler commun-
ity with that social formation becomes part of the irreconcilable contradic-
tions giving rise to an historical State, the product of the society at this
stage, and which is now about to overthrow the settler-colonial "superstruc-
ture", as it is becoming increasingly incompatible with the current develop-
ment of the "base", increasingly linked to international capital.
Borochov, therefore, tries to foresee an evolutionary approach to Zion-
ism, that is, the realization of the Jewish State as if historically emerged,
a Jewish State that has historical roots, that can be evolutionarily Jewish,
and whose historical material definitional conditions are Jewish and repro-
ducible over time; that is, one based on an historical site, a social forma-
tion, within which Jewish classes form and reproduce themselves in class
struggle, and the Jewish State is then continuously reproduced as a factor
of cohesion of the formation's unity and the place in which the contradic-
tions of various levels (economic, ideological, etc.) within a Jewish social
formation are condensed.
The Borochovist notion of Jewish class struggle as a prerequisite ma-
terial force for the emergence of a Jewish State is undoubtedly deduced from
a correct comprehension of the Marxist theory of the State. This comprehen-
sion is most articulated in his emphasis on the need for political class
struggle in Jewish life, not feasible in Diaspora. He realizes the State's
function of "order" in political class struggle, preventing the political
class conflict from breaking out in so far as this conflict reflects the
unity of a formation.9 5 He explicitly points out the inavailability of the
historical material prerequisites for a Jewish State, in Jewish life, which
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is, indeed, a testimony for the arbitrariness of Zionism, specifically,
"socialist" Zionism, whose essence is precisely and ironically the engineer-
ing of historical material conditions necessary for such a State to emerge
and be organically sustained on an ongoing basis. To substantiate our expo-
sition of the instrumentality of class struggle in this Zionism, in the reali-
zation of a bourgeois Jewish State, let us quote Borochov himself:
"Among other nations, the alliances usually proceed along class
lines. The ruling classes unite and build one reactionary
bloc, whereas the suppressed classes unite and build a revo-
lutionary bloc. Among the Jewish people, however, the grouping
does not occur on a class basis... .Within Jewry the chief
contradiction is not between the proletariat and the bour-
geoisie, or between the urban and agrarian populations, but
between Zionists and Galut champions of all classes. The con-
centration of anti-Zionist forces usually precedes Zionist
consolidation. This does not mean to imply that there is no
class struggle within Jewry...but the class struggle in Jew-
ish life has meagre social content... its historical horizons
are limited. The class struggle of the Jews is primarily on
the economic front. We lack, however, the political class
struggle; for the Jewish people is now divorced from State
functions and political rule as a unit. Under the prevailing
conditions in the Galut, it is really impossible to engage in
this struggle. Instead, each class, guided by its own inter-
ests, participates in the political struggle of the people
among whom its members reside. Although in its struggle
against the general bourgeoisie, the Jewish proletariat can-
not avoid a clash with the Jewish bourgeoisie, that struggle
is not for a dominance within Jewish life, for there is no
one to divest of or invest with power. In Jewish life, only
the economic [author's emphasis] class antagonisms find full
play; the political conflicts go off at a tangent... .Within
Jewry there does not exist the class struggle in its usual
forms. True, the Jewish people does not have a very strong
material tradition.... the Jewish community must fortify it-
self and become rooted in the surrounding environment, tying
itself organically to the soil of the neighbouring people.
A whole people cannot live as if in a hostelry. A neglect
of this truth caused the inner contradiction of general
Zionism." 96
It is important to keep in mind that a social formation consists of
several overlapping modes of production among which one mode plays the role
of dominance. In Borochovism, the capitalist mode is to play the role of
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dominance, as the capitalist proletariat Jewish class struggle that occupies
centrality in his strategy for the realization of Zionism. His main concern
lies in Jewish proletarianization and Jewish capitalization in Palestine; it
is not so much focusing on the creating of a self-laboring class, i.e., the
restoration of petty bourgeois class-locations undermined by the advancement
of capitalism in Diaspora. This concern is even a determining criteria of
the specificity of the territory to be acquired. Put differently, his con-
cern, as far as a material condition for a bourgeois Jewish State, is the
creation of a capitalist Jewish social formation by the Jewish petty bour-
geoisie, but which necessarily serves the interests of the Jewish metropoli-
tan bourgeoisie. Under the title, "The Jewish Interests and the Zionist
Enterprise," Borochov writes: "We must understand, finally, that the real
interests of the Jewish people are here in the countries of the Diaspora, in
the civilized and industrialized countries, but that the aims of Zionism are
there."97
In his discussion, "On the Question of Zion and Territory," Borochov
makes this link between the rationale for the bourgeois character of the
State, the capitalist nature of the Jewish social formation, and the domi-
nance of the Jewish bourgeois/proletariat class antagonisms much clearer as
he points out the two-fold significance of territory for Judaism:
"Its economic importance could be in that the new Jewish
society, which will be created in the territory, will serve
as a refuge and a work place for the oppressed Diaspora Jews.
For that purpose, it is necessary that the Jewish immigrants
could, in that territory, reach normal capitalization and
proletarianization and that the competition from the local
bourgeoisie and local proletariat will not push them outside
of the market. Such importance cannot be ascribed, as we
have seen above, to a territory located in the neighborhood
of a cultured society.... The territory could also be of inter-
national importance to Judaism, but for that purpose it is
necessary, first of all, that the overriding influence in
the territory be exercised by Jews, and secondly, that our
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society be a sovereign subject of international law. We
have already proven that the first condition is not capable
of being fulfilled in a territory close to a cultured capi-
talist society. Also, the fulfillment of the second condi-
tion is not possible..." 98
It is very clear from the previous quote that Borochov's territorialism
is, indeed, the creation of comptetive Jewish capitalism as disassociated
from monopoly capital as possible, so that from this Jewish competitive capi-
talist base a Jewish State of a bourgeois character emerges, and it is only
by virtue of the latter that it acquires international importance and recog-
nition; that is, only as bourgeois and not proletarian can the Jewish State
contribute to the internationalization of capital, both Jewish and Gentile.
This is to reinforce the point that Borochovism expresses primarily the inter-
ests of the Jewish middle-bourgeoisie and that fraction of the petty bourgeois-
ie aspiring to become a national bourgeoisie, which, in turn, coincides with
the interest of big Jewish and Gentile capital: imperialism. It represents
only secondarily the interests of that fraction of the petty bourgeoisie as-
piring to restore their petty bourgeois class-location and for immunization
against proletarianization. The latter applies mainly to members of kibbutz
and moshav movements. Borochovism does, by no means, represent the interest
of the Jewish proletariat, but rather expresses the imperative of Jewish pro-
letarianization if the interests of the becoming and existing Jewish bourgeois-
ie are to be, in the long run, well served. The proletarianization impera-
tive represents the most prominent feature in Borochovism. It is reflected
most clearly in the following phrase, written and underlined by Borochov him-
self: "...and we repeat and say: We are not afraid of foreign capitaliza-
tion in the territory, and even not from foreign immigration per se, but only
and solely from foreign proletarization."It
Jewish proletarianization is seen by Borochov as the condition for
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capitalization of petty Jewish capital and, more importantly, for the well-
rootedness of the bourgeois Jewish State.
"...We ask [Borochov writes] what economic value could there
be for the Jewish question in a territory of well-rooted
population? And we answer: It is valueless. And further,
we ask what international value could this territory be for
the purpose of guarding and defending Jewish interests in
countries of the Diaspora.. .and our answer is.. .no value
whatsoever.
"The territories will belong, in the future, not to the
powers dominating them today, and not to immigrants...but
only to the section of the population which produces the
wealth of that particular territory and sustains in it its
industrial and agricultural proletariat. Uganda does not
belong to England, but to the black population within it...
rooted in it to such a great measure that no force of immi-
grants can annihilate it. Eretz Israel does not belong to
the British but only to the population working there....
More important than the question of mere majority is the
question of the normal industrial and agricultural proletar-
iat. Because any majority today which will not be able to
reach, naturally, proletarianization, or the way of prole-
tarianization is barred for it, will be increasingly expelled
from its position to the point of death....The most important
question is, where could the Jews reach normal proletariani-
zation? ... Where is the country wherein we shall not have to
fear... not only foreign immigration and capitalization, but
mainly foreign proletarianization...? We know only one such
territory that can satisfy all these requirements and that is:
Wadi El-Arish (reference to Israel). It is a difficult dis-
tance from capitalist developed states, located near the sea,
its population is nomad and can always migrate east, and the
country has a hot subtropical climate which would make accli-
mation more difficult for a European than for a Jew." 100
In light of this statement, it becomes easier to comprehend the func-
tion, not only of proletarianization in the realization of Borochovist terri-
torialism, but also of the twin slogans, "Boycott Arab Labor," and "Conquer
Hebrew Work". The latter seems to be directly linked to the view of Jewish
proletarianization and the proletarianization of the native inhabitants of
the territory, as mutually exclusive processes. This mutual exlusiveness
lies, economically, in the state of the productive forces based on middle
and petty Jewish capital and restricted to forms of capitalist accumulation
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ranging from the primitive to the competitive, but not politically into mono-
poly. However, this mutual exclusiveness lies in the material requirements
for the emergence of a nation-state which is bourgeois and Jewish. The twin
slogans mentioned above are derivatives of the proletarian Zionist ideology.
The ideological seems the most explicit and occupies the place of dominance
(over the political and economic) in Borochovism. It is always the economic
that determines which of the three instances to be dominant in a particular
conjuncture. Here we see clearly how it is not at all accidental that the
ideological is dominant even in theory (and not only in practice, as demon-
strated in the following chapter) during the pre-Statehood phase of Jewish
colonial settlement in Palestine. The dominance of the economic or the poli-
tical would have inevitably exposed the proletarian mythology and unravelled
the bourgeois aspirations inherent in Borochovism. Mobilization on the basis
of "proletarian" ideology seems even theoretically essential for the realiza-
tion of the economic and the political of a truly bourgeois program.
Borochov is very conscious of the perfect conditions for the capitali-
zation of middle and petty Jewish capital; Jewish proletarianization is seen
as one of the conditions for, and consequences of, such forms of capitaliza-
tion: "Jewish immigration is slowly tending to direct itself to a country
where petty Jewish capital and labor may be utilized in such forms of produc-
tion as will serve a transition from an urban to an agricultural economy and
from production of consumer goods to more basic forms of industry." 101
Implicitly, Borochov advocates for the first phase a balanced capital-
ist development scale, which guarantees the capitalization of petty Jewish
capital, on the one hand, yet within the boundaries of Jewish sectarianism,
on the other; a development model which is uneven enough to steer-up class
struggle and give rise to a bourgeois state, yet, even enough to guarantee
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the Jewishness of the economy, of the class struggle, so that it gives rise
to a Jewish State. Put differently, what Borochov advocates is simply Jewish
capitalism. This is true at least for the first run. As far as the "second
run" is concerned, Borochov leaves it to be determined by history. Jewish
capitalism (as opposed to cosmopolitan socialism and capitalism) is, for him,
the only guarantee for Judaism, for preserving Jewish particularism. Boro-
chov, however, fails to recognize the contradiction inherent in his develop-
ment model; that is, the unity of two opposite tendencies: captialist secu-
larization versus Jewish sectarianism.
For him, at least in the first run,
"...The emancipation of the Jewish people either will be
brought about by Jewish labour, or it will not be attained
at all. But the labour movement has only one weapon at its
command: the class struggle. The class struggle must as-
sume a political character if it is to lead to a better
future. Proletarian Zionism is possible only if its aims can
be achieved through the class struggle; Zionism can be real-
ized only if proletarian Zionism can be realized..." 102
This is the strategy of Jewish labor for the realization of the Jewish
State. Borochovist Zionism is proletarian not in the sense of representing
the interest of the Jewish proletariat, but as a theory-of-action which sees
the realization of Zionism necessarily conditioned by Jewish proletarianiza-
tion. Borochovism is, therefore, not a proletarian program for abolishing
social classes. Quite the contrary, it is a theory and a plan of sectarian
class formation as a means for a sectarian bourgeois State. More precisely,
it is a methodology for developing a sectarian bourgeois State in the con-
text of settler-colonialism.
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Conclusions
Uneven capitalist development is a necessary outcome of and condition
for Jewish class formation and struggle.
Borochovism is thus a theory aimed at the creation of a class society,
not of a classless society. A classless society is incompatible with Zion-
ism, as the State is nothing but an outcome, object, and a unifier of
class struggle, a condensed relation of struggling social classes: Boro-
chov's is necessarily one of class formation, not abolishment, of social
classes. Borochovism is, therefore, objectively a capitalist development
strategy. The "socialist" ideology and Utopian forms of production that
derive from Borochovism can be only used to promote capitalist development
to its present stage where it serves to obscure the actual dynamic of the
present transformation of the social formation.
In Levenberg's Selected Studies in Labor-Zionism, Nachman Syrkin
writes: "Borochov was one of the staunchest supporters of the cooperative
[our emphasis] colonization movement, although at first he believed it was
a negation of the class struggle." [our emphasis] The underlined, if
documented, confirms our point regarding the imperative of uneven develop-
ment for class struggle and regarding the role of cooperative colonization
(the kibbutz and moshav models) in promoting capitalist development in the
context of essentially sectarian relations of production. This point will
be demonstrated in the following chapter in the analysis of the applica-
tion of Labor-Zionism.
The strength of the Borochovist strategy lies precisely in his cor-
rect understanding of the material conditions of Jewish life in Diaspora
and the material prerequisites for the emergence of the Jewish State,
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and further, in identifying the very segment of the Jewish masses who are
under material conditions that make them the most fit to become the van-
guards of Zionism; these were the "proletarianizing masses" who had nothing
to lose in Diaspora. Implicit in his development strategy which is essen-
tially for a Jewish social formation in which the capitalist mode of pro-
duction is dominant are three possibilities for proletarianizing the
masses:
(1) to become a national bourgeoisie;
(2) to restore their petty bourgeois locations;
(3) to become proletariat in secure employment and for a cause,
the actualization of Zionism.
The shortcoming in the Borochovist strategy lies in not foreseeing
the post-monopoly nation-State. His strategy derives from a Marxist con-
ception of the pre-monopoly state. Therefore, as will be seen in a later
chapter, the sectarian bourgeois state based on Jewish capitalist relation
conflicts with the essential internationalization of capital as the pri-
mary function of the nation-State in the age of monopoly capitalism.
In the transition from this chapter on the development of the Boro-
chovist theory into the following one on the practice of Borochovism, we
hope to shed light on the links between theory and reality for interpre-
ting the world and theory and reality for changing the world.
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"...[The required territory's] economic impor-
tance could be in that the new Jewish society
which will be created in the territory will serve
as a refuge and a work place for the oppressed
Diaspora Jews. For that purpose it is necessary
that the Jewish immigrants could, in that terri-
tory, reach normal capitalization and proletarian-
ization and that the competition from the local
bourgeoisie and local proletariat will not push
them outside of the market.
"...More important than the question of mere
majority is the question of normal industrial and
agricultural proletariat, because any majority to-
day which will not be able to reach naturally pro-
letarianization, or that proletarianization is
barred from it, will be increasingly expelled of
its position to the point of death.* Therefore,
the most important question...is: where could the
Jews reach normal proletarianization?...where is
the country wherein we shall not have to fear, just
as other countries do not fear, not only foreign
immigration and capitalization, but mainly foreign
proletarianization...
"...The best and essential advantage of Eretz Is-
rael is that it is not completely savage and not a
country of culture. Therefore, its transition to
higher forms of economy will be slow enough and
gradual and we shall not require these to start
with great beginning investments like in a "terri-
tory" and in the first period we shall be satisfied
with Jewish proletariat. Over time, of course, the
process of proletarianization of the peasants which
will flow into the factories will begin."
Ber Borochov, Selected Writings
Translated from Hebrew by Z.
Rubashov (Shazar) (unpublished
manuscript), pp. 8, 32, 35.
*
My emphasis
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I. Introduction
This chapter is a historical review of Palestinian proletarianization
in the context of Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine.
Proletarianization is often defined as the separation of producers from
their means of production, specifically, land. If so, then one would ex-
pect that land colonization by Jewish settlers and the proletarianization
of the native Palestinian population went hand-in-hand. This definition of
proletarianization is, however, inadequate and such correlation between set-
tlers' colonization and natives' proletarianization has not been the case in
Palestine, probably owing to peculiar objective and subjective conditions
that this chapter will deal with.
It is not only the expropriation of producers from their land that con-
stitutes the proletarianization process; but it is only in the context of
capitalist relations that expropriation from the land constitutes an aspect
of proletarianization.1
The imperative of separating the producers from their own land and/or
other means of subsistence is peculiar to capitalist relations. As Karl
Marx and Frederick Engels write:
"In the Middle Ages it was not the expropriation of the
people from, but on the contrary, their appropriation to
the land which became the source of feudal oppression....
It was only at the dawn of modern times, towards the end
of the fifteenth century, that the expropriation of the
peasantry on a large scale laid the foundation of the mod-
ern class of wage-workers who possess nothing but their
labor power and can live only by selling that labor power
to others. But if the expropriation from the land brought
this class into existence, it was the development of capi-
talist production, of modern industry and agriculture on
a large scale which perpetrated it, increased it and shaped
it into a distinct class with distinct interests and a dis-
tinct historical mission." 2
It is this transformation of pre-capitalist producers into a modern
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class of wage-workers which is what we mean by proletarianization. Prole-
tarianization, therefore, goes beyond the separation of producers from their
means of subsistence. It further involves the separation of laborers from
their own labor power, the exchange of that labor power against capital, re-
sulting in class formation and struggle. This involves the emergence of a
bourgeoisie and a proletariat as distinct social forces with distinct class
interests that are intrinsically antagonistic. Such class formation is in-
dispensable to capitalist accumulation, and its outcome.
As Marx explains, for capitalist accumulation to work two different
kinds of commodity possessors must come face to face: on the one hand, own-
ers of money, means of production, who are eager to increase their capital
by buying other people's labor; on the other hand, "free" laborers, the sel-
lers of their ability to work, their labor power. Free laborers in the sense
of being neither part and parcel of the means of property as in the case of
slaves, nor owning or possessing any means of production as the source of
their exploitation, as in the case of the peasant proprietor. They are there-
fore "free" and unencumbered by any means of production of their own. This
"freedom", however, is coercive. Generally, the emergence of "free" laborers
has been the outcome of a cruel and violent process throughout the history of
capitalism. Historically, free labor constituted one of the prerequisites
for wage labor, which is, in turn, the condition for capital. As Marx states
in his Pre-capitalist Economic Formations:
"One of the prerequisites of wage labor and one of the histori-
cal conditions for capital is free labor and the exchange of
free labor against money....Another prerequisite is the separa-
tion of free labor from the objective conditions of its reali-
zation - from the means and material of labor. This means above
all that the worker must be separated from the land, which func-
tions as his natural laboratory...." 4
In this sense, wage-labor implies freedom to own, and also freedom to
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sell, one's own labor power. Proletarianization is, therefore, a two-fold
process that presupposes the availability of both sellers and buyers of la-
bor power, simultaneously. It can be said to have a supply side and a de-
mand side to it: the creation of labor surplus, and the absorption of
this surplus in commodity production as a commodity. It is one of the
peculiarities of capitalism that labor power becomes, itself, a commodity
and can produce value only as a commodity that has an exchange value. Marx's
statement, "the expropriation of people from the soil forms the basis of the
capitalist mode of production...the prelude to the history of capital",5 im-
plies, therefore, that wage-labor (conditioned by free labor, which is, in
turn, the result of separation from means of production) is, itself, a con-
dition for capital in its productive form. The latter is important. It
means that proletarianization is linked to capital in production only, but
not to capital in circulation. It is, thus, a feature of capitalist accumu-
lation in the sphere of production, as distinguished from capital activity
in the sphere of circulation.
That proletarianization is peculiar only to one form of capital, namely
productive capital, simultaneously as an effect of it and the condition for
it, is strongly emphasized in the Marxist theory:
"One of the most obvious peculiarities of the movement in
the circuits of industrial capital, and therefore of capi-
talist production, is the fact that on the one hand the com-
ponent elements of productive Capital are derived from the
commodity market and must be continually renewed out of it,
though, as commodities and that on the other hand the pro-
duct of the labor-process emerges from it as a commodity and
must be continually sold anew as a commodity. Therefore,
Capitalist production cannot reach its full scope until the
direct agricultural producer becomes a wage-laborer; the
money relation between the buyer and the seller becomes a
relation inherent in production; but has its foundation in
the social character of production, not in the mode of ex-
change." 6 (emphasis added)
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In this sense, labor is proletarianized once it is engaged in commodity
production and in the creation of surplus value, i.e., as long as it is ex-
changed against capital within the sphere of production in the form of vari-
able capital which is inversely related to constant capital. This is to say,
as it becomes the condition for increasing the organic composition of capi-
tal at the expense of itself, as it faces capital antagonistically; in other
words, as class struggle begins.
It is in this sense that proletarianization is essentially a process of
class formation: as social classes only exist in class struggle, they are
formed and are defined in class struggle. Social classes do not emerge and
then enter class struggle; rather, they emerge through class struggle itself
as distinct social forces with distinct interests, and therefore with "an
historical mission". The proletariat is the opponent of the bourgeoisie;
these are the two principal classes of the capitalist mode of production.
Both classes are defined in the class struggle inherent in capitalist accumu-
lation, in the fundamental tendency for the organic composition of capital
to rise. Proletarianization and embourgeoisement constitute the dual aspects
of the capitalist accumulation process. Capitalist relations, as a condi-
tion necessary to the initiation of the proletarianization process, may be
destroyed by the process itself. This leads into a finer treatment of the
proletarianization concept; with regard to formation not only of "a class
in itself", but also of "a class for itself". This refers to the develop-
ment by the proletariat of consciousness of its own class interest, defined
by its objective location in production, and ultimately of the necessity to
act upon this consciousness by creating contradictions in the dominant mode
of accumulation. This is fulfilling its historical mission as a class for
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itself, as a class fit for self-emancipation from exploitation as the cre-
ator of surplus value for the capitalist class. Proletarianization, there-
fore, signifies the possible development of a revolutionary potential among
the producers of society's material values. This may clarify for us why
Borochov's emphasis on the necessity of Jewish proletarianization and Jewish
capiLallzation for the Jewish political class struggle to emerge was trans-
lated into the slogan of "Conquest of Hebrew Labor", as will be seen in the
following chapter. It may also shed light on the rationale underlying the
deliberate Zionist policy to prohibit the proletarianization of the native
Palestinian population, as demonstrated below.
Before we enter into the specifics of proletarianization in Palestine,
it is necessary to develop and keep in mind an additional theoretical point:
the process that transforms the social means of production into capital and
the immediate producers into wage-labor often expresses a relationship be-
tween a population becoming proletarianized and a developing or expanding
or concentrating bourgeoisie. Proletarianization is not just a separation
of producers from the means of production but also a concentration of these
means in the hands of another class. The alienation of the workers from
the means of production, including their own labor power, and the access
to, and control over these means by the capitalists, are two aspects of the
same process. The creation of surplus value by some segments of the popula-
tion implies the existence of a non-laboring class subsisting and expanding
its capital from the extraction of this surplus value.
These dual aspects of capital accumulation, proletarianization and
embourgeoisement, manifest the essential unevenness of capitalist develop-
ment. Although in theory it is not inaccurate to abstract proletarianiza-
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tion and embourgeoisement as the dual social aspects of the capitalist ac-
cumulation process, in reality proletarianization is not accompanied by em-
bourgeoisement within all social formations (a local proletariat co-existing
with a correlative local bourgeoisie), and it does not always involve the
entire mass of immediate producers. This depends on the historical specifi-
ally hegemonic capital. It also depends on the extent to which proletarian-
ization results merely from the penetration of capital or also from the
generalization of the capitalist relations of production. Put differently,
proletarianization does necessarily presuppose capitalist relations of pro-
duction, but it is not peculiar to capitalist social formations.
The development of capitalism in metropolitan countries, for example,
resulted in the liquidization of the peasantry as a social class, and the
proletarianization of almost the entire mass of immediate producers (except
for some petty commodity producers who, being threatened by proletarianiza-
tion, immigrated to settle "new" lands: the United States, Australia,
South Africa, Palestine, etc.). Because accumulation of capital in the
metropolis occurred under the generalization of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction, effecting the polarization of society into capitalists and modern
wage-workers as the principal classes and social forces within those social
formations, they became capitalist social formations. A capitalist social
formation exists when capitalist relations are generalized in the form of
local proletariat and bourgeoisie. After colonialism, the reproduction of
these relations, in turn, urges the integration and subordination of pre-
capitalist social formation. A feature of monopoly capitalism, this inte-
gration distorts the previously dominant relations in the latter, and their
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boundaries as distinct social formations.
Under colonialism, proletarianization, for the most part, preceded the
emergence of a local bourgeoisie. The introduction of commercialized agri-
culture and plantation economy was imposed by colonial powers through the
penetration of capital; distorting the traditional relations of production,
with conscious effuLL uuL t alow for the general
ist relations within the colony (classic examples are Malaysia, the Carib-
beans and East Africa, where the British imported Chinese and Indian labor
to be proletarianized in the rubber and other plantations, keeping intact
the local social structure). Colonial powers are not interested in develop-
ing a competitor local industrial bourgeoisie, but rather in maintaining
the colony as a market for their own manufactured goods, and as a pool of
cheap resources.
Under neo-colonialism, distinguished by the drive for a capital market,
local industrialization and the emergence of a dependent bourgeoisie become
indispensable for the extended reproduction of capitalism on a world scale.
Proletarianization occurs directly through foreign capital penetration, or
through a local bourgeoisie, whose very existence is dependent on the inter-
national bourgeoisie. In this case, capitalist relations predominate, sub-
ject to the logic of capitalist accumulation on a world scale. It does not
culminate, however, in the generalization of capitalist relations to the
entire mass of immediate producers.8 On the contrary, an underdeveloped
"traditional" sector is deliberately maintained and distorted to provide
for the development of the "modern" sectors. The largest proportion of
immediate producers is linked indirectly to the capitalist accumulation
process, and hence, impoverished without proletarianization: they are
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forced to join the army of the unemployed labor surplus and indirectly re-
duce the bargaining power and subsistence cost of the employed labor force,
thus enabling capital to reap super profits.
In settler-colonialism, foreign settlers with capital are usually brought
in to settle the land, not only extract value. They are expected to find
their workers among the indigenous population. This was the case, for exam-
ple, when the English appeared in the Cape Colony of South Africa in 1906.
They came as potential capitalists in need of a class of laborers to be ex-
ploited.
According to Bernard Magubane, from the beginning of white settler
colonization in South Africa, and in the process of harnessing the indige-
nous labor, a policy of conquest was begun that would not destroy the popu-
lation but that would rather deprive it of its land and subsistence and
thus reduce it, in effect, to a mere instrument in the process of capital-
ist prosperity. The Africans were subjected to both expropriation and ap-
propriation. That was the secret both of the conquest and the setting up
of reservations in which it was difficult for the Africans to maintain inde-
pendent subsistence. Hence, they become wage-workers, reproduced cheaply
over and over again.9
In this case, using Archie Mafeje's expression, the logic of predatory
capitalism has not been replacement of the old social formation by a new
one but rather establishment of a "hybrid" social formation. Although
Mafeje uses the creation and perpetuation of hybrid forms to describe the
objectives of West European capitalism in the colonies in general, I find
this idea more uniquely applicable to settler colonial social formations,
specifically in Africa, with the co-existence of an alien bourgeoisie with
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an indigenous proletariat.
The case of white settler-colonialism in the United States was somewhat
different. It represented a pre-capitalist settler-colonialism where set-
tlers with merchant capital, by instituting slavery, made their capital pro-
ductive; then, by abolishing slavery (the Civil War), created a pool of
"free" wage-labor. Capitalist relations were then generalized only to the
non-indigenous population. The native Indians, however, were subjected to
extermination, not proletarianization.
In Palestine, settler-colonialism was quite different from the above,
in that it involved more than simply settlers with capital in search of em-
bourgeoisement. Jewish settlers were brought to Palestine as the vanguard
of Zionism, being the movement that represented the aspirations of the Jew-
ish bourgeoisie for a State of their own. These Jewish settlers were mainly
small capitalists and petty bourgeoisie who had internalized this form of
consciousness (as it coincided with their own class aspirations) and were
entrusted with the "historical" mission of creating a Jewish bourgeois State
in Palestine to act on behalf of the Jewish bourgeoisie in Diaspora. For
the sake of this mission they were to refrain from conquering native labor;
instead, they mobilized immigrant Jewish labor, to be conquered by the set-
tlers' Jewish capital. It is similar in this respect to the U.S. experi-
ence.
Unlike the case in white settler-colonial South Africa, where the pro-
letarianization of the natives was the function of generalizing the capi-
talist mode of production in a "hybrid" social formation, under Jewish set-
tler-colonialism, forming a hybrid social formation was in direct contra-
diction with the objectives of Zionism. A pure Jewish social formation
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that replaces the indigenous one was to be developed in order to give rise
to the Jewish State. For this reason, the Jewish settlers were prohibited
from exploiting the indigenous labor. Immigrant Jewish labor was mobilized
to replace the native. The "conquest of Hebrew labor" became the incentive
for Jewish proletarianization, equivalent in some ways to the "work ethic"
in the United States settler-colonialism. Jewish proletarianization was
also the result of generalizing the capitalist relations of production on
the Jewish immigrant population alone, becoming both bourgeoisie and pro-
letariat; but not on the native Palestinians, who were excluded even from
proletarianization. The Palestinians were not meant exactly to be annihil-
ated, as in the case of the American Indians; they were only to be denied
the possibility of wage-earning. Emphasizing the imperative of exclusive
Jewish proletarianization in Palestine, Borochov said: "...any majority
today which will not be able to reach naturally proletarianization, or
that proletarianization is barred from it, will be increasingly expelled
of its position to the point of death."1 1 Does this imply that underlying
the commitment to proletarian Zionism there was an a priori awareness of
the detrimental repercussions it was to necessarily inflict on the native
Palestinian producers? This question is to be kept in mind for a later
discussion.
The central theme of this chapter is to illustrate how Jewish colonial
settlement in Palestine, while implementing Labor-Zionism (hence, the
generalization of the capitalist relations with regard to Jews alone in
the form of exclusive Jewish proletarianization and capitalization), had
blocked the proletarianization of the native Palestinians.
To this end, we identify three historical phases in Jewish colonial
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settlement in Palestine: (1) the Yishuv phase, distinguished by the domi-
nance of the ideological; (2) the nation-building phase, distinguished by
the dominance of the political; and (3) the post-1967 phase, distinguished
by the dominance of the economic.
We try to demonstrate that during all three phases Jewish settlement
is positively correlated only with the creation of Palestinian labor sur-
pluses, but that only in the current phase does Palestinian proletarianiza-
tion, per se, become a correlative of Jewish colonial settlement (currently
known as "Judiazation" schemes).
To sum up, unlike the previous chapter, which focuses on aspects of
the historical material determinants and nature of Labor-Zionism in theory,
the present chapter reviews aspects of the historical practices under the
hegemony of Labor-Zionism.
II. Jewish Settlement and Palestinian Proletarianization During the Yishuv:
1882-1948
The Yishuv represents Israel's social formation in its embryonic stage.
It is the first phase of colonization by pioneer Jewish settlers prior to
the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine. This is the period in
which Jewish class formation began by means of institutional arrangements
(the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund and the Histadrut), often re-
garded as the formative elements of the State. It is in the practice of
these institutions that proletarian Zionism seems to be embedded; and it is
through these institutional arrangements that Jewish labor, capital and
land were to be acquired and regulated for exclusive Jewish use and control,
as prerequisite for the emergence of Jewish class society and political
class struggle, and for the replacement of the indigenous Palestinian society.
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As recalled from the preceding chapter, this period is also one of
major transformations in world history in general and, correspondingly, in
the history of the Jewish people and of Palestine in particular. The dis-
integration of East-European feudalism, the transition of capitalism from
its competitive stage to the stage of imperialism, the beginning of monopoly
formation and the rise of finance capital. Development along these lines in-
flicted displacement and even threatened liquidation of the petty bourgeoisie
as a social class. As predominantly petty bourgeoisie, the Jewish masses
were severely injured by these processes. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the pioneering ideals of Hovevi Zion and, later on, Labor-Zionism, ap-
pealed to the Jewish masses and mobilized them for the construction of uto-
pian forms of colonialism.
During this period, Palestine was the battleground for struggle among
various historical forces: decadent Ottoman imperialism; modern British
colonialism; a recently emerging feudalism; an established merchant class;
and an embryonic industrial bourgeoisie on the verge of emerging in the strug-
gle among all these forces.
In the midst of this complexity it is difficult to establish accurately
the relationship between Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine and the
proletarianization of the native population. It may be helpful, therefore,
to specify four interrelated subissues:
A. Characterization of the Palestine social formation: the
nature of its class structure, the state of development of
the productive forces at the disposal of the native Pales-
tinian population, as they have special bearing on the pro-
letarianization process with and without Zionist colonialization.
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B. Characterization of Jewish settlement under the hegemony of
proletarian Zionism: examination of the Borochovist strategy
in practice.
C. The dispossession of Palestinian peasantry
D. The boycott of Palestinian labor.
A. Characterization of the Palestine Social Formation
Up until World War I, Palestine constituted an integral part of the
Levant, i.e., Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, a unity prior to colonial par-
tition. The mercantilist class was the unifying force among these three
differentiated societies. This is unlike Egypt, for example, where the uni-
fying force lay in the land-holding class. The Levant was in the process of
forming a socioeconomic unity, and probably of becoming a social formation.
The indigenous landed class was not strongly connected across the boun-
daries of these three regions of the Levant as was the case with the commer-
cial bourgeoisie. The indigenous merchant bourgeoisie was the natural op-
ponent of Ottoman feudal imperialism. It was under the yoke of an Ottoman
imperialism, on the verge of collapse, that an Arab land-holding class was
forming, precisely from commercial capital. From the same source of capital
indigenous manufacture was beginning to develop, faced, however, with strong
resistance on the part of Ottoman imperialism, on the one hand, and modern
colonialism, on the other. This was manufacture based on the petty commod-
ity form in which accumulation remains confined to the sphere of circula-
tion.
On the eve of British occupation in 1920, and the imposition of British
Mandatory Rule on Palestine, the bulk of the Palestinian-Arab population
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(430,000 of a total 757,182) were peasants and the large majority of land-
owners were feudal lords.
Prior to World War I, 250 feudal landlords owned 4,143,000 donams (1
donam = 1,000 square meters), which equalled all peasant-owned land. 29
percent of Palestinian peasants were landless. The development of a mone-
tary economy and commodity production allowed for further concentration of
property, mainly land. Consequently, the latifundia structure was formed.
This, in turn, reinforced the imposition of higher taxation on the small
peasant and, in effect, forced the peasant to "free" himself from property
relations, resulting in greater concentration of property and in class
polarization: land-holders, on the one hand, and the bulk of peasants be-
coming seasonal sharecroppers or tenants, on the other. It is worth stress-
ing here that concentration of land in the context of private property took
place upon the distintegration of the original communal ownership of land,
which used to be held collectively in "Masha'a" tenure.
The disintegration of the Masha'a communal land tenure system in order
to provide for more effective taxation was one of the objects of the Ottoman'
Land Code of 1858. Under the yoke of immense rural indebtedness, the indi-
vidual cultivators were, in effect. forced to sell their small holdings to
wealthy merchants and become share-tenants. This is how the land-holding
class emerged from merchant capital, and how the existing subsistence economy
was caught in a process of disintegration as a result of the gradual absorp-
tion of the Turkish Empire into the capitalist orbit. 1 3
Industrial production remained retarded. It was only in the 1890s that
the first industrial projects were established in the country; a silk manu-
facturing plant and a raisins-and-spices processing factory in Tantura, fol-
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lowed by soap and food industries, textiles in Gaza, leather industry in
Jerusalem, olive and sesame oil processing factories in Nablus, Jaffa, Jeru-
salem and Haifa. Haifa had, in addition, a manufacturing project for irri-
gation machines. In the aftermath of the First World War, Palestine's in-
dustry consisted merely of small-scale units of production (both factories
and guilds) employing between 6-10 workers. 1 4
When the British Mandate was first imposed on Palestine, however, there
was only the beginning of a wage-earning grouping under non-capitalist re-
lations of production, as in citrus plantations. Capital remained predomi-
nantly merchant also in manufacture under the predominance of the guild sys-
tem of production. The majority of the small-town dwellers were engaged in
agriculture, specifically orchards (citrus plantations). City dwellers con-
sisted mainly of professionals, handlers, stonecutters, builders and un-
skilled rural immigrant workers.1 5
The penetration of British capital into Palestine did not transform the
guild and stimulate modern production. On the contrary, it crippled the
guild system and probably blocked the development of modern industry. Even
in production, indigenous capital remained money capital.1 6
Until the eighteenth century, goods manufactured under the guild system
were exported to Europe. Following the Industrial Revolution, however,
these goods were forcefully removed even from Palestine's local market to
provide a marketplace for imported European commodities. 1 7
Concessions obtained by Western powers, on the one hand, and the intensi-
fication of feudal plunder, on the other, resulted in crippling both local
trade and industry, and eliminating the possibility for the development of
a modern national bourgeoisie. As Frederick Engels explains, in the face of
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such acute plunder on the part of the oppressive rulers, accumulation of
surplus value was by no means guaranteed as one of the basic conditions
for entrepreneurship, i.e., the protection of the merchants' identity and
property was denied.1 8
As is the case in almost all other colonies, in Palestine also British
colonialism fostered neither the development of local industry (except for
the extractive industries) nor the formation of a Palestinian bourgeoisie.
Unlike the case in other colonies, however, British colonialism in Pales-
tine did not foster even the development of a money capitalist class, or an
intellectual ruling elite organically linked with British colonialism as its
indigenous ally, as was the case in India, Egypt, etc., since it had found
a better local ally among the Western Jewish colonial settlers.
Following Ottoman feudal plunder, British-Zionist colonial collaboration
had obstructed the development of a genuinely independent Palestinian ruling
class of any kind. The emerging Palestinian dominant class itself sought an
ally in British powers against both Ottoman oppression and Zionist invasion;
and by so doing, it promoted Zionism itself, and played an insignificant and
rather misleading role in leading the struggle of the Palestinian masses in
the economic, political and ideological spheres for decolonization.
Also unlike the typical case, in Palestine British colonialism was not
primarily to extract raw materials, but rather to control and use the stra-
tegic location of Palestine: strategic for its international trade and in-
dustrial undertakings. British capital was therefore invested primarily in
infrastructural projects: construction of roads, ports, railways, oil
pipelines, etc., and only secondarily in agricultural production, specifi-
cally citrus plantations.
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British Mandatory authorities, on the other hand, provided a constant
support to Jewish industry and trade at the expense of the Arab. They pro-
vided Jewish capital with both political and economic protection and privi-
leges (e.g., the exclusive concession to exploit the Dead Sea in 1929, pro-
tection from tariffs imposed on Arab trade, and the privileged tax deduction
subsidized by the heavy taxation of Arab industry).1 9
British oppressive policy, the competitiveness of the more technologi-
cally advanced Jewish industry, and the enforcement of the Zionist slogan:
"Boycott Arab Produce", inflicted detrimental effects on Arab industry. Be-
tween 1930-1935 the total export of the Arab "shell" industry declined from
11,533 to 3,777 pounds, the number of soap factories in Jaffa alone dwindled
from 12 in 1929 to 4 in 1935. The latter should not be mistaken for concen-
tration of capital, as total production in the soap industry (one of the
basic Arab industries in Palestine) declined between 1931-1934 from 119,941
to 71,532 pounds. 2 0
It is only natural that such decline occurred in Arab industry in the
face of two more competitive manufacture systems (British and Jewish) and
the imposition of unfavorable terms of trade. Moreover, the gap between the
indigenous industry and the settlers' only widened as the British authorities
in Palestine granted 90 percent of the foreign privileges to Jewish indus-
trialists at the expense of the natives.2 1
The figures in Table Y are indicative of the uneven development and
distribution of means of production and reproduction in Arab versus Jewish
industry, and how unevenness was perpetuated by British privileges and pro-
tection policy.
It was only during the Second World War, when the British army in Pales-
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tine was required to be economically self-sufficient, that there was an im-
petus to invest in local industrial and agricultural production. In 1945,
therefore, Arab and Jewish citrus production had, for the first time, level-
led up.22
Arab industry, however, continued to lag behind, and even at a moment
of economic boom it was not transformed into large-scale modern forms of
production.
Table Y. Uneven Jewish Versus Arab Industry in Palestine During the Yishuv
Jewish Industry Arab Industry Foreign Industry
Employed Labor Force 13,678 4,117 2,619
Total Production 6,046 1,545 1,215
Net Production 2,445 313 1,106
Fixed Capital 4,391 703 5,799
(capital investment,
by thousand pounds)
Machine Power 40,644 3,914 133,128
(by horses)
Wages and Salaries 1,008 122 274
Source: Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine, Vol. I, p. 499.
Copied from Yassin, op. cit., p. 163. Date of Survey unknown.
In 1942, Palestine's Arab industry consisted of 1,558 establishments
engaging 8,804 persons; an establishment/employee ratio that is indicative
of the predominance of small-scale commodity form,23 amounting to only 10
percent of total industrial produce in Palestine. These figures express
the persistence of a structural weakness in the Arab industry from earlier
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stages and a widening gap with regard to Jewish industry. In 1935, Arab
industrial produce amounted to LP 1,545,000, as compared with LP 6,046,000
of Jewish industrial produce, i.e., 20 percent of total industrial produce.2 5
Moreover, in 1945 there were 1,558 Arab establishments employing LP 2 mil-
lion capital input, producing LP 5.6 million, as compared with 1,907 Jewish
establishments employing 1P 12 million capital input and producing 1P 29
millions.26 The latter figures are even more indicative than the former of
the relative structural weakness of Arab in comparison with Jewish industry,
as they point out major disparities in the organic composition of capital,
as between the Jewish and Palestinian economies.
Having roughly characterized the indigenous social formation during the
first phase of Jewish settlement in Palestine, we identify two features
with special bearing on promoting the creation of native labor surplus, and
on its absorption in modern production:
(a) concentration of land ownership, feudal plunder, resulting in
peasant dispossession and landlessness.
(b) the underdevelopment of Palestinian-Arab trade by colonial poli-
cies, depleting possible savings and thus impeding the develop-
ment of modern Palestinian industry.2 7
The latter point becomes more important if it proves to be responsible
for the nonemergence of a progressive Palestinian bourgeoisie capable of
revolutionizing the productive forces at the disposal of the native popula-
tion, and hence, offsetting the effects of the Zionist boycott of Arab labor,
discussed in a following section.
One cannot simply attribute the nonemergence of a Palestinian indus-
trial bourgeoisie to Zionism. This point requires a special study, to inves-
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tigate carefully the underlying causes, as in Syria and Lebanon as well,
industrial capital was and still is crippled simply by the predominance of
the merchant class.
The absence of a Palestinian industrial bourgeoisie, however, must not
obscure the emergence of a Palestinian proletariat, subject to the logic of
capitalist accumulation on a world scale; this will be the subject of dis-
cussion in an ensuing section. In the following section we demonstrate
that as the commercial fraction of the ruling class was crushed by British
colonialism, it was the feudal fraction of the ruling class that was liqui-
dated by Zionist land acquisition policy and, correspondingly, the peasantry
itself. The following also highlights the contradictory effects of Zionism
as far as unifying/dividing Palestine from the Levant. How land purchases
resulted in the very liquidation of the Palestinian and absentee feudal
classes, transforming same into merchant capitalists who were, in 1948, re-
integrated into the unifying class of the Levant.
B. Characterizations of Jewish Settlement Under the Hegemony of Proletarian
Zionism
It was not until the second Aliyah (1904-1914) that the historical
practices of Labor-Zionism began. The first Aliyah, beginning in 1882 and
led by the Hovevi Zion (the Lovers of Zion) movement, was not guided by
socialist Zionist ideals; rather, by the pioneering ethos and the return-
to-the-soil slogan. European-Jewish settlers with capital were brought in
*Aliyah" is a Hebrew word meaning ascent, refers to "Jewish immigra-
tion to Palestine", and is distinguished from "Yiridah", meaning descent,
which refers to "Jewish emigration from Israel." The first, second, third,
fourth, and fifth Aliyahs refer to the major waves of Jewish immigration
to Palestine before Statehood.
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to develop Jewish agriculture and industry (financially sponsored by mil-
lionaire Baron Rotchilde) and were to capitalize by exploiting native labor.
Not significantly different from settler-colonial initiatives elsewhere in
the world except for being vanguards of a political movement (Zionism)
aiming at a specific objective, the creation of a Jewish State in Pales-
tine.28 The conquest of land was, in their conception, the only basic pre-
requisite for such an enterprise. Unlike the first, the second Aliyah,
guided by the socialist Zionist movement, was to operate in the context of
a well-defined strategy, "colonization through Jewish class struggle" and
a clear strategic objective: the creation of an exclusively Jewish prole-
tariat, this in order to "normalize" the "inverted pyramid" of Diaspora
Jewish socioeconomic structure. This strategy was translated into two
principles: the "conquest of land" (kibbush hakarka'a) was coupled with
the "conquest of labor" (kibbush ha'avodah) as the dual aspects of Zionist
policy. In practice, these twin principles were specified further in the
twin slogan of exclusive "Hebrew work", expressed in the boycott of Arab
labor; and "Jewish produce", expressed in the boycott of Arab produce.
Those were the cornerstones of "economic separateness" motivated by the
urge to suppress the competition of the increasingly abundant, and there-
fore cheap, native labor, so that an exclusive Jewish proletarianization
by Jewish capital (recall the Borochovist strategy) could be actualized.
Several objective contradictions seem to be inherent in the Labor-
Zionist strategy which (as demonstrated in the previous chapter) is the
theoretically consistent approach to the realization of Zionism in the
form of a bourgeoisie Jewish State. These contradictions lie in the very
requirements for exclusive Jewish proletarianization in Palestine. On the
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one hand, it requires a capitalist economy, as proletarianization necessari-
ly presupposes capitalist relations of production. This proletarianization
is to take place in the context of settler-colonialism, hence the "conquest
of land" prerequisite. The conquest of Palestinian land implies necessari-
ly the displacement of Palestinian peasantry, the dispossession of the in-
digenous immediate producers, and an abundance of native labor surplus;
thus, cheap labor conducive to the extraction of super profits.
Under these conditions, and subject to the logic of capitalist accu-
mulation (given that capital is a secular relation abiding by no religion
but profitability), Palestinian labor was more competitive than Jewish. To
create an exclusive Jewish proletariat it was therefore necessary that the
capitalist economy of the Jewish settlers be "closed", closed to nonJews,
specifically native labor, the rationale for the main Zionist slogan,
"Hebrew labor", prohibiting the employment of Arab labor in Jewish agricul-
ture and industry. But a capitalist economy cannot develop as a closed sys-
tem; capitalist accumulation and the extended reproduction of capital has
been historically conditioned by subordinating and subjecting less-develop-
ed pre-capitalist social formations as the sites for its reproduction. How
did the Labor-Zionist movement accommodate this contradiction? The answer
to this seems to lie in molding the "conquest of labor" principle in the
ambiguous slogan, "self-labor". That the settlers' economy be a closed
economy in the sense of labor self-sufficiency was explained away as a
negation of the typical colonial practices, which are based on the exploi-
tation of native labor.
The "self-labor" slogan provided for a flexible interpretation:
firstly, reliance on one's own labor, negating the notion of hired labor,
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specifically wage-labor, that is, the negation of the capitalist relations
of production; secondly, the reliance on Hebrew work only (Avoda'h Ivrit),
negating not wage-labor per se, but rather the employment of nonJewish wage-
labor, i.e., specifically Arab labor; the latter was made very explicit in
the "Boycott Arab Labor" and "Boycott Arab Produce" slogans and practices.
It advocated the capitalist mode of production to be generalized, but for
Jews only.
It is this dual meaning and practice of "self-labor" that provided for
the accommodation of the contradiction mentioned above. It did so by re-
storing for a segment of the Jewish settlers their petty bourgeois class-
location, by consolidating a sector of the Jewish economy based on self-
employment, on petty commodity forms of production; that is, on pre-capi-
talist relations and/or primitive accumulation. Concretely, the "self-
labor" sector, specifically the co-operative moshav, based precisely on
petty commodity form of production for exchange, as well as the kibbutz at
its stage of primitive capitalist accumulation, constituted the equivalent
of the "traditional sector", a pre-capitalist periphery indispensable for
the essential unevenness of capitalist accumulation in the country-at-
large.
The pre-capitalist sector (the co-operative sector, including the
moshav and the kibbutz) is thus maintained as functionally equivalent to
the so-called "traditional sector" co-existing with, and providing for, the
extended reproduction of the "modern capitalist sector" which is the urban
sector, including the coastal citrus plantations based entirely on a lais-
sez-faire pattern of development.29 This way, the Jewish capitalist econ-
omy can have self-sustained growth as a "closed" economy, closed in the
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sectarian sense, closed to the nonJewish native population.
The point is to realize the imperative of self-labor in the sense of
petty commodity forms of production (i.e., the rule of the co-operative
sector, often referred to as the "labor" sector) for actualizing the strate-
gic objective of exclusive Jewish proletarianization; that is, for consoli-
dating Jewish capitalism in Palestine; for sustaining the Yishuv as a dis-
tinct social formation which is Jewish, and which consists-of overlapping
capitalist and pre-capitalist relations.
The labor sector, based on self-labor, as a negation of wage-labor,
was indeed a prerequisite for the implementing of the policy of "Hebrew
wage-labor only" in the capitalist sector of the Yishuv, given the abundance
of "free" native labor created by the other twin principle of Zionist
colonization, namely, "conquest of land".
"Self-labor" in the sense of petty commodity form resolves another
contradiction inherent in the Labor-Zionist strategy, as an essentially ter-
ritorialist strategy: the conquest of land.
Although indispensable for creating a Jewish social formation, the
site for Jewish class formation and class struggle, the conquest of land,
on another level, stands in contradiction with Jewish proletarianization as
a strategic objective and a prerequisite for Jewish class struggle, and
hence, the emergence of a bourgeois State.
This is really the contradiction inherent in "colonization through
class struggle", the Borochovist strategy for implementing the Zionist
idea; a basic contradiction in socialist Zionism. A conquest of the land
implies an access on the part of Jewish settlers to the natives' means of
production. This, in turn, undermines the conditions for Jewish proletar-
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ianization, as Jewish wage-labor requires "free" Jewish labor, utterly
separated from the means of subsistence, specifically land. The conquest
of land eliminates the condition for Jewish proletarianization, for Jewish
wage-labor, namely free labor, as we explained earlier. It also increases
the competitiveness of the native labor for capitalist exploitation.
Self-labor-based co-operatives again reduce the intensity of this
contradiction. Land can be conquered collectively to house the "labor sec-
tor" alone, but not the mass of modern wage workers. This, in turn, pro-
motes the development of utopian forms of living (kibbutz, moshav) as in-
centives for Aliyah, furthering Jewish settlement.
The contradictions inherent in the strategic objectives of Labor-
Zionism are thus accommodated through its inner tactical consistency and
flexibility. Perhaps it is precisely in this tactical flexibility, inher-
ent in the nature of the strategy itself, that the secret for the mobiliz-
ing force of Borochovist Labor-Zionist strategy lies; it provided the dis-
placed Jewish petty bourgeoisie, threatened by extinction as a class (on
the verge of proletarianization or marginalization), with three alterna-
tives: (1) embourgeoisement by assuring Jewish wage-labor; (2) restoration
of their petty bourgeois class-location by assuring the possibility of
land and self-labor; (3) secure proletarianization by Jewish capital by
eliminating the threat of a more competitive labor, and above all, prole-
tarianization for a cause, Zionism.
These premises, implicit in the Borochovist formulation of the labor
strategy for the actualization of Zionism, are very insightfully derived
from the material conditions of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie in Diaspora
and from the conditions in the "territory" of Palestine. It is, perhaps,
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this compatibility of the strategy with the tactics and the material condi-
tion that made the Borochovist blend of the Zionist ideology appeal to the
masses and, therefore, become a material force, the basis for Jewish set-
tlement later on, and the hegemonic ideology during the Yishuv phase and
thereafter.
Moreover, the attempt to maintain two separate economies in Palestine
during the Yishuv, with a closed modern Jewish economy in the midst of the
indigenous, is often interpreted as an attempt to establish economic dual-
ism; a dual economy as a material base for bi-nationalism. This interpre-
tation is inaccurate, as the development pattern which actually took place,
an essentially capitalist economy transplanted into the heart of an under-
developed one, meant, in fact, the "replacement" of, not co-existence with,
the indigenous social formation. Simply put, there can be no overlapping
social formations in the same place and time (as, for example, the over-
lapping of patterns of relations of production, of modes within a social
formation). When and where Labor-Zionism was implemented it necessarily
meant, in effect, the uprooting or distorting of the indigenous social for-
mation. That is why we tend to assert that socialist bi-nationalism advo-
cated then by left-wing Zionism, specifically Hashomer Hatzair, was an
empty slogan. This does not necessarily imply hypocrisy or insincerity
on the part of its advocates, but perhaps failure to identify the material
prerequisites for such a solution and some ignorance of the actual effects
inflicted by the historical practices of socialist Zionism on the social
being of the Palestinian people. For Jewish settlers to strike roots in
Palestine (possible only by creating a social formation, or a reproduction,
site) under capitalist relations, it was eventually imperative to uproot
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the indigenous pre-capitalist social formation. If Zionist settler-colonial-
ism was, like white settler-colonialism in Africa, merely the export of set-
tlers with capital, and of capitalist relations of production, it could have
been not only unnecessary to uproot the indigenous social formation, but to
do so would have been economically detrimental for a planter Jewish aristo-
cracy's ability to prosper and survive.
But this was not the case with Jewish settlers in Palestine, as they
were the vanguards of socialist Zionism, committed to Jewish class formation
and struggle; their socialist Zionist ideals come in contradiction with the
Palestinian reality, with the Palestinian social formation. In order to be-
come a normal society, they had to deform and replace the indigenous.
Having, in the previous chapter, determined the bourgeois essence of
Borochovism, specifically the bourgeois aim of the Borochovist socialist
Zionist strategy of labor in the theoretical sphere, we divert our attention
in reviewing the practices of Zionist colonization to examine the extent to
which Borochovism was actually implemented.
Furthermore, in the proceeding we must keep in mind that Jewish settle-
ment was never a squatting phenomenon, a spontaneous takeover of land in
Palestine. It was rather an implementation of a pre-planned political pro-
gram, guided by a clear commitment, a specific strategy, aiming at a well-
defined goal: a bourgeois Jewish State.
Jewish settlement in Palestine is, therefore, to be conceived as the
implementation of a most comprehensive development plan; development at the
level of social formation. Only if we grasp the complexity and contradic-
tions inherent in this intricate colonization program, may we comprehend
the dynamics of its implementation process (Jewish settlement itself) and
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the effects it inflicted on the native population.
In his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on
Palestine, David Ben-Gurion, one of the foremost socialist Zionist thinkers
and practitioners, expresses in concrete terms the comprehensiveness of this
political program, as follows:
"When we say 'Jewish independence' or a 'Jewish State', we mean
Jewish labour, we mean Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture, Jew-
ish industry, Jewish sea. We mean Jewish safety, security, inde-
pendence, complete independence, as for any other free people." 30
It is in this sense that Jewish settlement is the creation of a complex
system, an entire society, a social formation; and it is in this context
that our inquiry regarding the proletarianization of Palestine must be
placed.
Most relevant to our inquiry are the twin principles, "conquest of land"
and "Hebrew work", which together constitute the cornerstone of this compre-
hensive plan. These two principles are the main determinants of the dis-
placement of Palestinian producers; included here, also, are the institution-
al arrangements which embodied these policies.
Although they appear and are practiced as separate slogans, the conquest
of land and the Hebrew labor policies constitute a functional unity, even in
the bourgeois postulates of Zionism, as expressed in the following words by
Teodore Herzel:
"The private lands in the territories granted to us we must grad-
ually take out of the hands of the owners. The poorer amongst
the population we try to transfer quietly outside our borders
by providing them with work in the transit countries, but in our
country we deny them all work. Those with property will join
us. The transfer of land and the displacement of the poor must
be done gently and carefully. Let the landowners believe that
they are exploiting us by getting over-valued prices. But no
lands shall be sold back to their owners." 31
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One cannot help but sense the bourgeois flavor in Herzel's concern for
the gentle performance of violence in terms of denying the native Palestin-
ians access to both land and work; the alternatives of subsistence. The
latter discriminatory practice was, according to Noam Chomsky, condemned
from the left within the Palestinian Yishuv, specifically by Y.T. Kolton,
according to whom the "conquest of land" gave the Zionist movement a stake
in the feudal system (made explicit in Herzel's statement). Similarly,
Kolton shows how the policy of "conquest of labor" led even the labor move-
ment to stand in the way of the development of the Arab labor movement.33
Although the statement above is precisely an expression of the leader
of bourgeois-Zionism, and condemned, probably sincerely, from left circles,
we argue that the conquest of labor and land is not only consistent with,
but even indispensable for, the socialist strategy of Zionism. If histori-
cal practices of Labor-Zionism support this argument, our theoretically-
based argument in the previous chapter, regarding the bourgeois essence of
Borochovism, will be also reinforced. Let us now examine these twin Zionist
practices.
(a) The Conquest of Land and the Dispossession of the Palestinian
Peasantry
The dispossession of the Palestinian peasant is a function of the inter-
locking relationship between Arab feudal plunder, British colonialism, and
Zionist land acquisition. The latter, however, played the major and most
systematic role in this process.
Under the heavy yoke of rural indebtedness many peasants were forced
to "free" themselves by turning over their small holdings to the landlords
and becoming share tenants. Similar was the effect of taxation imposed by
the British authorities, in turn transferring State-controlled land to Zion-
ist settlement institutions. Purchase of land was the predominant method
of land acquisition by the Zionist movement in the Yishuv. Land was pur-
chased mainly from feudal lords, specifically absentee landlords, resulting
in tenant eviction. As Christopher Sykes puts it:
"The land problem of Palestine came primarily from...the sales,
often of very large tracts of country, by absentee landlords to
Zionist individuals and syndicates. A usual condition of such
sales was that the tenants should be evicted, for of what interest
to Zionist was the possession of Arab-tenanted land? The wret-
ched people who had earned a living, sometimes for many genera-
tions, on the land in question, found themselves forced out of
their homes and deprived without compensation of their only means
of earning bread....Evicted tenants, the real sufferers by Jewish
immigration, were the essence of the Palestine problem." 34
Regardless of the method and form of Zionist land acquisition for Jew-
ish settlement, it was inevitably at the expense of the Palestinian small
peasant and tenant. This fact was recognized even by Arthur Ruppin, the
Jewish- Agency's expert on agriculture and settlement, in a secret memorandum
to the Jewish Agency (in 1930), stating:
"Land is the most necessary thing for our establishing roots in
Palestine. Since there are hardly any more arable unsettled lands
in Palestine, we are bound in each case of purchase of land and
its settlement to remove the peasants who cultivated the land
thus far, both owners of the land and tenants...." 35
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It is not only that land was transferred to Jewish settlers at the ex-
pense of the Palestinian peasant, but also that it was transferred away ir-
revocably.
This essential irrevocability of Zionist land acquisition was institu-
tionalized in the Keren Kayemeth Leisrael (Jewish National Fund) established
by the Zionist movement in 1901 as "the first instrument for the practical
implementation of the idea of Jewish renaissance" dedicated to the acquisi-
36
tion and development of land in "Eretz Israel". The title to the land
purchased by the JNF was to be held in perpetuity as the "inalienable pro-
perty of the Jewish people."37 Under no circumstances is the JNF allowed
to transfer ownership of land once it is acquired.38 The JNF was estab-
lished "for the purpose of settling Jews on such lands" as were acquired,
"to make any donations...likely to promote the interests of the Jews", "to
make advances to any Jews in the prescribed region", to use funds in ways
which "shall, in the opinion of the organization, be directly or indirectly
beneficial to persons of Jewish religion, race, or origin".39 The irrevoca-
bility of the displacement of Palestinian producers from land transferred
for Zionist colonization practically culminates in Article 23 of the stan-
dard JNF Lease Form, stipulating, inter alia: "The lessee undertakes to
execute all works connected with the cultivation of the holding only with
Jewish labour." 40
This basic restriction, written into the lease which the JNF contracted
with- the Zionist settlers chosen for immigration and put upon JNF lands to
cultivate them, shows not only the institutional irreversibility of the
displacement of the Palestinian producer from the means of subsistence, but
also the inseparability of the "conquest of land" and the "conquest of la-
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bor" (Jewish labor) in the Zionist proletarian strategy. This inseparabil-
ity represents the contradiction mentioned earlier regarding exclusive Jew-
ish access to land versus exclusive Jewish proletarianization.
The boycott of Arab labor is embodied even in the Zionist land acqui-
sition policy responsible for "freeing" Palestinian labor, for creating the
native labor surplus. Here lies, also, the other aspect of the contradic-
tion, the regulation of labor policy through land policy increases the com-
petitiveness of the native Arab labor vis-a-vis Jewish labor, in the con-
text of capitalist relations of production.
The JNF purchased land from the Turks, the British, Western Churches,
and Arab owners, mainly absentees, and sometimes from small peasants, pres-
sured by the yoke of indebtedness and taxation. Between 1882 and 1914, Jew-
ish-owned land increased from 25,000 to 420,000 donams.41 Jewish holdings
purchased by JNF and other Zionist private or public agencies amounted to
594,000 in 1922, 1,058,500 in 1939, and 1,604,800 in 1941.42 "The number
of landless agricultural workers was estimated at 30,000 families, or 22
percent of the total 120,000 families dependent on agriculture."4 3
According to the Statistical Department of the Jewish Agency, as of
1936, 41.3 percent of the acreage purchased by the JNF had been acquired
from large landowners: of this, 52.61 percent was from large absentee land-
owners; 24.91 percent from large resident landowners; and 13.41 percent from
various sources such as the Turkish government, Churches, and foreign com-
panies. Only 9.41 percent was purchased from Palestinian peasants, 40.1
percent of which was acquired during 1891-1900, i.e., prior to the estab-
lishment of the JNF.
It is interesting that no mention is made with regard to land pur-
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chases from the British Administration in Palestine. This is probably be-
cause the British, by virtue of their political power and means, had assisted
Zionist land acquisition in a rather indirect, but more effective, way. In
1922, for example, Shmoel, the British Mandatory High Commissioner to Pales-
tine (el-Mandoub es-sami), imposed a law prohibiting the export of oils and
grains (the main indigenous crops and the basis of the country's wealth) so
that, in effect, peasants failed to pay taxes and repay agricultural loans
and, therefore, were forced to sell their land to Jewish settlers. Shmoel
went even further: he eliminated the Ottoman Agricultural Bank and demanded
the immediate repayment of loans, leaving the Palestinian peasants with no
other alternative but to sell their plots of land and to become landless with
nothing but their labor power.45
On July 24 of the same year, a mandate was issued by the British facili-
tating Jewish immigration and providing the Zionist movement with the right
to el-Amiri and el-Mowat lands (the commons), usually controlled by the poli-
tical authorities, the "State". 46
Moreover, the Mandatory authorities provided the Zionist companies with
the exclusive privilege, accompanied by political and economic protection, to
develop the Lake Houlah region, which alone constitutes one-third of Pales-
tine's arable land. 4 7
In the late 1920s, the British authorities granted Zionist companies
82,000 donams of agricultural land, in addition to lands provided for indus-
trial development by Zionist monopolistic companies.48
This is to give only a few examples of the role of the British colonial
authorities in the dispossession of the Palestinian peasantry, and the en-
hancement of Jewish settlement.
As far as the creation of labor surplus is concerned, the worst effects
175
were those inflicted on the Palestinian peasantry by the collaboration be-
tween Arab feudal lords and the Zionist movement. By 1928, most of the Jew-
ish land holdings (90 percent) had been purchased from absentee landlords,
leaving 30 percent of the Palestinian peasants landless. Between 1921-1925,
the Sarsaq land-holding family, for example, had sold 200,000 donams on
which had existed twenty-two Arab villages with 8,780 inhabitants, all of
whom were evicted, becoming wanderers all around the country.49 With the
help of absentee Arab landlords, Arab villages were removed, to be replaced
by Jewish settlements. By 1900, there were already nineteen Jewish settle-
ments erected in Palestine, reaching thirty in the summer of 1912 and occupy-
ing 280,000 donams of land. On the eve of World War I, the number of Jewish
settlements reached fifty-nine, inhabited by 12,000 settlers, while 70,000
dwelled in existing urban centers; and already in 1927, there were ninety-
six new settlements.50 Later on, between 1933-1936, 62.7 percent of the
land purchased by Jewish capital was from Palestinian feudal lords, as com-
pared with only 14.9 percent from absentee land-holders, and 22.5 percent
from Palestinian small peasants.51
Ghassan Kanafani indicates that during the August, 1929, and the 1936
mass insurrections in Palestine many small peasants sold their land to Pales-
tinian feudal lords in order to buy with cash weapons for waging their armed
struggle against British and Zionist colonialism, and often these landlords,
in turn, sold the purchased land to the Zionist movement.52
The latter is most indicative of the reactionary role played by Pales-
tine's big land-holding class with regard to the Palestinian masses. If
Zionism had only crushed this class, it would have played a crucially pro-
gressive role in Palestinian history, but the very lust for land gave the
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Zionist movement a stake in the feudal system, as mentioned previously. It
is interesting how Zionist "conquest of land" coincided with the interests
of the feudal class in Palestine, resulting in its liquidation as a social
force. The feudal class was by and large transformed into a free money capi-
talist class. Their money capital, however, was never transformed into pro-
ductive industrial capital.
Owing to the collaboration of the dominant Palestinian class (the "ef-
fendis" who emerged as an indigenous social force by virtue of their rela-
tion to the Ottoman feudal aristocracy), the Zionist movement was able to
"Arabize" the "conquest of land" and effectively employ treachery. In the
"Selected Memories" from his life involvement in the JNF activities, Musa
Goldenberg acknowledges several examples:
"One of the methods was to register the purchased land in the
name of Arab mediators, hired and entrusted to perform this
task on the condition that later on, through intricate legal
procedures, that land will be transferred back to us..." 53
The apparent alliance between the Zionist movement and the Palestinian
feudal class was not for joint development projects, but for a more effec-
tive plunder. Owing to the genuine alliance with the British authorities,
the Zionist movement acquired access to and control over much of the coun-
try's vital resources, specifically water. Water use and control policy
has been very instrumental in discouraging Arab agriculture and depressing
land prices.5 4
The collaboration of Arab feudal lords must not obscure the constant
resistance of the Palestinian masses, specifically the dispossessed peas-
antry and the boycotted proletariat, who had absolutely nothing to lose and
everything to gain by resisting Jewish colonial settlement based on the
'conquest of land" and "only Hebrew labor".
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Faced with the cruelty of Zionist colonization policy, the Palestinian
peasantry was made into a "revolutionary" class: however, under the most
vulnerable conditions and in the absence of a leadership. Under the Labor-
Zionist practices, the Palestinian peasantry and proletariat had every rea-
son for alliance. Peasants and proletariat were the vanguards of the Ezzidin
el-Qassam movement; of the August, 1929 insurrection; and the 1936-1939 re-
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volt.
In the Yishuv phase, the conquest of land was implemented through "gen-
tle" market exchange (although for the Palestinian peasant this was a violent
dispossession). For the objectives of the Zionist movement, this, however,
was a slow and unsatisfactory process. By 1947, the total Jewish holdings
comprised only about 9-12 percent of arable land. 5 6
The transfer of Palestinians across the boundaries of their social for-
mation in the aftermath of the 1948 War meant that extensive plots of land
were automatically transferred into the control of the Jewish State. As 250
Arab villages were destroyed upon the expulsion of their inhabitants, much
urban land was also acquired from Arab owners who were expelled or fled from
the larger towns. Extensive land acquisition operations took place then,
using the army of the newly-born State to drive Arabs over the Armistice
lines. Kibbutzim and other agricultural colonies then played a crucial role
in acquiring land from remaining Arab villages within the 1948 lines by sur-
rounding them with barbed wire fences and taking final and absolute posses-
sion of any obtainable land.5 7
The 1948 War represented a transition from the Yishuv to the nation-
building phase. This transitional period was the most critical time in
terms of large-scale acquisition of land. According to Chomsky, by the
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Armistice agreements of 1948-1949, Israel was in control of 77.4 percent of
arable land and exceeded 80 percent by 1950; it was estimated that more than
770,000 Palestinians became refugees.58 This massive separation of Pales-
tinian producers from their means of subsistence in response to the Zionist
conquest of land was thus conducted not through the "gentle and careful mo-
dels" prescribed by Herzl, but rather through violent expulsion, resulting
in the refugee camps persisting as "native labor reserves", doomed to be un-
productive, and marginalized as "surplus" population. This is precisely in
contrast with white settler-colonialism in Africa, where the expulsion of
African producers from their subsistence forms of life, and the consolida-
tion of the "native labor reserves" was precisely to create a system of
forced labor;59 but Zionism then needed only Arab land, but not Arab labor.
The physical displacement of Palestinians and their transfer across
the borders in the aftermath of the 1948 War was not an accident; neither
was the war itself. It was proposed and discussed by leaders of the Zionist
movement already in 1940. Joseph Weitz * commented in September, 1967, that
twenty-seven years ago he had written the following in his diary:
"Among ourselves it must be clear that there is no place in the
country for both peoples together....With the Arabs, we shall
not achieve our aim of being independent people in this country.
The only solution is Eretz-Israel, at least the west part of
Eretz-Israel without Arabs... and there is no other way but to
transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries,
transfer all of them, not one village or tribe shall remain,
and the transfer must aim at Iraq, Syria, and even Transjordan.
For this purpose, money will be found, much money; and only
with this transfer could the country absorb millions of our
brothers. There is no alternative...." 60
Joseph.Weitz was Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jew-
ish National Fund (1951-1973), Head of Plant and Afforestation Department of
the JNF (1918-1932), Director of the Land Development Division of JNF (1932-
1959), Chairman of the Israel Land Development Authority.
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Then, this time speaking in the aftermath of the 1967 War, he added:
"From that point of view, the 'transfer' solution was discussed
at the time, and it was supported by B. Katzenelson, J. Vulkani,
and M. Ussishkin,* and some preliminary preparations were made
to translate this theory into practice. Years later, when the
U.N. passed the resolution to partition Palestine into two States,
the War of Independence broke out, to our great fortune. In
this war, a two-fold miracle occurred: territorial victory and
the flight of the Arabs...." 61
In support of the "transfer" proposal, Berel Katzenelson wrote in 1945:
"Situations are possible in which the transfer of population will
become advisable....We do not assume the right to force anybody
out. This is a basic Zionist assumption....But was not kibbutz
Merhavia built on a transfer? Without many such transfers, Hasho-
mer Hatzair** would not today be setting in kibbutz Merhavia, nor
in kibbutz Mishmav Ha'emeck, nor in any other places...." 62
It is obvious from these three statements that the transfer of the
Palestinian population outside their social formation was indirectly sugges-
ted, explicitly proposed, and in fact debated among the leaders of the Zion-
ist movement as a solution to the problems facing the implementation of
Zionism in Palestine.
The advocacy of the transfer solution is often attributed (specifically
by the proponents of left-wing Zionism and its bi-national program) to right-
wing Zionism. We recall, however, from the previous chapter that it was
Borochov who had much earlier suggested that the territory's "population is
nomad and can always migrate east."
Through the "conquest of land" the indigenous population was made in-
deed "nomadic", free money capitalists capable of fleeing, and "free" labor-
*
B. Katzenelson was the founder and leading ideologue of Mapai, the
hard-core political nucleus of the ruling Labor Party; Y. Vulkani and M.
Ussishkin were two key leaders of the Zionist movement; and the Jewish
National Fund Board of Directors, whose chairmanship rested formally in
Ussishkin's hands from 1923-1941.
**
The youth movement of Mapam, the extreme left-wing of Zionism.
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ers, possessing nothing but their threatening labor power which had to be
transferred away.
Moreover, it seems in retrospect, that the transfer of the Palestinian
population across the borders of their own country was indispensable for the
implementation of Zionism in general and its socialist or proletarian stra-
tegy in particular. It provided not only for the possibility of Jewish demo-
graphic superiority and a large territorial base required for a sovereign
Jewish State. It provided also for the possibility of exclusive Jewish pro-
letarianization by transferring the contradiction generated by the actual
practices of Labor-Zionism, namely, the more competitive "free" native labor
force.
This point becomes clearer as we review the process and effects of the
"conquest of labor", the essence of the Labor-Zionist strategy. In the fol-
lowing discussion we therefore try to demonstrate the consistency of this
transfer with requirements of proletarian Zionism. In light of the contra-
dictions generated by the "socialist" Zionist practices in the concrete con-
ditions of Palestine, we argue that the transfer solution was indispensable
to the realization of proletarian Zionism.
(b) The "Conquest of Labor" and the "Boycott of Arab Labor"
The necessity to normalize the "inverted pyramid" used by Borochov to
rationalize his formula for the realization of Zionism, creating a Jewish
working class on a Jewish land, was in practice translated into the policy
of employing only Jewish labor in Jewish factories and farms. This is the
judaization of production, articulated in the slogan "Tozeret Haaretz"
(Popularize Palestine Products) which, "in the guise of promoting native
products resulted in a boycott of Arab goods."63 This, then, was explicitly
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maintained in the slogan, "boycott Arab produce". So daring and so deter-
mined to replace, not exploit, the natives, the Zionist movement tried to
mask their alien presence with the nativeness of the uprooted natives; they
wanted not to exploit the natives but rather to deny them that nativeness
and become, themselves, the natives of that land. The image, "native pro-
duct", was made applicable exclusively to the products of Jewish labor and
Jewish land, while the native produce was to be boycotted and made to dis-
appear. This attitude with regard to denying the nativeness of the native
was most articulately expressed by the Zionist leader, Menahen Ussishkin,
in his testimony before the Jewish Agency Committee on Jewish-Arab relations
in March, 1940, where he stated:
"I favor 100% Hebrew work and Hebrew products; I favor this,
because I oppose the strengthening of the Arabs; I am against
enabling them to establish roots in the country." 64
The "boycott Arab labor" slogan was to apply not only to the "free"
laborers emerging from the Zionist "conquest of land", but also to an al-
ready proletarianized or semi-proletarianized Arab labor force. The only
Hebrew labor policy was, in effect, not only to impede the proletarianiza-
tion of the landless peasantry, to deny the mass of "free" laborers a mar-
ket for their labor power, but also to result in the deproletarianization of
the native proletariat.
An Arab proletariat in Palestine began to form with the penetration of
British foreign capital, invested mainly in public works-related construction
and in citrus plantations. Since then, citri-culture was fostered by Arab
merchant capitalists employing Arab laborers but not exactly in the frame-
work of capitalist relations of production, as their capital remained un-
182
productive. The seasonal employees in such cases were only semi-proletar-
ianized. Semi-proletarianization applies also to the workers employed in
the small-scale Arab industries, as both of these agricultural and indus-
trial enterprises were generally characterized by the petty commodity form
of production; primitive accumulation.
The "boycott of Arab produce" under the "Tozeret Haaretz" slogan, in
addition to the discouraging policy of the British Mandate, discussed ear-
lier in this chapter, blocked the modernization of Arab production, hence
its capacity to absorb labor power as a commodity and increase the organic
composition of capital. As the boycott of Arab produce eliminated the pos-
sibility for realization of profit and its transformation into re-investible
productive capital, the "boycott of Arab produce" in turn reduced the pur-
chasing power within the Arab community itself, reducing the finding of
markets for Arab produce among the Arab masses. In this sense, the Zionist
movement applied the proletarian strategy quite dialectically indeed. This
explains the urge of the Palestinian petty bourgeoisie to respond with a
similar slogan, "boycott Jewish produce".
De-proletarianization applies also to Arab workers who, prior to the
implementation of Labor-Zionism were employed in Jewish factories and farms,
then were displaced in response to these slogans, and to Arab labor unrest
and resistance to Zionist policies.6 5
It is difficult to assess the size of the Palestinian "proletariat"
displaced by the practices of Labor-Zionism during the Yishuv era, as em-
ployment data, if available at all, is not precise, specifically as far as
the distinction between proletarian and non-proletarian wage earners. The
following figures may give us a rough idea of the employment dynamics, spe-
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cifically as influenced by Labor-Zionist practices.
According to Henry Rosenfeld, in 1920, the beginning of the British
Mandate, 12 percent of the Arab villagers were wage earners.66 The size of
the Palestinian working class grew from 5,000 workers in 1925 to 11,000 in
1929, reaching 33,000 in 1935.67 In the aftermath of the 1936 revolt of
the Palestinian masses, the size of the Arab proletariat declined to 3,029,
while the size of the Jewish proletariat reached 13,939.68 This decline in
the size of the Arab working class is often interpreted as the effect of re-
pressive measures against this subversive labor action. Although this in-
terpretation has much truth to it, one must see it also in response to the
pace of Jewish immigration, to Aliyah. In 1935 alone, 61,000 Jewish immi-
grants arrived in Palestine, fleeing Nazism.69 These absolutely disposses-
sed Jewish immigrants who, owing to Nazi persecution, were made "free"
laborers, possessing nothing but their labor power, were thus the most fit
for proletarianization; and with their state of vulnerability, they were
probably as competitive as cheap Arab labor.70 Correlated with the pace of
immigration was also the pace of land acquisition. In that same year, the
Zionist movement acquired 70,000 donams of land; this probably implied fur-
ther displacement of Palestinian peasants and, in effect, intensification
of resistance that led into the 1936-1939 mass revolt in Palestine. The
absorption of the new wave of Jewish immigrants urged better enforcement
of the "conquest of land" and the "boycott of Arab labor". The latter is
reflected also in the unemployment figures.
According to the Simpson Report, in 1930 unemployment in Palestine
totalled 30,000 (Arabs and Jews) and wages declined by 50 percent. While
the number of unemployed Arab workers was only 12,000, by 1935 it almost
doubled, amounting to 23,000.71 Notice the contradictory effect of the
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boycott of Arab labor on Jewish labor; as Arab cheap labor was blocked from
competing with Jewish labor, the need to depress wages, subject to the logic
of capital accumulation, specifically the essential tendency to increase the
organic composition of capital, urged the Jewish capitalist, in the face of
the "Hebrew labor only" slogan, to use precisely the unemployment of Hebrew
labor as a disciplinary mechanism for extracting higher rates of profit.
The Hebrew labor slogan was, in this sense, working against the interest of
Jewish labor. This is an example of how the covering of the essentially
bourgeois nature of Labor-Zionism with a proletarian message (the genesis
of Borochovism), hence its internalization by the "proletarizing" Jewish
settlers, finally leads them into becoming not only the exploited class,
but also the class that is "privileged" to be the exploited; the proletar-
iat. One must not disregard the possibility that "boycott of Arab labor"
and exclusive Hebrew labor" slogans have, in effect, created a feeling of
being "the chosen" labor, acting as an incentive for Jewish proletariani-
zation, and worst of all, as a means for pacifying the developing prole-
tariat.
The ideology and practice of proletarian Zionism have undoubtedly
blinded the Jewish working class, since its very inception, from recogniz-
ing its true class interest; misled even as it is still forming as a class-
in-itself and therefore incapable of developing into "a class for itself",
conscious of the objective contradiction between its own class interest
and that of the capitalist class, and committed to creating contradictions
in the dominant mode of accumulation. It is thus understandable why it
has not identified itself with the interest of the Palestinian proletariat
and displaced.
The previous figures are indicative of the fact that the slogans of
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"Hebrew labor only" were not entirely effective in preventing the penetra-
tion of Palestinian-Arab labor into Jewish economic enterprises and/or in
the complete elimination of existing Arab proletarian employees. It is es-
timated, for example, that by the 1940s the number of Arab wage workers in
the cities was between 35,000-37,000, of whom only 6,000 worked in Arab-
owned industries, 3,000 in Jewish and international concerns, 12,000 in pri-
vate home services, and the rest in governmental and public works.72 From
these figures, it is difficult to guess how many of the Arab workers had
actually occupied proletarian class-locations. We only know for sure that
12,000 private service employees were not proletariat.
Percy Lund provides employment figures in terms that are more helpful
for identifying the class distribution of the Palestine population: in
1931, 59 percent of this population belonged to the peasant class; 12.9
percent were employed in construction, industry and mining (as compared to
30.6 percent among Jews); 6 percent were in transport; 8.4 percent in trade;
and 1.3 percent in clerical work. One may only conclude from these that
the Arab working class constituted then less than 18.9 percent of total
population (industrial, construction, mining and transport workers). 7 3
These figures do not distinguish between the self-employed peasant and
agricultural cash-croppers, employed on the commercialized citrus planta-
tions. The latter, in fact, represent the only "steady" wage-earning seg-
ment of the Arab labor force, in the sense that their source of employment
was guaranteed, as Arab citri-culture remained competitive in foreign mar-
kets, despite the Zionist "boycott of Arab produce" and the popularization
of Tozeret Ha'aretz slogans. This, however, must not divert our attention
from the fact that this "steady" labor force was employed only seasonally,
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as the citurs plantation economy generates demand for labor only during the
harvest season. Furthermore, it is not clear whether or not this seasonal
employment of Arab labor on Arab citrus plantations represents capitalist
relations of production and, therefore, proletarianization.
It is most likely that Arab citrus plantations were based on share-
cropping. In this case, accumulation was based on non-capitalist relations
as it did not involve exploitation of free wage labor.
This is different, however, from the citrus plantations owned by Bri-
tish and Jewish productive capital. In these cases, capital organized the
labor process employing cash-croppers to create surplus value. This was
free wage employment under capitalist relations of production. The employ-
ees were, therefore, agricultural proletariat; more vulnerable, however,
than the industrial proletariat, owing to their subemployment as essentially
seasonal workers.
Palestinian capital remained, by and large, merchant capital, i.e.,
circulation capital. In indigenous manufacture, the petty commodity form
of production, rather than the modern capitalist labor process, prevailed.
Palestinian merchant capital was never transformed into productive capital,
hence the absence of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie, and therefore of
the possibility of proletarianization by Palestinian capital.
The above leads us to conclude that during the Yishuv Arab labor was
proletarianized only when employed by British or Jewish capital, as only
then were Arabs laboring productively, subject to capitalist relations of
production; only as employees of productive capital were they turned into
productive labor, engaged in the creation of surplus value directly, and
productive labor is the basic (but not only) criterion defining the prole-
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tarian class. 7 Arab employment by British productive capital reached its
peak during World War II, when the British colonial authorities for the first
time invested in Arab industry and agriculture.
In an article titled, "Wartime Development of the Arab Economy in Pales-
tine," Z. Abramovitz writes:
"During World War II, the increased economic activity in Pales-
tine brought about by British demands for food and military sup-
plies and British investments in buildings, roads and fortifica-
tions attracted substantial numbers from rural areas into the
much increased Arab labor force. The number of wage-earners
employed by the British increased from 15,578 in January, 1939,
to 76,548 in December, 1942....Thousands of workers who were
hitherto employed on their own land in their village were trans-
formed into wage-earners working for the Government. Thousands
of them were trained as skilled workers." 75
This is to say, the size of Palestinian wage labor force employed by
British capital in 1942 was equivalent to the size of Palestinian wage labor
force penetrating the Israeli-Jewish economy from occupied Gaza and West
Bank in 1972. The growth in British demand for Arab labor was, however, only
temporary. The fluctuation in the demand for Palestinian-Arab labor during
the Yishuv is absolutely phenomenal: 5,000 in 1925, compared to 11,000 in
1929; 33,000 in 1935; 3,029 in 1936; 15,578 in 1939; and 76,548 in 1942.
These fluctuations in the employment of Palestinian labor suggest that
it may not be accurate simply to attribute the non-configuration of a Pales-
tinian proletariat as a significant social force with a distinct class inter-
est during the Yishuv to Zionist labor policy alone, as the 1942 figures
point to a deeper explanation: the state of development and requirements
of the Palestinian forces and relations of production. If the absorptive
capacity of the productive forces at the disposal of the Jewish Yishuv
were to exceed the requirements of Aliyah absorption, the boycott of Arab
labor slogan could never have been applied. In fact, we notice the develop-
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ment of a labor movement acting upon its consciousness of its immediate in-
terests, while its social being, the objective conditions of its life, were
still extremely vulnerable. The militancy of Palestinian labor is expressed
most strongly in their role in the August, 1929 protest led by Izzed-din el-
Qassam. Proletarian workers, squatting in the outskirts of urban centers,
specifically Haifa, constituted the vanguards of the political and armed
struggle within his movement. This was the case also in the 1936 general
strike and revolt in Palestine, lasting until 1939.76 These two critical
events in modern Palestinian history were mainly protest against the triple
Zionist slogans: "Conquest of Labor", and "Tozeret Ha'aretz" (native pro-
duce). For the Palestinian proletariat, it was protesting the slogan,
"Boycott Arab Labor".
Moreover, this fluctuation was an impediment to the formation of Pales-
tinian proletariat as a class-in-itself with a distinct class interest, be-
cause it was essentially a transitory labor force used as a source of flex-
ibility for the British enterprises in times of crisis while boycotted by
Jewish enterprises. This implies a measure of vulnerability, and also,
under such conditions, the Arab labor force was developing a militant labor
movement prior to its becoming a class-in-itself; it's consciousness was
probably emerging more from its location in the social formation as a whole
and less from its location in the labor process, in the social division of
labor, with the result that its class and national consciousness overlapped.
Indeed, the subjective conditions of the Palestinian proletariat under
Jewish settler-colonialism, which were based on the boycott of Palestinian
labor, provide a classic example of what Tom Nairn considers progressive
proletarian nationalism. Of course, this genuine proletarian nationalism
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of Palestinian workers comes in direct contradiction with the bourgeois
consciousness known as "proletarian Zionism", aiming at creating an alter-
native proletariat that is to falsely internalize proletarian Zionism as
its own ideology.
As the "conquest of land" was mainly the task of the JNF, the "conquest
of labor" was mainly the task of the Histadrut. Together, the JNF and the
Histadrut constituted the two executive arms of the Jewish Agency which
functioned as the embryonic superstructure of the Yishuv, responsible for Ali-
ya mobilization the world over and its absorption in Palestine: meaning, in
practice, "conquest of labor" and "conquest of land". The unity of these
two tasks and their institutional mechanisms is articulated in the consti-
tution of the Jewish Agency, as documented below by the Royal Institute of
International Affairs:
"Two principles of Zionist colonization, both incorporated in
the constitution of the Jewish Agency, are especially resented
by the Arabs. These are: (i) the principle that Jewish pro-
perty is inalienable; no Zionist settler may dispose of his
lease to anyone but a Jew; (ii) the principle carefully safe-
guarded by the powerful Jewish Federation of Labour, that only
Jewish labor may be employed in Zionist colonies. The net re-
sult is that, when the Jewish National Fund makes a purchase,
the Arabs lose not only the land itself but also any chance of
being employed on this land." 78
The fanatic commitment of the Histadrut to create an exclusive Jewish
proletariat is articulated in its interpretation of the "conquest of labor":
in terms of prohibiting Jewish employers from employing other than Jewish
labor; but also in that the Histadrut "vigorously advocated the principle
of Jewish labor only in Jewish-owned economic enterprise." 79 In practice,
the latter means prohibiting Jewish labor from working in British or Arab
owned enterprises. One of the implications of such practice may easily be
the further control over Jewish labor by the Histadrut; as the Histadrut
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represents simultaneously both the general trade union of Jewish labor and
the single largest employer of Jewish labor in the Yishuv. This double inter-
pretation and practice of the "conquest of labor" by the Histadrut (in the
sense of only Jewish labor can be employed by Jewish capital and only by
Jewish capital can Jewish labor be employed) constitutes the most precise
application of the Borochivist formula of labor strategy for the consolida-
tion of Jewish political class struggle and the actualization of Zionism.
This, however, can also be counter-productive in that "Jewish labor by
Jewish capital only" is likely to reduce the bargaining power of Jewish
labor against the Histadrut as its major employer; so that Jewish capital,
not labor, dominates the labor process and, of course, wage determination.
This is only to notice how essentially anti-proletarian "proletarian" Zion-
ism actually is. With the latter principle, the Histadrut can then not
only "see to it that Jewish labor gets what it deserves," but that it also
"behaves" (its task as a capitalist employer)!
It is interesting to examine how the Histadrut tries to manage the con-
tradictions inherent in its dual role as employer, on the one hand, and as
trade union, on the other. As the General Federation of Trade Unions for
Hebrew Workers (until 1955), the Histadrut (often referred to as the labor
sector) allowed only Jewish labor to be organized labor, hence the problems
it faces as the employer of Hebrew labor only in disciplining its labor
force and controlling the labor process and wage determination.
The above provides only one example of this kind. Another important
mechanism enabling the Histadrut to fulfill its basic task, namely, the
"conquest of labor" for the formation of Jewish proletariat and farmers, is
its monopoly over the Yishuv's. health care system, "Kupat Hulim" (Sick Fund).
This not only controls the reproduction of labor force on a generational and
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daily basis, it also constitutes a material incentive for proletarianization
upon which it becomes a disciplinary mechanism for pacifying the Jewish pro-
letariat.
Another approach for fulfilling its task and accommodating the contra-
dictions inherent in it is the adherence to ideological incentives that
embody nothing but material interests, both economic and political. The
Esco Foundation of Palestine provides numerous examples, as stated below:
"The Histadrut defends its advocacy of the policy of Jewish
labor in Jewish enterprise on the ground that the Jewish home-
land can be built up only on the cornerstone of large working
class immigration. If the principle of one hundred percent
Jewish labor is relaxed, the tendency will be to drive the
Jewish worker out of the Jewish market altogether. Arabs do
not employ Jewish labor. If for no other reason than because
it is more expensive...to permit Arabs to penetrate the Jewish
labor market would mean that the influx of Jewish capital
would be used mostly for Arab development and would defeat
the Zionist purpose of providing for the Jewish immigrants."8 0
(emphasis added)
The actual material reasons underlying these ideological rationaliza-
tions are made explicit in Palestine: Problem and Promise (1946), an eco-
nomic study by R. Nathan, 0. Gass, and D. Creamer. On "labor organization
and enterprise" they state:
"The protection of the Jewish worker on the job has been one of
the three principal branches of Histadrut activity.... In view of
the lower standard of living of the Arab population, job pro-
tection started by insulating the Jewish worker against this
type of competition. This could be assured by stipulating that
Jewish-owned enterprises must employ Jewish workers exclusively.
... This attitude conforms both to Zionist needs and to socialist
beliefs. As socialists, Jewish workers are opposed to the idea
of Jews constituting themselves a master class exploiting native
labor... .As Zionists, they feel compelled to pursue a policy that
will lead to the maximum absorption of Jews into the Palestin-
ian economy. Otherwise, they cannot hope to constitute a major-
ity in their own homeland. Without a majority, Jewish Palestine
would be only another typical Jewish community in a non-Jewish
country." 81
The material motives here relate, in the first instance, to the economic
192
as far as it affects, in the last instance, the political the demographic
requirements for a Jewish bourgeois democratic state.
Evaluating the effects of this protective role of the Histadrut, the
same authors write:
"In the main, except for seasonal employment in the citrus groves
and a few enterprises based on government concessions, the policy
of exclusive employment of Jewish workers has prevailed. It has
no doubt increased the absorption capacity of Jews in Palestine,
in the short run, but it has also been a very important factor
in maintaining the barrier between the Arab and Jewish peoples.
Jewish labor proposes to continue to maintain this barrier at
least until the Arab sectors of the economy have developed to
the point where Arabs work approximately for the same wage as
Jews." 82
These appartheid-like implications of the practices of Labor-Zionist
institutions, specifically the Histadrut, were facts created and used to
justify the contradictory political positions of left wing Zionists regard-
ing the native Palestinian labor. As Yaacov Roi, an Israeli historian,
documents, when challenged by the Arab labor movement leading to the 1929
and 1936-39 Palestinian mass revolts,
"They preached that the international brotherhood of workers
applied only to workers who were already secure in their em-
ployment; it did not apply to a potential proletariat that had
to struggle to find employment and could not refrain from con-
flict with those workers whose place of work they must take
for themselves." 83
Implicit in this statement is the conviction that proletariat refers
only to an already organized labor force, applying therefore to Jewish
labor only. Unorganized labor constitutes only potential proletariat,
threatening by the cheapness of its labor power to displace the "indigen-
ous" actual Jewish proletariat, and hence, deserves no solidarity on the
part of the -latter.
In accordance with this left-wing Zionist position, unorganized labor
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often constitutes the most exploited segment of the labor force, and invol-
ves mainly Arabs and Oriental Jews) did not belong to the working class.
According to Nathan:
"Ever since 1930 the members of the Histadruth, excluding
workers' wives, have accounted for about three-fourths of
all Jewish workers.* An estimated 15 percent of the Jewish
working class were organized into unions separated from the
Histadrut on political or religious grounds...10-11 percent
of Jewish workers, who were unorganized, were largely Yemenite
and Sephardic Jews with the lowest standard of living among
Jewish workers and previously unexposed to trade unionism." 84
These 10 percent of unorganized Jewish workers (Yemenite and Sephardic)
are indispensable to the implementation of the "Hebrew labor only" policy.
This is probably the only segment of the Jewish labor force capable of defy-
ing the competitiveness of the cheap native labor; providing a substitute
for the boycotted Arab labor: the use of Oriental-Jewish labor is very in-
strumental in accommodating the contradictory requirements of capitalist
accumulation and Zionist exclusivism.
It is documented that when Jewish settlers continued to employ Arab
agricultural laborers for reaping super profits, the Zionist movement worked
immediately on mobilizing Yemenite Jews, known to work for wages lower than
Arabs' so that Jewish capitalists switch to maintain the "Hebrew labor"
principle.8 5
This use of Oriental-Jewish labor must not be seen merely as tactical
pragmatism. It is rather built-in as an integral part of the proletarian-
Zionist strategy in its original formulation by Borochov.
In his Selected Writings, on how to begin the actual implementation of
Jewish proletarianization, Borochov points out the Oriental-Jews:
*
Workers refers to persons eligible for membership in the Histadruth, the
principal qualification for which is the ideological belief in the non-exploi-
tation of labor.
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"Those cornerstones on which our future society will be built
are simple healthy Sephardic and Yemenite workers, potential
proletariat, a great portion of the diggers, camel drivers,
and porters." 86
This quote suggests that the place of Oriental Jews in Israel's social
division of labor, specifically their over-representation in unskilled and
semi-skilled manual labor, was not accidental, but pre-planned, subject to
requirements of capitalist development under the ideological hegemony of
Labor-Zionism. This quote further reinforces our conviction that the mobil-
ization of Oriental-Jews into Palestine was imperative for the proletarian,
not other, Zionist strategy. This point, in turn, defies the Zionist claim
of the refugee status of Israeli-Jews from Arab countries; and the at-
tempt of the Zionist movement to equate the presence of Jews from Arab
countries in Israel with the presence of Palestinians in Arab exile.
The use of unorganized Oriental-Jewish labor, although it provided a
measure of flexibility to Jewish employees, did not resolve the contradic-
tion inherent in the practice of Labor-Zionism. The more displaced and
boycotted Arab labor was, the more competitive it became. The "boycott
Arab labor" slogan was in contradiction with capitalist rationality inher-
ent in the Jewish proletarianization/capitalization imperative.
Zionist material and non-material incentives (including subsidies to
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Jewish employers by the Jewish Agency ) were not capable of detering Jew-
ish capitalists from the essential profitability incentives. Where it was
possible to reap super profit and where it was inappropriate for Jewish
labor to work (e.g., below subsistence wages and/or rough manual work,
like mining, etc.), Arab labor was still employed. According to the Esco
Foundation of Palestine:
"In practice, Jewish industrial as well as agricultural enter-
prise employs a considerable amount of Arab labor. Such indus-
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tries as the Palestine Electric Corporation and the Palestine
Potash Company, based on government concessions, do so as part
of their agreement. Other large private industries, such as
the Nir Match Company and Portland Cement, employ mixed labor,
as do some smaller establishments. In the old colonies, Arab
agricultural labor predominated; at least until the time of the
1936 disturbances. In some cases, as in Petach Teksa' Arab
labor is used almost exclusively... .Arab labor is not employed
on lands belonging to the Jewish National Fund. The agricul-
tural settlements founded on such land are based on the prin-
ciple of "self-labor", and no outside labor -- either Arab or
Jewish -- is employed. In addition, there is a clause in the
Jewish National Fund lease which prohibits the lessee from
engaging any but Jewish labor." 88
One must consider the likelihood of exaggeration in this statement, as
the Esco Foundation sounds proponent of Zionist enterprises. This apolo-
getic attitude is best articulated in the use of the term "1936 disturban-
ces"; this refers to the revolt of Palestinian displaced peasants and boy-
cotted labor as disturbances to Zionist colonization efforts in Palestine).
The point is that the Labor-Zionist movement could not practice its slogans
without counter-productive effects; the contradictory requirements and con-
sequences of Zionist capitalism in Palestine compelled the Histadrut (only
seven years after its establishment in 1920) to organize Arab labor, in
order to control it and regulate its effects on the "only Hebrew labor pol-
icy" of the Zionist movement. Another attempt by the Histadrut to mask with
"socialist" rationale her non-socialist motive, is reflected in the follow-
ing position as reported by the Esco Foundation for Palestine:
"..employment of Arabs in Jewish industry would lead to a class
stratification in Palestine along racial lines, with the Jews
acting as capitalist employers and the Arabs as workers -- thus
repeating in Palestine all the abnormalities that have led to
anti-Semitism in the Diaspora. By creating a higher wage stan-
dard through organization, the Jewish worker also prepares the
ground for adaptation of higher standards among the Arabs. If
the Jewish laborer should disappear from the market, the Arab
laborers would continue at their old wage as an exploited and op-
pressed class. Meeting the moral argument, the Histadrut pro-
poses collaboration with the Arab worker through the creation of
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an all-embracing Federation of Labour in Palestine, consisting of
two cooperating labour organizations -- Jewish and Arab..." 89
It is obvious from the above that the Histadrut's urge to organize Arab
labor was motivated by the needs and aspirations of the Zionist movement,
not of Arab labor, and that it follows from the "left-wing" proletarian
strategy, not from other postulates of Zionism.
Notice the Histadrut's emphasis on separatism as opposed to organiza-
tional unity of Arab and Jewish workers. This separation was institutional-
ized in the resolutions adopted at the Third Histadrut Convention in 1927,
which provided for the creation of a Confederation of Palestine Labor (Brith
Poale Eretz Israel), whose aim was stated to be: "The union of workers of
Palestine, regardless of religion, nationality or race, into one league for
the purpose of improving their economic, social and cultural position."
Under this Confederation there would be Jewish unions and Arab unions and
each national group would constitute an autonomous section within the Con-
federation. 90
As put by Abbu Khushi, a leading Zionist advocate of Arab-Jewish cooper-
ation:
"We want to help the Arab workers found an Arab labor organiza-
tion which will have a fraternal bond with our Histadruth. We
do not intend to make a Jew or a Zionist out of the Arab, any
more than we mean to conceal our Zionist aspirations from him."91
This emphasis on autonomous organization of Jewish and Arab labor is of-
ten euphemistically interpreted to express the bi-national attitude on the
part of the Histadrut. It is bi-nationalism, however, in the context of a
Jewish Commonwealth program which explicitly denies the validity of bi-na-
tionalism in the sense of a political parity, but assumes bi-nationalism in
92the cultural and communal sense. It is not only that cultural and communal
197
bi-nationalism with the elimination of the political dimension is irrelevant,
but also that it was not practiced in fact. According to-the same source:
"The Histadrut advocates common unions among Government employees,
particularly the railway and telegraph workers where the cultural
level between the Arab and Jewish groups is not very different
and where common wage levels may be achieved without reducing the
standard of the Jewish worker." 93 (emphasis added)
Common unions were thus advocated when they served the interest of Jewish
labor, when Oriental Jews were the ones involved, and when cost was not in-
flicted on the Histadrut. In the case of British Mandatory Government em-
ployees, it was, of course, in the interest of Jewish workers to demand
higher wages for Arab labor, so that Arab labor ceases to be more competi-
tive and loses the potential of displacing Jewish labor. Furthermore, wage
increase for Arab workers in this case does not come from Zionist funds and,
therefore, is not at the expense of the welfare of Jewish labor.
Reducing its competitiveness was not the only real rationale for organ-
izing Arab labor. One cannot disregard the elements of co-optation and
legitimization involved in this action. The Histadrut was urged to provide
an alternative to the militant Arab labor movement emerging in Haifa, Jaffa,
Jerusalem, Nazareth, Migdal and Nablus in response to Zionist conquest of
land and labor policies. The co-optation element is very clear in the
methods the Histadrut employed for this pursuit. In Abbu Khushi's words:
t...a nucleus of Arab workers must be formed to be prepared for
the task of spreading propaganda among the mass of Arab workers.
... They must be made to understand that a strike is to be
used as a last resort.. .and that a strike, if inevitable, must
be the consummation of long and careful preparations. A great
deal of time will have to be devoted to forging a solid body
of workers ready for sacrifices and risks... .The medical service
rendered the Arabs by the Kupat Holim [the public health care
system, over which the Histadrut exercise full monopoly] is im-
portant both as a means of attracting them to the Histadrut and
as an educational force. The poor Arab, whose medical needs are
entirely unprovided for, is grateful in the extreme for medical
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assistance given by the Kupat Holim, and for the spirit in which
it is given. Many times, a whole village has been won over to
the Confederation because a child of a fellah has been helped by
the Kupat Holim..." 94
Other devices used for winning Arabs to the Histadrut Confederation
were the establishment of a Savings and Loan Society, Histadrut Socializa-
tion Clubs for joint sport activities, etc. The co-optation element impli-
cit in the Histadrut's decision and actual effort to organize Arab labor
becomes more exposed as one notices the coincidence of the Histadrut initi-
ative with the development of incipient Communist politicalformations in
Palestine.95
By 1944, the total number of organized Arab workers was about 16,500.96
The imperative of organizing Arab labor in order to eliminate the threat
of the poorly-paid unorganized workers to the organized Jewish workers and
to contain the emerging militant Arab labor movement, have, in turn, gener-
ated further contradictions: growing economic and political demands which
are not likely to be met by the general Federation of Jewish Workers in
Palestine, as they were incompatible with the Histadrut's reason for being,
namely, the absolute commitment to form an exclusively Jewish proletariat,
and a Jewish social formation in Palestine. Moreover, financial and produc-
tive capital at the disposal of the Histadrut comes from Jewish philanthropy
and immigrants and, therefore, is already earmarked exclusively for Jewish
settlement efforts; for Aliyah absorption.97
The only faction in the Zionist movement which explicitly denounced the
exclusionist policies of the Histadrut with regard to the boycott of Arab
labor and the separatist organization of Arab and Jewish labor is Hashomer
Hatzair (the Young Guard).
Hashomer Hatzair, like the Histadrut, belonged to Poalie-Tzion (Work-
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ers of Zion), the main protagonists of proletarian Zionism. The Histadrut
(dominated throughout its existence by MAPAI, the largest Party in the
Zionist labor movement and in the Yishuv, as well) represented right-wing
Poalie-Tzion and had its main bases of support in the United States as ex-
plicitly anti-Bolshevik. Hashomer Hatzair represented left-wing Poalie-
Tzion; it centered in East Europe. It regarded itself the bearer of ortho-
dox Borochovism and tried to mobilize the Comintern support, for what it
conceived to be the "integration of pioneering Zionism within revolutionary
socialism: colonization with class struggle." 9 8
The kibbutzim established by Hashomer Hatzair (whose founding fathers
belonged to the Third Aliyah) organized into a federation (Hakibbutz Haar-
tzi) in 1927 and formed the base of this movement overemphasizing Halutziut
(pioneering) and voluntarism in constructing the new Jewish Society in
Palestine.
With its members protected in their communal settlements from Arab com-
petition, Hashomer Hatzair could afford to oppose the Histadrut labor policy
and advocate what appeared to be more progressive slogans: "the problem of
cheap Arab competition must be met in a more constructive way" (instead of
the 100 percent Hebrew labor and the separate labor organization advocated
by the Histadrut and MAPAI). "A program of a common organization of Jews
and Arabs in single unions is essential for reducing the amount of unorgan-
ized labor within the country."99
Realizing that cooperation with the Arab worker could not come about
so long as the program of "only Jewish labor" is followed to the point of
excluding all Arab workers from the Jewish economy, Hashomer Hatzair pro-
posed the following tradeoff: "acceptance of the principle of mass Jewish
immigration to Palestine," for "the affirmation of the equal rights of
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Arab and Jewish workers in the field of economic endeavor." Hashomer Hat-
zair emphasized further that "the Jewish and Arab labor organization would
have a common interest in preventing the flood of cheap labor streaming to
Palestine from surrounding countries."
This is, indeed, identical with Borochov's position on the issue,
probably upon realizing that the native population was contrary to his ex-
pectations, not "nomads that can always emigrate east."
In his essay on the history of Poalie-Tzion entitled Letoldot Trn'at
Poalie-Tzion, Borochov records that Poalie-Tzion "favours class solidarity
between Jewish and Arab workers and sees in the class struggle to improve
working conditions a means to strengthen the position of Hebrew labor in
Eretz-Yesrael...."100
If this is so, then in practice the left- and right-wing Poalie-Tzion
did not differ except in their pragmatism. They were implementing essen-
tially the same strategy with only a tactical difference, more pragmatism
on the left side. Both were promoting the position of Hebrew labor (osten-
sibly in the name of proletarian solidarity between Arabs and Jews) by
means of common organization or separate labor unions. "Solidarity with
Arab labor to strengthen the position of Hebrew labor in Eretz Yesrael,"
as stated explicitly by Borochov, means necessarily strengthening the Jew-
ish position in the labor market at Arab expense. This involved improving
the conditions of native Arab labor in order that it ceases to be a threat-
ening competitor for immigrant Jewish labor, the only way to implement a
settler-colonial program determined to create a new working class df its
own instead of capitalizing on the exploitation of the indigenous labor
force.
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To elaborate this point, it helps to mention a few more examples of
the practical positions of left-wing proletarian Zionism, as documented by
Zachary Lockman. A resolution of the 1934 conference of Hakibbutz Ha'artzi
stated that the struggle for "Jewish labor" should be conducted "on the ba-
sis of the principle of the priority of the Jewish worker for work in the
Jewish sector -- on condition that it does not damage the rights of perma-
nent Arab workers." 1 0 1
It must be remembered, however, that the permanence of Arab workers in
most employment positions was undermined by the very principle of the pri-
ority of Jewish workers advocated in the resolution. Also, only in agri-
cultural plantations (specifically, Arab-owned) and concession industries
were Arab workers likely to be permanently employed; these were labor cate-
gories that are unattractive to Jewish labor (as they were unskilled, manual
and physically dangerous), where Arab labor had to be employed anyway.
This resolution was, therefore, immaterial in terms of offsetting the
detrimental effects of the "only Hebrew labor" policy on the native Pales-
tinian labor.
In 1937, Hakibbutz Ha'artzi set up an urban counterpart sharing the
same ideology to attract city workers away from MAPAI and to constitute
a Zionist alternative to the Communists. In 1946, the League merged with
its. parent Party to form the Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party, the extreme
left of the Zionist movement.102 It stressed the common interests of the
Jewish and Arab working people, asserting that Zionism was, in fact, a
liberating force for the latter:
"... the Socialist League recognizes the community of economic
and social interests of the Jewish and Arab toilers in Palestine.
It regards the Jewish immigration to Palestine as a factor stimu-
lating the process of the liberation of the Arab toilers from the
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rule of feudalism and the men of religion, and regards the
Arab toilers (the worker and small farmer) as the natural al-
lies of the Jewish workers in their struggle to develop the
country and to establish a bi-national socialist society with-
in it...." 103 (emphasis added)
It was also this extreme left of the Zionist movement that formulated
the ideas of a socialist bi-national State in Palestine in which "the Jew-
ish people returning to their homeland and the Arab people living in it"
would have equal rights.
It is difficult to find the appropriate words for characterizing these
implausible positions taken by the extreme left of Zionism on the question
of native labor: on what basis did they conceive of the community of eco-
nomic and social interests of the Jewish and Arab toilers in Palestine?
The Arab toiler was to be necessarily supplanted by the Hebrew toiler and
dispossessed from the land (his only instrument of labor, of toiling) on
which the kibbutzim of Hashomer Hatzair were to be erected in order to cre-
ate exclusively Jewish toilers!
It is true that Zionism has, in effect, "freed" Arab tenants and small
peasants from the bond to the land, their source of exploitation under feu-
dal relations of production; yet, adhering to the proletarian strategy, it
deprived them of the "coersive" freedom to sell their labor power, prohibi-
ting their actual proletarianization, denying them the possibility of be-
coming a potentially self-emancipating class.
The economic and social interests of the Jewish and Arab toilers were
absolutely counterposed under the hegemony of proletarian Zionism. In this
respect, left-wing proletarian Zionism did, in effect, provide not an alter-
native to, but rather legitimization for, right-wing proletarian Zionism.
The distinction between right- and left-wing proletarian Zionism is,
therefore, practically irrelevant. The actual practices of right-wing pro-
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letarian Zionism seem to be the only consistent implementation of the pro-
letarian Zionist strategy.
A summing-up example of these daily practices is expressed best in the
following statement by David Hacohen, a leader of the MAPAI Labor Party,
and a long-time member of the Kenesset, where he says:
"I remember being one of the first of our comrades [of Ahdut
Ha'avoda] to go to London after the First World War... .There
I became a socialist... .When I joined the socialist students....
And even here, in these intimate surroundings, I had to fight my
friends on the issue of Jewish socialism, to defend the fact that
I would not accept Arabs in my trade union, the Histadrut; to
defend preaching to housewives that they not buy at Arab stores;
to defend the fact that we stood guard at orchards to prevent
Arab workers from getting jobs there....To pour kerosene on Arab
tomatoes; to attack Jewish housewives in the markets and smash
the Arab eggs they had bought; to praise to the skies the Keren
Kayemet [Jewish National Fund] that sent Hankin to Beirut to
buy land from the absentee effendi [landlords] and to throw the
fellahin [peasants] off the land - to buy dozens of dunams [one
dunam = .23 acres] from an Arab is permitted, but to sell, God
forbid, one Jewish dunam to an Arab is prohibited; to take
Rothschild, the incarnation of capitalism, as a socialist and
to name him the "benefactor" - to do all that was not easy.
And despite the fact that we did it - maybe we had no choice -
I wasn't happy about it." 104
The last sentence of this statement may be taken to signify an evidence
in support of our conclusion: namely, the absolute distinction between
Zionism and socialism; as Zionism was practiced. The logic of this actual
historical process seems consistent with the proletarian Zionist strategy.
It is irrelevant to argue whether or not Zionism could have been practiced
differently had left proletarian Zionism become hegemonic. The fact that it
did not, even in the Yishuv, is an absolute one; it is not inconsistent with
the proletarian Zionist theory, and most likely, it would not have made much
difference, as left-wing proletarian Zionism provided only for a source of
tactical flexibility and pragmatism for the actualization of the essentially
one Zionism (aimed at a Jewish State to act on behalf of the big Jewish capi-
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tal).
The bi-national proposal formulated by the extreme left proletarian
Zionism was advocated probably as the only possible approximation to a
wholly Jewish State in Palestine when the latter seemed impossible to ac-
complish, given the impossibility of optimizing the "Hebrew labor policy"
under capitalist relations of production. By attempting to acquire the
material prerequisites for establishing a Jewish national entity and State
in Palestine (precisely through the conquest of Palestinian land and the
boycott of Arab labor and produce), the Zionist movement had, in effect,
distorted the material base of the Palestinian national existence; yet,
had not fully acquired the demographic prerequisite for an only Jewish
Sovereign State.
It was a most appropriate move (in terms of Zionist objectives), in
light of those actual material conditions, to propose the bi-national solu-
tion, which rejects either a wholly Arab State or a wholly Jewish State in
Palestine, advocating that "the sovereignty over the country should be held
jointly and equally by two units constitutionally recognized as equal in
weight and status, one representing the Jewish, the other representing the
Arab, interests.... "1105
From the point of view of the Zionist leadership, advocates of Jewish
big capital, this proposal of course represents "the best of all evils";
it is the only thing that could have worked under those material conditions.
Right-wing proletarian Zionists seem, however, to have recalled Boro-
chov's advice; "to create facts and more facts is the cornerstone of poli-
tical strategy", hence, the expulsion of the Palestinian masses in 1948 and
the creation of a new fact. This is the "transfer solution" that had ulti-
mately made the proletarian Zionist strategy an effective one. Why the bi-
205
national program was superceded by the transfer program is not accidental;
proletarian Zionism is intrinsically incapable of implementation in other
than the "transfer" way. To elaborate, in the previous chapter we tried to
establish that theoretically Borochovism was bourgeois in character. In
this chapter, we intended to demonstrate that also in practice Borochovism
(the imperative of Jewish proletarianization and Jewish class struggle) was
implementable only in terms of capitalist development. Exclusive Jewish
proletarianization and class struggle implied necessarily the consolidation
of Jewish capitalism.
The reproduction of an exclusive Jewish capitalism transplanted in the
midst of a pre-capitalist social formation was simply inconceivable. It
contradicted the laws of capitalist accumulation. For the reproduction of
Jewish capitalist relations of production required necessarily the integra-
tion and subordination of Jewish pre-capitalist forms of production. To
guarantee the reproduction of the Jewishness of the relations of production,
of social classes, and of class struggle, it was imperative to deform the
indigenous social formation. Deformation was executed through dispossession
and expulsion of the Palestinians. Proletarian Zionism could have been im-
plemented without "transfer" of the indigenous population only if this pop-
ulation was Jewish. In that case, however, the proletarian strategy loses
its relevance to Zionism.
One may further argue that the transfer solution took precedence over
bi-nationalism, owing to incongruities between the proletarian Zionist
theory and the material and non-material conditions of Palestine in which
it was put into practice; and that it could have been implemented differ-
ently in a different environment, say if Palestine were, in fact, "a coun-
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try with no people". The fact is that proletarian Zionism was already in
theory formulated precisely for Palestine and in light of its actual mater-
ial conditions. In Borochov's formulation of the territorialist solution
it is explicit that "the territory" was Palestine which he also distinguish-
es from "a territory".
It is therefore historically accurate to argue that proletarian Zionism
was intrinsically incapable of being implemented without the expulsion of
the Palestinians. Put differently, the transfer of the great majority of
Palestinians across borders in 1947-48 was not only consistent with, but
also indispensable for, proletarian Zionism. It had finally altered in a
radical way the material conditions prevalent in Palestine in favor of a
sovereign Jewish State. In 1948 the Jewish State "emerged"; yet, not as
organically as it was supposed to. Here the Yishuv ends and a second phase
in the development of Israel social formation begins.
III. Jewish Settlement and Palestinian Proletarianization During the Nation-
Building Phase, 1948-1967
This is the phase of constructing Jewish political "independence" in the
frame of a sovereign nation State.
A fuller establishment of the apparatuses of the State: the army, the
legislative, the executive, etc. It was also the phase of broadening and
strengthening the material "base" (demographic/economic) of the State
"superstructure".
The early years of nation-building were distinguished by mass Jewish im-
migration both from under Nazism and from Arab countries.
Both this massive Jewish immigration as well as the "transfer" of the
vast majority of the indigenous population across what became the boundaries
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of the Jewish State, had radically transformed the demographic map of Pales-
tine. Absolute Jewish demographic superiority was established.
This period, of course, represents the peak of Jewish settlement in
Palestine. By 1970, there were already 702 Jewish rural settlements, as
compared with 303 in September, 1947. We must not forget that after State-
hood there was a shift to urban settlement, specifically the New Develop-
ment Towns and suburbanization schemes. From now on, Jewish settlement
ceased to be colonization through class struggle; it was transformed into
national development policy carried out no longer by pioneer settlers but
rather by state and public agencies on behalf of available and potential
newcomers.
In accordance with the general order of this chapter, we try to concen-
trate on the dual process of the creation of Palestinian labor surplus,
and the impediments of selling its labor power. The following section
focuses, therefore, on land and labor policies peculiar to the second phase
of Israel's development. Slogans are now replaced by policy.
A. Land Policy
Large-scale acquisition of land in the aftermath of the 1947-48 War re-
sulting from the expulsion of Palestinian peasants and the flight of land-
lords (absentees, in particular) is the material basis for the new land
policy.
As demdnstrated earlier in the Yishuv phase, land acquisition and trans-
fer of economic ownership from Arab to Jewish hands took place simply through
purchase, that is, market exchange.
In:the nation-building phase, market exchange was not the predominant
method. The major portion of land acquisition within the jurisdiction of
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the Jewish State was the result of military gains. As Efarim Orni correctly
puts it, the 1948 War "brought in its wake a revolutionary reversal in land
ownership."1 0 6
The major land policy task became then less one of actual acquisition of
land and more one of establishment and transfer of legal ownership of ac-
quired land to the Jewish State and Zionist organizations.107
The system of land law of the State for acquiring legal ownership and,
later on, for acquiring more land is comprehensively presented and carefully
documented by Sabri Jiryis in The Arabs in Israel.108 It is unnecessary to
try to duplicate his efforts here. Instead, the reader is referred directly
to this comprehensive study.
It is necessary, however, to emphasize that this system of land law by
the newly-born State was not to replace but only to complement the land ac-
quisition system of the pre-State Yishuv phase.
The Jewish National Fund continued to purchase land from the Palestin-
ians who became Israeli citizens upon the annexation of West Galilee and
the Small Triangle in 1949.
The Jewish National Fund (JNF), like all other Zionist institutions of
the Yishuv, remained operative after Statehood and in some cases became
more powerful then before when they became organs of the State. As put by
Chomsky:
"Prior to 1948, the JNF was a private self-help organization of
a national group. It is now an official agency of the State.
Its exclusivist principles have simply been absorbed as one element
of the official policy of Jewish dominance in a Jewish State." 109
The one-way transferability of land from Arab to Jewish use and con-
trol that prevailed in the Yishuv was further reinforced through constant
interventions. These interventions made more intricate the institutional
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setup that embodied the principles of inalienability originating in the
Constitution of the JNF. A JNF report on its land acquisition and tenure
provides an example of the above; it states:
"In 1960, laws passed by the Knesset extended the Keren Kayemeth
principles of inalienability of the soil and its use in terms of
heredity leaseholdship to all public holdings in Israel, i.e.,
to 92% of the State's surface prior to June, 1967. Simultaneous-
ly, an agreement between the Israel Government and the Keren Kaye-
emeth created the Israel Land Authority to deal with the adminis-
tration of all public lands, i.e., both State and Fund holdings,
and named the Keren Kayemeth as the Israel Land Development Author-
ity responsible for soil conservation, reclamation, afforestation,
etc., everywhere in Israel." 110
This refers to Israel Lands Administration Law. In the same year, the
Knesset, according to another JNF report:
"... enacted the Basic Law: Israel Lands which gives legal effect
to the ancient tradition of ownership of the land in perpetuity
by the Jewish people - the principle on which Keren Kayemeth
Leisrael was founded. The same law extended that principle to
the bulk of Israel's State domains." 111
It is in this sense that the "conquest of land" methods established
and practiced in the Yishuv were not replaced but rather complemented by
State policy. The new institutional arrangements and status were not to
transform earlier principles of Zionist land acquisition; the latter re-
mained in force.
The JNF is now a "public institution recognized by the government of
Israel and the World Zionist Organization as the exclusive instrument for
the development of Israel Lands." 1 1 2
Together, the three citations above imply, in effect, 92 percent of
the land (within the pre-1967 borders of Israel) was transferred to exclu-
sively Jewish legal ownership and use. Indirectly, this means that it is
illegal for a Palestinian (even citizen of Israel) to have access to this
land -- neither to own it nor to use it. The employment of Arab labor on
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this land is now prohibited indirectly by State law. This way, the bour-
geois State rids itself of the need for explicit discriminatory slogans
like the ones used in the Yishuv phase to live up to the twin labor Zionist
principles "conquest of land" and "Hebrew labor".
It is important here to try to understand why the Yishuv institutions
(often referred to as the formative elements of the State), which are world-
wide in scope and which were created to develop a material "base" for the
Jewish State "superstructure", remained operative after the establishment
of the State; and even became organs of the State itself.
This combined institutional structure and content of the State of Is-
rael makes it a complex one of a dual character: both an Israeli and Jew-
ish State, and simultaneously national and world-wide. Perhaps this dual
design is the only way that there can be a Jewish State that is to serve
all the Jewish bourgeoisie, both in Diaspora and in Israel itself.
It is not the place here to treat this question in any meaningful way.
It may, however, be treated later in this thesis. What we must point out
here is that, in effect, this dual institutional character of the State
superstructure enables the State of Israel to channel the means of produc-
tion into exclusively Jewish use, denying its Palestinian-Arab citizens
access to resources without explicit violation of the bourgeois democratic
traditions to which it explicitly adheres.
Concrete examples on how this actually works are abundant in a study by
Ian Lustick entitled "Institutionalized Segmentation: One Factor in the
Control of Israeli Arabs."1 1 3
Until now, we have emphasized only the methods and institutional ar-
rangements of land acquisition during the nation-building phase. We have
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not mentioned the volume of land actually expropriated from Palestinian-
Arab citizens during this period.
Official sources indicate that substantial territories were expropria-
ted after the establishment of the State. JNF holdings increased from
936,000 donams (Donams - 1,000 sq. meters) in May, 1948, to almost 3,400,
000 in 1950.114
Between 1949 and 1967, Yossi Amitai writes:
"Over 125,000 hectares from the 187,000 hectares that belonged to
Arabs the day Israel was created have been expropriated by dubious
legal means for Zionist motives." 115
It must be stressed here that these 187,000 hectares that belonged to
the Arab population of Israel does not constitute the whole of the 8 per-
cent which is "secular" land, that is, not controlled by JNF. It consti-
tutes only a very small portion of the latter. That 8 percent is primarily
situated within the coastal orange belt, the most fertile land in the coun-
try and is privately owned by Jews. 1 1 6
Land was expropriated from Arab citizens of Israel not so much for its
fertility and, therefore, agricultural value, but primarily for the erec-
tion of Jewish settlements in the heart of the Arab populated areas to dis-
perse them, hence reduce their potential to constitute a political risk,
such as the demand for majority rule in the Galilee, for example.
Examples of such Jewish settlements are Carmiel, Upper Nazareth and
Ma'alot, in the West Galilee, where Arab demographic superiority has pre-
vailed.
Regardless of the purpose of expropriation, the effect was always fur-
ther displacement of the remaining Arab peasants, the creation of further
Palestinian-Arab, labor supply inside Israel. Whether the generation of
further Palestinian labor supply during nation-building was or was not like
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during the Yishuv correlated with the generation of demand for Palestinian
labor is the subject of the following section.
B. Arab-labor Policy
The threat presented by Palestinian surplus labor to the imperative of
Jewish proletarianization during the Yishuv was considerably reduced during
the nation-building phase. This threat was reduced precisely by transfer-
ring this growing contradiction across the boundaries of what was to become
Israel. The mass of Palestinian labor surplus was stored in what, since
then, became known as the Palestinian Refugee Camps; seemingly, for a later
stage. Therefore, the methods used by the Zionist movement to prohibit the
penetration of Palestinian labor into Jewish work places during the Yishuv
became superfluous after the Palestinian exile.
The ideological slogans of the Yishuv became superfluous also because,
with the establishment of the State, new and more effective means were
available at the disposal of the Zionist movement, the repressing appara-
tuses of the State itself.
A military administration rule was imposed on the Palestinian national
minority by the bourgeois democratic State of Israel. This is activating
the Emergency Law in order to restrict their freedom of movement inside
the country. Although these practices were motivated primarily by what
they believed to be the security of the State, the Israeli authorities
have, in effect, also controlled Arab labor mobility. A system of work
permits was established to regulate the use of Arab labor in Jewish work
places.
Another reason why the ideological slogans of the Yishuv (specifically,
self-labor/Hebrew work) became superfluous and also inappropriate is the
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following: this period was that of mass immigration of Jewish refugees
fleeing Nazism and of Oriental Jews partly expelled and partly mobilized
by the Zionist movement, mainly for demographic requirement of national
sovereignty. The point is that they were not ideologically mobilized by
proletarian Zionism, as in the case in the majority of the pioneer set-
tlers of the Yishuv. In this sense, the Yishuv methods for boycotting
Arab labor became unnecessary under the considerable pressure to absorb
Jewish immigrants.
Moreover, after Statehood the boycott of Arab labor was not function-
ally identical with the imperative of Jewish proletarianization before
Statehood. Jewish class struggle was no longer an objective leading to
the emergence of the Jewish State. The State was already there in need of
a large army. Absorption of a wide Jewish base became, therefore, quite
accurately indispensable for the security of the State.
The actual boycott of Arab labor -- the impediments of Palestinian
proletarianization during nation-building were more the result of the con-
crete requirements of nation-building itself -- determined by the political,
not the ideological, as in the Yishuv.
The military administration rule (martial law) was simply removed when
upon the construction boom the economy needed Arab labor and had the capa-
city to employ it. Towards the end of the boom and the beginning of reces-
sion, Arab citizens were, like migratory labor, sent back "home" to the
semi-subsistence village. In retrospect, the removal of military adminis-
tration appears to be functionally similar to the removal of slavery in the
United States' South -- providing "freedom" to become wage-labor. A full
treatment of actual employment figures and dynamics during both this phase
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and the post-196 7 phase is the subject of a following chapter.
It was necessary to provide the reader with a more detailed background
on the Yishuv phase in order for the changes in the post-1967 era to be
more adequately comprehended.
In reviewing the second and third phases, it is only necessary to
briefly point out the general features peculiar to each phase, because
nation-building is only a transitional phase, and the post-1967 phase be-
comes the very subject of this thesis. It is the link between the phases:
how one emerges from the other as simultaneously the point of both rupture
and continuity is what concerns us most.
We have seen how the contradictions inherent in the theory and prac-
tices of proletarian Zionism resulted eventually in the transfer of Arab
labor surplus across the borders and of Arab lands into Jewish hands; trans-
forming the material conditions against bi-nationalism and in favor of a
wholly Jewish Nation State. A Palestine exile is established and the "en-
gathering of Jewish exiles" begins. The latter results in the over-develop-
ment of the Jewish State and of the productive forces at the disposal of
Israel's ruling class.
Further Jewish capitalization was fettered by confinement to the poli-
tical objective of Aliyah absorption -- meaning, in effect, priority given
to Hebrew labor, often at the expense of profitability. The essential
internationalization of capital (as capital accumulation cannot be confined
to national boundaries) motivated by the state of development and require-
ments of the productive force and facilitated by the overdevelopment of the
State had finally to express itself in the Six-day War. This was a turning
point, the emergence of the expansionist phase with immense territorial
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gains, yet with reservoirs of "free" Palestinian labor that, in 1948, was
thought to be transferred once and for all.
Comparing this with the 1948 War -- which he characterizes by: "a two-
fold miracle occurred: territorial victory and the flight of Arabs," Joseph
Weitz writes: "In the Six-day War, there was one miracle: a tremendous
territorial victory. But the general population of the liberated territor-
ies remained 'stuck' in their places, and this may destroy the very founda-
tion of our State."117
In reviewing this phase, it is, therefore, irrelevant to concentrate on
the other methods of land expropriation and, hence, the creation of Pales-
tinian labor surplus. More relevant here is to focus on the following fea-
tures:
(a) The massive mobilization of the Palestinian labor reserves into
Jewish work places, both from inside Israel and from the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank.
(b) On the controversy within the ruling class regarding the use of
this labor force as expressed in Israeli mass media. We try to
highlight the revival of the labor ideals and slogans of the
Yishuv as a means of offsetting the demographic threat presented
by this immense Palestinian presence in "Greater Israel", to what
is still believed to be the essential Jewish demographic superior-
ity.
(c) On the clash between the outlived ideals of the past and the pres-
sures exerted by new material conditions that characterize Israel
in its post-1967 phase.
The debates inside the moshav, the kibbutz, and the Labor Party may con-
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firm our rationale for choosing Borochovism as the basis of our analysis
and not other versions of Zionism. Public statements and debates are meant
here to illustrate the historical use by the ruling class of the socialist
Zionist ideals derivative of Borochovism in appealing to the Israeli-Jewish
population, and mobilizing them to serve Zionism. This is to indicate that
it is the Borochovist formulation of Zionism which ultimately became the
material force responsible for the transformation of Palestine.
IV. Palestinian Proletarianization in the Post-1967 Phase: The Irrevers-
ible Breakthroughs
In the rural villages of Galilee, the Triangle, the Gaza Strip, and the
West Bank, masses of Arab men, women and even children are being released
from private household servitude, semi-subsistence agriculture, and small-
scale commodity production. These Palestinian-Arabs are then absorbed
through the Israeli rural and urban labor markets into capitalist produc-
tion as seasonal cash-croppers on commercialized Jewish agricultural plan-
tations, as modern wage-workers in construction, textile, and food proces-
sing industries, and as service employees in menial positions within vari-
ous branches of this expanding economic sector. A process that has the ap-
pearance of massive Palestinian proletarianization in Israel, the content
of which constitutes the subject of this thesis.
This growing penetration of Palestinian-Arab labor in the Israeli-Jewish
economy has become, in recent years, a prominent feature disrupting the ba-
sic principles of Israeli society and transforming the character of both
Arab and Jewish communities alike.ll8
As Matityahu Peled, of Tel-Aviv University and a regular contributor to
Maariv, describes:
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"A presently characteristic phenomenon in Arab areas is the morning
mass exodus to working places into the Jewish areas and the evening
mass return to living quarters. The Arab village is no longer a
village in the traditional sense of the word, because a considerable
part of its population no longer works in agricultural pursuits,
but rather works the construction trade and/or industry. The Arab
village, however, is still a village in the sense that city condi-
tions do not exist in it." 119
The traditional scene of peasants rising up with the dawn, rushing in
family style and with animals to work their own land has been wiped out and
replaced with long caravans of trucks carrying workers to the Jewish work
places. This morning-evening in-the-truck mobility of Arab labor seems to
have become a fixed feature in the "landscape" of daily life. The Arab vil-
lage which used to be a semi-subsistence community has been transformed into
a "bedroom community", with its main function being that of reproducing Arab
labor power for Jewish capital, with the reproduction cost falling less on
the Jewish work place and more on the Arab residential place, to which labor
is forced to return;120 in this sense, it is becoming increasingly similar to
the Bantus' native labor reserves of South Africa.1 2 1
The effects on Jewish communities are rather qualitatively different, as
expressed, for example, by Debora Namir, a woman moshav member from Kfar Vet-
kin, who in 1972 published an open letter titled, "We live the Style of Life
of Effendis," to the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, in which she says:
"I was born in a moshav and am married to a moshav member. We live
in a moshav in the center of the country. Until the Six Day War, we
lived in peace, worked and earned our bread honorably. Since the war,
the wheels have turned around because my husband has become a con-
tractor of a serious agricultural work. There are no problems. Cheap
labor force is available, and there is great demand in the market.
Today we have five Arab workers, and we reached a situation where
we don't do work at all in our own farm.
"My eldest son refuses today even to mow the lawn: "Muhammed will
mow the grass"....The children of the moshav are being transformed
before my eyes into children of the rich of the worst and cheapest
kind.. .until about a week ago, the Arab workers lived in the differ-
ent citrus packing houses in the area. Now it appears that more work-
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ers were brought over before the hot-house harvest season and the
packing houses are full. My husband, therefore, built them a hut
in the yard. When I protested, he sent me on a tour of the village.
Well, it appears that every able man has become a contractor. Also,
the number of hot-houses which are completely dependent on Arab
labor have increased. The Arabs live in shacks just a few meters
away from the renovated villas and the style has become the style
of effendis....I do not think that this development can be combat-
ted locally in a country flooded by Arab workers from the terri-
tories. No longer do I walk alone in the evening to the fields.
It is simply unpleasant....The situation is particularly tragic
for young, unskilled people who seek seasonal work. In our area,
no Jew can get a job on a tractor, because this is no longer profit-
able for the employer. As far as I can see, Arab labor from the
territories in Israel must be prohibited. If, after five years,
the situation is so shocking, what will happen in another ten or
more years?... .The contractors, who today become rich, but with
some feeling of guilt, will tomorrow become a pressure group
which will not allow any changes in the situation." 122
Although the participation of Arab workers in the Israeli labor market
started in the early sixties, applying then only to Israeli-Arab male labor
and restricted to construction and menial services in the urban sector. It is
the post-1967 period that seems to represent major breakthroughs in three re-
spects, as follows:
First, a breakthrough in the mobilization of Palestinian-Arab labor, not
only from within pre-1967 borders but also, and even more importantly, from
territories occupied in the 1967 war, specifically the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.123 In a study by the Bank of Israel, Arie Bergman indicates that soon
after the 1967 war, workers from the "administered" areas started flowing in-
to Israel in an ever-increasing stream, driven by the shortage of job oppor-
tunities in the areas, and the acute demand for labor in Israel, and the high-
er wage paid in Israel. This inflow of workers was most strongly felt in con-
struction. By 1973, 50 percent of all of the areas' residents working in Is-
rael were engaged in this branch. Their share in the total number of workers
engaged in construction in Israel was 26 percent in 1973, compared to 3 per-
cent in 1968. The sharing of the areas' residents in industry is also growing
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constantly, thanks to the training courses conducted by the Ministry of La-
bor, that adjust the labor force to the requirements of the Israeli economy.
In 1973, no less than one-third of all employed persons in the areas were
working in Israel, as against 12 percent in 1970 and 4 percent in 1968. Evi-
dently, the flow of workers from the administered areas will persist as long
as overemployment exists in Israel, says Bergman.1 24
The number of employed persons increased by 45 percent in 1968-1973.
The entire increase in employment stemmed from increased employment in Is-
rael. Employment in the areas themselves went down by 3.5 percent annually
between 1969-1973. Demand for labor in Israel -- which persisted throughout
the entire period and was especially acute in 1972 -- and the higher wages in
Israel attracted ever-increasing numbers of workers from the areas, causing
both labor shortages and rapid wage increases there. 1 2 5
An article published in Maariv, June 14, 1970, by Ezra Yenov, under the
title, "The Gaza Strip: A Reservoir of Cheap Labour Flooding the Israeli Econ-
omy," indicates the following: Labour Exchange workers from the Strip settle-
ments are today the main reservoir of seasonal manpower in northern Negev and
southern Israel. Their penetration into the Israeli economy is increasing.
They are slowly dominating the agricultural sector and now in tens and hun-
dreds are entering into the construction industry and earth works; and their
first wave is already filling the available jobs in industry. More than 80
percent of the citrus pickers are Arabs from the Strip. The number of Israeli
pickers is decreasing and in some orchards the work is done entirely by Arabs.
The (male) workers from Gaza can't be selective over the kind of job, still
are ready to rush to the orchards for picking and not to the trucks that car-
ry women workers to the can factories in Israel. In the can factory, the work-
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er is paid less. It is harder to reach the quotas, and the chance for pre-
miums is smaller than in picking. Since an industrious worker from Gaza's
output is twice the requirement, it brings a saving of tools and supervision
to the employer.
Women workers from Gaza are already in textile factories in Kiryat
Gat. This outflow of labor has destructive and discouraging effects on
the local agriculture. Orchard owners of the Strip are having difficul-
ties finding workers to complete fruit picking, and the employed age in
the Strip's orchard has gone down to ten; i.e., children are employed for
rock-bottom wages in order to secure the continuation of the picking. The
ratio between manpower resources and labor demand can be maintained in
equilibrium due to the policy of employing refugees. Today, no less than
20,000 refugees from all the camps in the Strip are registered in the of-
ficial Labour Exchange, and the majority are hired in seasonable jobs in
the Strip and outside. The number of desperate job-seekers constantly
calling at the agency for any kind of job reached, at a point in 1970,
4,000 workers. This number does not include 6,000 women flooding the
agencies with their demand for jobs; most of them want to work in order to
improve the family income and to survive more easily in the competitive
race against the cost of living. When the main breadwinner of the family
has trouble facing the cost of living on his income, his wife and/or child-
ren join him. And, indeed, the sewing workshops, engaged families in con-
fection job work ordered by big factories in Israel, are hiring hundreds
of women from Gaza. This is also the case in the rug and light furniture
factories, which are crowded with boys. The Israeli Labor Ministry has
also opened six training centers in the Strip which produce skilled trades-
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men in trades demanded in Israel, such as locksmith, mechanic, carpenter,
and building branches (construction, ironbending, plastering, and carpen-
try). 126
As far as where in the occupational hierarchy workers from occupied
territories are absorbed, Haaretz, a Party-Independent newspaper in Israel,
reports that they are, in fact, replacing Oriental Jewish labor in the very
bottom of this hierarchy:
"...differences between the very rich and the very poor are
increasing gravely. Jews of Asiatic and African origin are
moving to better-paid jobs and to lighter work, while labor-
ers from Nablus, Qalqilia, and Ramalla [all in the West Bank]
are doing the heavier work that needs a great deal of physi-
cal effort. This has resulted in a racial division of labor,
a Black laborer in building or a water have become synonymous
with the word Arab." 127
Popular Israeli opinion expressed serious discontent with the use of
Arab labor in general, and its use in "marginal" positions in particular.
The penetration of Palestinian labor is perceived to be correlated with
growing inequalities and defying the socialist Zionist traditions.
A prominent Israeli dissident, Yehoshova Arieli, writing in the Aug-
ust 31, 1972 New York Review of Books, pointed to the effects of occupation
in producing political conformity, spurring new vested interests, deepening
soqial and material inequality, and leaving "Zionist values jettisoned" by
I i 128hiring Arabs to do the dirty work.
Similarly, in his work, "The Violent Era", the internationally-known
Jacob L. Talmon stated: "...the transformation of the Jews into bosses,
executives, or overseers of unskilled Arab laborers is a bitter irony of
the moral and social bankruptcy of the Zionist effort." He expressed the
belief that he was hardly chauvinistic enough to think that the Jewish
people enjoy a greater immunity to the dangers of such a situation than
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any other people. 1 2 9
Official opinions in Israel have expressed serious concern over the
use of Arab hired labor, as they see in it a violation of Labor-Zionism,
according to which Zionist colonization in Palestine was meant to "replace"
not to "exploit" indigenous labor. For example, Itzhak Ben-Aharon, the
powerful Secretary General of the Histadrut Labor Federation, stated in
an interview with the New York Times that "...six years of occupation had
eroded Israel's image of 'moral capacity and reliability' in the Western
world." He charged that "Israel was 'building Zionism' on the backs of
hired Arab labor from the occupied territories" -- a reference to the
55,000 Arab workers who have become the core of the manual labor force in
Israel since the 1967 war.130 Contrasted with these "Dovish" voices mourn-
ing the death of labor ideals are the "Hawkish" voices in the Labor Party
asserting the rationale for replacing these outlived ideals.
The dominance of the economic is finally asserted over the political
and ideological. A recent article in Davar, the organ of the ruling Is-
raeli Labor Party, explicitly states:
"Workers from the occupied territories have many advantages
over Israeli workers. Israeli workers shun industry and
production, whereas workers from the territories are be-
coming concentrated more and more in industry. It is al-
most impossible to fire an Israeli worker or to relocate
him without his permission and without a wage increase. On
the other hand, an Arab worker is exceptionally mobile, can
be dismissed without notice and moved from place to place,
does not strike and does not present demands... .From many
economic considerations, workers from the territories are a
bargain for the Israeli economy. They exist when and where
required and make a full contribution to the production
cycle. As long as we don't speak in social or political
terms, the workers from the territories display an excel-
lent economic flexibility." 131
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Second, a breakthrough, not only in the legal use of Arab labor but
also in the use of smuggled labor, specifically from the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank. For example, it was reported in Maariv, December 5, 1971
that:
"The actual number of workers commuting daily from occupied
territories was estimated in 1971 to be 10,000 higher than
that number of 'officially recruited workers', which was
42,000 in November, 1971. These 10,000 are employed ille-
gally. Fifty percent of their wages is kept by the contrac-
tors, who collect the wages for them. Haaretz, August 11,
1972, indicates that the workday of Arab labor in the mosha-
vim is 15-16 hours, starting at 4 A.M. until 9 or 10 P.M."
The smuggling in of labor from occupied territories to Israeli work
places is not practiced directly by Jewish employers but rather through
Arab middle-men. The smuggled labor as a new feature in the structure of
the Israeli working class is coupled with the emergence of the "Raises"
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as a new feature of Arab embourgeoisement.
In an article titled, Every 'Rais' Shall Do What is Right in His
Eyes," Yaakov Haelyon writes the following in "That Which Hurts", a section
of Maariv newspaper:
"'Raises' from Arab settlements within the green line
bring cheap Arab labor from villages beyond the green
line: girls who are taken to Israeli settlements are
picked up like 'Sardines' in tenders. Sometimes twenty
girls or more travel in one tender. There 'Raises' beat
the girls, who sometimes have to wait many hours for
their employers to take them to their villages at the
end of a day's work."
The smuggling in of labor is increasingly becoming an ac-
ceptable practice, as expressed by the silence and indif-
ference of the police. In the same article sited above
Haelyon writes that Miriam Egozi (Moshov Rishpon) lodged
a complaint about this practice in February, 1974. She
reinforced her evidence with photographs in which the
girls are seen waiting and the vehicles block the moshav's
traffic junction. Mrs. Egozi was surprised that the po-
lice did not see the "Raises"' vehicle, which carries
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many more passengers than the number permitted. She
asked further, how is it possible to lend a hand to
abandoning helpless girls to drivers who enslave them?
Why do we have to see and keep silent? Her appeal to
"That Which Hurts" was transferred to the Staff Comman-
dant of the Dan Region of the Israeli police.
"The police reply," writes Haelyon, " which reached us
at the beginning of April, 1974, included a recommenda-
tion to approach the Employment Service about the control
of the work of Arab women who come to the moshav. We were
not satisfied. . .and appealed again to the police. . .
and passed the reply to the complainer, who in turn, being
disappointed with the police's work, wrote again: "It
hurts us that in the Israel State, 1974, we all lend a
hand to the creation of the "Raises", who beat and pick
up uneducated Arab girls. Thus is done in the presence
of our children, who are stunned. Is that the way we
want to bring them up? Does shortage of workers justify
such shame? Are workers in Israel of 1974 transported in
such a disgraceful way? It seems that this state of af-
fairs is convenient to all groups involved."
. . .As we deepened the treatment of the case, it seemed
more and more serious. At the end of July we appealed
to the police and to the Ministry of Labor, asking for a
basic investigation of the problem. We also supplied
them with the vehicle numbers of the "Raises" and further
details. In September we received a letter from Mr. Hirsch
of the State Police staff, in which the following was re-
ported:
". . .the police had taken action in order to deal with
the vehicles transgressing various traffic laws while
transporting women workers to that moshav. In the police
visits, tickets were given to offenders who were there;
tickets for transporting passengers outside the body of
vehicle, transporting more passengers than permitted by
the driver's license, etc. At the end of the police oper-
ations, no offenses of the aforementioned kind were seen
during visits there. The police will continue their con-
trol in order to prevent the renewal of the phenomenon."
After five months, Mrs. Egozi (who wanted to wait and see
how things would turn out) replied that in spite of the
police operation, the "Raises" continue to act as they
please. In the meantime, however, because of the economic
situation, the number of workers in the moshav went down,
which seems to temporarily reduce the seriousness of the
phenomenon. She argued that although Moshav Rishpon is
not situated at a crossroads, the police should watch over
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the security of the passengers "even if it concerns Arab
women workers from the territories. . ." She noted, too,
that there had been no change for the better in the work
conditions of women workers in the moshav. "Nothing new
under the sun, and hence comes my question: what is the
role of the Ministry of Labor?"
. . Zalman Chen, the spokesman of the Ministry of Labor,
answered, "The phenomenon of the "Raises" is a nasty evil
nowadays. According to law, it is prohibited to employ
workers not through the employment bureau and there is
an arrangement by which workers are employed within the
bounds of the green line through the employment bureau in
the territories. Inspectors of the employment bureau try
to catch the lawbreakers and, in many cases, they succeed.
But there are cases in which "Raises" in cooperation with
employers in Israel, succeed in evading the inspectors and
in breaking the law. Not in every case workers from the
territories who are seen waiting for transportation are
unorganized."
Mr. Hirsch, of the State police, finally wrote to us:
"The traffic police in Hasharon area have visited and
inspected the roads near Moshav Rishpon and are continuing
to do so. Because of existing limitations, it is impos-
sible to have continuous inspection."
Yaakov Haelyon ends his article with his comment: "It
does not seem to us that the authorities concerned with
this case were anxious to abolish it." 133
This comment, however, is not adequate. Some extra ones are neces-
sary after listing the particular details of this article: the reluctance
of the police to take strict action against the "Raises" is pretty obvious.
What is more important, however, is the fact that the practice to be con-
demned turned into merely one of violating traffic laws, thus avoiding the
real issue, the very smuggling of labor from under occupation into Israel.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Labor's approach was that of rationalizing,
not condemning, the existing practice of "Raises" and use of smuggled la-
bor. Both attitudes are indicative of how law enforcement gets frozen and
official labor policy relaxes when faced with economic justification and
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material necessity of the ruling class, especially during a period of cri-
sis when the State apparatus is to serve the interests of the ruling class
against the effects of the tendency of the rate of profit to decline and,
thus, shake up the dominant mode of accumulation. The significance of this
point in the Israeli context gets magnified when compared with the atti-
tudes in previous stages of Israeli formation, in which instances other
than the economic had prevailed.
A further note on the "illegal" use of smuggled Arab labor is its
link with higher ratio of profit and the development of embourgeoisement
trends and values among the users of smuggled labor and in society-at-large,
such as expressed in the following:
"An Israeli journalist interviewed the employer of smuggled
labor:
In the evening the windows of the moshav are illuminated --
people eat their supper and watch T.V. In the darkness of
the far part of the yard dozens of fires are lit: the Arab
women are baking the bread.
Q: Why are you employing these Arab women?
A: It is more profitable. They receive lower wages.
Q: Did it occur to you to promise social insurance to
these workers?
A: It is not customary here. We have an agreement with
the contractor, and we pay him, that's it. We want
to be able to expand the farm, to build, to buy cars,
machines, and T.V. sets. Before the Six Day War we
did not enjoy this kind of life. It has been made
possible only through cheap labor." 134
Third, a breakthrough, as has already been noticed, is in the mobili-
zation of female labor from Palestinian-Arab communities, both inside Is-
rael and in occupied territories. Young rural Arab women long enslaved by
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patriarchal oppression, imprisoned in household servitude and subsistence
or semi-subsistence production, are now set free; "free" to sell their
labor power to the Israeli-Jewish capitalist and even to be smuggled in as
seasonal cash-croppers on Jewish agricultural plantations and as modern
wage workers in Israeli textile and food-processing factories.
These women who have been historically subjugated to the traditional
extended-family norms such as el-Sharaf and el-Ard (the honor of the fam-
ily) are now, in response to economic necessity, being released. Women
from the Arab villages in pre-1967 Israel have promoted accumulation of
Jewish capital in Israel indirectly, through their traditional role in
terms of reproduction of male labor power already directly engaged in Is-
raeli capitalist production. This is particularly true of females in rural
working class families, simply because of capital relation to domestic la-
bor.135 This point is nicely elaborated by Carmen Deere. In her words:
"Rural women's subsistence production in the capitalist
periphery allows semi-proletarian male workers to sell
their labor power to capitalist units of production for
less than the subsistence familial wage. Thus women's
contribution towards the maintenance and reproduction
of labor power within the rural labor reserve permits
the non-capitalist mode of production [the pre-capitalist
social formation] to absorb the costs of production and
reproduction of labor power. The division of labor by
sex, based on the articulation between modes of produc-
tion, serves to lower the value of labor power for capi-
tal, enhancing the relative rate of surplus value for
peripheral capital accumulation." 136
Nowadays, Palestinian-Arab women, in addition, not instead, are engaged
also directly in Israeli capitalist production. According to Emile Touma,
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more than 14,000 of the Israeli-Arab women are now modern wage workers.
In the period between 1967-1972, 7,000 Arab women entered industrial
work.138 A typical example of female recruitment is the large Gibour nylon
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textile plant located in Maalot and other neighboring New Development Towns
which, by 1973, employed more than 1,000 northern West Bank women. In 1973,
some 6,000 women flooded the agencies in Gaza demanding work.1 39
Most Arab women workers occupy unskilled labor categories. Specifi-
cally, in textile and food-processing factories, where wages are even lower
than those on fruit plantations. In Gaza, men rush to the orchards to do
harvesting work, not to the trucks that carry women workers from Jabalya
or Beit Hanah to the Israeli canning factories.140 Arab female workers are
forced to accept the least desirable, lowest-paid work. Previous discus-
sion on smuggled labor is most evident of the vulnerability of female labor,
specifically from occupied territories, in the case of which traditional
patriarchal oppression is combined with political oppression by military
occupation. Sex, class, and national oppressions coincide.
In villages where the mobilization of women to Jewish work places is
impossible because traditions still hold strictly, or undesirable because
the Israeli authorities are careful not to offend the traditional leaders,
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a case which is particularly true of Druze communities, crafts workshops
and small textile and clothing factories are being transplanted in these
communities to utilize their female labor reserves. Jewish national capi-
tal in Israel is thus running after cheap female labor in the Arab rural
villages, following precisely the pattern of international capital mobility
into the world-dependent periphery.
As Yousef Waschitz points out, Israeli-Arabs are socially and econo-
mically part of the Third World. They have been marginal and, at best,
indirect beneficiaries of Israel's national development processes; and ex-
cluded from actual development projects. He indicates that the State of
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Israel does not generally establish new industries. Its role in develop-
ment is to direct potential investors to areas it wants to industrialize
and to provide them with credits, grants, and tax exemptions. Only recently
there has been an effort to direct potential industrial investors to Arab
villages and towns. Some small industrial projects generally employing
30-50 workers have been established in Arab villages and towns. Most are
branches of Jewish enterprises interested in the potential of women work-
ers, generally textile and clothing plants. 1 4 2
Not unlike advanced capitalism is the mushrooming service sector in
Israel. As the case in the former, the expansion of this sector increases
the demand for female labor. For some reasons, the service sector is dis-
tinguished by its attraction of female labor, as is evident in its wage
differentials on sex lines. In Israel, for example, women earn 90 percent
of a man's wage in tourism, as opposed to 55 percent in industry. Obvious-
ly, in this specifically sensitive branch in Israel, Jewish women are more
reliable than Arab women for promoting "Aliyah" and contributions to, as
well as the international image of, the State of Israel. For these reasons,
let alone cultural and educational factors, Arab and Oriental Jewish women
are more likely to be absorbed in menial positions of this branch and in
other less strategic branches of the service sector.
Historically, the female labor reserve is mobilized mostly following
wars or in periods of crisis. In Israel, according to Bergman, "unlike the
steep and continuous rise in the Arab male participation rate between 1968
and 1973, the female participation rate took a somewhat different course,
rising between 1968-1970" following the post-1967 war and resulting in a
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shortage in male labor, but declining in the three following years during
the economic boom.143 And it is my impression, through personal contact,
that it is rising again since the deepening of the post-1973 crisis.
Fourth, a breakthrough in squatting and family labor mobility. The
demand for Arab female labor combined with a more important factor, i.e.,
landlessness resulting from increasing land expropriation for settlement
and "Judiazation" schemes, has encouraged whole-family squatting on Jewish
farms and plantations in West Galilee and the coastal regions. These Arab
families live in huts or tents and move about in search of seasonal employ-
ment as cash-croppers (and sometimes even as share-croppers, which may not
designate proletarianization). The labor of the wife as well as the child-
ren is absorbed in cash-production and in the reproduction of the labor
power sold to the Jewish capitalist farmer.
The following excerpts from an article by Baruch Nadel in Yediot
Ahronot give some feel for this rural squatting phenomenon and the new
transformations in the division of labor within the Jewish agricultural
sector, accompanied by a simultaneous evolution of racist attitudes among
the young Jewish generation, who are moving off manual work to be replaced
by Arab squatting labor on Jewish farms. Concrete examples are derived
from Yesud-HaMaalee, where the journalist has visited and talked with the
Arab squatters and with their Jewish employers. Nadel writes:
"In Ysud-HaMaalee, founded ninety-three years ago, Jews
work with machines now, and Arabs do the manual work.
Life is not easy for Jews, too, although there are no
more epidemics and the romanticism of farming and barn
have ceased to exist. The first settlers learned tilling
the land from their Arab neighbors and were ploughing
as they did, sowing, harvesting as they did, and the
bread was wonderful. . .The fields of Ysud-HaMaalee are
scattered with bizarre tents. Big tents are pitched in
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the fields from the Rosh-Pina Metula Road up to the Jordan
area, which was formerly Lake Khula. The tents are made
of unstitched sacks sewn together to form large sheets,
pieces of material from blankets or bed covers, and long
strips of coarse black material made of goat's wool and
reed mats. In the tents live the tillers, most of them
inhabitants of Zakhnin* village -- halfway between Safed
and Acne. In each tent lives an Arab family -- seven,
ten and even up to twelve members. . .The Shakur family,
one of these squatters from Zakhnin village, spends about
three months a year in the field of a farmer from Ysud-
HaMaalee. The farmer gives them land, water, and tobacco
and sows watermelons, and the harvest is divided between
Shakur and the farmer. (They play, indeed, the traditional
role of share-croppers or tenant farmers.)
At the end of the tobacco and watermelon season, the tents
are taken down and the people of Zakhnin take on other
trades. The shakur family returns home, north of the Beit-
Netaja Valley in central Galilee. There in the fertile
valley, the family has fifteen dumams on which it grows
vegetables. The children attend school, Atalla and the
girls work in the field and earn their living well out of
the good soil. . . In the fields of the Settlement about
forty families from Zakhnin and a few families from other
villages are scattered. Most of the land in Ysud-HaMaalee
is tilled by Arabs, and even the work of thinning and
picking in the plantations, which are mechanically culti-
vated by the farmers, is almost totally done by Arabs.
. . When a tractor passes outside, Atalla says: "Those
are Jews." Arabs have no tractors here. They are the
manual workers, backs bent holding tools. . .
Binjamin (the employer):. . .Today we water the soil auto-
matically, and only the thinning and picking requires many
hands. There are only Arabs for such work. Once we had
Jewish workers from Hazur (probably inhabited by Oriental
Jews). So many workers came from Hazur that not everyone
got work.
David (the son):. . .Today people from Hazur do not want
to work in agriculture.
Binjamin:. . .Unfortunately, today there are only Arab
workers. In neighboring kibbutzim, too, everything is
done by Arab labor.
*Zakhnin -- one of the Arab villages of Galilee that suffered most from
land expropriation and was most active in, and later most injured by, the
aftermath of the internationally publicized Land-Day General-Strike on
March 30, 1976.
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David:. . .In the kibbutzim there are volunteers from
abroad and it is easier for them. Otherwise, Arabs would
have worked even in the dining room. 144
Binjamin:. . .We have a citrus plantation near Kibbutz
Hulata. When I passed there, I saw a young man from
Hulata who took some grapefruits from me. He said, "I
see your citrus plantation is totally based on Arab
labor." I said to him, "What about your vegetable garden?
Is it not totally based on Arab labor?" He said, "We
have not succeeded in finishing the picking. As it stands,
all agricultural work is Arab work. If they went on strike
agriculture would totally collapse. And the prices! A
small shikse [a young gentile woman] takes 40 IL. a day
and a sheigetz [a young gentile man], 50 IL. a day, and
if you tell them to hurry up, they do not come back to
you." 145
Rivka:. . .I cannot stand them.
David:. . .They became so impudent, you can hardly ima-
gine!
Rivka:. . .One of them came yesterday to drink water and
later came to phone! I thought I would explode.
Binjamin does not hate Arabs as do his neighbor and his
son. He just weeps secretly about tilling land -- the
basis of man's life and the life of the people -- which
is slowly passing from the Jews back to the Arabs." 146
This squatting by Arabs on "Jewish land" seems to frighten the Israeli
authorities and the original Jewish settlers, probably reminding them of
their own colonization strategy,,known as "fait accompli": the establish-
ment of accomplished facts. 147
In Maariv, July 3, 1975, an article titled, "The Israeli Settlement
Authorities are Taking Action Against the Leasing of Lands to Arabs," says:
"The Ministry of Agriculture and the Settlement Department
of the Jewish Agency have recently launched a campaign to
eradicate the "plagues" of land-leasing and orchard-leasing
to Bedouins and Arab farmers in western Galilee. The Direc-
tor of the Galilee Area for the Jewish Agency, Mr. A. Nahmi,
said that his office sent a circular notice to all settle-
ments in which they are warned that the leasing of national
lands to be cultivated by Arab share-croppers, as well as
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enting orchards for picking and marketing by Arabs contra-
dicts the law and regulations of the settlement authorities
and the settlement movements. Settlers from the Galilee who
oppose the leasing of lands to Bedouins and to Arabs from
Western Galilee defined the phenomenon which is very common,
especially in Mishmar-Hayarden area as the area of Arab colo-
nization and as a most negative phenomenon, bound to harm the
very future of Jewish settlement in Galilee."
Fifth, this brings us directly to the last major breakthrough in the
post-1967 era of proletarianization in Israel -- that is, the large-scale
penetration of Arab labor into the Jewish agricultural sector and the ex-
plicit emergence of the Israeli Rural Labor Market.
This is a breakthrough, not only in the sense of violating the prin-
ciple of self-labor that derives from socialist Zionism through the use of
hired labor, but also in the sense of violating more specifically the prin-
ciples of "Hebrew work" and "Jewish produce", of socialist Zionism by hir-
ing Arab labor, especially in the strongholds of Labor-Zionist ideology,
the kibbutz and the moshav, where this ideology has historically prevailed.
Penetration of Arab labor seems to defy the dominant ideology of the rural
settlers, the historically hegemonic fraction within the Israeli ruling
class, hegemonic as far as political practices are concerned. It is not
surprising, therefore, that Minister of Agriculture Uzan, denouncing this
development, told Jewish farmers that:
"The domination of Jewish agriculture by Arab workers is a
cancer in our body; the situation being created today is
bound to send many Jews back to agricultural work and then
problems of physical work can be solved by mechanization."
[The Minister remarked that] "...there is a danger of Jew-
ish workers abandoning agricultural work, and that in Jew
branches, we have already arrived at an undesirable state
of dependence [on Arab labor]." 148
"The Supreme Council on Settlement Law had decided to
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take stronger sanctions against agricultural enter-
prises which lease their land to be cultivated or
their "crop on the trees" or "in the field" to be
harvested by Arabs. In the Council there are repre-
sentatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Colo-
nization Department of the Jewish Agency, the Israel
Land Management and representatives of all the trends
in the settlement movement. Minister of Agriculture
Uzan pointed out the gravity of the situation and
demanded that radical measures be taken to prevent
deals of land leasing." 149
We note from the quotes presented above that the Zionist institu-
tions of the Yishuv, represented in the Supreme Council on Settlement Law,
and the formative elements of the State are still operative as another
state within the State of Israel. These represent the "State" apparatus
of the settlers in the period of pre-statehood. It is there role until
today to maintain control over land and determine land use policies speci-
fically in the rural sector. It is these institutions as well as their
leaders and directors that are outraged most by the massive penetration of
Arabs to Jewish agricultural production.
The prevalence of labor-Zionist ideology --the principle of Hebrew
work -- in the Israeli agricultural rural sector has been interpreted in
terms of the special attachment of Jews to land in Palestine due to their
alienation from the land in "Diaspora". However, the same emphasis on con-
trolling agricultural land by the settlers themselves persists also in
South Africa. One therefore tends to interpret it more as a peculiar char-
acteristic of colonial-settler regimes; control over rural land being stra-
tegically crucial for keeping the native population separated from their
means of subsistence, in a state of dependency and, thus, kept under con-
trol.
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Furthermore, in Israel the control over rural land use is seen to
be directly linked to the security of the State. For example, Bar Yossef
(well-known Israeli sociologist) wrote recently:
"Anyone unaware of the grave danger inherent in our
transformation into a nation of bosses or anyone who
has not taken to heart the lessons of Algeria, is
simply blind or has taken a leave of his senses. The
risk arising from an Arab labor force living in miser-
able hovels near large farms is ten times more dan-
gerous than other hazards, political and military com-
bined. A nation of bosses is, in the final analysis,
a rootless people and the land to those who work it.
That is an immutable law of history and if we console
ourselves with the thought that use of Arab construc-
tion labor is only temporarily, the same cannot be said
for agriculture. There, we got to the basic foundation
of the State." 150
The links between the principles of self-labor Hebrew work, rural land and
the security of the State are explicitly articulated in the 1976 May Day
Proclamation of Histadrut:
". . .Our determination to continue the unceasing fight
of the People of Israel in their homeland to maintain
and build a Labor Society for the sake of the security
of the State. . .
". . .On this May Day, we send greetings to the defen-
ders and settlers of the border regions. The Histadrut
works throughout the year to deepen the mutual solidarity
of the workers and those called to serve in the army, of
urban workers and those settling the land." 151
Similar attitudes seem to be expressed by the Jewish inhabitants of
rural settlements, specifically the kibbutz and moshav. They view them-
selves as the protectors of the land and of the State. However, labor-
Zionist ideology, which they long internalized, seems to conflict with
their new material needs. Some resolve the conflict in a pragmatic atti-
tude. Others resolve it in further struggle to live up to their original
ideological commitment, as expressed in the following debate among moshav
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members over the issue of Arab labor in Jewish agriculture and its possible
effects on the State.
A stormy debate in Moshav Veer Tuvia on the issue of hired Arab
labor was published in Maariv (Supplement), July 18, 1975 and sheds light
on the ideological and political controversy over this issue, as perceived
by the moshav members. Under the title, "Who Will be the Drawers of Water
in Beer Tuvia?", Dorit Cohen-Alvaro writes:
"The atmosphere in moshav Beer Tuvia has been stormy since a few weeks
ago. Some members of the moshav have violated the unwritten principle of
Jewish labor in the homeland and privately bought Arab workers to work on
their farms." The article reads as follows: "Two years ago, the following
resolution was passed in the moshav: No Arab labor on public farms. The
management will take all necessary measures to implement that resolution."
A few weeks ago, the inhabitants of the moshav gathered together with the
same problem on the agenda. After speeches and stormy exchange, the chair-
man of the meeting said: "You should know that other moshavim which have
the problem of Arab labor are waiting for the resolution which will be
passed in Beer Tuvia. Think about it before you vote." And the resolution
passed this time is as follows: "There may be Arab labor, but only via the
Management Committee, with its approval and under its control, as there is
no alternative."
Among the moshavim in the southern region which have employed Arab
workers in agricultural hired labor since the Six Day War, Moshav Beer
Tuvia remained -- until a few weeks ago -- ideologically isolated. The
phenomenon of employing Arab labor in construction, industry and agricul-
ture, which became widespread over the whole country, did not spread into
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Beer Tuvia.
The breakthrough was not made in one day. At first, only a few
Arab workers were brought in by a Jewish contractor. Later some were
brought in by a few farm owners, secretly -- "only for pressing work of
two or three days." But not long ago some citrus growers organized and
openly brought in a large group of Arabs to work. A clamour was raised and
a meeting was called. The objectors raged: "What about the ideal of Jew-
ish work? And what about the security aspects?" The supporters answered:
"A few Arab workers will not destroy the structure of the moshav. The
whole country is flooded with Arab labor and it is not us who will bring
redemption."
Peretz, a member of the village Management Committee, was the mo-
shav's representative in the "moshavim movement" and now volunteers to help
new moshavim. Peretz expressed his objection to admittance of Arab labor
on the following basis:
"In order to understand why admittance of Arab labor
to the moshav is so serious, one has to know some
basic facts: our State, by giving Jewish farmers land
and means to maintain a Jewish village has entrusted
them with a certain responsibility for the existence
of the State. We must hold on to the land if we want
to exist as a nation. And those who maintain the ter-
ritory are the farmers. Two nations live here and each
of them claim its right over that land. The one which
will implement this right will be the nation which
will hold the land and with its own hands till it."
Peretz expressed strong objection to the compromise in the Manage-
ment's recent resolution, because that still violates the principle of Jew-
ish work and is a start of a chain of events: "The problem does not start
and does not end with picking peaches," as the supporters of the resolution
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claim.
"From thinning out peaches one week a year to leasing land
and residence in the moshav, that process of transferring
land from Jews to Arabs is a slow process which can go on
for years [says Peretz], but today we are at the beginning
of a chain of events, starting with work on plantations,
then work in the fields, milking the cows, lodging at the
moshav and leasing land -- one leads to another. If we
let normal economic processes operate in the State of Is-
rael -- and we should take into account that the Arab pop-
ulation is pushed into all areas which require manual work,
thus marginal as far as income is concerned -- a situation
will be crdated in which the owner of a farm will decide,
for reasons of convenience and utility, to live in Tel-Aviv
and maintain Arab employees on his farm (turning into ab-
sentee landlords). It would not be because he prefers
Arabs on his land, but because there are no Jews who are
prepared to be agricultural workers. Hence, we will reach
a stage in which the Arab population will hold most of
the territories and that will cause an endless struggle
between the two nations."
Peretz proceeds:
"On the one hand, we have a million Arabs for whom getting
a piece of land and being an owner of land from which one
can make a living is a tremendous achievement. On the
other hand, we have Jews, members of moshavim, who see
alternatives to the farm. At first, that process will
ruin the village they live in, socially, but in the long-
run it might be a threat to the State as a whole."
Yaacov Galan, another moshav member, a descendant of an old Biluist
(Bilum -- early settlers in the 1880s). In support of the admittance of
Arab labor to the moshav, he argued:
"In my opinion, there was no difference between our atti-
tude towards the Arabs and the attitude of the Gentiles
towards Jews in the Diaspora. The objection to Arab labor
in Beer Tuvia is a discrimination against the Arab worker.
This is an almost religious objection, based upon the
ideology of our fathers: self-work, Jewish work, etc.
But things have changed. I argue, the Jew, precisely be-
cause of what happened to him, cannot say: the Arab,
since he is an Arab, will not work on my farm. And if
that was the decision, then it should be an uncompromising
one. Either they will not work at all -- neither in con-
struction, nor in garbage sweeping, nor in cleaning the
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dung out of the chicken coop -- or there will be no
restriction in respect to the type of work."
Answering him, Peretz argued:
"There is a great difference between construction work
and work on the farm. No one challenges the Arab's
right to work. I see no harm in it as long as it is
not directly connected with my work on the farm. Con-
struction is a general problem of the State of Israel,
and the State should deal with it. But we are en-
trusted by the State with the cultivation of the land.
If you object to discrimination, then how far can you
go? Are you prepared to admit the Arab worker as a
member of the moshav, having equal rights?"
Bazar, another member of the Management Committee, compromisingly
argued:
"Self-work is a lofty idea but we could not keep it.
Thus, farms based upon hired labor were established in
Beer Tuvia. Today, hired labor is Arab labor. I agree
that bringing Arab labor to the moshav is a disaster.
But we cannot change in one day a reality that has al-
ready existed for a few years. For the long-run, the
solution must be changing the character of the farms.
For the near future, the resolution which was passed is
the best solution: controlled Arab labor."
Rami Korn, a recent member on the Management Committee, expressed
a totally different point of view:
"I object to Arab labor, since it constitutes an opening
[precedence] for hired labor. Up to now, hired labor
was restricted, since there was a shortage of workers,
and thus, it could not harm the lifestyle in the moshav.
But now, there is an abundance of Arab workers and they
don't mind any kind of work, and that is the danger to
the framework of the moshav. It will bring a flight from
manual work. Already, now, the children are encouraged
to get higher education, since manual work is no longer
regarded as an ideal. A young man who graduated from
high school and continues at the university has the whole
world open for him."
The debate in this moshav was concluded with the acceptance of the
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Management Resolution of "controlled" Arab labor. The Management Committee,
alone, can approve employment of Arabs. Ilana commented:
"Up to now it was the members who brought Arab labor on the
moshav; from now on, the Management Committee will bring them.
The Resolution was formulated in that form for conscience's
sake. But for me, there is no difference as far as results
are concerned. In any case, the Arabs will work in the moshav.
The principle is the important thing. Just as one cannot keep
"a little kosher" by eating only "a little pork", one cannot
keep the principle of Jewish work by taking only "a few Arabs".
She (Ilana) strongly criticizes the attitudes which were voiced in the meet-
ing and says:
"The debate between the supporters and the objectors is like
a 'dialogue des sourds'. Most speakers evaded the main point.
They speak about hired labor, world-wide justice, rights of
Arabs, and who is a Jew. But they were afraid to say why do
they object to the Arab worker as an Arab. They ignored the
issue -- i.e., it is not a question of discrimination, but a
question of hatred -- the Arabs' hatred for us. The way we
go will lead to the destruction of the moshav, the destruction
of the State and the creation of a people of parasites. And
one should not say that I am exaggerating. In neighboring
moshavim, e.g., Nir-Banim, Arugat, etc., which did not pay
heed to this issue from the beginning, they use Arab workers
in all branches of the farm. Some workers even lodge there.
And there are families which go abroad and leave the farm to
the Arab workers. Their daughters are afraid to walk at night
on the path from the main road to the moshav. Now those moshav
members say that if it were possible, they would put back the
clock. Perhaps one cannot put back the clock, but one can
stop it."
This debate expresses quite clearly the crisis of the moshav, crisis
in the sense of incompatibility between the ideology of self-labor it em-
bodies and new material conditions of the moshav community as a microcosm
of what is happening in the country-at-large.
Moreover, this crisis in the "base" is mirrored by a similar one on
the level of the "superstructure", as expressed in the following debate
inside the Labor Party itself:
"Yediot Aharonot reported in a series of articles the discus-
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sions that took place at the Secretariat of the Israeli Labour
Party on the future of the occupied territories.
"The doves were more concerned about keeping Israel a predomi-
nantly Jewish state and therefore advised returning the heavily
populated centres to a Jordano-Palestinian state and planning
Jewish settlement in the territories. The hawks called for
a policy of dynamic annexation and settlement in all of the
occupied territories, of integrating their economy with that
of Israel and of leaving the problem of the Arab population
in them to be solved at a later date.
"Dayan's advice was to allow conditions and the new facts to
develop into a solution without having to reach an agreement
with the Arabs. Allon feared that integrating the territories
without giving Palestinians an Israeli citizenship would raise
political issues.
"Sapir objected to Arab labour in Israel, as giving Israel a
racist character, the Arabs doing the "black work" and having
to return to sleep in their own villages. He objected to in-
tegrating a million Arabs into the Israeli economy and having
to pay for improving their social conditions. He also objec-
ted to having them send their representatives to the Knesset
and feared that by the end of the century, the Arabs would
equal the Jews in Israel.
"Peres agreed with Dayan on keeping all of the occupied ter-
ritories. He advised establishing a kind of local autonomy
in them, to be federated with Israel. He said Israel should
not be touchy about Arabs doing the "black work", for that is
what they can do.
"Eban, a dove, was on the side of returning the populated
areas and of keeping all lands needed for Israel's security.
He recommended the Allon plan, but said the map could be al-
tered.
"He advised not drawing a map, since keeping things dark added
a flexible element to negotiations. Eban said that peace in
the territories had so far been preserved because Israel had
not closed the options for a solution since it had not annexed
the territories nor had it tried to unify the economic and
legal statutes. Eban spoke about the advantages derived by
Israel from providing work for the Arabs in Israeli industries,
since this deprived the occupied territories of its labour
force and stagnated its economy." 152
This dovish-hawkish polarization of the Labor Party reflects the inter-
nal crisis of the hegemonic power bloc in the dual transition from the domi-
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nance of the political instance to that of the economic, on the one hand,
and from the dominance of the sectarian tendency in Labor-Zionism to that
of the secular.
The doves are concerned more with preserving the Jewish character of
the State of Israel and therefore advocate the return of the populated ter-
ritories, as they represent a threat to the imperative of Jewish demogra-
phic superiority. They object to the integration of Arab labor into pro-
ductive employment by Israeli-Jewish capital, believing that it gives Is-
rael a racist character and reduces its proletarian settler-colonialism,
which does not exploit but rather expels and replaces native labor, into
a classical secular settler-colonialism. This is the conservative view
characterized by a pre-monopoly conception of the Jewish State.
Hawks like Dayan and Peres advocate, to the contrary, annexation of
the occupied territories and exploitation of Palestinian labor. Political
(demographic and security) considerations are overridden by economic ones.
Their views express the subordination of Labor-Zionism's sectarian tendency
to its secular tendency in the face of the essential internationalization
of local capital. The hawks, therefore, favor transformation in the sense
of secularization of the Jewish settler-colonial formation. What is it
that compels this faction in the hegemonic power bloc to advocate positions
that are pregnant with what is believed to be security and political risks?
To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the fraction of ruling
class (i.e., the source of capital) they represent! It is our thesis that
the hawkish position represents the political articulation of local private
capital and its urge to integrate less-developed forms of production and
subordinate them to the requirements of its extended reproduction in the
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face of increased penetration of foreign investment capital. The earlier
quote (page 81) on the importance of workers from occupied territories as
a source of economic flexibility is the culmination of this hawkish posi-
tion and it perfectly coincides with the Likud's. This coincidence is one
evidence of transformation of the Labor-Zionist relations of production
and, hence, the emergence of a new epoch in Israel's history.
Conclusions
This chapter presented an historical review of Palestinian proletarian-
ization since the beginning of Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine.
Three phases were identified with regard to the creation of Palestinian
labor surplus and its absorption in productive employment, the two faces of
the proletarianization process. These phases were distinguished by a dif-
ferential dominance of instances. During the Yishuv phase, the separation
of Palestinian producers from land and the boycott of Arab labor by Jewish
employers was motivated by an explicit ideological commitment for exclusive
Jewish proletarianization and class struggle. The formation of a Palestin-
ian working class was impeded precisely through ideological appeals. Under-
lying the Zionist movement's objection to the integration of native Pales-
tinian labor into Jewish economic enterprises was the urge for exclusive
Jewish proletarianization and class struggle as a material prerequisite
for the emergence of the Jewish State.
Since Statehood, during the nation-building phase, the boycott of Arab
labor was rationalized by political appeals concerning sovereignty require-
ments: the imperative of Jewish demographic and defense superiority. It
was also practiced through political/military means. The military and poli-
tical victory won by Israel in the Six Day War proved that military super-
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iority is the function of technical know-how, not size of the army. In
both phases, the absorption of Jewish immigrants and of Palestinian-Arabs
in productive employment by local Jewish capital were necessarily mutually
exclusive. The class interests of Arab and Jewish producers were, there-
fore, counterposed. Only in the post-1967 phase, characterized by the
dominance of the economic and by a higher degree of the development of
the productive forces, was the absorption of both Jews and Arabs simul-
taneously made possible. The rotation in dominance of instances (ideo-
logical, political and economic) is therefore not accidental. This his-
torical review suggests that it is related to the specificity of the re-
lations of production and the degree of development of the forces of pro-
duction peculiar to each phase, as will be documented later in this thesis.
A common feature in all three phases is the massive separation of
Palestinian producers from the means of production. A distinctive feature
of the present phase is the massive integration of Palestinian labor sur-
plus into productive employment by Israeli capital. It is simplistic,
therefore, to explain the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel to-
day in terms of the mere availability of a pool of cheap Palestinian labor
in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Jewish settlement in Palestine has been
historically correlated with the creation of Palestinian labor surplus.
The Zionist "conquest of land" always resulted in displacement of Pales-
tinian producers and the presence of cheap "free" labor. In order to com-
prehend the current proletarianization of Palestinians, it is thus more
revealing to focus on the forces underlying the demand for, not the supply
of, Palestinian labor in Israeli productive employment.
As expressed in the introductory quote to this chapter, the prole-
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tarianization of Palestinian peasants at a later stage was already fore-
seen as early as Borochov. This quote, therefore, reinforces our argument
that the proletarianization was bourgeois in character. This, however,
does not negate the possibility that it was meant to be proletarian also
in character; neither does it negate the fact that it was taken to signify,
and internalized by, segments of the Jewish people as such.
The debates inside the moshav and the Labor Party are very indica-
tive of the conflict between this outlived sectarian aspect of the Labor-
Zionist ideology and the new material conditions characteristic of the
post-1967 era. It is interesting to see the role of the social scientists
and intellectuals (Bor Yosef, Tolmon, etc.) in their attempt to reproduce
and reactivate this outlived ideology of the past in the face of a force-
ful social change.
This historical review of the relationship between the actual his-
torical practices of proletarian Zionism, specifically the attempt to im-
plement the imperative of exclusive Jewish proletarianization and class
struggle, on the one hand, and the proletarianization of Palestinians, on
the other, suggests that the latter follows as an objective contradiction
from the former. This is different from and even refutes the static view
that Palestinian proletarianization in Israel contradicts socialist or
Labor-Zionism. This apparent logical contradiction is irrelevant to the
dialectical materialist perspective.
It is important to identify and comprehend the objective contradic-
tion inherent in Labor or proletarian Zionism, the unity of materially
contradictory tendencies, namely, that it is not only capitalist in charac-
ter, but also sectarian. This review leads us to examine the proletarian-
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ization of Palestinians in Israel today as a consistent outcome of this
objective contradiction. The development of the productive forces under
capitalist relations have forcefully transformed the sectarian character
of Labor-Zionism.
During the Yishuv it was necessary to activate the proletarian ideol-
ogy, for mobilizing Jewish immigration, and for the formation of Jewish
social classes and class struggle; and therefore, for Jewish social forma-
tion dominated by capitalist relations of production (follows from the
imperative of Jewish proletarianization and capitalization). This was
necessary to give rise to the State as the object, outcome, and unifier
of struggling Jewish social classes.
After Statehood it was unnecessary to activate this ideology, as
there were other forces for mobilizing Jewish immigration (Nazism, in par-
ticular, and expulsion of Jews from Arab countries upon the establishment
of the State). The nation-building project became, itself, a concrete
Aliyah incentive. The State apparatuses were, instead, used to regulate
land and labor policies.
In the post-1967 era, the sectarianism of Labor-Zionism was already
undermined by the effects of its capitalist character on the relation and
forces of production. The economic became the ultimate regulator of labor
policy and the incentive for Jewish immigration, as will be seen in a
later chapter.
This chapter tried to demonstrate that Borochovism was actually im-
plemented, and that even this most extreme left version of Zionism could
only be implemented on capitalist development lines because Borochovism
was bourgeois in character.
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If the Borochovist proletarian strategy was, indeed, proletarian
in character, aimed at a socialist transformation of the relations of pro-
duction in Palestine, it would have not involved, either in theory or in
practice, the commitment for exclusive Jewish proletarianization and
class struggle, mainly because a genuinely socialist development strategy
is necessarily aimed at the abolishment, not the formation, of social
classes.
The three historical phases point out the undevelopment and under-
development of the productive forces at the disposal of the indigenous
population. The indigenous labor has been almost invariably dependent on
foreign sources of wage employment. The non-ascendency of a Palestinian
industrial bourgeoisie undoubtedly retarded the formation of the prole-
tariat and intensified the vulnerability of Palestinians in the labor
market.
The point of this chapter was to illustrate how, under the histori-
cal practices of Labor-Zionism, the class interests of native Arab and
settler-Jewish laborers were necessarily counterposed, owing to the sectar-
ian capitalist relations of production and the low degree of development
of the productive forces at the disposal.
Attempts by Zionist left and Communists to organize Arab and Jewish
producers and politicize them on the basis of commonality of class inter-
ests were, if not ignoring, at least obscuring contradictory class inter-
est. This historical review which culminates in large-scale mobilization
of Palestinian labor into Israeli economic enterprises suggests that the
history of Palestinian non-proletarianization in the past and of their
proletarianization in the present is the history of the rise and decline
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of Labor-Zionism as the hegemonic ideology ruling Israel's social forma-
tion. This sets up the context and rationale for the present study, spe-
cifically for assessing the possible development of commonality of class
location and hence interest as a solid base for future politicization
aimed at actual cross-national proletarian alliance.
The description of the mobilization of Palestinians into Israel's
labor market does not examine either the class transformation involved or
the class locations they are entering. This is the first task to be ac-
complished by this study. It is to demonstrate that what is happening is,
in fact, proletarianization, the formation of a Palestinian proletariat.
Then, we examine the place of this source of labor in relation to
other sources of labor that are engaged in Israel's production process
and what the differential locations of the various sources of labor may
imply in terms of objective conditions for potential Jewish-Arab prole-
tarian alliances. These twin tasks are the subject of the following chap-
ters.
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Chapter III
1. As Engels, for instance, points out, during the decline of the Roman
Republic, the Italian peasants who were expropriated from their land
formed a class of "poor whites" similar to that of Southern slaves be-
fore 1861, a class unfit for self-emancipation. The Gypsies may pre-
sent another example of separation without proletarianization.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, On Britain, Foreign Language Publishing House,
Moscow, 1962, pp. 10-11.
3. Remember the "land enclosure" movement and the violent struggle of
peasants against their separation from the land in the development of
European capitalism.
4. Karl Marx, Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, edited and with intro-
duction by Habsbawn, New York, International Publisher, 1965, p. 67.
5. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 768, 504.
6. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 2, p. 241.
7. Generally, I disagree with this Hegelian scheme associated, in the
Marxist tradition, with Lukacs: class-in-itself (economic class-loca-
tion) and class-for-itself (class endowed with its own class conscious-
ness = class struggle); the essence of the analysis of social classes
their place in the class struggle; they do not exist independently of
class struggle. This scheme seems, however, appropriate for under-
standing the Zionist practices, its arbitrary formation of a Jewish
proletariat through ideological and material incentives; its approach
to the creation of not only classes, but also class struggle itself.
A Jewish proletariat was to be formed in order for Jewish class strug-
gle to emerge; a Jewish class formation not in, but rather for, class
struggle. This, of course, raises serious questions with regard to
the genuine being of the Israeli Jewish proletariat. This will be
discussed again in later chapters.
8. Some Arab oil-producing countries like Kuwait and the Arab Emirates
are probably an exception. Capitalist relations of production were
immediately generalized, in terms of embourgeoisement that applies
only to nationals (e.g., Kuwaitis) and proletarianization that applies
mainly to foreigners (non-Kuwaitis); contrary to the classic settler-
colonial case, here we have an indigenous bourgeoisie with a non-indi-
genous proletariat.
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and F. Engels, Collected Works, the Russian Edition, Vol. 22, quoted by
Yassin, op.cit., p. 17.
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25. Ibid., p. 58.
26. Yassin, op.cit., p. 192.
27. From the standpoint of historical materialism, one cannot explain
why something has not occurred. One cannot provide a scientific
explanation for the non-emergence of a Palestinian progressive (i.e.
industrial) bourgeoisie. Many historians attribute this fact to
Zionist practices (see, for example, Nathan Weinstock). Although
the argument for this may sound very plausible, it remains methodo-
logically unverifiable. Historical materialism refers to the logic
of the actual historical process. Furthermore, not unlike Palestine,
in other parts of the Levant (specifically, Syria and Lebanon) indus-
trial developmnent stimulated by mercantilism had not been able to
outgrow mercantilism and destroy it and consolidate capitalist rela-
tions of production. The mercantilists remained there to be the
dominant class (see on this, "Debate with F. Trabulsi," Al-Hourriah,
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CHAPTER IV
JEWISH LABOR SUPPLY AND MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION:
EFFECTS ON DEMAND FOR PALESTINIAN LABOR
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I. Introduction
In this chapter we examine the nature of the Israeli labor force, in
terms of peculiar characteristics that derive from the settler-colonial na-
ture of this social formation. We focus on the prominent features prevalent
since the 1967 war, believed to have affected the militarization of the Is-
raeli economy and, indirectly, the growing demand for Palestinian labor.
We focus first on the sources and composition of the labor force: the
ethnic/national composition of the labor force; the civilian/non-civilian
dichotomy in the process of economic transformation. We interpret the par-
ticipation rates and patterns and describe the various segments of this labor
force and their different modes and locales of reproduction. Finally, we ex-
amine prospective sources of labor in light of the conflicting investment
versus immigration incentives. We conclude the chapter with a discussion
of the implications of the structure and composition of the labor force for
the prospects for proletarian alliances.
To understand the internal structure of the working class as well as
the class-locations of the various segments of the labor force in later
chapters, we reconstruct a holistic picture of the labor force as a unity
(a fragmented unity) within the unity of the division of labor. Identifi-
cation of the origins and characteristics of the labor force reveals some
of the determinants underlying the differential locations of its various
segments in Israel's economic structure as well as specifically in the so-
cial division of labor. Most importantly, this chapter helps us to estab-
lish the extent to which segmentations of the labor force by ethnic ori-
gins, religious affiliations, national identities, as well as on the basis
of managerial dichotomies are, in the last instance, superceded by or co-
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ILLUSTRATION 1
Table 1
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TABLE I. JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL
Immigrants
15,552
15,259
18,790
22,098
118,993
239,576
170,249
175,095
24,369
11,326
18,370
37,478
56,234
71,224
Year
1958
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1960
1961
1962
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1964
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1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Immigrants
27,082
23,895
24,510
47,638
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33,698
18,510
18,065
20,696
37,900
38,000
41,000
Source: Zionist Year Book, 1972, London, p. 399
Year
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1952
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TABLE II. JEWISH AND ARAB POPULATION OF ISRAEL (1948-1975)
Year
11/8/1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
5/22/1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972*
1973*
1974*
9/1975**
Total Population Jews Arabs Percentage
Arabs
I I I
834,317
1,173,871
1,370,094
1,577,825
1,629,519
1,669,417
1,717,814
1,789,075
1,872,390
1,975,954
2,031,672
2,088,685
2,150,358
2,179,491
2,331,801
2,430,125
2,525,562
2,598,424
2,657,410
2,708,082
2,772,012
2,847,745
2,928,056
3,018,900
3,226,600
3,331,800
3,409,000
3,451,000
Source: Sabri Jiryis,
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1,932,357
2,068,882
2,155,551
2,239,177
2,299,078
2,344,877
2,383,554
2,434,832
2,496,438
2,561,400
2,636,600
2,749,400
2,834,200
2,890,300
2,921,000
The Arabs in Israel,
117 ,639
160,000
167,101
173,433
179,302
185,776
191,805
198,556
204,935
213,213
221,524
229,844
239,169
247,134
262,919
274,574
286,385
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337,180
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14.1
13.6
12.2
11
11
11.1
11.2
11.1
10.9
10.8
10.9
11
11.1
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.3
11.5
11.8
12.8
12.1
12.3
12.5
12.7
14.9
14.8
15.2
15.4
Monthly Review Press,
1976. *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975, p. 287.
**Maariv, September 8, 1975.
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in the native population. By the end of 1947 (prior to the establishment
of the Jewish State), the population of Palestine totaled 1,380,000 native
Palestinians, plus 700,000 Jewish settlers. With the founding of the Jew-
ish State, the greater majority of Palestinians were expelled to neighboring
and other countries, where they are still scattered (Illustration V). The
State thus was established with a total population of 834,317, with only
117,639 Arabs. In 1949, West Galilee and the Small Triangle were annexed,
resulting in increasing the native Palestinian Arabs to 160,000 (14 percent
of the total population) and with a 4.6 percent birth rate, became 380,300
(12.8 percent of the total population) in 1967, and 530,000, or 15.3 per-
cent of the total Israeli population (3,451,000), in 1975.
According to Israeli statistics, there were 599,000 Palestinians on
the West Bank in 1967 and 675,000 in 1974. In Gaza, there were 390,000
in 1967 and 417,000 in 1974. This is to say that 1.5 million native Pales-
tinian-Arabs are now within the boundaries of "Greater Israel"; the ethnic
composition of the total population being roughly 31 percent Western Jews,
33 percent Oriental-Jews, and 36 percent Palestinian-Arabs.
A high fertility rate has been consciously used by Palestinian-Arabs
in Israel as a political national survival and de-Zionization strategy, in
the sense of undermining the Zionist imperative of Jewish demographic
superiority in Palestine. According to the Koenig Report, the natural
population increase of Arabs in Israel amounts to 5.9 percent per annum,
compared with 1.5 percent for Jews.2 This high fertility rate has some
effect on the rate of participation in the labor force, which is lower
among Arabs as compared with Jews. The relatively higher rate of labor
force participation among Jews is largely the function of the reliance of
0 e
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the labor force on immigration of persons in their most productive age.
From the founding of the State in 1948 until the end of 1974, Israel
received 1.6 million Jewish immigrants, most of whom came in the first
years of Statehood, during the nation-building phase, as shown in Table II.
In recent years, however, specifically following the October, 1973, war,
Jewish immigration to Israel has been declining and growth in the Jewish
labor force has become increasingly dependent on birth rates.
According to Maariv and Yediot Aharonot of January 2, 1975, the number
of Soviet Jews who arrived in Israel in 1974 was 17,000, compared with
33,000 in 1973; 900 in December, 1974, compared with 3,000 in December,
1973. The percentage of "Vienna drop-outs" in December, 1974, was 36 per-
cent. Haaritz, March 17, 1977, reports 49 percent of Soviet Jews who immi-
grated to Israel in February had already emigrated away from Israel. The
number of United States Jews arriving to settle in Israel in 1974 was 3,000,
compared with 4,000 in 1973. In sum, the number of new Jewish immigrants
arriving in Israel in 1974 was 32,000, compared with 56,000 in 1973, a de-
cline of 40 percent. Between 1974-1975 there was a further decline of 52
percent. The Jewish population increased by 53,000 (2 percent birth rate)
and the Arab citizen increased by 17,500 (3.5 percent birth rate). Of this
total increase in the Jewish population of Israel, 46,500 were due to
"natural excess of births over deaths" and 7,000 were due to the balance
of immigration (including those Jews who came to settle in Israel but re-
fused Israeli citizenship) over emigration. The crisis in immigration
seems matched by a corresponding increase in emigration. 1975 was the
worst year for immigration in a decade; with emigration (17,000) exceeding
immigration (12,600); compared with 32,000 immigrants versus 25,000 emi-
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grants in 1974. A Ministry of Labor Report states that 200,000 Israelis
live in North America, more than half of them in the New York City area.
Others estimate the number to exceed one-quarter of a million. The same re-
port, covered in Yediot Aharonot (March 31, 1975), states that among these,
only 12,000 are students and the rest are legal immigrants, either permanent
residents or U.S. citizens with dual Israeli-American citizenship.
The ethnic/national composition of the labor force has been already
discussed but now we focus on those characteristics specifically related to,
or affecting, differential locations in the employment structure, our con-
cern in this essay. These may differ from the characteristics underlying
their differential locations within the social division of labor. Accor-
dingly, the Jewish labor force consists of:
1. The early pioneering settlers (Vatikim) of European origin and
their Israeli-born children (Sabras), who laid the foundation of Israel's
social formation. They transplanted its settler economic base and political/
ideological superstructure, including the revival of the Hebrew languages;
they have, over time, acquired skill in operating and managing the State
apparatus in administrative and clerical work, and are over-represented in
the State bureaucracy. This segment of the labor force is also over-repre-
sented in skilled labor categories in general and skilled manual categories
in particular. This is probably due to their seniority in the country and
their long-term experience in small-scale artisan production (especially
in traditional industries, to which they were accustomed in Diaspora, such
as clothing and other finishing-level production [diamonds and metal pro-
ducts]); this population group represents the larger portion of those who
internalized and practiced the principles of Hebrew work and opposed hired
labor. They represent the core of the Histadrut "labor" sector and the
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kibbutznik labor force.
Ironically, this group is also highly represented among emigrating
Israelis in the seventies.5
2. Asia-Africa immigrants (Eidot Hamizrah) were mobilized by the
Zionist movement, since the Yishuv. But they were not made participants
in the planning and design and in laying the institutional foundations of
the State. They were brought in only at the implementation phase, to ful-
fill the demographic requirement for nation-building; i.e., the creation of
Jewish majority for legitimizing the establishment of a Jewish State.6
They were initially brought and later expelled from Arab countries to be-
come a part of the base (demographic and economic) but not to take part in
the superstructure, following Borochov's proposal. They were not Zionists,
because Zionism is a Western capitalist movement aiming at a State. Yemen-
ites, who on their own began the "return to Zion", were probably motivated
by religious sentiments, not political cause. They come from Middle-East-
ern pre-capitalist social formations and cultural and socio-economic back-
ground similar to that of the native population; potential competitors for,
and therefore supplanters of, cheap Palestinian labor. They were brought in
to provide for the essential unevenness of "closed" capitalist development,
closed to non-Jews. They were imperative for sustaining a sectarian Jewish
capitalism. It is not, therefore, accidental that this population group
continued to occupy a marginal position in the Israeli employment structure.
It is over-represented among the welfare recipients. Their "marginality"
is essential for Jewish capital accumulation under the hegemony of Labor-
Zionism and thereafter.
Middle-Eastern Jews were also to constitute the core of the unskilled
agricultural and industrial labor force, much in demand during the early
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stages of the country's economic development. The mobilization of these
Jews from pre-capitalist social formations dominated by semi-feudal and
small-scale commodity production, in which they were skilled craftsmen and
traders, and their transfer into the Western Jewish economy, transplanted
in the Palestinian social formation, resulted necessarily in the "de-skill-
ing" of this population in Israel. This de-skilling has persisted until
recently, when the emergence of the Black Panther movment exerted moral
and political pressure on the Jewish State and raised demands for human
capital investment and manpower development efforts, and concomitantly,
when an abundance of unskilled Palestinian labor was made available and
desirable in the aftermath of the 1967 war. These two factors have resulted
in a shift towards public and community services, hence this population
group increasingly became State and local government employees.
The recent massive penetration of Oriental-Jews into the mushrooming
public services sector, where wages are higher, has significantly improved
their standard of living, due to a higher effective demand. Their increas-
ing access to income was not accompanied by an increasing access to economic
ownership. Oriental-Jews, since they were alienated from their means of
subsistence upon their transfer into the Jewish State, have had no access
to the means of production in Israel, except for possession, not ownership,
of agricultural "national" land, off which they are now moving into services.
Their increased share in revenues as they penetrate the service sector pro-
motes the downward-commodity-mobility providing for a false sense of an
upward-social-mobility, hence the co-optation and pacification of this
group, as evident in their voting in the recent elections.8 The resulting
transformation in their consumption habits and ownership of durable goods 9
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reinforces the role of this group in promoting realization on a domestic
scale. This major transformation of consumption patterns among Oriental
Jews must be considered in the analysis of demand for Palestinian labor. It
has special bearing on the rise of subsistence cost, the cost of reproduc-
tion of labor power, i.e., wage.
Finally, it is important to indicate here that Oriental Jews, as well
as the previous early settler-Sabra groups, constitute the main segment of
the labor power whose reproduction is endogenous, i.e., whose cost falls on
Israel. "Aliyah absorption" is the major form of reproductive effort, pro-
vided mainly by the settler-Sabra generation through the Yishuv public capi-
tal and State capital.
3. Europe-America immigrants: In the present, this group constitutes
the major source of Jewish labor in Israel. Historically, it has represen-
ted an inflow of human capital from advanced capitalism and recently, also
from the industrialized Soviet Union, into Israel. This population group
provides that proportion of the labor force with the highest levels of pro-
fessional training in technical and scientific skills. In this sense, Jew-
ish immigration from European-American countries into Israel is a form of
free technology transfer. For Israel, it is also a form of saving human
capital investment through "brain-gain", while for the immigrants' countries
of origin, it may represent disinvestment in human capital through "brain-
drain". In the unity of the world capitalist system and its single inter-
national division of labor, however, this portion of Israel's labor force
does not represent disinvestment in human capital; on the contrary, as a
part of international technocracy, it is uniquely positioned to directly
promote accumulation on a world scale. For our purpose, however, it is
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more important to focus on the place of this segment of the labor force
within Israel's employment structure, and how its integration into this
national entity, in turn, affects Israel's economy and place in internation-
al trade. It is argued here that this portion of the labor force leads the
economy and ultimately determines the nature of the relations of production
and the development level of the productive forces. It is this population
group that made possible the shift into high technology production, through
its contributions to Israel Research and Development. Unlike the settler-
Sabra Jewish population, whose contribution focused mainly on nation-build-
ing, this group has its principal effect on the advancement of Israel capi-
talist accumulation.
Like the Western early settlers, the recent Western immigrants form
together the core of Israel's "labor aristocracy". In recent years, since
the sixties, Jewish immigration into Israel has been almost exclusively from
highly industrialized countries. This is also expected to be true in the
foreseeable future, as projected by Israel Manpower Planning Authority.12
These immigrants represent that segment of the Israel labor force whose labor
power is the most costly to reproduce, and whose reproduction cost falls not
on Israel but mainly on the country of origin. These Jewish citizens of ad-
vanced countries have acquired their skills and training experience at the
expense of the economies of their origin. They put these skills into use
in the Israeli economy, and hence develop the productive forces of Israel
as well as the U.S. (as this highly skilled labor is employed mainly by
Israel-based American subsidiaries).
It is by virtue of this inflow of European-American immigrants that
it is possible for Israel to have and sustain an international comparative
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advantage in high technology production, which is the optimal development
strategy for Israel in terms of rates of profit. Israel does not pay for
the training of the largest portion of its technical labor force; and train-
ing for technical skill is the most costly input in high technology produc-
tion. Israeli-made high technology products thereby gain a competitive
position in the international market because they can be sold for prices
lower than those of qualitatively equivalent high technology products made
elsewhere in central capitalism, yet with the same rates of return.13 This
is made possible precisely because most of the training cost is not included
in the cost of production of such Israeli-made commodities. This is to say
that Israeli capitalists, and for that matter international subsidiaries in
Israel, can realize their profits by selling their products at lower prices;
and it is in this sense that high-skill labor force immigration into Israel
directly provides Israel with comparative advantage in high technology pro-
duction, and indirectly, with competitive position in the sphere of realiza-
tion.
This advantage, however, may generate an opposite reaction. Capital-
ist development is nothing but a series of successive contradictions. The
competitive position of Israeli-made high technology commodities on the
international market may generate repercussions for the detriment of Israel.
European-American countries may start to impose quotas on immigration of
their scientific Jewish citizens into Israel if they become convinced that
this is a factor in promoting the competitiveness of Israeli products at the
expense of their own competitive position in the sphere of realization.1 4
In an article titled "Israel Seeking Aid for Arms Industry," it has been
already reported in the New York Times (December 19, 1976) that "Pentagon
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officials have complained that Israelis are competing with American arms
producers." If Jewish immigration from advanced countries is impeded
through such measures, Israel will face both a political and a serious
economic crisis. Especially from now on, since the high technology (mainly
military) production has become the leading economic sector, and much long-
term investment in sophisticated scientific infrastructure is underway, and
since most other economic branches have become closely integrated with and
subordinated to this potentially stabilizing branch.
Our examination of this sector of the labor force underlies the impor-
tance of the sources of Jewish labor in Israel. The locations of reproduc-
tion of its labor power, as a settler-colonial social formation totally
dependent on exogenous sources of labor, means that changes in Israel's
employment structure and industrial production are not a function of local
manpower development policy, and therefore, simultaneously presents spe-
cific advantages as well as specific high risks.
4. The "non-Jews" in the Israel labor force: It is consistent with
the non-secular character of the Jewish State to classify its citizen labor
force as "Jews" and "non-Jews".15 For if this dichotomy is superceded by
a common "Israelism", then what significance to non-Israeli Jews will the
Jewish State of Israel have?
The apologetic view usually points out the heterogeneity of the non-
Jewish population in Israel as a rationale underlying the use of this dicho-
tomy. "Non-Jews" as an aggregate category that includes all the minorities,
when disaggregated, the category includes: Arabs, Druze, Bedouins, Circas-
sians, Armenians, etc. Because we are concerned about the prospects for
cross-ethnic/national proletarian alliance, it is important to give some
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attention to these dichotomies. Later, we will examine whether or not
class segmentations cross these lines.
This disaggregation of the "non-Jews" is inaccurate and, indeed, mis-
leading. The Druzes are an Arab religious sect that has departed from
Islam and existed historically in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. The Arab
identity of the Druze religious sect has never been questioned before the
Israeli authorities expropriated their Arab identity in an attempt to iso-
late them and co-opt them as allies, hence making them equal to Jews in
their subjegation to compulsory military service, from which the "Arabs"
were excluded. The isolation of the Druzes as part of a divide-and-rule
strategy has, in the long-run, failed to contain their growing Palestinian-
Arab nationalism, increasingly expressed by Druze resistance poets 16in
Israel and in the emergence of a political movement (Lajnat Al-Mubadarah),
led by Sheikh Farhoud. Their insistence on asserting their Arab identity
is being reflected in the growing number of Druze prisoners jailed for re-
sisting the compulsory military service in the Israel army. The role played
by Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leader of the Lebanese National (Patriotic)
movement during the Civil War, and even more so, his assassination by the
Phalangists, had a profound effect on the Druze community in Israel and,
indeed, represented a turning point in the assertion of their own Arab
identity in mass public events.17
The Bedouins are also Arabs. They maintained a-tribal social structure
and nomadic style of life, subsisting from a mix of gathering and cattle-
raising economy. These nomad Bedouins in Palestine are an integral part of
the indigenous social formation representing a pre-tribute-paying-feudal
mode of production that has historically co-existed with the former as well
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as with the small-scale commodity production which prevailed until the
capitalist mode fully asserted its dominance in the Israeli-Palestinian
social formation. Zionist land expropriation and settlement policies, in-
cluding Bedouin "relocation" schemes, have uprooted this form of life
and radically transformed this group. It applied methods for isolating
this population as it did in the case of the Druze, and for integrating
them in military service as an imposed expression of gratitude for these
"modernization" efforts. This is ultimately to contain the Bedouins, as
their way of life represents a potential security risk to the objectives
of Zionism in Palestine.
In sum, both the Druze and the Bedouin population are Palestinian-
Arabs. The Palestinian-Arab population of the various religious affilia-
tions, Muslims, Christians, and Druzes, is deeply-rooted in that place, with
a long history, reflected in the residuals of various modes of production
co-existing, outliving, and reproducing each other in that social formation.
As evident in the rather historical segmentation of the Palestinian society,
residual classes dynamically co-exist with those classes distinctive of the
dominant mode of accumulation: the landlords and the peasantry, urban mer-
chants, artisans, and the nomadic Bedouins. With the consolidations of
capitalist accumulation through Zionist colonization, these historical
forms are quickly vanishing. This is so because "the capitalist mode of
production is characterized, in its extended production, by a two-fold
tendency: to reproduce itself within the social formation in which it takes
root and establishes its dominance, and to expand outside of this forma-
tion."18 This is the qualitatively new dimension of capitalism as opposed
to all previous modes of prodution; in its constant reproduction it exists
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only by subordinating other modes to itself and integrating remnants of
previous modes into its own system.
Unlike the "Arabs", the Bedouins and the Druzes, the other population
groups included in the "non-Jews" category, i.e., the Circassians, Arme-
nians and Bahaies, are not the by-product of the economic history of that
place. They are rather national and religious minorities from European
countries, who found refuge in Palestine and have chosen to integrate them-
selves into that social formation, hence becoming a part of and not being
apart from the native Palestinian population. The size of these popula-
tions in Israel today is quite insignificant, and more importantly, they do
not constitute a politically oppressed national minority in their own home-
land, as the former Palestinian-Arab citizens do. What is important, how-
ever, is that the emphasis on the dividing characteristics of these groups
has been systematic and instrumental for the sake of political stability
and security of the State.
It will be interesting to find out how this separatist-differential
treatment (which was also true under the Ottoman rule and the British Man-
date) affects the class location of these various groups, and whether or not
capitalist transformation in Israel today is likely to promote or impede
the commonality of the class location and interest of the various religious,
ethnic and national components of the labor force. The question, in other
words, is whether or not capitalist class "segmentations" do ultimately as-
sert themselves against ahistorical societal segmentations, and are not ob-
scured by the latter.
Given that all the above segments of the labor force are non-Jewish
citizens of an essentially Jewish State, they all have in common one thing
that distinguishes them from Jewish citizens, including Oriental-Jews;
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this is their political status, a relation of political subordination
which is an important determinant of class location, as will be demonstra-
ted in the next chapter. In describing the employment structure, however,
we refer to all this hetergeneous non-Jewish labor force as "citizen
Palestinian-Arabs", i.e., Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. We use
"Jews" and "non-Jews" categories mainly when we need to compare the pheno-
menon over time, using previous studies and tables that talk in those terms.
We are reluctant to use even the more liberal "Israeli-Arabs" (as distin-
guished from Israeli-Jews) simply because of its ahistorical connotation.
The "Israeli-Arabs" are historically Palestinians, and their "Israeli"
being is a function not of their choice, but rather an ahistorical manager-
ial imposition by the architects of the Zionist project in Palestine. The
systematic denial of their Palestinian identity and the imposition on them
of a "non-Jewish-Israeli" identity derives, again, from the settler-colo-
nial and non-secular character of Israel.
In this position, the Palestinian citizens of Israel are not unlike the
native American Indians, made into a vulnerable minority in their own home-
land, except for the fact that the Palestinians had already developed a
national consciousness and had become a national entity prior to the estab-
lishment of the Zionist regime, while the American Indians were still a
tribal society when the European settlers colonized their homeland. Also,
the great majority of the native Palestinian population was expelled and
made refugees in the neighboring Arab countries in order to render the na-
tional entity and make possible the creation of an alien one in its place.
In the aftermath of the 1967 War and its large territorial expansion,
a large segment of the Palestinians expelled in 1948 were forcefully inte-
grated into Israel's labor force under military occupation, with neither
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citizen nor immigrant status. Although this Palestinian segment and the
citizen Palestinians in the Israel labor force constitute an historically
organic unity, in the analysis of Israel's employment structure, we find
it more revealing to distinguish them from the "non-Jewish" citizens, in-
cluding Palestinians; and for the purpose of this study, we also distin-
guish them from other non-citizen Arab participants in the Israeli labor
force;19 thus referring to them in a separate category as "non-citizen
Palestinian-Arabs".
It is important to remember that reproduction of labor power for the
non-Jewish segments of the Israeli labor force does take place within the
remnants of a Palestinian social formation -- within the semi-subsistence,
extended-family unit of production or, using the dualists' terminology, in
the "traditional" sector, forcefully integrated into the "modern" sector
of "Greater Israel". This is so partly because Arab labor (citizen and
non-citizen) in Jewish work places is essentially commuter, a subject dis-
cussed later in more detail.
To sum up the sources and composition of the Israeli labor force is
mainly to see through these apparent segmentations and to try to think in
terms of the locale of its reproduction cost and the relation of its vari-
ous segments to the means of production and to ideological-political domi-
nation/subordination.
III. Labor Force Participation
The Israeli statistics are based upon labor force surveys, which de-
fine as belonging to the labor force employed persons (both self-employed
as well as employees, including those temporarily absent from work) and
persons actively seeking work in the survey's determining period.20 This
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definition generates several difficulties, one of which is that the de-
termining period is generally brief. The labor force participation figures
are thus subject to considerable seasonal fluctuations, which are particu-
larly sharp in agriculture and construction, where Arabs are primarily em-
ployed. Further, where there is no organized labor market, the distinction
between unemployed and non-participants is not always clear, and some of
the unemployed slip out of the labor force.21 Another problem in this defi-
nition is one regarding persons employed other than through the market mech-
anism; hence their labor power is not exchanged for capital. This is espe-
cially true in the case of unpaid employment on family farms, especially
women, both in domestic work and subsistence agricultural production. This
is also true in the cases of illegal employment, which was often applied to
Palestinian-Arab citizens in the earlier stage of the country's development,
when their penetration into the labor market was regulated by military ad-
ministration rules and work permits. The same applies today to labor smug-
gled in from the territories occupied in 1967.
A further problem lies in the dependence of the rates of labor force
participation on the demand for labor, so that they cannot correctly re-
flect the supply of labor.22 Most important, however, are the problems
this definition of the labor force poses in regard to understanding the dyna-
mics of the labor market and the employment structure, let alone the prob-
lems it poses regarding class analysis and transformation.
According to Y. Ben Porath:2 3
"In 1961 the ratio of labor force to total population was 25.3
percent among Arabs (43.5 percent for men); for the Jewish popu-
lation the figures are 36.8 and 53.1 percent respectively, and
these cannot be considered high, either. Among the Arabs of
Palestine, in 1931 the proportion of active population was
also higher. In most European countries, the active population
constitutes over 40 percent of the total population (over 60
percent of men), and in Africa and South America over 30 per-
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cent (over 50 per cent of men). Among the countries included
in the international comparison of participation rates pre-
pared by Kuznetz there is only one (Puerto Rico) where the
rate was less than 30 per cent. Even if unpaid family mem-
bers are excluded, the labor force proportion is still gener-
ally higher than among Israeli Arabs.
The main reason for the low ratio among the Israeli Arabs is
the age structure.... The Arab population in Israel today
is one of the youngest in the world, especially in comparison
with the old countries of Europe (illustrated by Denmark in
the table). Israeli Arabs are younger than Israeli Jews to-
day, and they are also younger than the Arabs of Palestine
were in 1931. A relatively large part of the Arab population
is outside the working ages; and a large proportion of the
over-14 population is in the younger working-age groups, with
a low rate of participation."
Comparing the labor force participation of Arabs, Asian-African immi-
grants, and the rest of the Israeli Jews, Ben Porath identifies the fol-
lowing features:
"...(a) the participation rate of all men is roughly the same
in the three population groups; (b) at age 14-34, the rate is
higher for Arab than for Jewish men; (c) at 35 and over, the
rates are higher for Jews than for Arabs, the difference in-
creasing with age; (d) the participation rate of Arab women
is lower than that of Jewish women. In most of these compari-
sons the group of Jews from Asia-Africa stands midway between
all Jews and Arabs."
He also interprets these differential participation rates: As far as
men are concerned, the participation rate of youths (aged 14-17) is not
exceptionally high in comparison with other countries, but it is much higher
than among Jews. It complements the low percentage of students of this age
among the Arab population (23 percent for boys and 11 percent for girls in
1961, as compared with 58 percent for both sexes among the Jewish popula-
24
tion.
In the 18-34 age group the difference in school still exists, and in
addition, the Jews serve in the army, while Arabs do not, and this also con-
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tributes to the higher participation rate of the Arabs. Contrasted with
this, in the older age groups the participation rate declines to a low
level. The rate for old Arab men is low, even when compared with the
rates of highly developed countries, and it is certainly much lower than
the rates in some of the less developed countries of the region. Ben
Porath attributes this to a combination of large family structure and mar-
ket conditions; specifically, the character of the demand for hired labor,
which comes mostly from the Jewish sector.
These reasons are accurate; however, more is needed for a fuller explan-
ation. For example, the special alienation and humiliation the older Pales-
tinian-Arab generation had to face in the job-seeking process, when they
were made overnight into strangers in their own country, not knowing the
language of the imposed foreign regime of the alien employers, let alone
the estrangement consequent upon forceful proletarianization of a generation
who have historically subsisted from self-employment. This is on the supply
side of labor. On the demand side, however, one must also consider the
savings in terms of social security and similar benefits the employer makes
by not hiring older Arabs and the profitability implied in selective hiring
of Arabs in their most productive years. The fact that Arab labor most in
demand falls in the 18-34 age group, when Jewish labor during these most
productive years is absorbed either in non-productive activity (education)
or non-civilian productive and non-productive activity, is indicative of the
substitution effect of, and flexibility provided by, Arab labor in Israel.
In this sense, the use of Arab labor makes it easier to invest in Jewish
human capital and to release Jewish labor power to the military; as a re-
sult, Jewish labor, upon military and/or educational training, becomes more
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eligible for job opportunities and more competitive in the labor market
than Arab labor. Hence, the higher rates of labor force participation
among Jews than Arabs in the older age groups.
Comparing the participation rates within the civilian labor force
of Arabs and Jews before and after 1967, indicates a persisting differ-
ence; the participation rate of Jews is still higher than that of Arabs.
In 1975, for example, 49.4 percent of the 2,077,800 total Jewish popula-
tion of working age belonged to the civilian labor force, compared with
25
39.5 percent of the 280,000 total Arab population of working age. Al-
though it includes the population of East Jerusalem, the latter figure
does not take into account the 69,000 other workers from occupied territor-
ies employed in Israel during that year.
In recent years, a constant decline is witnessed in the share of the
civilian labor force in the total population of working age. In 1975,
only 48.3 percent of this population belonged to the civilian labor force,
26
compared with 48.5 percent in 1974 and 49.7 percent in 1973. The Minis-
try of Labor attributes this decline partly to the crisis in immigration,
coupled with increased emigration in recent years.27 This decline is
especially true in male participation.
A trend of decrease in the percentage of men in the civilian labor
force has persisted over time: 77.3 percent in 1964, 70.4 percent in
1969, 68.3 percent in 1973, and 66 percent in 1974. The number of men in
the civilian labor force decreased even in absolute terms, reaching
758, 500 in 1974, as compared with 764,600 in 1973 (a decrease of 0.8 per-
cent). Although their number in the civilian labor force increased by
3.1 percent and reached 364,000 persons in 1974, women's participation
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rate in the civilian labor force stayed the same after the War. 31.3
28
percent in 1974 and 1973, respectively. According to Labor Force Survey
1974:
"The percentage of Jews in the labour force in the 14-17 age
group continued to decrease: 26.5% in 1967, 23.3% in 1970,
19.6% in 1973 and 16.2% in 1974, both among men and women.
It is possible to explain the decrease in the participation
of the 14-17 age group in the civilian labour force by the
rise in the percentage of those studying in this age group
[74.4%]....
Among Jewish men in the 18-24 age group there was also a
long-term trend of decrease in the percentage of those in
the labour force: 47.2% in 1967, 41.8% in 1970, 41.0% in
1972, 41.2% in 1973 and 35.2% in 1974. Again, among Jewish
men in the 25-34 age group there was a decrease in the per-
centage of those in the civilian labour force: 92.7% in 1967,
90.1% in 1970, 89.2% in 1973 and 86.9% in 1974. The decrease
can only partially be explained by the increase in the percent
of those studying and not working aged 18-34.
Among Jewish women in the 25+ age group there was a rise in
the percentage of participation in the labour force: among
the 25-34 age group from 32.8% in 1967, 37.3% in 1970, 42.7%
in 1973 and 46.2% in 1974.
Finally it seems that a part of the decrease in the labour
force participation among the younger ages can be explained
by the increase in percentage of those studying (14-17 ages),
increase in the number of those on compulsory army service
(18-34 ages) and a larger number of people called up to re-
serve and regular army service (25-34 ages) and in the last
two age groups--an increase in those studying and not working." 29
Furthermore, the proportion of those in the civilian labor force but
temporarily absent from work has, in October-December 1973, during the
war time, reached 253,000, compared with 71,000 a year after the War and
30
with 52,000 a year before the War.
In sum, trends in the Jewish labor force participation patterns
seem to differ much in the post-1967 phase from those mentioned previously.
Their declining percentage in the civilian labor force, due to extending
schooling time or to absorption by the army service are inseparable from
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the drastic intensification in the militarization of the economy and the
expansion of the defense following the 1967 War, and the shift into high
technology military production; from the requirements for sustaining mili-
tary occupation of Arab territories and probably, from the mushrooming of
the service sector, requiring more skilled persons. The massive penetra-
tion of Palestinian-Arabs into the Israeli labor market since 1967 there-
,fore continues to provide for flexibility and substitution effects in the
use of Jewish labor. This is so, in spite of the fact that the citizen
Palestinian-Arab segment, belonging in 1975 to the labor force, makes up
only 10 percent of Israel's total civilian labor force, and together with
non-citizen Palestinians, 15 percent.31 More importantly, according to
the Jerusalem Post, citizen Palestinian-Arabs have, in 1976, reached 25
percent of the productive (produces surplus value, not in service and cir-
culation branches) segment of the Israeli civilian labor force. If we
consider the share of all citizen and non-citizen Palestinian-Arabs (ex-
changing their labor power against capital through the Israeli labor mar-
ket during the same year) in the total citizen Palestinian-Arab population
of working age (14+), who are residents of Israel, then one can say Pales-
tinian-Arabs participated in Israel's civilian labor force at a rate of 66
percent.32 This is especially significant later in assessing the reproduc-
tion cost in respect of this labor power.
In sum, the massive penetration of Palestinian labor into the Israeli
economy in recent years must be analyzed, partly in the context of this
concomitantly declining rate of Jewish participation in the civilian labor
force, in response to the drastic expansion of the defense sector. This
may help in revealing the meaning of "labor shortages", justifying the
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hiring of Arab labor.
IV. Civilian/Non-Civilian Labor Force Dichotomy
Labor Force Survey 1974 defines as "in civilian labor force" age 14
and over who were "employed" or "unemployed" during the determinant week.3 3
"Employed person: a person who had worked for at least one
hour during the determinant week in any form of work or gain-
ful activity; a worker in a qibbuz (in services or in any other
branch) plus any unpaid family member or unpaid inmate of an
institution who worked more than 15 hours during the determi-
nant week. Also included are those temporarily absent from
work who during the determinant week have not been seeking
other employment. Yeshiva members actively employed in
teaching are treated as employed persons (from 1967 those
aged 18 and over).
Unemployed: all those who did not work at all during the
determinant week (even one hour) and actively sought work in
that week through registration in the Labour Exchanges or in
other employment agencies, by personal or written applications
or in an attempt to establish private enterprise. Also in-
cluded in this category are temporary absentees from work who
have actively sought other employment.
Not in civilian labour force: all the adult residents who in
the determinant week were neigher "employed" nor "unemployed".
This group includes students and pupils (except for Yeshiva
students aged 18 plus acting in a teaching quality), housewives
(who did not work even for one hour outside their home), per-
sons incapacitated for work, pensioners and rentiers who did
not work even for one hour during the determinant week, ser-
vice men in the Armed Forces (either a compulsory term of ser-
vice or regular army) and unpaid family members and inmates
of institutions having worked less than 15 hours per week." 34
Accordingly, the civilian/non-civilian (specifically military) labor
force dichotomy is being, by definition, officially obscured. The "em-
ployed" category within the civilian labor force "also includes those
temporarily absent from work who, during the determinant week, have been
seeking other employment." The latter refers, most likely, to persons
temporarily mobilized into the Reserves or regular army service.
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In this sense, the military labor force can be simultaneously in and
not-in the civilian labor force. Also, as a result of this definition,
the absorption into the military indirectly provides the masking of unem-
ployment.
As a case in point, Quarterly Economic Review - Israel reports:
"...as the risk of unemployment grows, unemployment in fact
fell from 3.5 percent in the first quarter of 1975 to 3.0
in the second. Such slack as existed was still being masked
by the demands of the military service which had absorbed the
surplus population (115,000 since 1973); while the labor
force had expanded during the same period by only 35,000." 3
Another evidence of the correlation between military mobilization and
the masking of unemployment is illustrated by Ibrahim Oweiss in Table 4
and Figure 3, showing that unemployment reached its highest level prior to
the 1967 War. A drastic decline in unemployment occurred immediately in
the third quarter of 1967, which was followed by a steady decline until
it reached a full employment zone.36 Oweiss is thus also saying that in
Israel, war efforts not only absorb a substantial part from the labor
supply, hence masking unemployment rates, but also (especially when
accompanied by territorial expansion) they stimulate production, thus
creating further demand for labor; and further, the increase in military
production generates even more jobs. The correlation between militariza-
tion and promoting employment multiplier effect has been best demonstrated
in the American economy (Leontief) and the world economy (Kidron).
This brings us directly to the next point, which is the difficulty
involved in distinguishing the civilian from military labor force, result-
ing from the increasingly systematic and comprehensive integration of
civilian and military production since the 1967 War.
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This systematic integration is best articulated and reinforced by Eli
Ginzberg, an American consultant to the Manpower Planning Authority in the
37
Fifth Report on Manpower in Israel, 1968. In this report, Ginzberg em-
phasizes the imperative of "closer articulation between military and civi-
lian enterprises" if Israel is to survive and prosper. He supports his
advice with the following rationale:
"Because of the critically important role of the defense in
the nation, sizeable budgetary allocations have been made and
will inevitably continue to be made to modernize and improve
the Israel Defense Forces. The Ministry of Defense is with-
out question the single largest customer in the nation...and
has taken the lead in many areas to develop a military indus-
trial complex. This has proved highly successful in many
sectors because the military enterprises were able to move
ahead with degrees of freedom, tighter management, and superior
labor morale."
Ginzberg tries further to advocate not only that military production
be the leading sector, but also the subordinating of the civilian economy
to its servitude; hence, furthering circulation linkages in production.
"...If the demand of the military for a broad range of items
can be placed on the civilian economy; if the standards
which the military requires can be established as norms
within the civilian economy; if the advanced sectors of the
military industries can penetrate foreign markets as part
of a larger Israeli export effort; if military requirements
can be used as a basis for developing imports substitutions,
the entire economy will be stimulated."
Ginzberg does not forget to mention the potential spill-off effects
on the civilian economy:
"...The fact that the military is increasingly dependent on
advanced technology, particularly in the field of electronics,
means that it can stimulate branches of that industry, not only
to meet military needs but also to develop civilian speciali-
zations."
"Lately [he adds], more attention has been paid to the poten-
tial gains from more closely articulating the military and
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civilian economies.... Since the survival and prosperity
of Israel depend on the strengthening of its economy as
well as the maintenance of strong defense forces, impor-
tant gains would accrue by extending to the civilian
economy the leadership of defense industries in design,
production, distribution, quality control. Some movement
has been made in this direction but more can and should
be done to diffuse the many points of strength that the
defense industry has acquired."
A survey of the ex-generals, conducted by Youram Peri in 1972,38
shows that they are to be found in all branches of the economy and seem-
ingly very much in accordance with Ginzberg's report: army people are
taking control of more and more branches of the government and industry.
Even three out of Israel's four universities are run by generals. For
example, Yaacov Dori was, until recently, the President of the Haifa
Technion, Israel's Institute of Technology. Mordechai Makleff is
Chairman of the Citrus Marketing Board and thus in charge of Israel's
leading export organizations. Haim Laskov, Moshe Dayan's successor as
Israel's Minister of Defense, was, until recently, Director of the Port
Authority. The newest ex-Chief of Staff of them all, Haim Bar Lev, is
now in the Cabinet as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Aluf (Major
General) Meir Amit, who was Chief of the Operations Branch and Chief of
Intelligence, is now Director of Koor, the giant Histadrut concern that
controls one-fifth of Israel's industry. Aluf Dan Tolkowsky, formerly
Chief of the Air Force, is General Manager of the Discount Bank Invest-
ment Company; Aluf Ahoran Doron is Director General of Tel Aviv Univer-
sity, and Aluf Elad Peled is Director General of the Ministry of Educa-
tion.
After the Six-Day War, the prestige of senior officers increased
even more and the demand for them by the civilian market skyrocketed.
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Air Force Chief, Ezer Weizman, had set a precedent when he doffed his uni-
form and the very same week in 1969 became Minister of Transport, repre-
senting the Herut Party led by Menachem Begin. When his party left the
Government in July, 1970, in protest against a Cabinet decision to accept
the American Peace initiative, he became a Director of Maritime Fruit
Carriers, a giant company by any standards. In 1968, Aluf Uzi Narkiss
was appointed Head of the Jewish Agency's Immigration Department. He
staffed seven of the fifteen top posts in his department with ex-army
people. Most of the generals have brought other army officers along with
them. After the conquest of the West Bank, and since retirement from his
post as the first military Governor of "Judea and Samaria", Chaim Herzog
has penetrated a variety of civilian occupations: heading a public corpor-
ation called G.U.S. (air conditioning motors and spare parts, elevators,
textiles, etc.); a member of the Executive Committee of Israel Aircraft
Industries, of the Industrial Development Bank, and of the company that
publishes Encyclopedia Judaica.
Identifying the locations of some ex-generals in the civilian economy
and employment structure is very indicative of how civilian and military
labor forces are becoming increasingly interwoven. Peri attributes this
phenomenon partly to the fact that the Israel Defense Force is a civilian
army based on the reserve force and thus does not permit a barrier to be
erected between military and civilian society; and partly to the increas-
ing technological sophistication of the Israel army, hence the need for
constant innovation, and the importance of vitality. Thus, the impera-
tive of early retirement of standing officers in their mid-40s, resulting
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in that each year large numbers of officers--majors, colonels, and gener-
als--are ejected into the civilian market. Although these points are
accurate and, in part, explain the higher rates of participation in the
labor force among Jews than among Arabs of the 34+ age population, a com-
plementary and rather stronger explanation of this increasing insepara-
bility of the civilian/non-civilian productive forces is to be found in
the irreversible shift into high technology production, which seriously
affects the type of labor to be in demand, and likely to constantly gener-
ate new demands for more and more skilled labor with technical sophistica-
tion, usually found concentrated in the military. Put differently, we
argue that military production is becoming. itself, the leading export
sector in the civilian economy and is behind the increasing oneness of the
civilian/non-civilian labor force. This is not only speaking of the link-
ages military production generates and promotes in the economy, but also
and more importantly, of deeper structural transformations, specifically,
the merger into a single division of labor. Later on, we will also see
how the militarization of civilian economy integrates the Israeli labor
force more directly into the international division of labor, with an in-
creasingly privileged labor aristocracy on the one hand, and an increasing-
ly exploited segment of the labor force, on the other.
A point directly related to the segmentation of the working class
is central to a following chapter.
A concrete micro-scale example of the integration of military and
civilian production is in Clal Industries, Ltd., the largest private sup-
plier to the Israel Defense Forces. Clal Industries, Ltd. is very much
in aerospace, producing and exporting sophisticated, custom-built equip-
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ment. It is also Israel's biggest private industrial conglomerate, opera-
ting in varied spheres; heavy and light industries and construction, aero-
space and communications, vehicle assembly and textiles, with 10,000 em-
ployees. Similarly, Elta Electronics Industries produce, along with
weaponry, medical electronics.39 Also, Process Control Instrumentation
(PCI), relatively new to Israel industry, is used both in military and
civilian production. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, "with
the tremendous expansion of the chemical and food industries, PCI will ex-
pand proportionately. This is due to the need for automation to substi-
tute for the lack of manpower and the need to export products to sophisti-
cated markets." 40
A macro-example of the increasing integration of civilian and military
production and personnel is reflected in transformation of the army, indus-
try and the universities into the "three musketeers". Most of the metal
products manufacturing, rubber, textiles, and even clothing, is integrated
into the defense and feeds into military production directly or indirectly.
Therefore, the question is no longer one of what is military and what is
civilian, but rather how strategic each industry is for military production.
This formulation reveals its significance when we examine joining/replace-
ment trends by economic branch and when we compare the horizontal labor
mobility and differential access of the various ethnic groups to the eco-
nomic branches more or less politically, economically and scientifically
strategic.
In high technology production, it is occupational status that matters
most. How much access to information and to the acquisition of technical
skill one has in these industries determines whether one is primarily part
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of the military or the civilian labor force. Here comes the importance
of the technical division of labor, hence the alienation from knowledge
as a means of production. Although military production tends to require
mainly highly skilled labor force, this, however, must not obscure the
generation of the routine unskilled labor category which allows for no
possibility of learning about military production and maintains that un-
skilled segment of the labor force "laymen", civilian labor compared with
the technical military personnel.
An evidence on the persistence of unskilled labor categories within
Israeli military production is found in "Agan", one of the three engineer-
ing works of the Koor Metals, Ltd. Agan's arch panels are made of heavy
gauge galvanized steel products used often as military shelters, and are
easily assembled with bolts and nuts by unskilled manpower.41  Another evi-
dence, rather within the international division of labor, is found even in
higher technology production. For example, U.S. mini-computers industry,
in which the construction of memory boards from millions of wires requires
immense labor input, is sent to Korea, where unskilled and semi-skilled
labor is abundant and therefore more cheaply available.42 Although in-
volved in military production (probably unknowingly), this is yet to be
considered a civilian mass of labor.
Some vulnerability, however, is implicit in the integration of mili-
tary and civilian production. It lies in the realm of labor unrest and
political instability. Integration results in an inevitable concentra-
tion and centralization (essential for both guaranteeing secrecy as well
as efficiency), and necessarily magnifies the risk involved in labor
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unrest and sabotage. This, in turn, increases the need for repressive
measures, including "layoffs", and the call on State intervention for, using
Manuel Castell's expression, "the socialization of the cost and the privati-
zation of the profit." This issue is directly related to the "political-
business-cycle" and the fiscal crisis of the State, affecting, in turn,
the "economic-business-cycle", a series of contradictions to which we will
return later on.
It must be kept in mind that labor unrest is reinforced by the decline
of unemployment rates. Under capitalism, a certain rate of unemployment
is systematically maintained precisely for its disciplinary function--disci-
plining the labor force. It follows that labor unrest is highest under con-
ditions of full employment. These conditions are promoted by the expansion
of the military as it absorbs the surplus population, hence the diminishing
of labor reserves. These dynamics in the Israeli realities are most evi-
denced in the figures on labor unrest characterizing the post-1967 War in
general, and the post-1973 economic/political crisis in particular.
It is important to indicate that absorption of the surplus popula-
tion by the military (for security considerations) applies most to the Is-
raeli-Jewish labor force and least to the Palestinian-Arab labor force.
In fact, the expansion of the military makes more room in the civilian la-
bor market, furthering the demand for Arab labor. Both the availability
of unmobilized reserves of Palestinian-Arab labor in Israel, as well as an
unlimited supply of non-citizen Palestinian labor in occupied territories
under conditions of severe political vulnerability, provide for the ut-
most disciplining of the Arab labor force. This fact is evident, for ex-
ample, in the lack of labor unrest in the construction branch, where
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Palestinian-Arab labor is concentrated.44 Although the import of cheaper
labor power from occupied territories is potentially disciplining to the
Palestinian-Arab labor force inside Israel, it has, if any, very little
disciplinary effect on the Jewish labor force of Israel. Since the inte-
gration of the territories occupied in 1967 into the Israeli economy, and
with the increasing penetration of Palestinian-Arabs into the Israeli
labor market, a negative correlation existed between the former and
Israeli labor unrest. Labor unrest has been constantly rising, more in
correlation with declining rates of unemployment or the persisting of full
employment conditions.45
The fact that importing Palestinian-Arab labor power inflects no dis-
ciplinary effect on the Jewish labor force is probably linked to the in-
creased integration of the civilian economy into military production. Con-
siderations of security (both of the State and of this dominant industrial
capital) do indeed shelter Jewish industrial workers (who are increasingly
moving into military and military-related production) from the competitive-
ness of this cheaper Arab labor. This point may explain the import of labor
-- non-Jewish labor -- from European countties like Yugoslavia in 1972.46
During the peak of the economic boom, full employment and a shortage
in Jewish labor, the import, on a temporary basis, of this skilled Euro-
pean labor that represents no security risk for the State of Israel, is
more likely to discipline the Jewish industrial labor force in these stra-
tegic sectors of the Israeli economy.
This point has some bearing on our central question regarding the
prospects for Jewish-Arab proletarian alliance in Israel. The relation
of political domination/subordination prevalent today provides the subordi-
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nate Palestinian labor force, particularly that imported from occupied
territories, with the potential for security risk and sabotage. This risk,
in turn, reduces its potential to replace, hence discipline and split the
Jewish industrial labor force in strategic economic sectors, thus neutral-
izing the import of Palestinian labor as a systematic method to impede the
possibility of cross-national proletariat alliance. At least one potential
obstacle to such an alliance is, in effect, removed. This, however, is not
to deny the possible existence of other far more impeding factors; neither
is it to imply that the use of imported or resident Palestinian-Arab labor
is neutralized from its disciplinary effect regarding all segments of the
Jewish labor force. It is mainly to point out the potential contradictions
in this realm, and the emerging need to explore other disciplinary methods
and means for the labor aristocracy. Such other means can be material and
non-material incentives, the import of labor with higher disciplinary poten-
tial, increasing the division of labor, already suggested by Eli Ginzberg
in light of United States experience in labor management. Central to the
policy of the Likud is the implementation of rather tough management of
labor, especially since the penetration of the military ex-generals into
civilian management and administration. The question to be posed here is
how to manage the contradictions likely to emerge from these managerial al-
ternatives? This leads us into the final issue -- prospective sources of
labor, in light of the conflicting investment/immigration incentives.
V. Immigration Versus Investment Incentives: Implications on Prospective
Sources of Labor
The post-1967 era, as we have previously mentioned, represents a shift
in emphasis regarding the primary function of the Jewish State. The shift
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is from that of Aliyah (immigration) absorption, the "ingathering of the
exiles" as part of the nation-building objective into that of furthering
the internationalization of capital.
Although these two functions are essentially complementary, yet the
fulfillment of one is likely also to generate contradictions that are detri-
mental to the fulfillment of the other. It is these simultaneously comple-
mentary and contradictory functional requirements that constitute the sub-
ject matter of this section.
It is important to make clear that since its inception and by virtue
of its transplantation in the Middle East, Israel has served the political
objectives of world capitalism and its expansion. It has maintained spheres
of influence to prevent the transformation of the prevailing order and the
imposition of a socialist alternative. It has postponed the ripening of
the principal contradiction between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and the
development of a revolutionary proletarian movement. As an instrumental
target of massive discontent, it has been systematically used by ruling
classes in the Arab countries to divert the attention of their exploited
masses from class struggle.
Recently, the State of Israel promotes in a more direct manner the eco-
nomic objectives of international monopoly capital, specifically in the
sphere of realization. Israel is not like other developing countries in
the periphery of world capitalism. It does not promote the internationali-
zation of capital mainly by offering a market for capital goods, cheap labor
power and primary products under terms of trade that guarantee unequal ex-
change, hence higher rates of return. Israel, in some respects like Euro-
pean advanced countries, belongs to the center of world capitalism because
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and in spite of its location outside, and strategic to, central capitalism.
Israel, therefore, by virtue of belonging in some ways to the developed
center and in other ways to the developing periphery, provides unique in-
centives for foreign investment, even as it promotes the internationaliza-
tion of capital in special ways.
For example, most of the incentives for investment in Israel are
built on provisions that Israel can offer those foreign firms in the sphere
of realization. Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 14, 1976: Special
Israel Advertising Section presents a comprehensive articulation of all
the factors that make Israel a market for high technology products, an
excellent base of business opportunities for advanced technology and for
international marketing by U.S. companies. This is an articulation of the
potential the Jewish State has for furthering the internationalization of
monopoly capital. It shows how the Jewish State, like secular nation-
states, is virtually compelled to abide by the requirements of international
capital.
For details on these incentive provisions, see attached copies from
the original advertisement. What concerns us most here are two of these
incentives: the "higher foreign tax credit through U.S. LDC [less de-
veloped country] tax status" and, in General Bar-lev's words, "a very
sophisticated lower-paid labor market," the two being among the main fac-
tors that reduce the cost-of-doing-business in Israel by foreign, speci-
fically United States companies, hence promoting higher rates of return on
investment.
One can immediately notice the irony and contradiction implicit in
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the provision of higher foreign tax credit based on the U.S. LDC tax
status, as an incentive for investment in high technology production. More
important, however, is the fact that this advantage is likely to be manipu-
lated and gained by Israel on the basis of having a large proportion of
its labor force coming from less developed countries (Oriental-Jews and
the Palestinian-Arabs). The second advantage is, as mentioned previously,
made possible precisely because an equally large proportion of Israel's
labor force immigrated from advanced capitalist and post-capitalist econo-
mies with an already acquired experience and training in high technology
production. Therefore, even in furthering the internationalization of
capital and not only in her nation-building efforts, the State of Israel
capitalizes on both poles of its labor force. This combination of labor
force gives Israel a unique advantage over all industrialized as well as
underdeveloped countries.
In advertising her industrial climate favorable to the interests of
foreign capital, the State lists as a first item, "skilled labor at rela-
tively low wages: Israel's labor force ranges from highly skilled engi-
neers familiar with modern American technology to untrained workers.
Wages are considerably lower in Israel than in most Western countries."4 7
Similarly, in explaining why more U.S. companies are using Israeli
facilities for contracting (30 new American projects were established in
1975, in addition to the 150 successful American companies) the Special
Israel Advertising section in Aviation Week & Space Technology highlights
the fact that "industrial wages in Israel are relatively low, as compared
with those prevailing in other industrial countries with the result that
local industries are capable of meeting customers at attractive terms."
311
The same source, recognizing the centrality of the manpower factor
in attracting foreign investment capital in high technology production,
points out also the externality of the very source of this investment in-
centive, saying:" one of the most important factors that enables Israel
to mount a significant research and development program is its scientific
and technical manpower. In many ways, this is a crucial element. Capi-
tal, even sophisticated equipment, can quite easily be moved from one
country to another on very short order. Human skills, however, can be
imported only on a very limited basis, and their development at home is a
long, complex and vulnerable process. The human capital, essential for
the operation of a modern technological society, is available in signifi-
cant quantities. In 1974, some 100,000 Israelis held academic degrees,
and another 79,000 had graduated from post-secondary education institu-
tions other than universities. Something like one of every five Israelis
in the civilian labor force has had more than twelve years of schooling.
To some extent, this is the result of a significant "brain gain" through
the larger-scale immigration of often highly qualified people."4 8 The
more effective this incentive becomes in attracting foreign investment,
the more industrialized Israel becomes, hence, the less fit to the U.S.
LDC tax status, which is another unique advantage Israel has over other
Western countries for attracting business opportunity. It has already
been expressed: "We are on the verge of moving from an underdeveloped
country to an industrial state and it is solely because our defense in-
dustry.. .Before the war broke out in 1967, Israel was bogged down in its
first serious recession; scientists were leaving the nation because of
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the lack of opportunities.",9 The more foreign investment attracted, the
lesser is emigration, the greater becomes the demand for more of this tech-
nically sophisticated lower-paid labor, and hence Labor and National Insur-
ance, a monthly review of the Ministry of Labor, states in May, 1976: "The
need for more academicians to be integrated into our industry is a national
and economic goal we cannot overlook."50 In light of such growing need,
the question becomes, what are the potential sources of technical and scien-
tific labor force to be mobilized in response to this growing need? Hypo-
thetically, at least five alternatives exist: (a) intensive investment in
human capital -- training of labor force already available in Israel; (b)
mobilizing into the civilian labor force scientific Israeli labor force re-
siding abroad or absorbed in the military; (c) intensifying selective immi-
gration of professionally-trained Jews from technologically advanced coun-
tries; (d) import of non-Jewish European labor; and (e) heavier reliance on
Arab labor.
However, not all these hypothetical sources are feasible in fact. If
Israel were to pay the reproduction cost of her technically sophisticated
labor power, she would not have the advantage of lower cost of production
with favorable effects on realization. Thus, it would cease to provide one
of its major investment incentives. Since it is the inflow of highly
trained labor whose training cost falls outside the boundaries of her econ-
omy, that makes it economically feasible for Israel to provide foreign com-
panies with lower-paid high-skilled labor. This is principally at the ex-
pense, not of this portion of the labor force (which is usually subsidized
by philanthropic capital as an absorption cost), but mainly at the expense
of the immigrants' countries of origin and also of the lower strata of the
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working class in Israel. More importantly, the dependence of this alterna-
tive source of scientific labor force is also politically not viable, as
far as Jewish demographic superiority is concerned. Continuous Jewish im-
migration is imperative for the sovereignty of the Jewish State, especially
under the annexationist program of the Likud. Otherwise, Arabs can soon be-
come an absolute majority and demand a majority rule in accordance with the
laws of the essential bourgeois democracy of Israel.
Efforts have been underway to increase Jewish participation rates in
the civilian labor force. This is particularly true in the case of Jewish
female labor. In light of the troubling decline of Jewish male participa-
tion in the civilian labor force during the last decade (from 75.5 percent
in 1965 to 64.3 percent in 1975), Minister of Labor, Moshe Bar'am, has
stated in the Knesset in March, 1976: "Our women are today a great potential
for our labor force and we are doing our utmost to involve them therein.
To facilitate the mobilization of Jewish female labor reserve, the Ministry
of Labor had devoted immense efforts for child day care centers. Today, for
example, accommodations for 27,000 are available, compared with only 12,000
five years ago.52 This source is not only insufficient, but also may result
in further decline in the Jewish birth rate, which is again detrimental to
the national objective.
Another approach for increasing the rates of Jewish participation in
the labor force, specifically technically trained labor, has been that of
activating the Emergency Regulations to forcefully mobilize Israeli citizens
residing abroad back into Israel. The increased integration of the civilian
and military labor force in high technology production makes it easier to
use these regulations in times of peace, not only in a military emergency.
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Shortage in scientific labor and academicians can be regarded today a secur-
ity emergency.
According to Davar (June 22, 1975), in an article titled, "IDF Musters
Israelis in the U.S.," in early November, 1974, an Israeli Colonel arrived
in the United States and, after a month of what was termed "hard work", com-
piled a list of thousands of Israelis "sorted by their addresses, ranks,
military professions, and abilities. If a state of emergency were to be
called in Israel tomorrow, IDF (Israel Defense Forces) could send them
mobilization notices on the same day." According to Israeli law, part of
the Emergency Defense Regulations, every Israeli citizen is required to
register in an Israeli consulate if he or she stays in a foreign country for
a period longer than one month.
The Israeli Military Office had prepared, among other things, mobiliza-
tion calls "a perfect recruiting system" and "an exercise of mobilization
by telephone" (probably to avoid publicity of the event).5 3
Under the title, "Treatment of Israelis Abroad Who Do Not Fulfill Their
Duty to IDF Will Harden," Yediot Aharonot (December 8, 1974) reports shortly
after the arrival of the Israeli Colonel to the United States: " ...the Is-
raeli passport may be taken away [also] from those who are called to a spe-
cial reserve service at time of emergency -- and will not comply."
More importantly, another report, titled, "IDF Tries to Enforce Report-
ing for Mobilization Abroad," in Maariv (June 18, 1975), states that Head
of the (IDF) Manpower Department, General Moshe Gidron, has met recently
with the Heads of the Ministry of Interior in order to establish regulations
enabling measures to be taken against young Israelis who stay out of the
country and do not comply with mobilization calls sent to them.5 4
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The real question that emerges in light of this information is not
with respect to the effectiveness of those measures in mobilizing skilled
Israelis-back home; a far more serious question is, rather, the disincentive
effect those measures are likely to inflict on the immigration of non-Is-
raeli Jews, promoting reluctance among potential newcomers to come.
The Israeli Development Economist, Michael Bruno, views the problem
of labor shortage in Israel as rather one of maldistribution, not absolute
shortage.55 Maldistribution, probably in terms of the tendency of the
economically active labor force to concentrate in unproductive labor cate-
gories -- categories that do not involve creation of surplus, hence enlarge-
ment of the surplus product. In this sense, maldistribution is most evi-
dent in the mushrooming of the service sector among all economic branches,
absorbing the largest portion of the civilian labor force. It may also ap-
ply to the mushrooming size of the police army, the latter totalling, in
1976, 75,000 soldiers in the Regular Army, which includes those serving on
a permanent basis and those on a compulsory temporary basis, in addition
to 307,000 in the Reserves.56 The military force thus constitutes 30 per-
cent of the total civilian labor force. Further, the size of the army
seems equivalent to the size of the non-citizen Palestinian labor force
imported from occupied territories. Does this suggest a replacement as
opposed to a joining trend in the technical and/or social division of
labor? This question is to be explored in Chapter V.
The training of an Israeli labor force and/or the making available of
an already trained labor force neither economically nor politically pre-
sent a viable alternative for Aliyah (Jewish immigration). Neither does
the use of skilled migratory labor from advanced European economies, as
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was the case in 1972. This is not to say that such migratory labor will
not have an important function, specifically a disciplinary one; pacify-
ing Israeli labor in high technology production and stabilizing labor un-
rest under full employment conditions.
Migratory labor (even if restricted to Jews alone) is still a trans-
itory, not a permanent, resident and citizen that can be automatically
subjegated to compulsory military service. Such a solid base of civilian
labor force that can at any time be mobilized into the military is essen-
tial for the security of the Jewish State. It is on this basis that
Zahal, the Israel Defense Forces, created by David Ben-Gurion in 1948,
was formed on two principles:
(1) Every Israeli person at the age of eighteen (except for the
religious or physically or mentally disabled) puts in compulsory military
service (36 months for males and 20 months for females);
(2) Upon release from compulsory service, the young man remains a
soldier in the Reserves and is called up for active duty once a year for
a month or more until he is forty, and after that, for two weeks until
he is fifty-five. Every Israeli citizen (except for Palestinian-Arabs)
is, as some Sergeant Major put it, "a soldier on leave eleven months a
year." 5 7
An Israeli-Jew who is primarily a potential soldier cannot be simply
a transitory immigrant in Israel, one who immigrates and emigrates in
accordance with capital mobility and incentive availability, as citizens
of other countries can be. This fact, in itself, constitutes an immi-
gration disincentive. The reliance on migratory labor, as opposed to
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immigrants who are potential citizens in coping with labor shortage is
neither economically nor politically viable; in the case of Israel, it
can be a very risky deal, capable of promoting the vulnerability both of
the State, as well as her very strategic high technology industry.
A remaining alternative to be explored in the face of an immigration
crisis and in response to a growing demand for labor resulting from in-
creasing foreign investment in the country is heavier reliance on Pales-
tinian-Arab labor. Of course, Palestinian-Arab labor for clear security
considerations cannot be integrated into Israeli high technology produc-
tion. Perhaps it can replace, hence release, Jewish labor in less stra-
tegic economic branches. The availability of this reservoir of Pales-
tinian labor (specifically from Gaza and the West Bank) is made possible
by military occupation, and it can be maintained under control only by a
growing army and police force, consisting mainly of Jews.
In his article "Israel 1976: A Bi-national State," Moshe Eter,
Economic Editor of The Jerusalem Post attributes one of the problems of
the economy and maldistribution of the labor force to the necessity to
contain terrorists and to maintain security and political stability in
the country and therefore, the police force increased by 120 percent and
the civil employees by 40 percent. In addition to 19,000 in the police
force, 150,000 are employed by special security agencies; this does not
include the civil guards. 5 8
In part, this explains the constant decline in male Jewish partici-
pation in the civilian labor force. Palestinian-Arab labor is not likely
to replace this Jewish labor force in such strategic apparatus of the
Jewish State;59 as a result of this inevitable maldistributional problem,
the shortage of Jewish labor power is likely to persist even in the non-
strategic sectors of the civilian economy, making more room there for
Palestinian-Arab labor. Let us now examine the potential viability of
further reliance on Arab labor as an alternative adjustment in the face
of an increasing demand for technical labor force in high technology in-
dustry, concomitant with a simultaneous decline in immigration, and rise
in emigration, rates.
Reliance on Palestinian-Arab labor is being discussed here in the
context of optimizing the utilization of available sources of labor force
as an alternative adjustment to immigration decline. In this sense, it
is also related to the possibilities for optimizing the utilization of
available Jewish labor precisely by means of redistribution of both seg-
ments of the labor force in the employment structure.
Palestinian-Arab labor was historically and still is underutilized
in the Israeli economy. Underutilization applies both to those in, and
not in, the labor force. In the first case, underutilization is in the
form of subemployment due to the nature of labor categories within which
Palestinian workers are situated, in the case of citizen male labor these
are usually menial personal services in garages, restaurants, etc., and
to non-citizen Palestinians these are mainly seasonal cash-cropping jobs,
etc.
Underutilization, both in the form of subemployment regarding par-
ticipants in the labor force, as well as in the form of non/subproletari-
anization regarding the non-participants in the labor force applies most
dramatically to female Palestinian labor, citizen and non-citizen alike.
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Only 30 percent of citizen-Palestinian-Arab females are in the labor
force, many of whom are only seasonally employed as agricultural cash-
croppers. Subemployment applies dramatically also to the Palestinian-
Arab intelligentsia unemployed or situated in unskilled manual labor
categories or subjegated to skill-mismatch for the usual "security con-
siderations." 6 0 Non-citizen Palestinian-Arab workers from Gaza and the
West Bank, espeically smuggled workers with no work permit, are the ones
victimized the most by various forms of subemployment and for a rather
longer span of time.
Several efforts for higher mobilization, overutilization, and alter-
native relocation of Palestinian-Arab labor force are now underway; this
is true for Israeli citizens, as well as non-citizens.
As demonstrated in Chapter VI, citizen-Palestinian-Arab labor is in-
creasingly penetrating new economic branches and industries. The differ-
entiation in Arab-Jewish distribution by economic branch is lessening in
recent years. As far as not talking about a particular industry, one can
say that citizen-Arab labor is increasingly allowed to join or replace
Jewish labor in the industrial branch. Furthermore, industrial plants
owned by Israeli-Jews are now penetrating Arab residential locales to
utilize more Arab labor on the very site of its reproduction. Although
the employment of Arab labor in such plants seems to provide neither for
joining nor for replacing Jewish labor, this method of mobilizing unutil-
ized Arab labor force does, in effect, provide for indirect replacement of
Jewish labor by Arab, hence releasing the former for an alternative util-
ization.
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According to Y. Harari, the year 1970 represents a turning point in
Government policy towards industrializing the Arab village, institutional-
izing this shift in 1973 by appointing an Arab citizen (Kamal Qasim) ad-
visor on this affair to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. As a re-
sult, the industrialization process was speeded up, reaching 100 indus-
trial projects, 18 of which were established during the first half of the
year 1976. These industrial projects are no longer restricted to textiles,
as was the case in the past; they are geared towards a larger variety of
products: ceramics and stone-polishing products. Production includes
also fairs, shoes, carpets and diamond-finishing products. This is in
addition to 2,500 small workshops, 80 of which produce bricks, 38 for
olive oil, etc.61
Reaping super-profit by employing oppressed Arab females is probably
the motive for placing Jewish industry in Arab villages. Moreover, mobili-
zation of Arab females into the Israeli labor force does, in effect, coin-
cide with the national demographic objective since it is likely to delay
the marriage age of the now "productive" women. Consequently, the fertility
rate among the Palestinian-Arab population may decline. Child day care cen-
ters are not made part of the government effort to mobilize Arab female la-
bor, as is the case in mobilizing Jewish female labor into the labor force.
The inflow of Jewish industrial capital into Arab villages as a re-
cent alternative to intensifying the outflow of female village labor into
Jewish work places which constitutes only a semi-proletarianization pro-
cess, does also coincide with economic, specifically profitability
considerations. This is because it contributes to minimizing the cost of
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production in general, and of reproduction in particular. This is true
not only in regard to that labor employed on the site of its reproduction,
but also, and more importantly, in regard to labor employed in Jewish
work places outside the village. As we earlier noted, one of the factors
most conducive to profitability in hiring Arab labor is the fact that the
reproduction of the latter is exogenous to the "modern" sector, and its
cost falls mainly on the "traditional" sector. It is female domestic
labor, including agricultural production for direct consumption that con-
stitutes this semi-subsistence "traditional" sector, in which a large
portion of the cost of production and reproduction has been absorbed. A
massive outflow of female labor from the village to employment in Jewish
work places is likely to eliminate the village potential for absorbing the
reproduction cost of commuter Arab workers in Jewish work places. The ef-
fect of this penetration of industrial capital into the village is thus
two-fold: cheaper utilization of unutilized labor, as well as maintain-
ing the possibility of women's contribution to the reduction of subsis-
tence cost of commuter labor, hence making possible the extraction of
higher rates of surplus value from the latter.
Of course, a further utilization of available female Arab labor re-
serves, most likely in unskilled labor categories, is not likely to re-
place skilled Jewish labor that can then be released for high technology
production in which shortage in labor is most severe. But it does poten-
tially contribute to improving conditions of skilled Jewish labor, as a
way or coping with emigration, etc.
The most recent form for industrial utilization of Palestinian labor
in rural localities is the "Regional Factories" (Mifalim Ezoryim) of the
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kibbutzim. "Regional Factory" is a factory belonging to several kibbutzim
in partnership, sometimes together with the Government or a private inves-
tor in addition. Such a factory is built outside the boundaries of any
of the kibbutzim that own it, probably in order to "resolve" the contra-
diction of "hired" labor within the kibbutz by transferring it outside
its boundaries.62 According to Yediot Aharonot (April 13, 1977), the "Re-
gional Factories" of all the kibbutzim consist of ten groups with 165 sub-
sidiary factories, employing 5,000 workers of which only 1,000 are mem-
63bers of kibbutzim.
On the emergence of this phenomenon, Davar (April 22, 1977) reports:
the "kibbutz organization of industry" has decided, with the approval of
the Histadrut, to subcontract the work "which is not appropriate to the
character of the kibbutz" to special factories, which will be situated in
Arab villages of Israel, and which will not be allowed to become complete
plants, but which will be limited only to such work of subcontracting as
will be given them by the kibbutz industries.
This innovative idea of Regional Factories of the kibbutzim must be
seen in the context not only of furthering the reliance on Palestinian-
Arab labor to replace, hence release, kibbutznik labor into managerial
productive labor categories in more strategic kibbutz and non-kibbutz
industry. Rather, it must be also seen in the context of adaptation of
utopian socialist forms to the capitalist transformation of the economy-
at-large and in the midst of concentration and centralization processes.
Of course, the use of these Regional Factories to make invisible
the violation of labor Zionist ideals, specifically the principle of
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self-labor, as opposed to hired labor is only in part an attempt to re-
store the utopian "socialist" image of the kibbutz, hence to reinforce its
potential for attracting Jewish immigrants. This point, however, must not
divert the attention from the dominant profit motive underlying this de-
velopment scheme.
The victory of the Likud over the Labor Party; its doves (the advo-
cates of withdrawal from occupied territories), as well as its hawks (the
advocates of Greater Israel--Eretz Yisrael Hashlemah) eliminates the con-
troversy regarding the integration of occupied territories as a periphery
with "unlimited-supply-of-labor" into Israel economy. Not unlike the
Labor Government, the Likud leaves no room for diplomatic peace settlement,
hence eliminates the feasibility of a Palestinian State in the near fu-
ture. Employment of Arab labor from those territories will therefore con-
tinue to be under Israeli control, unless forces external to Israel's
internal dynamics impose alternative employment conditions. This source
of labor supply, being now more ensured, can be mobilized to replace Jew-
ish labor in agriculture and non-strategic industries, hence release the
latter into training for, or directly into, high technology production.
This unskilled Palestinian labor is technically capable of replacing Jews
only in unskilled labor categories in which Asia-Africa immigrants are
over-represented. The latter, however, when replaced by Arab, seem to
move into services, not production. Furthermore, training them for
high technology production, where demand for labor is highest, is a very
costly and vulnerable endeavor, if it is to become a national priority,
which is very unlikely.
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In pointing out the "paths to more effective manpower utilization,"
Eli Ginzberg warns Israel Manpower Planning Authority that:
... serious problems will rise in Israel as the number
of students completing elementary school from recent immi-
grant families from Africa and Asia begin to outnumber
those who are native-born or who come from the families
of immigrants from Europe....
... The birth rate of recent immigrant families from Africa
and Asia is much higher than that of the earlier settlers
from Europe, which carries the threat that "Oriental" Jewry,
with values and goals different from the older population,
will soon form a majority of the citizenry; that educated
Israelis are going abroad and that many are delaying their
return; that the number of immigrants from the West--Europe,
North and South America, and South Africa--remains low.
...Against these demographic facts, to which must be added
that... the Arab population in Israel and surrounding Israel
... continues to multiply at high rates; the gross disparities
in manpower in quantitative terms is certain to worsen in
the decades ahead." 64
In light of these "ominous implications", Ginzberg emphasizes the necessity
of special attention to be "devoted to devising ways and means to help in
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accelerating the flow of trained manpower from the West."
This is not the place to discuss the Moynihan-like "culture of pov-
erty" argument and "blaming the victim" tone in his analysis of why the
Oriental-Jews are potentially unfit and untrainable for high technology
production and his racist view as a serious threat, the becoming of the
Oriental element (Arab and Jew) an overwhelming majority in the Israeli
labor force; which, in turn, necessitates the devotion of all effort to
accelerate the inflow of trained manpower from the West. It is the place,
however, to conclude that sophisticated training of unskilled Oriental-
Jewish labor force in Israel is neither a national priority nor one of
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the objectives of the Ministry of Labor. It seems an unconsidered idea.
Therefore, the use of Palestinian labor in the place of this segment of the
Jewish labor force seems very unlikely to promote the mobility of the re-
placed Jewish labor into high technology production, where shortage in man-
power prevails. It provides, indirectly, an alternative for immigration
of trained Jewish manpower from the West. The integration of this Pales-
tinian labor force, on the one hand, intensifies the imperative of Aliyah
on the basis of the demographic threat its presence represents, and can also
promote, though very indirectly, material incentives for immigration --
better wages, housing, etc., to the newcomers at the expense of the heavy
appropriation of non-citizen Palestinian labor force value. The appropria-
tion of a higher surplus value from Palestinian workers can allow for main-
taining a labor aristocracy not at the expense of capital -- without decline
in the rates of profit. The conquest of Palestinian labor in Israel today,
indirectly constitutes a material incentive for Jewish immigration from the
West, the only alternative source of labor likely to accommodate both the
economic and the political objectives simultaneously.
The Immigration Potential: Incentives and Disincentives
In the following, we examine the transformation in immigration in-
centives over time and in response to the inflow of foreign investment
capital, and the implications of those transformations on the future of
Aliyah.
In the Yeshuv, prior to the establishment of the State, Zionist
leaders relied primarily on ideological, and secondarily on material, in-
centives for Jewish immigration into Palestine. The pioneer (Hehalutz)
paving the road for the building of a National Home (a State in disguise)
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was presented as the heroic Jew in Zionist literature. From its inception,
the concept of "Aliyah" (immigration) versus "Yerida" (emigration) has a
connotation of blackmail that exerts moral pressure on Jews to immigrate
to "Eretz Yesrael". This has been used since H. Bialik until the present
time as a non-material "incentive" for immigration.
Similarly, Zionists used religious sentiments based on archaic Bibli-
cism, the strongest of which was the "redemption" of the land -- the Pro-
mised Land -- as a Divine Command. In Zionist practice, the land is re-
deemed once it is colonized and settled by Jews. The "return-to-the-soil"
appeal in "spiritual" Zionism, as well as later on in proletarian Zionism,
was a non-material incentive used precisely for guaranteeing the material
base for a Zionist State superstructure in Palestine, both territorial and
demographic.
The emergence of Labor "socialist" Zionism provided the most solid
ideological incentive for Jewish immigration; the whole idea of constructing
utopian socialism in collective living forms (the kibbutz) and "labor sector"
(the Histadrut) were most appealing to East European Jews, who were very in-
volved in the revolutionary debates and actual struggle in the East European
scene, then disappointed by the defeat of the first Russian revolution. It
is important to indicate that even then in the Yeshuv, ideological incen-
tives were not sufficiently effective in recruiting pioneers; Judah Matras
indicates that the provision of material incentives (such as subsidized or
guaranteed housing, employment and services) was necessary, and that indi-
viduals with skill and/or wealth were recruited to, and if they were re-
cruited did not long remain in, the rural settlements. 6 6
Since the Zionist movement made explicit its objective of establish-
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ing a Nation-State in Palestine and all through the nation-building phase
after 1948, political/patriotic immigration incentives became more preva-
lent. Historical events external to Zionism have also coincided with the
immigration objective. For example, the rise of fascism in Nazi Germany
and anti-semitism in the West become a powerful push for Jewish immigration
to Palestine prior to and right after the establishment of the State. The
segment of the labor force victimized by Nazism came as refugees, not as
colonial settlers; they came to Palestine as "free" laborers and were,
therefore, coersively proletarianized, unlike the majority of the settler
proletariat.
With the exception of this group and some segments of the Asian-Afri-
can immigrants, most Jewish immigration after Statehood seems to be posi-
tively correlated with wars, specifically those resulting in territorial ex-
pansion (unlike the exceptional case of the 1973 October War). Nation-
building and national security (security of the State) became the most in-
strumental slogans in increasing both Jewish philanthropic capital and Jew-
ish human resources for national infrastructural development, including the
army. Wars and territorial expansion required immigration for maintaining
sovereignty through demographic superiority, as Zvi Gitleman points out:
"After 1967, with the inclusion of large numbers of Arabs
in the boundaries of the State, and with the realization
that the birth rate of Israeli Arabs is much higher than
that among Jews, the Government launched a campaign to at-
tract additional immigration in order that the relative
weight of the Jewish populaiton be preserved, and that the
total Jewish population grow, partially in order to enhance
Israel's military security." 67
Included in the nation-building objective is, of course, the develop-
ment of Israel's economic and urban infrastructure that generates job op-
portunities, in turn used as incentive for more Jewish immigration. The
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innovative forms of rural and urban settlements have always been used by
the Zionist leaders as a source of attraction to immigrants, especially
Jewish youth interested in experimenting with new styles and forms of life.
This applies, though, less to Oriental and more to Western Jews; it ex-
plains the immense Zionist effort devoted to publicizing the kibbutz, the
moshav, and the Histadrut, emphasizing their utopian aura and egalitarian
premises, and hence the potential for young immigrants to participate in
the construction of an ideal society.
All the above are basically non-material incentives that have appealed
to "Diaspora" Jews in the past.
In the current expansionist phase, Israel occupies by military force
territories of three neighboring countries. Therefore, Israel can no longer
capitalize on utopian slogans such as the construction of an ideal society
to promote Jewish immigration. Further, the Jewish remnants from the age
of "egalitarianism", as far as wage policy and workers/management relations
are concerned, have been overridden by conditions necessary for promoting
the internationalization of capital, specifically as they conflicted with
requirements for attracting foreign investment capital. Examples of such
requirements are: concentration of capital-large-scale production, and the
development of foremanship and other supervisory labor categories for in-
creasing the productivity of labor for capital. All this implies further
division of labor in the pursuit of optimization.
Conditions necessary to pave the road for foreign investment, "with
the Aliyah objectives in mind," that necessarily undermine the non-material-
istic Aliyah incentives of the past, were explicitly advocated by Eli
Greenberg and seriously considered by the Ministry of Labor.
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"It is startling and revealing [he writes in 1968] that
there is no adequate Hebrew word for "Foreman". Yet the
Foreman plays a critical role in the industrial life of
most advanced nations... .Israeli industry cannot grow
rapidly in sophistication without institutionalizing the
role of the Foreman. Among the important duties of a
Foreman is to help orient the newcomer and to see that he
acquires the requisite skill to perform his task as ra-
pidly as possible....The slow development of foremanship
in Israeli industry is unusual in light of the fact that
the Israel Defense Forces rely heavily on the non-commis-
sioned officer. The industrial Foreman should discharge
functions that parallel in many respects those of the non-
commissioned officers. If Israeli industry is to grow in
scale and sophistication, the growth of foremanship must
be speeded." 68
Ginzberg further emphasizes the development of management skills, coupled
with liberalization policies, if Israel is to attract foreign entrepreneurs,
and if her enterprises are to expand, particularly overseas, and more impor-
tantly, to erase the residuals of the egalitarian doctrine; for example, by
tying wage increases more closely to productivity gains.
The post-1967 phase, therefore, represents an almost total shift into
material incentives for both investment as well as Aliyah. Profitability
has become the primary consideration for international subsidiaries to choose
Israel as an operation site. Material provisions and benefits have become
the primary incentives for Jewish immigration. The quality of housing and
employment increasingly determine immigration/emigration trends. Further-
more, the kind of investment that Israel has been trying to attract (mainly
in the realm of high technology production and industrial research and de-
velopment) does predetermine the kind of labor-in-demand; hence comes the
emphasis on selective Aliyah of professional and technically trained per-
sons with the United States being the most promising of all potential
sources for the supply of Jewish trained manposer in the near future.6 9
As Gitelman points out:
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"The recent immigration (since the 1967 War) differs from
previous movements in its participants' age structure and
educational and occupational distribution. By and large,
the recent immigrants are younger, better educated, and
more concentrated in professions than were the immigrants
of the first two decades of the State. In 1970, for ex-
ample, 34 percent of the immigrants were 19 years old or
younger, 46 percent were between 20 and 49 and only 8 per-
cent were over 65. Fully 43 percent of the 1970 immigrants
were classified as professionals (akademaiim), whereas such
people constituted only 15 percent of the Israeli population
as a whole.
To encourage immigration of trained manpower from advanced
countries is to provide new immigrants with special privi-
leges strongly resented by, and seen as discrimination
against, the old-timers. Although the Israeli population
has been taught to regard immigration of Jews as one of the
most important national goals, a survey commissioned by the
Ministry of Absorption found that in 1971 half of the Israeli
population had not spoken to any immigrants in the past year.
In another survey, 55 percent of the population thought that
the help given to immigrants comes at the expense of the poor
strata in Israeli society. When respondents were divided ac-
cording to ethnic origin and age, it was discovered that 60
percent of Oriental Jews thought the poor were suffering be-
cause of the Soviet immigration and more than 66 percent of
young (18-29) native-born Israelis (Sabras) thought so; un-
like the older settler generation. When asked whether all
the demands of Georgian Jews should be granted rather than
have them return to the Soviet Union, 64 percent of the adult
population said they should leave the country and their de-
mands ought not be met." 70
The above is only to point out some of the internal contradictions
selective Aliyah provokes in Israel; increasing social inequality means,
potentially, intensifying class struggle among "Israeli Jews" and between
the latter and Diaspora Jews. This, at one point, may lead to political
instability, which is risky for business operations there. This is to say,
selective Aliyah as incentive for foreign investment may, in effect, re-
sult in disincentives for foreign capital. In the meantime, by intensify-
ing class struggle among Israeli Jews, selective Aliyah may also broaden
the base for cross-national proletariat alliance.
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Because of the superior knowledge and training of the recent immi-
grants, and consequently, their higher wages, let alone the special privi-
leges they are granted by the government and absorption agencies, the veter-
an population, who have paved the road for the latter and "made the desert
bloom" are now losing out in competition with the newcomers for access to
jobs and housing. Perhaps the most extreme expressions of resentment to-
wards immigrants have been the physical harrassment of immigrant tenants
in a building in Ramat Gan, where an atmosphere of terror was created by
young Oriental Jews, and a letter sent by "Sabras in Need of Housing" to
Georgian immigrants, which said: "We the Sabras were disappointed to learn
that Jews like you exist in our State....You should know once and for all:
you will not milk this State like a cow... .New immigrants, the Ma'abarot,
will await you; please clean them and let us try out your apartments."71
Material incentives and privileges to attract technically trained
manpower (which is increasingly in demand) are also increasingly required.
Further encouragement of foreign investment in high technology industry
promotes inequality and is a possible source of intensified conflict within
the ruling class, as the Sabras and veteran settlers are forced out of their
historically hegemonic position. The dual inflow of capital and of a
trained scientific labor force directly linked with international monopolies
promises more potential for the development of the productive forces. This
potential lies in the expansion of high technology industry, the optimal
strategy for economic development in the Israeli realities. This strategy,
however, results ironically in increasing emigration of Israelis in general,
*
Shanty housing in which the majority of previous immigrants, espe-
cially during periods of massive immigration, had to live during a transi-
tional stage in their absorption in the country.
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and Sabras in particular.72 This is emigration of the petty bourgeoisie,
both "old" and "new", who are, according to Borochov, the class most needy
for national territory and, more importantly, who were the vanguards of
Zionism; the actual creators of the Jewish State.
Emigration of Sabras back to Diaspora is, therefore, an extremely
sensitive issue in Israel, for it may be taken to signify the ultimate
bankruptcy of Zionism and its territorial solution to the Jewish question.
After all, only 20 percent of world Jewry have chosen to become citizens of
the Jewish State, and of this 20 percent, even Sabras, the more deeply
rooted "native Israelis", are beginning to sail away back to "Diaspora".
Not only that, emigration of Sabras may itself constitute a disincentive to
Aliyah. It also designates a vicious circle: the early Jewish settlers
pushed out the indigenous Palestinians and now recent Jewish immigrants are
pushing out the only indigenous Israelis.
This view of the petty bourgeois settlers is contrasted with the view
from Diaspora. The current emigration/immigration dynamics are not troubling
the latter. On the contrary, these dynamics are taken to provide a relieving
excuse for the absence of commitment to Zionism (in terms of Aliyah) on the
part of the traditional and "new" Jewish petty bourgeoisie, who are still
residing in Diaspora. These dynamics (specifically with regard to emigra-
tion (Yeridah) of Sabra Jews), in fact, provide legitimization for the ad-
vocacy of a new position: dynamic integration of Diaspora and Israel
(ironically parallel to the "open-bridges" policy advocated by the Israeli
"Hawks" with regard to the "Diaspora" of the Palestinians).
This new position is expressed most eloquently in Ginzberg's recom-
mendations on Israel's manpower development strategy. In Ginzberg's words:
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"... the multi-cornered flow of persons into and out of Israel,
temporarily and permanently, must be viewed in the larger
context of the development and vitality of both Israel and
the Diaspora. The security and welfare of each will be
strengthened as the bonds between them are made closer.
When an Israeli scientist goes abroad to assume a position
in a major industrial company.. .he may be the direct or
indirect cause of new business ties which can aid in stimu-
lating the growth of the Israeli economy. And the ability of
Israel to attract trained people from the West depends more
on the rate of its economic expansion than on any other single
factor.... The more complex relations that exist between Is-
rael and the Diaspora...may require a more circular flow of
people than is suggested by a direct approach to Aliyah." 73
Nothing is more indicative of the crisis of Aliyah than these words,
hence the bankruptcy of proletarian Zionism. The position expressed by Ginz-
berg is probably representative of the aspirations of the "new" Jewish petty
bourgeoisie (technicians, engineers, managers, etc.) who, unlike the big
capitalists and the old petty bourgoisie, are free of property relations.
They are, therefore, more mobile in accordance with the requirements of
monopoly capital. It is by virtue of its relation to monopoly capital that
this class, or class-faction, is reproduced. In this respect also it differs
from the traditional petty bourgeoisie, who are constantly threatened with
extinction by monopoly formation.
The pragmatism expressed in Ginzberg's recommendations with regard to
Jewish immigration/emigration derives from a more correct assessment of the
actual material realities binding Israel with Diaspora in the age of mono-
poly capitalism. This dynamic integration by means of free labor inflow
may be taken to signify a proposed alternative to Aliyah, as the only re-
maining solution to the problem of Jewish labor supply in Israel. This al-
ternative, however, may lead to the disintegration of the Jewish national
entity "manufactured" by the Zionist movement in Palestine, hence the
transformation of the Israeli settler-colonial formation into a mere secu-
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lar "appendix" to United States imperialism. The proposed form of integra-
tion between Diaspora and Israel (which signifies transformation in the
material life of the Israeli society) may also give birth to a new form of
consciousness among the Israeli masses, specifically Oriental-Jews, as such
integration is likely not to benefit them but be to their own detriment.
If it actually develops, such consciousness will probably be for de-Zioni-
zation. In that case, subjective conditions for Israeli-Palestinian prole-
tarian alliance becomes a more plausible possibility.
Conclusions
This chapter presents an examination of the sources and ethnic/nation-
al composition of Israel's labor force. It focuses on problems concerning
Jewish labor supply in an attempt to identify the impetus underlying the
growing demand for Palestinian-Arab labor in Israel today. This is also to
assess the material prerequisites for proletarian alliance among the various
segments of the labor force.
Evidence from this analysis suggests that the growing demand for Pales-
tinian-Arabs in Israeli Jewish economic enterprises can be only partially
and indirectly explained in terms of changes in Jewish labor supply.
The growing demand for Palestinian labor is not unrelated to the fact
that the majority of Jewish immigrants in the recent decade have come from
advanced capitalist countries (specifically the United States). These are
not "labor freaks" but rather professionally trained scientific labor force.
The result is concentration of scientific technological know-how in Israel.
This, in turn, constituted a major impetus for the development of high
technology military industry as the main exporting industry in Israel's
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civilian economy and the most strategic economic sector in the country.
For security considerations, the shift to military industrialization
urged the revival of the "only Hebrew labor" policy in this expanding sec-
tor of the economy. The intensification of demand for Jewish labor in the
sector of arms and arms-related production, on the one hand, and the short-
age of Jewish labor supply, on the other, are probably responsible for boost-
ing the demand for Palestinian-Arab labor in traditional Jewish industries,
specifically consumer goods production.
Central to this chapter is the argument that transformations in the
composition of the labor force presented an incentive to foreign investment
and high technology military production in Israel. This, in turn, urged
concentration of capital for economies of scale. One implication of con-
centration is more division of labor for further control of the labor pro-
cess. More division of labor implies more and more unskilled labor cate-
gories are generated. Such unskilled labor categories in Jewish industry
were, in the past, performed by Oriental-Jews. Now Israel witnesses an ab-
solute shortage of new Oriental-Jewish labor supply, as well as "maldistri-
bution" of the existing Oriental-Jewish labor stock, reflected in the over-
whelming tendency to move into public services. In light of this develop-
ment, the growing generation of unskilled labor categories compels the
Israeli ruling class to mobilize the reservoirs of Palestinian labor which
it has historically boycotted. This analysis points out a possible corre-
lation between shortage in unskilled Oriental-Jewish labor force and the
demand for unskilled Palestinian labor force. It is not profitable to
deskill new Jewish immigrants, coming predominantly from advanced capital-
ist countries. This point is demonstrated later on, as it belongs to the
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differential locations of the various segments of the labor force in the
technical and social divisions of labor, the subject of the following chap-
ter.
This analysis suggests that the growing demand for Palestinian labor
in the productive sectors of the Israeli economy is not accidental. It
corresponds to structural transformations in the social and technical or-
ganization of production. Therefore, it is more likely to be a permanent,
not a temporary, phenomenon -- as was the case in previous historical
phases. This point has special bearing on the national proletarian alli-
ances, as it is only conceivable to discuss the possible development of
common proletarian class interest, hence the potential for cross-national
proletarian alliance, when Palestinian masses are allowed to labor produc-
tively (to exchange their labor power against Israeli capital) on a long-
term basis. Occupying a permanent place in the labor process is a prerequi-
site for class formation as a social force with distinct interest and mis-
sion.
Another evidence from this chapter that suggests more favorable ma-
terial conditions for proletarian alliance is the following:
The shift into military production is the most optimal strategy for
furthering the development of the productive forces at the disposal of the
post-1967 Israeli society; for reasons repeatedly elaborated in this chap-
ter, and for market considerations. Given its settler-colonial nature,
Israel cannot afford (if for nothing more than security reasons) to employ
Palestinian labor in this economically strategic and politically sensitive
sector. These considerations urge the Israeli ruling class to maintain a
core Jewish proletariat and to appeal to it as its ally. The
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latter, in turn, presents a guarantee against the transformation of Israel's
class structure into a South Africa-like one: polarization into Western
settler bourgeoisie and native proletariat. Put differently, security con-
siderations reduce the possibility of the replacement of Israel's Jewish
proletariat by Palestinian-Arab proletariat and increases the possibility
for joint class locations among Arabs and Jews. Proletarian labor cate-
gories in the military industry are most likely performed by Oriental-Jews,
increasing the similarity in the material conditions of Arab and Oriental-
Jewish labor.
Finally, the essence of this chapter is the revealing of contradic-
tions concerning Jewish labor sources, specifically contradictions inherent
in the Aliyah versus investment incentives. The urge for selective Aliyah
and how it intensifies class struggle among the Jewish labor force and, con-
sequently, reinforces the commonality of class interest among Oriental-Jewish
and Arab toiling masses. Ways of accommodating these contradictions are
identified but only superficially treated in this chapter. They were pre-
sented to shed light on the possible transformation of the settler-colonial
formation in Palestine; specifically in terms of deZionization (seculariza-
tion), subject to the essential participation of the Jewish State in the
internationalization of capital. More adequate treatment of these dynamics
at the level of social formation is presented in Chapter VI, after the
dynamics at the level of division of labor are illustrated in the following
chapter and in the internal structure of the proletariat, illustrated in
the next one.
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CHAPTER V
DIFFERENTIAL LOCATIONS OF JEWS AND PALESTINIAN-ARABS
IN
ISRAELI TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR
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I. Introduction
In this chapter, we try to identify the locations of Arabs vis-a-vis
Jews in Israel's technical division of labor, as reflected in their occu-
pational and industrial structures of employment. Our purpose is to iden-
tify class locations of these two population segments of the labor force.
Despite the fact that the technical division of labor is itself determined
and reproduced by the social division of labor, we still have to depend on
the employment structure, for it is the main data source available. This
analysis is one of three used in our study to identify differential class
location and transformations expressed by changing and persisting positions
in the social division of labor. This complements the analysis of the
sources of Israel's labor force presented in the previous chapter and can
be comprehended only on the basis of the latter.
In our Introductory Statement of the research problem, we have already
discussed the incompatibility of statistical categories (including employ-
ment data) available in bourgeois socieites with the requirements for class
analysis.
With this limitation in mind, we proceed to examine the differential
locations of the various "segments" of the labor force in the country's
occupational and industrial structures of employment. We examine these
locatons dynamically as they change over tine in response to transforma-
tions in the economy-at-large and to major historical events, resulting
from the development of the productive forces. We examine both the pene-
tration of citizen and non-citizen Palestinian-Arabs into the Israeli la-
bor market following the 1967 war, identifying the occupations and econo-
mic branches they do or do not enter, at what rates, and on what level of
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concentration.
To place it in a more historical context, we compare this penetration
process in the two phases prior and after 1967; distinguishing in the sec-
ond phase between the economic boom prior to, and the economic crisis fol-
lowing, the 1973 October War. Central to this analysis are also changes
in the employment structure of Jewish population groups; changes that are
concomitant with the increasing merger of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-
Jews in the civilian labor force. The intention is to examine the patterns
of Jewish-Arab labor mobility in horizontal and vertical directions within
the employment structure or, for that matter, the labor market. The latter
leads us directly into the assessment of actual and potential joining/re-
placement trends among the different segments of the labor force, regarding
their locations in the technical division of labor. All this is an attempt
to answer empirical questions posed in our introductory chapter which, in
turn, feed into the major objective of this study, that is, formation of
a Palestinian proletariat, and the potential for cross-national proletariat
alliance concomitant with the intensified participation of Palestinians in
the Israeli labor market during the last decade.
Again, employment information can provide only clues to the class
location of the entering and/or the already active labor force. For exam-
ple, finding that Palestinian workers are predominantly joining Jewish
workers in a particular industrial labor category (a location in the tech-
nical division of labor) and predominantly replacing them in agricultural
cash-cropping, may not translate directly and respectively into joining/
replacement in the social division of labor. Later, we may find that
Palestinian-Arabs, while replacing Jews who are moving off agriculture
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(as is the trend in the technical division of labor) are likely to be
joining Jews in the social division of labor when those Jewish self-
employed farmers become industrial wage-workers.
This analytical transformation from locations in the technical into
locations in the social division of labor leads us directly into the es-
sential distinction between concrete forms of labor performed and the so-
cial forms of that same labor. It is in this sense that employment data,
as presented in bourgeois statistical abstracts, can at best provide clues,
but not answers, regarding the class location which, in turn, depends on
the particular position within the social division of labor and political-
ideological relations.
The most serious limitation we therefore face lies in the fact that
employment information refers merely to the concrete forms of labor per-
formed, that is, the different tasks assigned to the members of the labor
force as they are employed in a particular occupational capacity within a
particular economic branch or industry. These tasks are designed and al-
located on the basis of fixed or changing technical coefficients, assumed
by conventional social theory to generate efficient growth patterns, and
in the case of deviation, to result in some form of "malfunctioning" of
the system. It is in this sense that we refer to the resulting employment
structure as the technical division of labor or the design of the labor
process by capital, matching people to jobs, guided by the profit impera-
tive.
Bourgeois employment categories and information do not thus directly
reflect the social form of labor performed, That is to say, they do not
refer to the social context of work, the relations involved in a particu-
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lar labor category to the means of production and to ideological and poli-
tical domination/subordination,
For example, the portion of the labor force that belongs to the farm-
ing occupation and to the agricultural economic branch, as presented in
the employment structure, may fall within the boundaries of different so-
cial classes, depending on the social form of labor, even when the con-
crete form of labor they perform is the same (say, tobacco-growing). The
self-employed tobacco-growing farmer and the wage-earner tobacco-growing
farmer, even though virtually performing identical tasks, are still per-
forming different social forms of labor, according to each of which, the
former belongs to the petit bourgeois class, and the latter, to the prole-
tariat.
The objective of this chapter is, therefore, two-fold: first, to
understand the employment dynamics, that is, the changing allocation of
labor to match the emerging demand in society for various concrete forms
of labor to be performed, using simple statistical tools to demonstrate
these dynamics (i.e., average employment structure, rate of change, index
of differentiation); and second, to translate concrete into social forms of
labor, hence identifying the extent to which the various segments of the
labor force fall within the boundaries of the working class. For this
purpose, we use Poulantzas' criteria of objective determination of prole-
tarian location in the production process, namely, productive, manual, non-
supervisory labor. The crux of this chapter is to indicate the extent to
which employment of Palestinians in Israel represents an increase in the
number of Arabs and Jews who share proletarian class interest,
In the last instance, we are concerned about the prospects for class
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alliances. It therefore becomes important to know how stable or unstable
the employment structure of the labor force is, This means we are con-
cerned to indicate to what extent the current locations of the various
segments of the labor force in Israel's employment structure are merely
conjunctural, and therefore unstable, and/or which result from irrever-
sible structural transformations and are therefore more permanent and less
transitory. The latter has special bearing on class struggle (specifi-
cally of the more vulnerable Palestinians) and the potential for alliances.
Ultimately, the inseparability of the technical and social divisions
of labor is more important than the distinction between them. They con-
stitute two faces of the capital accumulation process and structure.
This is speaking of the articulation between the relations of production
and the labor process in the form of the relation between the technical
and the social divisions of labor, The labor process does not exist in
itself independently, but always in definite social forms. In the actual
organization of the labor process, the social division of labor, directly
dependent on the relations of production, dominates the technical division
of labor.
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II. The Occupational Structure of Employment
A. Proportionate Distribution
A comparison of the average Jewish occupational structure of employ-
ment during a five-year period prior to 1967 and that of the Arab labor
force (citizens of Israel) during the very same period points out the
prominence of the mental labor categories in the Jewish employment struc-
ture as compared with prominence of manual labor categories in the Arab
occupational structure of employment. According to Table JJ, 79.6 per-
cent of the Arab labor force seems to be located in manual occupational
categories (this includes farmers, construction workers and craftsmen)
compared with 67 percent of the Jewish labor force in mental occupations
(administrators, managers, clerks, salesmen, professionals, service,
sports, recreation, etc.) The fact that craftsmen and production process
occupational categories seem to represent the largest (24.8 percent) por-
tion of the Jewish labor force, while the largest portion of the Arab
labor force (40.8 percent) are farmers and fishermen and only 10.9 percent
of the Jewish labor force belonged to the latter (and only 15.7 percent of
the Arab labor force belonged to the former occupational category) must not
obscure or contradict the above. Perhaps it reflects the more industrial
background of the immigrant Jewish labor force, and the more agricultural
(peasant) background of the indigenous Arab labor force.
The second highest concentration of the Jewish labor force seems to be
in white collar categories: 17 percent in administrative, managerial, execu-
tive and clerical occupations; 13.1 percent in professional, scientific,
technical; and 12.5 percent in services. Contrary to that, the Arab labor
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force tends to be concentrated, next to farming, in construction (23.1
percent) and manufacturing work..
Arabs and Jews are equally represented only in one occupation, in-
creasingly undesirable to Jews, i.e., transport and communication. Arabs,
however, seem to be most poorly represented in administrative, executive,
managerial and clerical jobs (only 1.9 percent of the labor force com-
pared with 17 percent of the Jewish labor force). Those who belong to
this category are most likely to work only at the level of local munici-
pal councils.
The under-representation of Arabs in these State-bureaucracy-related
occupational categories is indeed consistent with their political status
as a native national minority within a settler colonial regime. After
all, this is a Jewish State and it is to be managed and administered by
Jews.
This point may explain, in part, the heavier concentration
of Jews in administrative/managerial than in scientific/technical occupa-
tions as our figures reflect, in spite of the exceptionally high level of
professional training that distinguishes the Israeli-Jewish labor force
compared with Israel's Arab labor force or with other developing countries.
In fact, the Arab labor force demonstrates the contrary, being less
poorly represented in scientific/professional than in administrative/mana-
gerial jobs. Of course, one must not forget that Arabs in professional
occupations are mainly school teachers in their separate but not indepen-
dent Arab schools.
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As indicated also by Ben Porath, "much of the Government and public
services supplied to the Arab population emanate from central offices
staffed by Jews and situated in Jewish districts. Central offices for
managing the Arab minority affairs are usually staffed by Sephardic/
Oriental Jews. This dimension in the occupational structure of employ-
ment reflects a carefully calculated control policy; most effective of
all is control through demoralization by means of educational curriculum,
designed by members and ideologues of the Zionist ruling class and imple-
mented by Arab teachers. This is not the place to examine the long-term
effectiveness of this policy; it is only to point out a very important
question for future research.
If we compare these features characterizing the average Jewish and
Arab occupational structure of employment prior to 1967 with those pre-
valent in the average occupational structures five years after 1967, we
first notice a persistence in the main features of both structures, in
spite of the differences. For example, with a dramatic decline in the
percentage of Arabs who are farmers (from 40.8 to 24.9), this category
continues to be the largest in the Arab occupational structure. The de-
cline in the proportion of the labor force in this occupational category
applies to both Arabs and Jews alike.
In the case of Arabs, however, farming seems to be the only occupa-
tional category to release labor into other occupations, while in the
case of Jews, not only farmers, but also traders, construction and mine
workers are moving away into new occupational categories.
Further, in light of the figures presented in Table JJ regarding
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the post-1967 average occupational structure of employment, one can per-
haps suggest the following pattern of labor mobility: the largest portion
of Arab farmers released from their previous occupation are entering ser-
vices, while the largest portion of Jews released from previous occupa-
tions to which they belonged in the pre-1967 period are now entering pro-
fessional, technical and scientific positions. Of course, put this way,
this pattern assumes no change -- no new elements entering the labor
force. Put differently, however, on the basis of a more realistic assump-
tion, the same pattern of occupational mobility can be stated this way:
new elements entering the Arab labor force in the post-1967 period are,
instead of becoming farmers, responding to demand in all occupational
categories, especially services, while new elements (most likely to be
immigrants) entering the Jewish labor force, as well as those released
from previous occupations, are responding mainly to demand in the profes-
sional/scientific labor market. This direction of mobility carries a
special significance to our analysis and is only consistent with major
transformations in the Israeli economy, specifically the shift into high
technology production following the 1967 war. The latter has intensified
the demand for scientists and sophisticated engineers, hence the prominent
enlargement of this occupational category.
In sum, the direction of Jewish as well as Arab labor mobility is
generally from occupations related to less strategic industries into oc-
cupations that are related to more strategic industries, while following
the same general rule, Arabs, however, seem to follow the very route
of Jewish labor mobility; they are moving from the least into the
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less economically strategic occupations, while Jews are moving from
the least and less into the more economically strategic occupations.
3
This pattern of mobility seems likely to generate a contradiction, in
the sense that Jewish mobility into economically more strategic posi-
tions is resulting in Arab mobility into politically more strategic
positions. The potential for such contradiction can be exemplified by
the following trend: the higher ratio of professionals/scientists to
managers/administrators after than before 1967 among Jews, and the higher
ratio of managers/administrators to professionals/scientists after than
before 1967 among Arabs.4 It can be seen as evident also in the mobility
of Arab labor from occupied territories into Jewish agriculture, a trend
that is discussed later on.
Looking at the average structure instead of the occupational dis-
tribution in the individual years, although clarifying general compara-
tive patterns, it can also obscure important facts. This point is espe-
cially significant in periods of crisis like 1966 and the first half of
1967, when the Israeli economy was passing through severe recession.
During this period, for example, laid-off Arab construction workers seem
to have been pulled back into farm work. The proportion of the Arab
labor force in farming, an occupation that is constantly shrinking all
along the years, prior to and after that crisis, seems suddenly to ex-
pand during recession and absorb Arab lay-offs back into the soil when
the economy does not need them elsewhere in this case (i.e., when the
first construction boom reached its limit and unemployment seemed wide-
spread). 5
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In light of this detail, it is worth mentioning, though in passing
only, that as the military absorbs the "surplus" Jewish labor, similarly
agriculture is the parallel sponge-like mechanism in the Arab sector.
This, indeed, points out a form of flexibility provided by the "tradi-
tional sector", hence shedding light on one of the reasons why it is
tolerated in modern economies, This is related to why the center needs
a periphery into which to transfer the effects of its main contradictions,
a point to be discussed further elsewhere in the context of uneven de-
velopment and the extended reproduction of capitalism.
In sum, the comparison of average proportional distribution is a
very static method, hence likely to obscure major dynamics of change that
take place during each particular year which may otherwise reveal signi-
ficant facts, It reflects trends in horizontal mobility across occupa-
tions rather than actual changes within each.
B. Rate of Change
The rate of change is a more dynamic indicator of transformation in
the particular occupation within the structures of employment over time.
It reflects some historical dimension of change that the average propor-
tional occupational distribution does not. The rate of change does sharply
reflect a wide range of instability (in both directions of growth and
decline) of demand for each particular labor category; but may not in-
form us anything about horizontal/vertical mobility across occupations.
In this case, for example, the rate of change is not to describe oc-
cupational structures of employment for the Arab and the Jewish labor
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force in a particular time or how the distribution of the latter changes
over time. It rather measures the ups and down, or stability, of demand
for each (Arab and/or Jewish) labor category during a specific period of
time. Refer for this analysis to Table J-2, computed from the absolute
as distinguished from the proportionate distribution (as in Table J) of
each labor force in positions within the technical division of labor,
i.e,, by the various occupational categories.
The most prominent feature reflected in the comparison of change in
the Arab versus Jewish occupational structure of employment is that of
the change rate being considerably higher in the Arab than in the Jewish
occupational structure. This is true in both directions, expansion as
well as decline. Higher rates of expansion in the Arab employment struc-
ture become more striking and apply invariably to all occupations, espe-
cially services during the post-1967 economic boom, as do also the rates
of decline during the pre-1967 recession.6 This feature can be correctly
interpreted as an expression of instability in the Arab structure of em-
ployment. The Arab citizens of Israel do not control the sources of
their own employment, even their control over their traditional agricul-
ture was too shaken by land expropriation, price control and water-use
policies, resulting in their increasing vulnerability and dependence. The
latter, in turn (along with political vulnerability) subjugate the Arab
labor force to the ups and downs of the economy at large and force it to
respond more extremely to crises and booms.
The second most prominent feature, comparing the two periods, is the
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striking evidence of decline or stagnation in the period between 1963 and
1967, versus expansion in the period between 1967 and 1971. Those fig-
ures are consistent with reality, the expression of historical events,
a severe recession following the end of the construction boom, reaching
its sharpest point in 1966 and the first half of 1967 exploding in the
form of the expansionist Six Day War of June. The latter, in turn, re-
sulting in a net territorial gain, reservoirs of cheap labor, concomi-
tant with large inflows of capital and trained manpower, all together
steering the economy and beginning a new economic business cycle -- re-
flected in the rates of expansion in the period following the war, In
light of the 1963-1967 period figures, one can confidently conclude that
when it strikes, recession hits Arabs harder than Jews, The demand for
Arab craftsmen and industrial workers declined at a rate of 14 percent,
compared with an increase of 1 percent in the demand for Jews in that la-
bor category. Similarly, during the same economic crisis, the demand for
miners and even construction workers declined by 33 percent in the case
of Arab labor, compared with only 17 percent in the case of Jewish labor.
These indicators, again, reinforce our point regarding the relatively
higher instability characterizing the Arab, as compared with the Jewish,
structures of employment. The Arab structure of employment seems more
responsive to external sporadic push-and-pulls than to the internal de-
velopment of the labor force in terms of skill and aspirations. Unlike
that, one observes a systematic pattern in the direction and rate of
change within the Jewish occupational structure of employment that seems
to derive from both the internal development of the labor force as well
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as centrally-oriented manpower policy. This is reflected best, for ex-
ample, in the steady and constantly increasing decline in the farmers
occupational category, regardless of crisis or boom, and most importantly,
in the professional/scientific/technical occupational category, showing
constantly, before and after the war, the highest rate of expansion among
all other occupations in the Jewish structure of employment.
This observation makes much sense, knowing of the shift towards high
technology production, and of course, in light of our information about
the sources of current labor inflows, specifically the inflow of sophis-
ticated technical manpower from the West as provided in the previous
analysis of Israel's labor force in the seventies. The mid-sixties re-
present the end of Asian-African immigration and 1967 signifies the begin-
ning of selective Aliyah, hence transforming the occupational structure,
and naturally concentrating more heavily in the technical/scientific/
professional labor category; thus, in turn providing a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for Israel's comparative advantage in high
technology production, analyzed earlier. Later in this section we will
come back to discussing the resulting transformations in technical divi-
sion of labor as expressed by the 1972 new occupation classification.
To come back to the point is to assert the observation of a systema-
tic and predictable change in the Jewish occupational structure of employ-
ment compared with the unpredictable direction and rate of change in Arab
occupational structure of employment. It is important, however, to
realize that underlying the appearance of random and spontaneous change
in the Arab occupational structure of employment is an essentially deli-
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berate and systematic policy to keep the indigenous labor force vulner-
able, thus maintained as a flexibility variable used when and as the
economy needs. Examples of how the Arab labor force is made to display
flexibility to the system are many.
Some of these we have mentioned earlier when discussing the economic
meaning of Arab labor being essentially commuter labor in Jewish work
places. This refers not only to the partial transfer of reproduction
cost into the Arab traditional village, but also in making these commuter
workers appear in and disappear from the labor force and market as seems
appropriate to the health of the economy, measured by the extent to which
the needs and interests of the ruling class are satisfied. Figures in
Table J-2 evidence this point, not only in that the decline in the de-
mand for labor during recession is sharper in the case of Arabs than in
the case of Jews, but also in the very obstruction of Arab participation
in the labor force, hence its decline by 8 percent. This decline in the
size of the Arab labor force during the pre-1967 economic crisis cannot
be viewed in terms of shortage; rather, it must be interpreted as a
function of a coersive dismembering of Arab workers from the labor force
when their presence started threatening the demand for Jewish labor,
a dismemberment through discouragement in the job-seeking process, in-
evitably forcing them into reabsorption in traditional semi-subsistence
agriculture, from which they were originally released to meet a seemingly
temporary demand for Arab labor during the first construction boom. This,
in turn, results in the masking of the relative unemployment effects of
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recession on the Arab population, hence erasing the scars of discrimina-
tion between Jewish and Arab citizens and blaming it all-in-all on a
conjunctural recession. In the post-1967 economic boom we witness an
enlargement at a rate of 56 percent of the Arab labor force, compared
with 17 percent in the Jewish labor force, in spite of the stimulating
effect of the Six-Day War on Jewish immigration into Israel. This is
indeed an expression of a disproportionate growth in the demand for Arab
labor in a period of rapid economic growth.
We are, of course, aware of the fact that technically, the high rate
of expansion in the Arab labor market is, in part, a reflection also of
the previous decline in their labor force participation and not only of
real processes, such as labor force maturity, the mobilization of Arab
female labor, and the reactivation of the previously dismembered workers.
The comparison between changes in the Arab labor force before and after
1967 does, therefore, indicate a measure of economic flexibility that
the regulation of its use displays in that system of accumulation.
Another example on this matter is to be seen in the growing demand for
administrative/clerical Arab labor by 200 percent prior to the War;
although such high rate of change in the demand for Arabs in this occupa-
tional category must be attributed, in part, to their poor representation
in this occupation in previous years, as demonstrated earlier, it is part-
ly to be viewed as the indirect effect of Jewish mobilization into the
military at that time.
The increase in the demand for Arab labor in this occupational cate-
gory is probably restricted to clerical and low-management levels, re-
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placing Jewish labor temporarily released into the army. An occupational
ceiling is necessary for protecting the Jewish State from its Arab national
minority precisely during her war engagements with the surrounding Arab
world. This temporary penetration of Arabs into occupations that are
during periods of political stability, restricted mainly to Jews, is an
observation later on reinforced also by our index of differentiation. The
dynamics of demand for citizen-Arab labor in Israel are not peculiar to
that specific context. These dynamics are, indeed, not unlike those of
demand for black labor in the United States. As Harold Baron documents:
"The history of the demand for black labor in the post-war
period showed the continued importance of wartime labor
scarcities. The new job categories gained during World
War II essentially were transferred into the black sectors
of the labor market... .In reconversion and the brief 1948-
1949 recession, blacks lost out disproportionately on the
better jobs. However, the Korean War again created an in-
tense labor shortage, making black workers once more in
demand, at least until the fighting stopped.
The period of slow economic growth from 1955 to the early
1960s saw a deterioration in the relative position of
blacks... .The civil rights protests had generated little
in the way of new demand. Only the coincidence of the
rebellion of Watts, Newark, and Detroit with the escalation
of the Vietnam War brought about a sharp growth in demand
for black labor." 7
Baron further indicates that
"...in a tight labor market the undesirable jobs that
whites leave are filled out of this labor reserve so that
in time more job categories are added to the black sector
of the labor market. If the various forms of disguised
unemployment and subemployment are all taken into account,
black unemployment rates can run as high as three or four
times those of whites in specific labor markets in reces-
sion periods." 8
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The same can be said of the demand for citizen-Arab labor in
Israel. In the period of rapid economic growth following the War, distin-
guished by a persisting shortage of Jewish labor, the demand for Arabs
increases in occupations that- are becoming less desirable or undesirable
by Jews. The traders and salesmen labor market is a case in point. Such
is also the service labor category in Table J.2, where demand for Arab
labor grew at a disproportionate rate (182 percent) compared to a rate of
1 percent for Jewish labor. These figures may sound confusing, knowing
how desirable the service sector is becoming to Jewish, specifically
Oriental, labor. Later on, however, in analyzing the industrial structure
of employment, we realize that this growth in the demand for Arabs is re-
stricted mainly to personal services that Jews are leaving and moving
more into public/community service, in the case of Oriental-Jews, and
business/financing services, in the case of Western immigrants. Arabs
are thus in many cases moving into subemployment conditions, a much more
subtle phenomenon than unemployment, per se.
Statistically speaking, unemployment rates seem always higher among
Israel's Jews than non-Jews, in periods of crisis as well as booms. An
average of 1965-1974 indicates the unemployment rate for Jews (3 percent)
compared with non-Jews (2.8 percent); furthermore, it seems to hit Israeli-
born Jews the highest (4.3 percent); then come Asia-Africa immigrants
(3.2 percent): and the least affected are Europe-America immigrants (1.9
percent).9  The latter is accurate, given the reality that this labor
force usually immigrates only on the basis of demand for its labor power,
as we explained in an earlier chapter.
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The lower rate of unemployment among Arabs, however, can be under-
stood only in light of the possibility for making it easily invisible by
pushing this labor force back into semi-subsistence traditional rural vil-
lages. And, also, in light of the lack of temporary absence from the
labor force for compulsory military service in the reserves army, which
applies mainly to the Jewish citizens. Thirdly, in light of their poli-
tical vulnerability and the non-applicability of most bourgeois civil
rights to them, which reduces the need for disciplining this labor force
by means of high unemployment rates. In the past, Arab labor force was
released through work permits just to meet the demand. The supply side
of this labor was never allowed to flow freely prior to this economic
development phase; as we have elaborately described in Chapter II. Mech-
anisms such as Emergency Regulations (inherited from the British Colonial
Mandate and denounced as "fascist" by many Zionists at the time of the
Mandate) used in previous years to regulate the entry-exit flows of citi-
zen-Arab workers into the Israeli labor market, made more possible the
use of Arab labor as a flexibility-displaying factor. Economically speak-
ing, the role played by these mechanisms is not dissimilar to the role of
racism in regulating the participation of blacks in the United States urban
labor market.
This, however, poses a question regarding the prospective use of citi-
zen-Arab labor as a flexibility-displaying variable in the new realities
created by the war. We are referring specifically to three new reali-
ties: first, the emergence of a modern labor market replacing the
Labor-Exchanges; mechanisms that have historically regulated the demand
and supply sides of labor in Israel since its very inception. Second,
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the intensification of the penetration and integration of the citizen-
Palestinians within the green-line border into Israel's modern economy,
specifically services and industry; concomitant with the irreversible
rendering of the indigenous traditional sector which can no longer re-
absorb Arabs, once released into the modern labor force.
Third, the availability of a rather more vulnerable (both politically
and economically) Arab labor force through the integration of territories
occupied in the 1967 War into the Israeli economy. A labor force that is
therefore more conducive to the displacement of economic flexibility.
Does the availability of this labor force make it economically possible
and politically necessary to integrate the citizen-Arabs into the Israeli
economy on a more firm employment basis, hence undermining the conditions
for its vulnerability and reinforcing its bargaining power?
Of course, the latter depends very much on the way the Palestinian
question is to be settled in the near or far future; specifically, whether
or not the inflow of Palestinian workers across the green-line borders
stops or continues and under what terms of trade! Assuming the non-
withdrawal from the occupied territories as an irreversible political fact,
then on the basis of data we already have (such as those in Table A, for
example), we can compute and identify the possible trends. However, one
cannot comfortably make such an assumption. We-already know that the
use of migratory labor from Mexico and Puerto Rico was not to improve the
conditions of black labor; at best, it was to discipline the latter. Al-
though, in effect, black occupational mobility and improvement in income
status was promoted by the penetration of alien migratory labor, the latter
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has not affected the access of blacks to economic ownership; this is to
say, it has not resulted in any structural transformation in the relations
of production.
As far as the replacement of the old mechanisms of labor allocation
with a modern market mechanism, one cannot promise much change. Studies
in the United States, the very center of the world "free" enterprise mar-
ket system, prove the labor market is not neutral regarding race and
ethnicity. Contrary to this claim by neo-classical economic theory, sta-
tistical and other forms of discrimination still operate within the labor
market, resulting in its very segmentation.10 In light of these findings,
the emergence of Israel's labor market can promise, at best, more subtle-
ty in the use of Arab labor for displaying economic flexibility. This is
precisely what the history of demand for black labor in the U.S. shows;
such subtlety can take the form of subemployment instead of unemployment.
C. Internal Segmentation of the Jewish Labor Market
We must be aware of the fact that our previous analysis has related
to the Jewish labor force as a homogeneous group with the same occupational
structure of employment. This can be very misleading, since the Israeli
labor market is segmented, not only on national lines, but also by ethni-
city. There is not only one Jewish occupational structure of employment,
but rather different demand structures for different Jews in different
times.
Table C illustrates this important point. Our previous analysis
compared only Column 1 with Column 2, disregarding the differential loca-
tions of, and demand for, Israeli-born versus Asia-Africa and Europe-
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Table C. E-ploye4' Israeli Citi7ens .y Occupation and Population Group, 1958-1770, 1972.
1968 1969 1970a 1972
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occupation 4 U 1 a0) 4) g j 4) ) o 0. 4 4) @ I'O0(1961 classifi- 1 a .2 ow a W a 14 old
14 5 1 r t4d 14 Id gd -A W.I I4 4) $4 14 $ 4 $4C 0 ~ $4 M4 $4 4 54 0
cation) -a M 0 0 aH OHH H H414HA!
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Total 82.8 828.1 174.3 279.8 374.0 86.9 874.2 208.0 293.9 372.3 102.8 944.6 254.3 315.9 374.4
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Professional, Scien-
tific, Technical 5.7 14.0 21.9 6.0 16.2 5.1 14.6 21.6 6.8 16.8 4.7 16.4 24.1 7.9 18.8 6.6 17.6 24.3 8.7 20.7
2. Administrative, Execu-
tive, Managerial 3.3 11.7 21.2 10.9 21.2 3.6 18.4 21.9 10.4 22.4 3.6 18.8 21.9 U.1 23.1 3.9 19.0 22.7 12.3 22.2
3. Traders, Agents,
Salesmen 8.3 9.0 4.4 7.9 12.0 7.9 8.5 4.5 7.7 11.2 7.7 7.7 4.4 7.1 10.0 8.2 8.4 4.7 7.3 11.9
4. Farmers, Fishermen 30.6 8.6 8.5 11.8 6.3 26.6 8.3 8.4 10.1 6.7 23.9 7.7 8.8 8.4 6.5 19.9 6.9 8.2 7.8 5.2
5. orkers in Transport
and Communications 5.4 5.1 6.1 5.2 4.6 5.9 5.3 6.8 4.9 4.7 5.3 5.3 6.6 5.8 4.3 6.6 5.0 6.1 5.7 3.7
6. Construction Workers 20.2 6.0 3.6 9.5 4.6 21.2 6.0 3.3 9.7 4.4 22.5 6.3 3.5 10.6 4.6 26.4 6.7 3.9 11.4 4.6
7. Craf tsmen, Production
Process Workers '16.9 25.5 23.1 30.0 23.3 19.6 25.6 23.3 30.8 22.1 19.7 25.1 21.5 31.1 22.3 18.4 24.0 20.3 29.0 22.2
8. Services, Sport,
Recreation 9.5 13.2 10.3 17.8 11.0 10.1 13.3 9.3 18.6 11.2 10.5 12.7 9.2 18.0 10.4 10.0 12.4 9.8 17.8 9.5
9. Not Known 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: CBS-LFS, 1970. Special Services No. 376, Table XI for Jews only. Arabs computed from Table 34 of the same series.
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America immigrant Jews. The figures indicate a distinctive occupational
structure of employment for each group. This is especially prominent in
the case of the Oriental-Jews (Column 4), who tend to be located mid-way
between the Arab and the rest of the Jewish citizens. This position was
determined before, and persisted even after, the 1967-War. A comparison
between the differential location in the present and previous technical
division of labor will enlighten our understanding of prospective trends.
For this matter, we try to compare Ben-Porath's findings, based on
Labor Force Surveys and the 1961 Census of Population and Housing, with
the figures presented in Table C. This comparison is methodologically
appropriate, since both periods represent the beginning of an economic
boom. Also, because until 1972, L.F.S. were based on the 1961 classifi-
cation of occupational categories.
According to Yoram Ben-Porath, the 1963 occupational structure of
employment highlights the four following features:
1. "The percentage of farmers is much higher among Arabs
than among Jews. The percentage of farmers among the Asia-
Africa immigrants is higher than among all Jews but lower
than among the Arabs. The percentage of members of the
professions, administrative workers, clerks, merchants and
service workers is higher among Jews than among Arabs.
2. "The percentage of workers in manufacturing, construction
and crafts is approximately the same for Arabs and Jews;
however, in 1961, only one-tenth of Jews in this group
were unskilled laborers, while for Arabs, the proportion
was about one-third... .The percentage of manual workers
among Asia-Africa immigrants is higher than among total
Jews, but lower than among Arabs.
3. "There are fewer Jews in technical and professional than
in managerial, administrative and clerical occupations;
among the non-Jews the oreder is reversed. New immigrants
from Asia show the same pattern as all Jews in this respect.
And it is of some significance that Arabs and Asia-Africa
Jews differ.
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4. "The main features of the occupational comparison are also
reflected in the industrial structure of men's employment.
Arabs are under-represented in government, public and
commercial services, and in manufacturing industries, and
are concentrated in agriculture and in construction....
Here, too, there is some similarity between Arabs and
Asia-Africa immigrants, and the more recently the latter
have immigrated, the greater the similarity." 11
Table C, in which there is a more detailed segmentation of Israel's
labor market by the various citizen groups, points out the persistence of
the distinctive features of the Arab occupational structure of employment
relative to that of the Jewish labor force. As far as the occupational
structure of Jewish employment, the figures in this table reflect not only
differential locations of the various Jewish groups in the technical divi-
sion of labor, but also simultaneously with these consistent internal dif-
ferentiations, changes with the occupational distribution of each group
over time. The year 1970 represents a turning point concerning the latter
type of change. For the first time the proportion of the born-in-Israel
(Sabra) labor force who are farmers exceeds that among Asia-Africa immi-
grants (Oriental-Jews).
In the same year, the representation of the Sabra labor force in pro-
fessional, scientific/technical occupations (24.1 percent) exceeds their
representation in the administrative, managerial/executive occupations
(21.9 percent), contrary to the reversed feature in the average Jewish
occupational structure of employment pointed out by Ben-Porath prior to
the war, and persisting in the post-war period as reflected in Column 2.
Another important change is in the representation of Europe-America
immigrants versus Sabras in the administrative, managerial/executive
occupational category until the war, and all along the nation-building
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phase, the demand for this labor category was always higher for the veter-
an/Sabra labor force, who were more familiar with official Hebrew language
and institutions of the State. In 1968, however, the representation of
both "Western" population groups equalizes, then the Western immigrant
representation exceeds that of the indigenous Israeli Jews. In this labor
category the demand for Oriental-Jews continues to be much lower than it
is for the rest of the Jews and much higher than the demand for Arabs,
and it continues to be "of special significance that it is so."
We have already pointed out the underlying rationale behind the poor
representation of Arabs in the administration and management of the Jewish
State, compared even with Oriental-Jews. What is more important, however,
is to indicate the significance of this point in the determination of
class location, specifically in terms of the political subordination/
domination criterion, addressed in the following section. The ex-
ceeding demand for Western Jewish immigrants over the Sabra labor force
in this occupational category can be interpreted most accurately in light
of a shift in the need for managerial skills from the State apparatus into
production itself. The management of industrial relations in the pursuit
of higher productivity and optimization (necessitated by concentration/
centralization tendency, and consistent with the predominance of the eco-
nomic over the political instance following the war, discussed previously)
not only became a higher priority, but also required modern managerial
skills likely to be more acquired by Europe-America immigrants.
Another prominent feature in the Israeli occupational structure of
employment is the fact that among all segments of Israel's labor force,
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Asia-Africa immigrants are the most highly represented in services/sport/
recreation occupations, and among craftsmen and production-process workers.
Speaking of this as ethnic occupational "specialization", one can probably
state in light of Table C that as Oriental-Jews seem specialized in ser-
vices and crafts, and Arab citizens in farming and construction, Western
Jews born-in-Israel or immigrants tend to specialize in the scientific/
technical and administrative/managerial categories.
In 1972, occupational categories change. A new classification, dif-
ferent from that of 1961, emerges. This change does probably reflect
transformations occurring in the economy at large. During that year,
rapid growth steered by the aftermath of the Six-Day War reached its
highest pace and shortage of Jewish labor became most acute. It was in
that year that Israel, for the first time since its very inception, im-
ports non-Jewish manpower from the West; this migratory labor was mobilized
from Yugoslavia and Francel2 to meet the new demand generated by the re-
structuring of the division of labor in the form of the 1972 occupational
classification.
The new labor categories identified in Israel's post-1972 occupational
structure of employment are more specific than previous ones, and more
articulately capitalist. A comparison between the 1961 classification (as
in Table C) and the 1972 classification (as in Table A) indicates a fur-
ther differentiation of labor, that is, steepening of the division of
labor. The latter is most evident in the distinction, for example, between
skilled and unskilled productive labor categories. Also, in the isolation
of the mass of clerical workers from administration and management, very
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Table A. Employed Persona in Israel by Occupation and Population Group, 1972 - 1974.
Occupation
(1972 classifi-
cation)
Total - Thousands
Total - Percentage
Scientific & Academic
Workers
Other Professional,
Technical Workers
Administrative
Managers
Clericals 6 Related
Workers
Sale Workers
Service Workers
Agricultural Workers
Skilled Workers in
Industry: Mining,
Building and Trans-
port and Other
Workers
Other Workers in
Industry, Transport
and Building and
Unskilled Workers
.d0 rf
01 2 -3
1972
Born in:
14 4- 0
4
-4
5
.a
6
0 14
7
1973
-V4 -A I4 to co
Ai0 9 0 M41 1
Cn- 0 %14 -A4 
A..tE4 UI~ " 4 ;r i- Af-E
1 2 3 4 5
ain:
0 1
14 $
6 7
19 74
-4
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155.2 102.8 52.4 944.6 254.3 315.9 374.4 1168.3 107.3 61.0 981.1 273.3 317.6 390.2 173.5 104.8 68.7 984.6 238.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
0.1 0.2 0.0 6.2 7.8 1.9 8.9
4.2 6.3 0.0 11.4 16.7 6.4 12.0
0.8 1.3 0.0 3.3 3.4 (1.4) 4.9
2.8 4.3 0.0 16.5 20.4 12.0 17.5
7.4 8.3 6.0 8.3 4.7 7.1 11.7
8.4 10.8 4.0 12.8 9.9 18.5 9.9
18.4 16.1 23.0 6.9 8.2 7.8 5.2
24.6 ' 37.2 0.0 29.0 25.7 35.3 26.0
32.3 14.8 67.0 5.6 3.2 9.6 3.9
0.1 0.2 0.0 6.3 7.9 (1.5)
4.9 7.7 0.0 11.8 16.4 7.0
1.0 1.5 0.0 3.6 3.5 (1.5)
9.0
12.5
5.2
5.2 8.2 0.0 17.3 21.9 12.0 18.3
4.5 7.0 7.0 8.0 5.1 7.3 10.7
8.0 10.6 3.0 12.6 9.4 18.6 9.9
16.2 14.3 20.0 6.1 7.2 7.2 4.6
22.2 34.9
34.9 15.7
0.0 28.7 25.4 35.9
Born in:
-5 4
M--
N d 0NO
to
5 6 7
306.7 393.3
100.0 100.0
1.0 1.7 0.0 6.9 7.9 2.0
5.1 8.5 0.0 12.7 18.0 7.4
0.2 0.4 0.0 3.6 3.5 2.0
2.2 3.6 0.0 18.2 23.8 12.8
7.7 8.0 7.0 8.0 5.4 7.3
7.0 8.8 3.0 11.9 8.1 18.9
16.5 14.9 19.0 5.5 5.9 6.1
25.21 22.5
70.0 ' 5.6 3.2 9.0 4.6 37.2
9.9
13.1
4.8
18.4
10.5
9.1
4.7
37.3 0.0 27.9 24.2 34.7 25.2
15.7 71.0 5.3 3.1 8.7 4.3
Table A was constructed from several sources, as follows:
a. Columns 2 and 4-7 in all three years are computed from CBS-LFS, 1974, Jerusalem, 1976, Table 48, p. 108, and Table F, p. VX.
b. Non-citizen Palestinian Arabs category refers to Palestine workers from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. They are to be
distinguished from other non-citizen Arab workers in Israel from other occupied territories (Golan Heights) and South Lebanon.
They are distinguished from Israeli citizen Palestinian Arabs by their political status. The occupational distribution of
this population group was concluded from their distribution by economic branch, as presented in Table C (t in Hebrew) in
Aryeh Bregman, The Economy of the Administered Areas, 1974-1975, Jerusalem, 1976, p. 25. 1 arrived at their occupational
distribution by simply "de-skilling" them within their economic branches distribution, as appears in Column 4 of Table F;
assuming that due to the "Open Bridges" policy skilled Palestinian labor from Gaza and the West Bank is likely to find job
opportunities in the Gulf and other oil-producing Arab countries. Further, the Israeli rationale for importing Arab labor
is shortage in unskilled labor, and the demand is a function of the availability of cheap and thus "de-skilled" labor re-
serves. Furthermore, non-citizen Palestinian labor is employed precisely in branches where citizen Palestinian labor is con-
centrated, and therefore, for political as well as economic rationale, It is more likely that the latter, not the former,
occupy the more skilled labor categories.
c. Column 1 is computed from Columns 2 and 3.
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much likely to be the effect of a greater integration into international
monopoly capital; and finally, in the very distinction on the top between
scientific and academic versus other professional and technical workers.
The former is probably the Industrial Research and Development labor cate-
gory, related to high-technology military production.
In order to know what difference the new, compared with the old,
categories make as far as clarifying the internal segmentations of the
occupational structure of employment and in terms of facilitating the man-
power planning effort in meeting specific demands (as, for example, in the
case of selective Jewish immigration), it will be helpful to compare 1972
employment figures based on 1961 classification in Table C, with those
based on 1972 classification in Table A, with the exclusion of Columns 1
and 2 from the latter for a valid comparative ground.
Such a comparison indicates that, unlike the former, the 1972 classi-
fication is much more revealing of the differences between the Sabras'
occupational structure of employment and that of the Europe-America immi-
grants. While the former seem to be the most highly represented among
other professional, technical and clerical workers, the latter seem to be
the most highly represented in scientific/academic labor categories, as
well as among administrative/managerial, and even more prominently, sales-
workers.
Unlike the first two occupations, in which the order of representation
from highest to lowest goes from Europe-America immigrants to Sabras to
Asia-Africa immigrants, who are very poorly represented, and then, to
citizen-Palestinian-Arabs, among salesworkers, however, the order is as-
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toundingly different: Europe-America immigrants are the most highly re-
presented, followed by Palestinian-Arabs, then Oriental-Jews, and last
and least, come the Sabras.
A meaningful interpretation of such a differential representation
in this labor category depends greatly on the nature of the commodity mar-
keted by each segment of the labor force. It makes much difference
whether or not the differential representation of ethnic groups described
above applies to the same market(s), or that it reflects the representa-
tion of each group in a different commodity(ies) market(s); say, for ex-
ample, Europe-America immigrants in the financial market and the inter-
national high-technology commodity market, Sabras in the local and on
export of luxury consumer goods market, Oriental-Jews and Palestinian-
Arabs in the basic consumer goods market, specifically within the so-
called "informal" market. Each type of these sales promotes realization
for a different form of capital. For such information we need a detailed
industy-by-occupation matrix, a lacking source of data that we will be
discussing soon.
One important detail that we can draw from these figures in light of
previously-presented information is the noticeable trend of Arab mobility
into the salesman/trader/agent labor category already during the 1966 re-
cession, a phenomenon hence concomitant with their first major layoff ex-
perience. We recall this trend to be accompanied also similarly with
mobility into transport and communication work. One way of interpreting
the two is in terms of a search for self-employment as a taxi and/or bus
driver, as a small shop-keeper in the Arab villages. During that reces-
sion, many laid-off Arab construction workers rushed into their villages
378
to construct houses for their own, applying both skill as well as savings
gained during the construction boom; and many others, specifically the
landless, rushed into purchasing a self-employment means for securing their
future livelihood. Many chose trucks to transport Arab workers into Jewish
work places and in-between to transfer "Jewish" commodities into Arab
residential areas, thus combining both transport and sales as an alterna-
tive form of work.
The growing representation of Arabs in these two labor categories
after the 1967 War can be attributed, in part, to a growing demand in more
attractive labor categories into which Jewish salesmen and transport work-
ers moved, leaving room in their previous occupation to be filled-in by
Arabs. In other part, it has to be attributed to Israel's desperate need
for expanding her commodity market into new Arab frontiers within the
1948 borders and, more importantly, across them into occupied territories.
Palestinian-Arab labor, not only from Israel, but also from occupied ter-
ritories, became in high demand for more effective results in promoting
Arab consumerism towards Israeli commodities. This went even beyond the
occupied territories, into Arab countries through the "open-bridges"
policy. 1 3 The latter made it absolutely necessary to mobilize workers
from the territories into this employment category.
This point leads directly into the new major element in Israel's
current employment structure, that is, the non-citizen-Palestinian labor
force from the occupied territories. The construction of Table A is the
very first attempt in the literature to reconstruct the employment struc-
ture of Israel's labor force on the basis of the new realities created
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by the 1967 War and persisting now for a decade; that is to say, consider-
ing the non-Palestinian workers employed in Israel as an integral part
of the latter's employment structure, causing and resulting from class
transformations that have bearing on the real balance of forces and poten
tial for transforming these realities, hence comes the rationale for analy-
zing the penetration of the new labor element in the context of these new
realities at large as a part of and not apart from this integral whole.
Neither Israeli nor Palestinian official literature has posed the question
in this way. No one has yet examined the joining/replacement effects of
this penetration within the Israeli technical and social division of labor;
which can be done only by reconstructing that whole within which real
social forces do exist and operate. For this matter, it is not sufficient
that our analysis be dynamic but also that it captures precisely those
dynamics that are socially significant; that is, dynamics that make a dif-
ference in interpreting the world and in changing it.
Following this rationale, Table A reflects not only the Israeli-
Jewish labor market segmented by ethnicity or source of labor; but also by
its Palestinian-Arab extension. Unlike Table C, which highlights the in-
ternal segmentation of the Israeli labor market on ethnic lines, this
table highlights labor-market segmentations also on national grounds:
Israeli-Jews total (Column 4), including all their sources of labor (Col-
umns 5, 6, 7) as being a nationally sovereign group, and Palestinian-
Arabs' total (Column 1), though segmented by political status, as being
a nationally subjegated group. Given that in the present conjuncture, the
national question constitutes the main aspect of the principal contradic-
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tion, this reconstruction as in Table A does allow for the capturing of
socially significant dynamics which have some bearing on the determina-
tion of class location, as will be discussed later on. The ultimate pur-
pose of this reconstruction is to find out whether underlying these seg-
mentations by nationality and ethnicity is a potential for similarity in
class location, hence commonality in class interest and thus better pros-
pects for cross-national class alliance! It is clear that within these
relations of political domination/subordination there is no room for al-
liance among the Palestinian and Israeli national bourgeoisie and petty
bourgeoisie, since their interests are in direct conflict with each other
in this particular conjuncture; this is true even on the basis of objec-
tive material conditions--specifically territorial and demographic. The
development of the productive forces by the Israeli-Jewish bourgeoisie --
which can happen only through continuous "selective" Aliyah, i.e., the
law of return, territorial expansion, and colonization of Palestinian
land and the reinforcing of partnership with imperialism will, inevitably,
be at the expense of the aspirations of Palestinian national bourgeoisie
and petit bourgeoisie and in direct contradiction with the interests of
all Palestinian social classes.
Hence, comes the assertion that the only aspirations that are es-
sentially international, cross national boundaries and are likely not to
conflict with each other directly are those of the proletariat. The class
interests of the Israeli-Jewish proletariat and the Palestinian-Arab
proletariat are likely to objectively coincide, despite the
subjective conditions for conflict peculiar to this conjunction in which
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false ideologies such as nationalism are becoming deeply internalized.
The purpose of this study is therefore restricted to examining the
potential for proletarian, but not other, cross-national class alliances.
Hence comes the significance, for example, of the distinction provided in
Table A between skilled and unskilled productive labor. Citizen Pales-
tinian-Arabs seem to be the most highly represented in the skilled produc-
tive labor category; second come Oriental-Jews; then the equally repre-
sented Sabras and Western Jews, although on the average, Israeli-Jews are
more highly represented than Palestinian-Arabs (including non-citizens)
in skilled labor categories. In unskilled labor categories, concentration
of Palestinians in general, and non-citizens in particular, is dispropor-
tionately the highest.
A comparison between the average representation of Israeli-Jews and
Palestinian-Arabs in Israeli productive labor categories indicates that
Palestinian-Arabs (citizens and non-citizens) are over-represented in
agricultural work by a factor of 0.3, in skilled industrial work by a fac-
tor of 0.8, and in unskilled industrial work by a factor of 1.3, while
Israeli-Jews are under-represented in all these labor categories by a fac-
tor of 0.92 in the first, 0.65 in the second, and of 0.93 in the third,
respectively. If we compare the subethnic/national groups, non-citizen
Palestinians seem over-represented in agricultural work by a factor of
3.6; they are nonexistent in skilled industrial work, and over-represen-
ted by a factor of 12.4 in the unskilled industrial labor categories,
compared with citizen Palestinians being over-represented by a factor of
0.8 in the first, 3.1 in the second, 0.6 in the third. Among the various
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Israeli-Jewish subgroups, Sabras and Oriental-Jews seem to be over-repre-
sented by a factor of 0.12 in the former and 0.23 in the latter. Both are
under-represented in agricultural and unskilled work. Western Jews seem
to be under-represented in all productive labor categories, including
skilled industrial work,
The other attribute of Table A is the reflecting of the 1973 October
War's effect on the occupational structure of the various segments of
the Israeli labor force. Economist Ibrahim Oweiss has correctly concluded
that "the 1973 War was more costly to the Israeli economy than any pre-
vious war because it was extended over a longer period of time, while the
net result did not involve any territorial expansion. On the contrary,
Israel lost occupied Arab territories after the disengagement of troops
on both the Egyptian and Syrian borders."1 5 In fact, 1973 represents the
end of the post-1967 economic boom and the beginning of economic and poli-
tical crisis, steered by the economic crisis of world capitalism in the
seventies due to the increasing integration of Israel's economy, speci-
fically military production into United States' monopoly capital since the
1967 War. This is to say, in other words, that the very penetration of
U.S. capital that has steered the economy and contributed to its boom in
the aftermath of the 1967 War, has also intensified the economic crisis
and contributed to the persistence of inflationary processes in the after-
math of the 1973 War.
Notice how in wartime (1973) the demand for citizen-Palestinian-
Arabs in the administrative/managerial and clerical labor categories,
that usually were filled by Jews, increases then declines disproportion-
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ately after the war. That is, when mobilized Jewish clerical and adminis-
trative workers are released back into their civilian positions. In
fact, in 1974 the representation of Arab labor in those categories as well
as in services and sales becomes even lower than it was a year prior to
the war. The latter may be attributed to the economic crisis, during
which Arabs lose the occupational upgrading gained during the period of
rapid economic growth following 1967. This conforms with the rules that
govern black/white labor mobility in the United States, as previously
pointed out by Harold Baron.
Again, this is revealing and reinforcing of the point made earlier
regarding the roles citizen-Arab labor plays in substituting for Jewish
labor during periods of military mobilization, and as a "flexibility-dis-
playing" factor in the Israeli economy.
These roles are expressed statistically in the form of temporary
upgrading of the Arab occupational structure of employment and must not
obscure the importance of their role in the post-1967 economy during
political stability. Further, it is of significance that the non-citizen
Palestinian workers from the occupied territories did not perform this
kind of flexibility-displaying role during that period of military mobili-
zation; rather, on the contrary, the proportion of this labor force in
agriculture and services declined during the war and stagnated after the
war, despite a proportional increase in the sales and unskilled labor
categories. It is of significance also that by virtue of their Israeli
citizenship, the former can be subjected to display economic flexibility
when the security of the State is being threatened, and it is precisely
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for lacking that condition that the latter can be neither trusted nor can
be coercively subjegated to such a role.
This point will become even more clearly evident in the following
indeces of differentiation of Israeli occupational and industrial struc-
ture of employment over time.
p Index of Differentiation in the Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab
Structures of Employment:
Technically, the Index of Differentiation is 0.. = 1/2 E[P. - P. ] x100
13J ig jg
where P is the proportion of persons in group i employed in occupation
(or industry) g, and P. is the proportion of persons in group j employedjg
in occupation g. In other words, it is half of the sum of the absolute
horizontal differences between any pair of columns (in the occupational
or industrial structure of employment) divided by 100. The index ranges
from 0 (when distribution is identical) to 1.
As we apply it in Table N and Table B, the index demonstrates rela-
tive differentiation in the employment structure of any two population
groups, over time, and comparative pairs of population groups. In this
context the significance of this tool lies in reflecting a range of rela-
tive segregation/desegregation or discrimination equalization trends and
amounts, in terms of access to the various locations in the technical divi-
sion of labor in general but not to a specific location (occupational or
industrial) in particular. Put differently, this index measures inequality
of ethnic/national distribution in the occupational and industrial struc-
ture of employment.
Comparing the index of differentiation in the occupational versus
Table N. Index of
Employed Citizens,
Differentiationa in the Occupation and Industrial Structure of Arab and Jewish
1963 - 1972.
O ccupationb Industryc
MHH
Year1 D1 D1 D1 D4 DA1960426 021 0,8 815. 0 .P W P 45
b Ur)U OW Ia boP U) 64W(
Yea H -HH 0 ,fld- WH *rl0-H-fa d d -4'r
to 6 -5 44 P M -H0 to6-4 W-H 4
____ D12 D14 D15 D54 D355 D?3'n DAJ-
1963 0.418 0.522
1964 0.4126 0.488
1965 0.424 0.485
1966 0.442 0.509
1967 0.426 0.505
1968 0.363 0.301 0.404 0.246 0.095 0.426 0.410
1969 0.346 0.292 0.379 0.253 0.103 0.404 0.396
1970 0.336 0.291 0.375 0.258 0.099 0.398
1971 0.338 -- -- -- --
1972 0.347 0.289 0.399 0.265 0.098 0.384
a. For the formula of Index of Differentiation, see note "b" in Table B.
b. Index of Differentiation of the economic structure is computed according to the formula above, from
Table S for column D12, and from Table C for the rest. Occupation structure in Table S and Table C
is based on 1961 classification.
c. Industry here refers to economic branch; DAJ column is computed from Table 22, Labor Force Surveys
1969, Special Series No. 333, Jerusalem, 1970, pp. 41-44. Formula for differentiation of industrial
structure is the same as in occupational structure, where g refers to a particular industry (economic
branch) instead of occupation.
(-'
00
U,
W qW w~ W W w W www1W 1W W 1W
386
industrial structure of Israel-Arab and Jewish employed citizens (Table N),
we notice: first, greater segregation between Israeli-Jews and Israeli-
Arabs in the industrial than the occupational structure of employment.
The same finding applies also in earlier years (1958-1963), as in Ben-
Porath's study of the Arab labor force in Israel. In the latter, this
feature applies even in the case of Arab versus Oriental-Jews.16 We can
perhaps attribute the lower differentiation in the Israeli-Arab versus
Jewish occupational structure of employment, at least in part, to a rather
higher segregation experienced systematically in the past (probably for
security considerations) in the industrial structure of Arab employment.
There are more industries than occupational categories that do exclude
Arabs (the diamond industry is one example, and military-related production
is most likely to be so). The concentration of Arab workers in few
specific industries (such as construction) increases their specialization
in related labor categories, resulting in the upgrading of their occupa-
tional structure of employment. Due to some industrial segregation, they
gain skill in those areas of production, thus they become more highly
represented in skilled labor categories, as demonstrated earlier by Table
A.
Another factor that contributes to the relative upgrading of their
occupational structure of employment, that is, the narrowing of the index
of differentiation in that realm, is the residential segregation of the
Arab citizen labor force; a subject more elaborately discussed in the con-
text of Israel's economic structure. This is particularly true in relation
to the social service delivery system, specifically education, health,
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welfare and local municipal councils, generating jobs that can be most
effectively (from the perspective of the ruling class) performed by local
Arabs. This is similar to the semi-separatist, but neither equal nor
independent self-government-oriented, policies towards blacks and other
minorities in the United States. The creation of local municipal councils
in Arab villages and staffing them with local community labor force does,
for example, increase the representation of Arabs in the managerial/
administrative occupational category. Similarly does the separate (but
neither equal nor independent) school system for the Arabs in Israel in-
crease the latter's representation among the so-called "other professionals
and technical workers", which in the case of Arabs refers, simply, to
school teachers, social workers, etc., while in the case of Jews, refers
mainly to sophisticated engineers, etc. This fact is revealed by a more
detailed occupational structure of employment, as shall be seen later on.
Third, a dramatic decline in the index of differentiation of Israeli-
Jewish versus Arab occupational as well as industrial structures of em-
ployment is noticeable in the aftermath of the 1967 War. Citizen-Pales-
tinian labor seems to penetrate a larger range of economic branches and
occupational categories following the 1967 War. This change seems even
more dramatic in the industrial than the occupational structures. One
also notices how, during the 1966 recession, differentiation between Is-
raeli-Arabs and Israeli-Jews increases then declines during war time; which
is, in turn, consistent with the point made earlier regarding the relative
instability of the Arab employment structure, and also reinforces the
point regarding some similarity with the history of demand for black labor
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in the United States. In both cases, political vulnerability of the
minority group members of the labor force as well as the profit imperative
of the ruling class are the conditions underlying these dynamics of demand
for Israeli-Arab labor, as for American black labor.
If we consider the subethnic groups in the Israeli labor force, we
notice that in the post-1967 era differentiation in the occupation struc-
ture is the lowest between Israeli-born Sabras and European-American immi-
grants (Column D35), and the highest between Sabras and Israeli-Arabs
(Column D13); and it is of significance that these so-called indigenous
Israeli-Jews, who have co-existed with the indigenous Palestinian popula-
tion for the longest time, continue to be the least mixing with and the
most different from the Arab labor force as far as locations in the techni-
cal division of labor is concerned. This fact is likely to be the result
of labor-Zionist segregationist policy in Palestine since the Yishuv.
Despite the above, however, a prominent trend highlighted in Table N is
the tendency towards equalization in the post-1967 occupational structure
of Israeli-Arabs, compared with that of all other Jewish population groups.
In the case of Oriental-Jews, a counter-tendency prevails in their rela-
tion to Sabras and Western Jews; the differentiation or gap in the occupa-
tional distribution tends to get wider during that same period. To sum
up this observation is to point out an increasing integration of the Is-
raeli-Arab citizens into the Israeli-Jewish occupational structure of
employment. Perhaps it is happening at the expense of Oriental-Jews, or
as a result of the latter's tendency to heavily concentrate in the service
labor category, especially since the June War.
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As far as the replacement/joining question is concerned, this table
suggests the likelihood for either trend to be highest in cases where dif-
ferentiation in occupational location is lowest. That is, among Israeli-
born Sabras and Europe-America immigrants, then in the case of Oriental-
Jews and Israeli-Arab citizens, but not between the latter, on the one
hand, and the former, on the other.
As Table N focused only on the citizen labor force prior and after
the 1967 War, basing the analysis on the 1961 classification of occupa-
tional and industrial structures of employment, Table B, unlike the former,
focuses on the period prior and after the 1973 War, which represents a
shift from an economic boom into crisis. The index of differentiation
includes also the non-citizen Palestinian segment of Israel's labor force,
and is based on the 1972 classification of occupational and industrial
structure, hence comes the impossibility of comparing the two indexes, a
comparison that otherwise may allow for meaningful generalization regarding
transformation in these differentiations over a longer period of time,
specifically the effects of the post-1967 period of rapid economic growth
with the post-1973 period of economic stagnation and decline. Given these
limitations, one has to analyze the 1972-1975 period separately, not in
comparison with the previous one.
Despite the differences mentioned above, one feature that seems
equally prominent in both tables is the very narrowing down of the gap
in the occupational structure of Israeli-Arab citizens compared with that
of all Israeli-Jewish groups during wartime. This is to say, the decline
in Israeli-Jewish/Arab occupational differentiation, a feature that is not
V W W
Table B.a Index of Differentiationb of the Occupational and Industrial Structure of Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab
Groups Employed in Israel, 1972-1975 (1972 classification).
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unlike the case in 1967, is evident again in 1973.
The tendency towards equalization in the occupational structures of
Israeli-Jews and Arabs in war-time must not be understood only in terms
of increasing penetration of Arabs into higher labor categories in order
to temporarily replace Jewish labor upon military mobilization, but also
in terms of the very absorption by the military of Israel's most qualified
manpower from the civilian economy. The latter, in effect, results in the
degrading of the civilian Jewish occupational structure, hence contri-
buting to the apparent equalization tendency mentioned above. This is to
say, the decline in Arab/Jewish occupational differentiation witnessed
during both the 1967 and the 1973 wars can be more accurately interpreted
as a result of upgrading in the Arab occupational structure (not exceeding,
however, the level of clerical and public service labor categories), on
the one hand, and the degrading of the Jewish occupational structure in
response to military mobilization, on the other. The latter factor is
likely to be even more acute in the 1973 War, after the shifting of the
economy towards high technology military production.
The narrowing of the gap in the Arab/Jewish occupational structures
is closely reflected in the second row of Columns D2-4, D2-5, D2-6, and
D2-7. Notice how the gap narrows down during military mobilization for
the October War, but unlike the case following the 1967 War, the gap
widens again after the War (most evident in Row 4, Column D2-4). The
latter difference is significant, and it is to be interpreted in terms
of the differential effect the economic boom versus the economic crisis
inflicted on the upgrading/degrading of the occupational structure of the
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Arab citizens in Israel.
In the industrial structure of employment, however, the 1973 War does
not seem to have the same effect the 1967 War has had as far as narrowing
down the differentiations in the industrial structure of Arab versus Jewish
citizens. Quite the contrary, indeed, figures in Column B point out the
widening of industrial differentiation between Israeli-Jews and Israeli-
Arabs in 1973. This finding is of a special significance, and likely to
be interpreted most accurately in light of the increased militarization of
the economy and the closer articulation between military and civilian in-
dustries following the 1967 War, documented in a previous chapter; the
presence of Arab labor in military-related industries is likely to present
a more serious risk during war than "peace" time. This point is also
relevant to the question of replacement/joining trends in industrial Arab/
Jewish labor mobility indirectly related to the prospects for cross-
national proletariat alliance.
Furthermore, notice how the narrowing of the gap in the occupational
structures of Israeli-Jews and that of Palestinian-Arabs who are citizens
of Israel, does simultaneously intensify the gap in the occupational dif-
ferentials between the latter and non-citizen Palestinian-Arabs (Column
D2-3, second row); that is to say, as wars increase the integration of
citizen Palestinian-Arabs into the Israeli-Jewish occupational structure,
it in the meantime disintegrates and removes the Palestinians within the
green-line borders from the non-citizen Palestinians from across the
green-lines employed in Israel. This can be seen as being, at least in
effect, a political control strategy to prevent alliances between the two
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Palestinian national groups under such critical security conditions.
Political status relative to the State of Israel seems to be the
most crucial factor in determining the range of differentiation between
occupational as well as industrial structures of employment of Arab and
Jewish segments of Israel's labor force, the effect of which being even
greater in the case of occupational as compared with industrial distri-
butions. The latter is evident in the higher figures in Column D3-4 than
those in Column C. The citizenship of the State (regardless of its rank-
ing position as first, second, or third class) seems to make quite a dif-
ference regarding the location of Arabs in the technical division of labor.
This is illustrated in the fact that the index of differentiation in the
occupational structures of citizen versus non-citizen Palestinian-Arabs
(Column D2-3) does almost double that of differentiation in the occupa-
tional structures of citizen Palestinian-Arabs versus Israeli-Jews (Column
D2-4). It is also greater than differentiation in the case of all Pales-
tinian-Arabs versus all Israeli-Jews in general (Column D1-4).
In sum, greater occupational differentiation exists between citizen
versus non-citizen Palestinian-Arab workers in Israel than between citizen
Palestinian-Arabs and any Israeli-Jewish population group. The same role
is likely to be applicable in the industrial structure (although data were
not available to specify by Jewish ethnic group), with segregation being,
however, greater in the occupational, than in the industrial, structure.
The latter makes much sense in light of the fact that around 70 percent of
the non-citizen workers from occupied territories fall in unskilled labor
category in the very bottom of Israel's occupation structure, as we have
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already demonstrated in Table A.
It is possible that non-citizen Palestinian labor had replaced citi-
zen Palestinian labor in unskilled labor categories, allowing the latter
to move into better positions in skilled labor categories. But it is not
clear whether citizen-Arabs can be again de-skilled in the case of with-
drawal from occupied territories or any other adjustment that may block
the inflow of "unskilled" labor from the territories. We only know that
it is inherent in the essential unevenness of capitalist accumulation to
generate simultaneously skilled and unskilled labor categories. Labor is,
if necessary, de-skilled in order to match the labor category most in
demand. In light of this theoretical understanding as well as the in-
deces of differentiation preserved in Table B, it seems not unlikely that
Arab citizens be de-skilled again. Further, it seems very unlikely that
in the present conjuncture Palestinian workers from occupied territories
can join Jewish workers in more than unskilled locations within the techni-
cal division of labor. They are likely to replace Oriental-Jewish workers
and citizen Palestinian labor or join the latter in unskilled industrial
and agricultural production work. With the persistence of the economic
crisis following the 1973 War, the index demonstrates a tendency towards
growing differentiation in the occupational structures of Israeli-Jews and
non-citizen Palestinian labor employed in Israel.
In conclusion, although revealing of some significant trends, this
index of differentiation does not provide any specific information re-
garding differential location in a particular occupation and/or industry.
It is computed from the average occupational and/or industrial structure
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of employment; thus, it tells us nothing about either the concrete or the
social forms of labor to which different population groups have more or
less access. In other words, this index of differentiation does not iden-
tify specific locations in the technical and/or social division of labor
within which segregation or desegregation for/against particular segments
of the labor force prevails.
It is a more appropriate tool for assessing levels of discriminatory
distribution of different segments of the labor force within the structure
of employment in general. This provides us with some relevant hints that
are likely to shed some light on differential class locations and guide
us somehow in identifying the latter. Finally, a strong point in this
analysis is the attention given to the relation between the occupational
and industrial structure of employment. The latter is the focus of the
following analysis.
III. The Industrial Structure of Employment
A. The 1967 Base Year
The industrial structure refers here to the proportional distribu-
tion of the employed labor force among the various branches of the economy.
For an accurate estimation of the transformations that have occurred in
the industrial structure of employment of the labor force employed in
Israel during the post-1967 decade, it helps to know how it was in the
beginning of that very period. The figures in Table FF respond, in part,
to this need, presenting the men's industrial structure of employment in
aTable FF. Palestinian-Arab and
in Israel in the West
bJewish Employed Men by Economic Branch
Bankc and the Gaza Stripd - 1967.
Economic Branch Jews in Palestinian- Palestinians Palestinians
Israel Arabs in in the Gaza in the West
Israel Strip Bank
1 2 3 4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture, fishing
and forestry 11.3 38.9 23.9 34.6
Industry 28.8 16.6 13.9 15.1
Construction 9.5 18.0 9.2 15,6
Electricity and
water 3.0 1.4 1.3 0.9
Commerce, banking
and insurance 13.2 8.5 16.3 12.3
Transport, storage
and communications 9.6 6,3 8.5 6.8
Services 24.6 10.3 26.9 14.7
D121= 0.361
4Al
I D23 = 0. 266 I
Al A~\N
, I
D14 = 0.D294
[) = 0. 188
D13 = 0.180
D24 = 0.087
Sources: a + b: from Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 1976.
c + d: from Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly,
Israel Defense Forces.
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the 1967 base year for the Jews in Israel (Column 1). The citizen
Palestinian-Arabs in Israel (Column 2), the Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip (Column 3), and in the West Bank (Column 4).
According to these figures, the Palestinian population in Israel
and in the West Bank seem to be more evenly distributed among the various
economic branches than are the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and for
that matter, the Jews in Israel. Furthermore, the Palestinian industrial
structure of employment in the West Bank seems almost identical with that
of Palestinians inside Israel. This is evident also in the index of dif-
ferentiation being 0.087, the lowest, as illustrated in Table F.F.
It is of special significance to find out, in light of the same
figures, that the highest differentiations in the industrial structure
of employment apply to Jewish versus Arab citizens of Israel, reaching
up to 0.361. In 1967, the Palestinian-Arab industrial structure of employ-
ment in Israel was more similar to that of the other Palestinians across
the Green-line borders than to Jews within those borders.
We notice also that the Jews in Israel were more similar in that
respect to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and,
for that matter, in Israel itself. This apparent similarity, as expressed
in the idea of differentiation, must not obscure the significant differ-
ences in the relative size of the industrial and agricultural labor force
among each Palestinian group; while the proportional size of the Jewish
industrial labor force in Israel doubles the proportional size of the
Palestinian industrial labor force in the Gaza Strip, the contrary is
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true in regard to the agricultural labor force in both regions. The lat-
ter may seem strange, knowing that the majority of the Gaza population
are landless refugees, already dispossessed in 1948, and remembering the
unfavorable climatic and soil conditions for agriculture in Gaza. The
disproportionate difference in representation by this economic branch can
be interpreted partly in terms of higher productivity in Israeli agricul-
ture, partly in that most agricultural production is done by Palestinian-
Arabs, not Jews in Israel, and finally, in the possibility that the agri-
cultural labor force in Gaza is engaged more in fishing than in farming,
per se, except probably for cash-croppers on citrus plantations.
The lack of agricultural and industrial production base in Gaza
seems to be balanced by disproportionate concentration of the labor force
in services17 and commerce. It is thus understandable why the Palestin-
ians in Gaza seem to be the most highly represented in these two economic
branches, when compared to the three other populations.
Israeli Jews and Gaza Palestinians seem to be more highly repre-
sented than the Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank in all non-pro-
ductive economic branches; also, both are represented less than the others
in construction; but again, for very different reasons; in the case of
Jews it is because they depend on the Arabs in Israel to construct their
housing; in the case of Gaza Palestinians, it is mainly a reflection of
economic stagnation and the little possibility for the construction indus-
try to expand and flourish where refugee camps are the predominant forms
of habitat; and where landlessness prevails.
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In the West Bank, a much higher proportion of the labor force is
employed in construction and agriculture than in Gaza. This is probably
due to the fact that the majority of the West Bank Palestinians are not
refugees;18 thus, they have more access to land ownership and sense of
permanence; hence, the higher weight agriculture and construction have in
that economy.
It may sound logically contradictory, however, that the Palestinians
in Israel, who, unlike those in the West Bank, were during the pre-1967
experience constantly subjegated to Zionist land expropriation, seem to
be, despite that, the most highly represented in agriculture and construc-
tion of all the other groups.19 In reality, these figures simply reflect
two different kinds of employment of Palestinians in the modern construc-
tion sector in the case of Israeli citizens and in semi-subsistence tradi-
tional construction industry in the case of the West Bankers. In Israel,
Palestinians build mainly for Jewish immigrants; not for their direct
consumption.
Finally, the prominent concentration of Palestinians of the West
Bank and Israel in agriculture is expressive also of the supply, and not
only demand, side of labor. The West Bank as well as the Galilee and the
Small Triangle within Israel are the only regions populated by Palestin-
ians who have never been totally uprooted and "transferred" from their
Palestinian soil.
In this sense, the considerably high weight of agriculture is, in
part, a reflection of the predominantly peasant class background of this
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labor force. In his historical analysis of the economic structure of the
West Bank, Jamil Hilal reinforces this point.20 He explains how and why
the West Bank under the Hashemite rule was systematically curved out from
development plans, hence preventing proletarianization in this region,
as well as the transformation of its feudal land tenure system and the
development of its productive forces. In addition to the effects of the
major distortion of the Jordanian economy-at-large being essentially a
service economy entirely dependent for its reproduction on foreign aid,
the West Bank, populated mainly by Palestinians, was systematically isola-
ted from the East Bank of the Jordan and subjugated to a forceful out-
migration of its skilled labor force (trained labor became the main export
commodity of the West Bank) and restricting of the rest to non-productive
economic branches at best, to cash-cropping on export agricultural planta-
tions; itself promoted by the very persistence of the latifundia land-
holding system.
Industry that represents 15.1 percent of the labor force in the West
Bank refers mainly to small-scale commodity and petty production, thus
absorbing mainly a self-employed labor force and not modern industrial
wage workers. This is different from the case of the Palestinian indus-
trial labor force in Israel, who are employed mainly as unskilled indus-
trial workers in Jewish factories and can very rarely be self-employed
in self-owned industrial enterprises even on the workshop scale. In this
sense, under Zionist rule, the Palestinians in Israel became far more
alienated from the means of production than in the West Bank under the
401
Jordanian rule, subject to more advanced capitalist relations.
As far as the Palestinian industrial labor force in the Gaza Strip,
it is most likely to represent the petty producers type. There has been
no systematic study of the economic and class structure of this region
prior to its occupation in 1967. The industrial structure of employment
prevalent in 1967, as in Table FF, is most articulate of the inviability
of this economy, being almost entirely dependent upon services and circu-
lation activity, and given that, the largest portion of its population
subsists from international transfer payments.
With this analysis of the industrial structure of employment in
the 1967 base year, we notice very clearly that the Palestinian labor
force scattered under the various regimes, Israeli, Jordanian, or Egyptian,
was until 1967 maintained essentially unproletarianized, even though to
a lesser degree in Israel. Now we can proceed to identify the major
transformations in these groups' industrial structures of employment upon
the intensifying of their integration (within and across the Green-line
alike) into the post-1967 Israeli economy; paying special attention to
whether or not, and in what economic branches, Palestinian-Arabs are re-
placing and/or joining Israeli-Jews. First, we examine transformation
in the employment structure of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank Pales-
tinians, then that of Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, and
last, that of Israel's labor force in the seventies as an integral,
though fragmented, whole.
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B. The Post-1967 Industrial Structure of Employment of the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank Palestinian Labor Force
In this analysis we have to deal not only with changes in industrial
structures of the labor force employed within the occupied territories,
but also of those in Israel. Not only that, a distinctively different
industrial structure of employment peculiar to Palestinian commuter work-
ers has emerged, but also further changes have disrupted the very employ-
ment structures of the portion of the labor force remaining in the West
Bank and Gaza. According to Table FB figures, which come from Israeli
sources, the distortions that have characterized the employment structures
of these two regions in the pre-1967 War period seem to be further rein-
forced in the first two years of Israel's military occupation; that is,
polarization has intensified, as evidenced in the disproportionate con-
centration of the labor force in agriculture, on the one hand, and in
trade, transportation, and service economic branches, on the other. Later,
in 1973, expansion seems to shift from the former branch into the latter;
this polarization seems to be accompanied by a decline in the relative
size of the local industrial and construction labor force of both regions;
and the emerging and expanding of a new economic branch, i.e., public
and community services, which already by 1973 had absorbed a very signi-
ficant portion of the labor force, more noticeably in the Gaza Strip.
In part, this reflects Israeli efforts to develop and foster a local
Palestinian authority or administration instrumental for social control,
14W W
TABLE F,B
Employed Persons by Branch in the "Administeqed" Areas
1968, 1969, and 1973
Total employed
persons who are
residents of the
administered areas
1968 1969 1973*
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Public and community
services
Trade, transportation,
and services
Total
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Public and community
services
Trade, transportation,
and services
Total
The changing trend in the
Table are given in order
year.
46
19
15
66
21
18
52
32
42
Employed persons in the administered areas
All administered areas 3udea and Samaria
1968 1969
45
18
13
64
19
13
1973* 1968 1969 1973*
(thousands)
40 33 47 30
20 11 12 14
8
The Gaza Strip
1968 1969 1973*
Employed persons
in Israel
1968 1969 1973*
12 17 10 1 2 12
7 7 6~ 1 2 12
9 8 7 4 5 1 2 5 34
18 19 26 18 18 24
37
135
34
14
il
39
163
44
196
10 1I
36 37 29 21 22
130 151 131 84 100
(percent)
40 27 35 42 31 39 47
13 16 14 13 15 13 12
Il 21 10 9 6 11 8
14
22
87
35
16
8
8
15
46
26
15
9
7
15
51
33
14
10
10
17
44
23
14
2
13 12 13 14 12 18 12 I1 16 17 14 * 23
28 24
100 100
23
100
27
100
24
100
30
100
25
100
22 25 33 29
100 100 100 100
38
100
5
20
20
40
1
2
12
17
17
42
2
5
65
18
18
52
- 8 3
20
100
16
100
9
100
branch composition of employment typical of the period under review, started in 1969. Figures for 1968 in this
to show the number and distribution of employed persons in that year affected by the war in the preceding
SOURCE: 1969 and 1972 - Central Bureau of Statistics, Family Surveys in the Adminstered Areas. 1969-1972.
1968, areas - Central Bureau of Statsitics, Statistical Abstracts, 1970 and 1972.
1968. Israel - Bank of Israel estimates.
Source: Aryeh Bregman, Economic Growth in the Administered Areas, 1968-1973, Jerusalem,
1974, p. 32.
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and more importantly, to become an alternative to the P.L.O. leadership.2 1
Contrary to the local, the commuter workers from occupied terri-
tories are mainly and increasingly concentrated in productive economic
branches, distributed equally in agriculture and industry and doubly con-
centrated in construction. In 1973 the Israeli construction industry ab-
sorbed 52 percent of the non-citizen Palestinian labor force employed
during that year in Israel. According to Hilal, in 1972, 57.2 percent of
West Bank workers in Israel worked in construction; compared, for example,
with 19.5 percent in industry. One can confidently conclude that all
these productive (produce surplus value) Palestinian wage workers in
Israel fall undoubtedly within the boundaries of the proletariat class.
The penetration of Israeli agricultural and industrial investment capi-
tal into the occupied territories has inflected changes in the class
nature of those communities, specifically the promoting of peasant and
petty-producers' proletarianization. The integration of these terri-
tories into the Israeli economy has enlarged the size of their working
class, not only relatively, but also in absolute terms. In Hilal's
estimation, in 1973 there were nearly 60,000 manual workers in the West
Bank, forming around 47.5 percent of its total labor force, and nearly
38,000 in the Gaza Strip, forming approximately 55.6 percent of its
total labor force; that is to say, more than 97.6 thousand (or half the
labor force) were manual workers, of whom 60.8 percent worked in Israel.
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Three main groups seem to be affected most by the proletarianization
process resulting from this forceful integration of these territories into
the Israeli economy. These are first, the segments of the labor force
previously subjegated to marginalization by the Jordanian regime; this
category includes the camp refugees, specifically those near urban cen-
ters, the occasionally-employed landless peasantry and subemployed ser-
vice employees. These represent that segment of the Palestinians who
have been already, prior to occupation, dispossessed from their means of
subsistence due to Zionist practices in Palestine, and also to the con-
centration of the land-holding system for and/or as a result of the emer-
gence of agricultural plantations. The latter is especially true in the
Gaza Strip, where agriculture is more capital-intensive, which explains
further the relatively smaller size of the agricultural labor force com-
pared with that of the West Bank and the Palestinians in Israel.
Second, the small peasants, previously self-employed petit bour-
geoisie, existing more heavily in the West Bank, where a less concentra-
ted land tenure system used to prevail. The proletarianization of this
group is most likely to be the function of three interrelated processes
of Zionist penetration: (a) the penetration of Jewish settlers, meaning
the intensification of land expropriation by Israelis, and landlessness
of Palestinians; (b) the penetration of Israel agricultural investment
capital (and "demonstration-station plantations" for the "modernization"
of the territories' traditional agriculture), a prerequisite for which
is land concentration, resulting, again, in the disposition of the small
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peasant; (c) the penetration of Israeli commodity and inflationary price
structure, forcing peasants out of semi-subsistence production into wage-
earning.
Third, the traditional industrial labor force, i.e., the small-scale
commodity petty producing craftsmen, who could not survive the competition
with Jewish industrial capital, and the loss of their internal market
upon its invasion by the more competitive Israeli commodity.
This is not different from the transformation of Palestinian agri-
cultural petty production and Jewish petty manufacturing and crafts shops
starting earlier in Israel but intensified most after the 1967 War.
Upon proletarianization the majority of these skilled petty produ-
cer craftsmen were de-skilled or at best entered semi-skilled labor cate-
gories in Israeli-owned capitalist factories in Israel and in the terri-
tories themselves. The size of the modern industrial labor force remains
relatively small in relation to the size of the productive labor force
at large. In 1973 around 32,000 of the total of employed persons who are
residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (then totalling 196,000)
were employed in industry. This is to say, the industrial labor force
constituted 12 percent of the total. 38 percent (12,000) of these indus-
trial workers were employed in Israel.22 This represents an increase of
1100 percent in the size of the industrial labor force employed in Israel
in the period 1968-1973.
In light of the figures in Table F-BA, the size of the territories
employed labor force reaches its maximum expansion in 1974, totalling
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then 210,000, compared to only 205,000 in the following year. Similarly,
in the same year the demand for this Palestinian labor in Israel seems to
reach its peak, 68,000 (not including the illegally smuggled in) then de-
clines from 1975 on.
The industrial structure of the employment of the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank labor force tends to stabilize with the persisting of Is-
rael's post-1973 economic crisis. This tendency towards stabilization in
the structure of demand applies equally to those employed locally as well
as in Israel (see Table F). The above is indicative of the increased de-
pendency of these territories on Israel's economic business cycles. Also,
it exposes the correlation between the deepening of the economic integra-
tion of these territories into Israel's and therefore, international
market, and the speeding up of the proletarianization of their inhabi-
tants.
C. Non-citizen Palestinians in Israel's Post-1973 Industrial Structure
of Employment
Despite the tendency to stabilize the employment structure of the
non-citizen Palestinians in Israel, Column 4 in Table F shows a slight
decline in the relative size of the agricultural labor force balanced
out by a slight increase in that of the construction industry. Two
points are worth pointing out here: first, it is interesting that a
decline in agricultural employment applies to all segments of Israel's
labor force, including Palestinians from occupied territories, who in
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the early years of occupation seemed to flood Jewish agricultural planta-
tions in the private and co-operative sectors (recall debates in section
3 of Chapter 2). During the period between 1968 and 1973 the relative
size of non-citizen Palestinians in Israeli agricultural employment was
constantly growing and exceeding both that of the Jews and the citizen
Palestinians. Such increasing penetration of non-citizens into a de-
clining economic branch, from which both Arab and Jewish citizens were
moving away, is likely to indicate that the portion of citizen agricul-
tural labor forced out of that economic branch was replaced by labor
imported from the occupied territories. Of course, the latter were
entering agricultural production as proletariat, while in the case of
the former, a self-employed labor force is most likely to be the one
shunning agriculture and entering other branches as industrial proletar-
iat or service employees where demand for labor was very high. In this
sense, the apparent replacement in the technical division of labor is
not coinciding with replacement in the social division of labor. This
exit/entry flow of agricultural labor force may imply precisely that both
groups are joining modern proletariat class locations.
Second, the decline in agricultural employment regarding all the
segments of the labor force, starting after the October War, can be in-
terpreted both in terms of the rising organic composition of agricultural
capital, manifesting itself in an increased productivity and mechaniza-
tion. The latter, made possible precisely by the very extraction of
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higher relative surplus value from the non-citizen labor force intensive-
ly employed in this branch in-between the two wars.
Indirectly, this decline in agricultural employment can be seen
also as a result of the ultimate shift from agriculture into industry, as
a leading export sector. Reference is to polished diamonds and high
technology products as the export-producing branches for the inter-
national market. This shift is evident in the different nature of agree-
ments signed, for example, with the European Common Market before and
after the 1973 October War,23 both leading inevitably into reducing the
potential employment-multiplier effect in agriculture.
Furthermore, the increase in the non-citizen Palestinian construc-
tion labor force in 1975, concomitant with that decline in agricultural
employment, must be interpreted merely as a redistributive adjustment.
This is to say, the increment one notices in the relative size of con-
struction non-citizen Palestinian labor force must not be explained in
terms of a new demand in the economy for non-citizen Palestinian labor
force; but rather in terms of mobility of an already mobilized labor
force from agriculture into construction. This conclusion is based on
two observations: first, of decline in the size of non-citizen Pales-
tinian labor force employed in Israel in that same period. Despite
that, the decline in the demand for labor from the territories in Israel
is linked more likely to the potential decline of the construction than
the agricultural branch. Second, of the correlation between Jewish immigra-
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tion and construction boom and decline in Israel; and given that 1975
represents the year in which immigration was, probably for the first time,
declining in absolute and relative terms, and also exceeded by
emigration from Israel; as recalled from the analysis of Israel's labor
force in the seventies. In 1974, however, the year following the October
War, the increased representation of non-citizen Palestinians in the con-
struction industry is in part the result of the replacing of citizen by
non-citizen Palestinian workers. While, in the meantime, citizen Pales-
tinians are filling in gaps in services and industry caused by the long-
term mobilization of Jews into the military. Unlike the quick victory
and release of the mobilized labor force into their civilian posts in
the aftermath of the 1967 war, in the aftermath of the 1973 war mobiliza-
tion lasted long, resulting in real manpower loss and shortages.
Although 1976 labor force surveys are not yet available, one can
comfortably expect a decline, or at best stabilization, in demand for
construction workers from the occupied territories, unless in the form
of replacement not a result of new demand in that industry. Demand for
construction workers is more likely to decline in housing than in public
works. One of the usual effects of the militarization of the economy
(as witnessed, for example, in the economy of Massachusetts, one of the
states that has comparative advantage in military production) is the
stagnation of consumer-goods producing industries (housing, shoes, clo-
thing, food industries). There is no reason for this not to apply to
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Israel. In addition to the effects of militarization and the immigra-
tion crisis, another factor that may contribute to decline in the con-
struction employment-multiplier is the increased privatization of hous-
ing, promoted by the emergence of the finance-capital market and the
land market. The subjegation of land (the so-called national land, once
the inalienable property of the State of Israel) to speculation by pri-
vate developers is increasingly accepted by the Israeli public as a leg-
acy of the 1967 War.
One of the implications of the above is the increased transfer of
housing from the public (mainly co-operative: Histadrut, Jewish Agency,
and other absorption institutions) into the private sector. The profit
imperative for the private sector implies the optimization of produc-
tivity through technological innovation, possibly at the expense of em-
ployment-multiplier effect. An interview with Robert Logcher, the head
of a project undertaken by the MIT Center for Policy Alternatives on the
housing industry in Israel, verifies the point regarding the shift from
housing primarily for Aliyah absorption into housing primarily for profit,
for capital accumulation. According to Logcher, the purpose of the pro-
ject is identifying alternatives of technical innovation to improve the
efficiency of the construction industry upon the request of American in-
vestors in, or indirect contributors to, this branch of Israel's econ-
omy.24 In effect, the introduction of technological innovation is likely
to reduce (as in the case of agriculture, also) the employment-multiplier
effect of a future growth in this industry. This development project
emphasizes the fundamental problem in Israel's housing industry as being
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that of low productivity-the high weight of man-hours per unit produced,
the latter being attributed to the availability of "a large pool of cheap
but unskilled labor, the utilization of which promotes less efficient,
less productive construction technique."25 Labor-saving is thus the very
objective of this policy project.
The same source indicates that the housing industry in recent years
employed around 8.5 percent of the total labor force; approximately 60
percent of this labor is Arab.2 6
If achieved, labor-saving in the construction industry is, inevitably,
likely to imply high lay-off of Palestinian construction workers, probably
the non-citizens whose share in the total labor force engaged in construc-
tion in Israel had reached 26 percent already in 1973 when their percent
of all employed labor in Israel was only 6 percent.27 In the following
years, their size even increased in relative and absolute terms.
1976's budgetary cuts, accompanied by expansion spending, hit the con-
struction industry most -and were expected to push inemployment up
to the 60,000 mark, or 5.5 percent of the working population.2 8 According
to the 1976 Annual Supplement of the Quarterly Economic Reviews 45,000 of
these were from occupied territories. The latter are most likely to be
construction and agricultural workers.
And more importantly, it may not affect the unemployment rate since
non-citizen Palestinians (except for the residents of East Jerusalem) do
not appear in Israeli official statistics as members of the labor force,
but rather separately in special sources that refer specifically to the
population of occupied territories.
2 9
To sum up the employment of non-citizen Palestinians in Israel's con-
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struction industry is to point out the following features:
(a) The non-citizen Palestinian labor force employed in Israel
tends to be disproportionately over-represented in the construction indus-
try.
(b) This over-representation seems to increase constantly since the
1967 War and continues through the 1973 October War and its following eco-
nomic crisis, reaching the highest proportion (55 percent) by 1975.
(c) During the economic boom following the 1967 War, the size of the
construction labor force among all groups (Israeli-Jews, citizen Pales-
tinians, and non-citizen Palestinians) tends to increase both in absolute
and relative terms until 1973. During this period, thus, Jewish-Arab
labor mobility into construction represents a joining as opposed to re-
placement trend in an expanding economic branch. Whether or not this
cross-national merging of Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab construction
workers in the same industry implies also that they are joining the same
class locations depends on the social form of labor performed by each.
Put more concretely, it depends on the number of those from each
group who do the actual manual (skilled or unskilled) construction work
versus those who perform mental, supervisory, managerial functions (for
example, the foremen, civil engineers, etc.)
As indicated earlier, there is no doubt about the proletariat class
location of the non-citizen Palestinian workers employed in the productive
branches of Israel's economy. Furthermore, there is no doubt that most of
the supervisory, non-productive mental labor categories in the construction
industry are performed by Jews, not Arabs, in this branch. The latter is
evident in the higher average number of years of schooling of Jewish than
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of Arab citizens employed in construction being (8.3 years) in the case
of the former compared with (5.8 years) in the case of the latter. Also,
and more importantly, in the very differential in the level of training
among Arabs and Jews who share the same occupation in the construction
industry. For example, Jews who belong to the top occupational positions
in construction have on the average 16.2 years of schooling, while Arabs
in the same occupational position within this industry have on the average
only 8 years of schooling.3 0
The important detail that we need to know, however, is the number of
Jews and Arabs in each occupational category within this industry and, for
that matter, within the other economic branches. We may be able to get
these details later, but for the meantime one thing is obvious to us; in
absolute terms and despite their apparent under-representation in relative
terms, the number of Jews who are employed in the construction industry
does by far exceed that of Arab citizens, and it is greater than both
citizen and non-citizen Palestinians combined.
In 1972, for example, 7.7 percent of the employed Jewish labor force
was in construction, corresponding in absolute terms to 69,434 workers,
compared with 26.1 percent of citizen Palestinians corresponding to 26,831
workers, and 50 percent of non-citizen Palestinians corresponding to
26,000 workers. This is to say, approximately 60 percent of the labor
force employed in the construction industry, including all its occupational
categories, are Jews; the majority of these are likely to be wage workers.
The latter point can be further reinforced by the fact that in 1974,
for example, there were 84,500 employees posted in the construction branch,
73,600 of these are related to contracting and subcontracting, with an
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average monthly wage of 1,295 IL., and only 10.9 related to public works
and civil engineering work, with an average monthly salary of 1,751 IL.
The latter represents the bulk of professional and technical labor cate-
gories in the construction industry, while the former represent the bulk
of actual workers. Of course, these figures under-represent reality be-
cause they exclude the self-employed in the construction industry. 3 1
Knowing earlier also that 60 percent of the construction wage-workers
per se are Arabs, it means there are around 52,000 Jewish construction
wage-workers, which is equivalent to the number of Palestinian-Arabs. In
other words, approximately 100,000 Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews in
the construction branch are likely to share proletarian class locations.
(d) During the post-1973 economic crisis and long-term military
mobilization, non-citizen Palestinians continue to move into, while citi-
zen-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs are increasingly moving out of, the con-
struction industry, except for 1975 when the percentage of all Palestinians
goes up, as is evident in Table F.
The predominant trend here represents both joining and replacing in
a stagnating, yet not declining, sector. Clearly, those moving in are,
indeed, moving into productive manual labor categories. It will help much
to know who is moving out, that is, what labor categories are being re-
placed by non-citizen Palestinians? Are they also productive manual labor
categories, or the mental supervisory ones? Moreover, what labor cate-
gories are they occupying in the other branches they are entering?
It makes much difference whether the replaced portion of the con-
struction labor force is moving into productive manual categories in in-
dustry versus moving into non-productive mental categories, say in public
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services, or for that matter, in industry itself. In the former case,
the replaced and the replacing workers are, indeed, joining each other in
the social division of labor--both falling within the boundaries of the
proletariat class; in the latter, however, the replacement is not only in
the technical division of labor but also in class location. The former
is likely to promote the prospects for proletariat alliance between those
moving into and those moving out of the construction labor force, while
the latter case is likely to impede such alliance between a becoming-pro-
letariat and those moving into (or out of and into) non-proletariat class
locations. It is hard to tell, since both the service and the industrial
labor force of Arab and Jewish citizens seem to expand in 1974.
Summing up the employment dynamics in the construction industry is
also raising questions regarding the political/economic rationale behind
the existence of the highest demand for Palestinian-Arab labor (both citi-
zens and non-citizens) in construction work. The official and popular
liberal Israeli views are often heard to attribute this disproportionately
high demand for Arab hands in construction to their being traditionally
skilled in this trade, pointing out as evidence the sophistication and
beauty of the indigenous traditional Arab house. This rationale loses its
validity in light of the rather much higher demand in this branch for
labor force specifically from the occupied territories in the unskilled
and, at best, semi-skilled construction labor categories.
For a more accurate answer, therefore, it is worth pointing out the
following:
First, the average wage in construction is relatively high. In 1974,
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for example, the monthly salary per employee post reached up to 1,354 IL.,
compared with the general average wage in Israel (1,542 IL.). Further,
it is the highest among branches in which Arab labor is competitive; that
is, higher than that in agriculture (970 IL.), food processing (1,001 IL.),
textiles (1,149 IL.), and personal services (963 IL.).32 In this sense,
Arab labor is also likely to be more attracted to employment in this eco-
nomic branch when unable to move further upward.
Furthermore, the relatively higher wages in this branch results in-
directly in reinforcing the purchase power of this labor force, a pre-
requisite for the development of consumerism and the necessary expansion
of the Israeli local market into Arab frontiers.
Second, unlike construction industry in the United States, in which
the labor force are capable of organizing powerful trade unions, hence the
greater bargaining power in terms of economic demand and social benefits,
in Israel the contrary is true. Indicators of labor unrest even before
1973 during the very period of rapid economic growth show the construc-
tion labor force to be the most passive and disciplined. Probably the
structure of the construction industry, except for Solel Boheh (Histadrut-
owned company), fragmented into small projects, does not allow a sense of
unity among the workers.
Third, and more important, is the fact that this physically rough
and dangerous industry has the highest percentage of injuries. The em-
ployment of Palestinian-Arabs, especially non-citizens whose labor power
is imported from the occupied territories and the reproduction cost of
which falls outside Israel-proper, means tremendous savings in social
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security and compensatory social benefits for work injuries. Of course,
the physically tough nature of work in this economic branch makes it only
rational for Jews who are the less vulnerable not to be attracted to this
industry, thus when demand emerges, the abundantly available Arab labor
is the more likely to move in.
Fourth, although during some periods Israel has had the highest rates
of building in the world, the construction industry in Israel is yet not
a stable one. In fact, it can be accurately described as a "seasonal"
employment-generating industry; expanding and declining in response to
dramatic events such as wars and immigration. The latter are themselves
seasonal in the sense that they seem historically to be linked with Is-
rael's economic and political business cycles. It is in this sense of
uncertainty that the construction labor force ought to be a vulnerable
one. The layoff of Arab labor in periods of decline does not inflict as
equally high a stress on the Israeli society.
In addition to construction and agriculture, industry comes as the
third of productive economic branches penetrated by non-citizen Palestin-
ians in Israel. As demonstrated by the figures in Table F, in 1975 in-
dustrial employment does for the first time since occupation exceed the
agricultural employment of the labor imported from the territories. The
latter is due not to an increase in the percentage of industrial workers
among non-citizen Palestinians (which, in fact, has remained constant
from 1973 through 1975), but, simply, to the dramatic decline witnessed
in agricultural employment (from 19 percent in 1974 to 15 percent in 1975).
The October War seems to intensify the penetration of non-Palestin-
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ians into Israel's industrial labor market. The percentage of the indus-
trially employed averaged 18 percent in the period 1973-1975, compared
with an average of 15 percent during the period in-between the two wars.
The recent war seems to affect similarly the other population groups until
1974. In 1975, however, unlike non-citizen Palestinians, citizen Pales-
tinians and Jews show a slight decline in the percentage of their labor
force employed in industry. Although slight, the latter is yet signifi-
cant, as the following analysis indicates:
That is, Jewish labor released during that year from industry is
moving into community and public services, not production; this means
that non-citizen Palestinian labor entering industry, certainly as a pro-
letariat, are replacing Jewish labor not only in the economic branch but
also in class location. Moreover, the industrial Jewish workers who are
likely to be replaceable by unskilled Palestinians from the territories
are probably Oriental-Jews. Based on this observation, one may suggest
that the prospects for cross-national proletariat alliance in Israel are
greater during periods of economic boom than periods of economic crisis.
We have already seen that the joining of Arabs and Jews in productive
economic branches increases during rapid economic growth. Despite an
apparent replacement in the technical division of labor, also joining
proletariat class locations tends to increase.
Citizen Palestinians shunning industry during that year seem, unlike
Jews, to enter productive branches, and even more interestingly, move
back into agriculture, apparently replacing non-citizen Palestinians who
moved from agriculture into construction. As they are being pulled out
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of community and public services (a decline from 16.6 percent in 1974 to
14.5 percent in 1975) to make room for Jews released from industry as well
as military mobilization (an increase from 27.1 percent in 1974 to 28.3
percent in 1975).
This pattern of labor mobility across economic branches promises a
greater number of citizen and non-citizen Palestinians to be sharing pro-
letariat class locations. The fact that in 1975 the same pattern of labor
mobility implies that Palestinian-Arabs are replacing Israeli-Jews in
class location cannot yet undermine the material conditions for cross-
national proletariat alliance. We must remember that the Palestinian-
Arab labor force in Israel constitutes only 15 percent of the total em-
ployed persons, and around 25 percent of those employed in productive
labor categories.33 In this sense, Palestinian-Arab proletariat can, at
the most, replace one-third of the Jewish productive labor force, and in
that case, will join the two other thirds remaining in proletariat class
locations. Unless the latter are replaced by an alternative source of
immigrant workers which is neither Palestinian nor Jewish, the material
conditions for cross-national proletariat alliance are not likely to be-
come seriously disrupted.3 4
For that matter, given the relative weight of both national groups
in Israel's labor force, it is the mobility of Palestinians into, and not
the mobility of Jews off, productive labor categories that makes the most
crucial difference. In this regard it is important to remember that non-
citizens, in addition to being already more highly represented in industry
than citizen Palestinians, in Israel's employment structure, are also
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employed by Israeli industrial capital and/or joint manufacturing ventures
in the territories themselves. The latter reinforces the point made
above. In fact, it can add to the number of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-
Jews who share proletariat class locations within the boundaries of
"Greater Israel". In this sense, the more Israeli capital moves into oc-
cupied territories (the very site of reproduction of Palestinian labor), the
less visible becomes (in the case that it occurs) the replacement of Jews
by Palestinians in the social division of labor; yet, the greater con-
tinues to be the number of Palestinians joining Jewish proletariats. To
the extent that Israeli national capital running into Palestinian communities
within and/or across the Green-line boundaries is being invested in indus-
tries capable of generating demand exclusively for Arab, but not Jewish,
labor, this mobility of capital is likely to reduce the possibility for
replacement of Jews by Arabs, and to increase the number of both groups,
in proletariat class locations. It is, indeed, the latter that is pre-
valent; the reviving of indigenous Palestinian production and the trans-
ferring of work inappropriate to Jewish localities into Arab ones (recall
examples from Chapter IV, pp. 47, 49).
Summing up the industrial structure of employment of the non-citizen
Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories prior to, and after,
the 1973 War, we must point out the following:
(a) We have intentionally focused merely on the productive segment
of the labor force, neglecting those active in the sphere of circulation.
At first glance, one may expect that this petty bourgeois segment of the
labor force that is likely to prosper under occupation through trade
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across the open bridges; however, the nature of the terms of trade to
which it has been subjegated, that is unequal to exchange, plus the loss
of its local market once invaded by the more competitive Israeli commo-
dity, and finally the imposition of value-added tax and control of bank-
ing by the military authorities, all these material conditions have hit
their interests hard and, therefore, they are likely to ally themselves
with the proletariat struggle. This issue, however, refers to the analy-
sis of class position, which may or may not coincide with one's class
location and interest. Further, it is more relevant to conjunctural
unity and less to class alliance.
(b) It becomes obvious in this analysis that the penetration of
non-citizen Palestinians into the Israeli economy and/or the penetration
of Israeli investment capital into occupied territories do inevitably
increase the number of Palestinians who share with the Israeli-Jewish
proletariat a common class location and, therefore, interest.
Several questions pose themselves in this regard, the most impor-
tant of which is whether the locations of non-citizen Palestinians in
Israel's industrial structure of employment and class structure are
transitory or permanent and irreversible ones. Of course, this depends
most on the lasting or termination of military occupation, and in the
latter case, on the nature of settlement implemented in regard to the
Palestinian national question. Given the uncertainty involved in re-
lation to the above, it may help to examine historical experience of
citizen Palestinians in the industrial structure of employment, since
they will certainly continue to be an integral part of Israel's labor
425
force.
IV. The Industrial Structure of Employment of Palestinians Who Are
Citizens of Israel
Previously, we have shown that Arab penetration into the Jewish
labor market has occurred since the early days of Zionist colonization.
More importantly, we have already demonstrated how this penetration took
place, despite systematic ideological and institutional impediments, in
order to allow for the formation of Jewish farming and working classes
in Palestine. The penetration of the indigenous Palestinian labor into
the modern Jewish sector was thus limited to the extent that it did not
interfere with that class formation.
The first massive penetration seems to happen during the first con-
struction boom, beginning in the late fifties and ending in the mid-six-
ties, when military regulations were removed to allow for the inflow of
this labor power into the Jewish sectors (recall Chapter II).
In this section we argue that the most dramatic growth in the rates
of citizen Palestinian penetration into the modern labor force of Israel
has occurred precisely in the years following the 1967 War, when tradi-
tional sources of Arab labor became abundantly available in the new
territories captured by Israel in that war. Table K-1 provides a strong
evidence in favor of this argument.
It analyzes the percentages of change in the demand for Arab labor
in Israel's industrial structure of employment, not only historically
during different historical phases, but also comparatively with those of
the Jewish population. As the latter constitute the sovereign majority
Table K-l. Rates of Change in the Jewish and Arab Industrial Structure of Employment
Year Period, 1955 - 1975
Over a Twenty-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Rate of Change Agriculture Industry Electricity Construc- Transport Public Personal Othersa
i.e., size of and Water tion Services Services
labor force
1955 - 1975
A Jews 83 -33 106 -9 30 112 136 29 157
Arabs 148 -15 219 150 360 413 290 600 273
1959 - 1967
B Jews 23 -11 30 17 -7 28 37 33 35
Arabs 27 17 23 14 54 79 21 12 194
1962 - 1975
C Jews 29 -32 28 -40 19 26 44 -7 89
Arabs 78 -32 95 -38 161 56 193 305 49
1963 - 1967
Jews 3 -7 1 32 -23 8 13 13 7
D Arabs -8 -9 -7 60 -31 17 -2 0 186
1967 - 1971
Jews 17 -20 17 -39 25 17 16 4 60
E Arabs 56 -15 29 -75 127 79 160 163 36
1971 - 1973
Jews 9 -4 12 -8 5 6 10 5 13
F Arabs 13 -3 32 -150 22 13 13 6 11
1973 - 1975
G Jews 1 -13 -1 7 -9 1 11 -17 4Arabs 0 -21 12 0 -6 10 1 31 -l
Source: Computed from Table K. Rate of Change formula is the same as in Table U.
a'Others" (Column 8) includes: "commerce, banking and insurance" economic branch until 1972 classification 4
according to which "others" refers to two economic branches, "commerce, restaurants and hotels" and "finan-
cing and business services". This is the only change in the new economic branch classification.
W M W
Table K. Absolute Distribution of Israel Citizen-Arabs and Jews by Economic Branch.
Year Total Labor Agriculture Industry Electricity Construc- Transport and Public Personal Others
Force and Water tion Communication Services Services
Citizen Palestinian-Arabs
1955 43,400 21,200 5,800 200 5,500 1,500 4,000 1,100 4,100
1959 47,600 21,400 7,700 700 6,300 1,900 4,400 1,700 3,500
1963 65,900 27,600 10,200 500 13,971 2,900 5,400 1,900 3,600
1967 60,600 25,000 9,500 800 9,700 3,400 5,333 1,900 10,300
1971 94,600 21,200 12,300 200 22,000 6,100 13,800 5,000 14,000
1973 107,300 20,600 16,200 500 26,800 6,900 15,500 5,300 15,500
1975 107,600 17,000 18,500 500 25,300 7,700 15,600 7,700 15,300
Israeli-Jews
1955 542,300 81,000 121,200 11,700 48,800 34,500 119,300 47,000 78,800
1959 727,800 89,000 149,400 15,200 57,300 45,100 143,000 48,800 79,000
1963 743,100 85,500 192,500 13,400 69,100 53,500 172,400 57,300 99,575
1967 770,100 79,320 194,835 17,712 53,137 57,758 195,605 64,688 107,044
1971 902,500 63,300 227,300 10,800 66,300 67,900 227,500 67,000 171,600
1973 981,100 60,800 253,600 9,900 69,300 72,000 250,400 70,400 194,700
1975 995,000 54,000 250,100 10,700 63,400 73,000 281,100 60,400 202,300
Sources: 1954, 1963, 1971 from Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, New York, 1976, p. 305.
1967, 1975 from Havari, The Arabs in Israel, 1976, Gevaat Havera, 1976, p. 15.
1963 computed from proportionate distributions in Table 22, L.F.S., 1969, Special Series # 333.
L -A
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and the core of the labor force, they are more likely to reflect the normal
trends in the employment structure of the country. The comparison, there-
fore, highlights the peculiar features in the industrial structure of em-
ployment of the Arab citizens.
1955 is chosen here as the base year because it is just prior to the
first war (1956 Sinai War) since the establishment of the State of Israel.
The figures in Table K-1 therefore reflect the effects of three wars,
which helps indicate that it is not war per se, but rather the peculiari-
ties of the 1967 War compared with the Sinai and October Wars, that had
the most crucial effect on the penetration of Palestinians (citizens and
non-citizens) into the Israeli labor market. Also, to demonstrate how the
two wars that resulted in territorial expansion and Jewish immigration
have steered the demand for Arabs in the construction industry, much more
than the October War. As the aftermath of which is distinguished by de-
cline in immigration as well as in territorial gains.
Furthermore, 1955 represents the time of laying down the foundations
of the country's modern industrial infrastructure, starting with the in-
flow of German reparations into Israel.
To sum up the general direction of change in the features of the Arab
versus Jewish industrial structures of employment in Israel, guided by the
figures in Table K-1, is to indicate the following:
A. During the twenty-year period between 1955-1975, Arab citizens
seem to penetrate into all branches of the economy at a much higher rate
than Jews (Row A). This feature, however, must not mislead us to conclude
that the change in absolute terms is equally dramatic. We must be aware
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that technically, the rate of change index is influenced by the size and
distribution of the labor force in the base year. In this sense, however,
the higher rates of penetration among the Palestinian-Arab citizens do cor-
respond with reality. They reflect the obstruction of their participation
in the Israeli labor market in the fifties, concomitant with the massive
waves of Jewish immigration into Israel.
The differential penetration of Arab and Jewish citizens is most
striking in the post-1967 War and more specifically during the period of
rapid economic growth in between the two recent wars. In that time, when
labor shortage, both in skilled and unskilled labor, became acute and labor
power was imported from occupied territories and Europe, citizen-Palestin-
ians then penetrated all the expanding productive branches of the economy
at rates that are disproportionately higher than those of Jewish penetra-
tion. (See Row C, specifically E and F, and more specifically, Columns 2,
4, and 5.) The only branches into which Jews penetrated at a higher rate
than Arabs are those in the sphere of circulation (Column 8, Rows C, E, and
F). The latter include commerce, restaurants and hotels, financing and
business service, primarily controlled by Western Jews. Simultaneously,
the 1967 War seems to represent a dramatic turning point in the penetration
of Arab citizens into personal services (becoming the least attractive to
all Jews) and into public and community service (becoming the most attrac-
tive of all economic branches to Oriental-Jews), as in Column 7 and 6 in
Row E.
The direction and rates of change in the employment structures of Arab
and Jewish citizens of Israel in the post-1967 period in general (Row C) and
in the period between the two wars in particular (Row E and F) do again re-
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inforce the conclusion suggested by the analysis of non-citizen Palestinian
employment in Israel. That is, the prospects for cross-national proletariat
alliance are greater during periods of rapid economic growth, not decline
and stagnation. Because it is in such periods that Palestinian-Arabs and
Israeli-Jews experience the highest rates of joint penetration into the
productive branches of the economy.
A comparison between two periods of economic crisis before and after
the 1967 War (Row D and G) in addition reinforces the conclusion reached
above; it points out an increased dependency of Israel's industry on Pales-
tinian-Arab labor in the post-1967 era (Column 2).
During the post-1973 political and economic crises, and while Jewish
employment declines by one percent, Arab industrial employment increases
by 12 percent. This is very different from the pre-1967 recession, when
Arabs' employment in industry declined by 7 percent to make room for Jewish
labor. The 12 percent increase in industrial employment balances out for
their declining employment in construction.
The integration of Palestinian labor into Israel's industry can only
increase, and the dependency of the former on this labor force is an irre-
versible one. The latter point is based upon at least two of several trans-
formations occurring since the 1967 War in the country's industrial produc-
tion: the transfer of industries inappropriate (certainly in terms of pro-
ductivity or profit) for Jewish labor into Arab separate residential locales,
mentioned above. And the indirectly related but more important shift into
high technology military production, into which skilled Jewish industrial
labor force is to be mobilized, leaving gaps in the less strategic indus-
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tries to be filled in by Palestinians.
All the above is for the better in terms of promoting joint penetration
of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews into proletariat class locations.
Finally, with the ultimate and irreversible capitalist transformation
of the economy in the post-1967 era, economic crisis can mean only intensi-
fying the extraction of higher relative surplus value in order to prevent
the declining rate of profit, one of the two fundamental structural tenden-
cies of capitalist development. Owing to its political vulnerability,
Palestinian labor in Israeli industry is more conducive to serve that pur-
pose than Jewish labor. And this adds another reason, assuming an increas-
ing dependency of Israel on the industrial Arab labor force.
In conclusion, all the above is, in effect, likely to promote joint
penetration of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews into proletariat class
locations and, hence, improve the objective conditions for cross-national
class alliance.
B. Vertically, most prominent is a constant decline in the agricul-
tural employment of both populations, generally at a much higher rate among
Jews than Arabs. In twenty years, Arab agricultural employment, contrary
to its general trend, seems to have increased only during recession (Row B,
Column 1), as observed also in the occupational structure of employment
analyzed earlier. Neither the employment data by agricultural branch nor
by the farming occupations, however, makes a distinction between decline in
self-employment and wage-labor in agriculture. With the exception of non-
citizen Palestinians, whose agricultural employment in Israel can only be
proletariat in character.
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C. Electricity and water (Column 3) is the economic branch in which
Jewish and Arab employment show high rates of decline during periods of
rapid economic growth (Row E and F) and growth in periods of economic stag-
nation (Rows B, D, G). This seemingly negative correlation is most promi-
nent in the constrast between the three years before and after the 1967 War
(Row C and D).
Although it has the lowest weight in the employment structure, this
economic branch is yet very important, being related to the country's most
scarce resource, namely water, and therefore electricity. The management
of its use becomes even more critical in the absence of other (with the ex-
ception of solar) energy sources. Perhaps the employment figures in this
branch can be read in two different ways:
(a) that an earlier growth does, in effect contribute to the develop-
ment of, hence the generation of employment opportunities in, other bran-
ches;
(b) that in the post-1967 era, work in this branch became very capital-
intensive and therefore labor-saving, hence the decline in Arab and Jewish
employment in that branch.
Both interpretations are correct. Aviation Week & Space Technology,
June 14, 1976, testifies for the latter. But also the former interpretation
makes sense, since the figures in Rows B and D relate to that period in
which construction of the first national water scheme for the irrigation of
the Negev took place. That is, the giant canal mobilizing water from nor-
thern Galilee to the southern parts of the country, which may have un-
doubtedly steered employment into this branch.
433
Although most of the labor categories generated in this economic
branch in Israel are mental supervisory and managerial ones (centralized
control of this source is one of the fundamental Zionist policies) and per-
formed by Jewish citizens, it is mainly the construction work in this branch
that is likely to be performed by Arabs. Palestinian labor in this employ-
ment branch is therefore definitely proletariat. It is worth mentioning
here the indirect effect of water-use policies on the proletarianization
of citizen-Palestinians through limiting the productivity of agriculture,
hence the discouragement of the self-employed farmers, then left with no
alternative to the selling of their labor power to Jewish agricultural and
other employers.
D. Not unlike the non-citizen Palestinians from Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, citizen Palestinians were also to enter the Israeli modern sec-
tor through the construction industry. The relatively lower rate of growth
in their employment in this compared with other branches such as transport
and personal services (Row A) is only indicative of their much earlier pre-
sence in the construction branch. During the first construction boom and
despite recession, which hit Arab workers harder, as demonstrated in Row D,
Column 4, we still see in Row B (which includes both the periods of boom
and recession) not only a higher rate of Arab than Jewish employment in
this industry, but also replacement of Jews by Arabs in those labor cate-
gories. More importantly, despite the fact that in the early sixties con-
struction was a leading branch in the economy, and despite the availability
of no other labor sources, we see the most dramatic increase in the absorp-
tion of citizen Palestinians into this economic sector to occur precisely
in the period in-between the 1967 and 1973 Wars. This is precisely when
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more than 50 percent of non-citizen labor from occupied territories was
also mobilized into this industry; so that in 1972, 75 percent of the em-
ployees in the building trade were Arabs. No wonder the popularity of
the Israeli joke which is as follows: "Nixon sends us phantoms, Brezhnev
sends us new immigrants, and the Arabs build our country."3 6
No doubt that the penetration of non-citizen Palestinians to perform
mainly unskilled labor categories affected the social form of labor per-
formed by the citizen Palestinians within this industry. Many of the latter
became foremen, and "Raises", supervising the productivity of non-citizen
labor. This is to split and discipline both groups of workers, who have
in common their political and ideological subjegation to the Jewish employer.
Intervention in the economic criteria for the structural determination of
class location is an effective policy (from the viewpoint of the Israeli
ruling class) to disrupt the material conditions for proletariat alliance,
hence also to weaken their alliance on national lines. However, only a few
citizen Arabs can be assigned a supervisory managerial position, since
they are less competitive than Jews for such labor categories within this
industry. One can therefore confidently conclude that the large majority
of Palestinian construction workers perform manual work ranging from skilled
to unskilled, hence falling within the boundaries of the working class.
Similarly are the majority of Jews in this industry, whose size in this
employment category increased at the highest rates in the four years follow-
ing the Six-Day War (Row E), as we already explained.
Like the water and electricity industry, so is also construction--the
two most unstable branches that seem, however, to expand and decline in
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contrast with each other, as a negative correlation exists between the two
branches.
E. Transport and communication is the productive economic branch into
which Arab penetration seems to grow in a more stable manner than in other
branches, fluctuating not in response to specific events. As reflected
also in the occupational structure of employment, it seems also in this
table that it is becoming increasingly unattractive to Jewish labor, hence
Arabs are increasingly moving in. Due to the small size of the country,
transport and communication can never become an economically strategic eco-
nomic branch. In other words, transport workers in Israel are not likely
to become a powerful trade union with the bargaining power truck workers in
the United States or, for that matter, in Chile enjoy.
F. The highest rates of change in the Arabs' post-1967 industrial
structure of employment lies in their penetration into the service sector,
specifically personal services. While the size of the personal service
employees declined by 7 percent among Jews, it grew by 305 percent among
Arabs (Row C, Column 7). In the eight years prior to the war, the contrary
was true. Jews were more strongly attracted to this kind of employment
than Arabs. In 1975, the Arab labor force, totaling then 9.7 percent of
Israel's citizen labor force, has constituted 11.3 percent of all personal
service employees, an over-representation by a factor of 16 percent. Per-
sonal services thus becomes the third of the economic branches in which
citizen Arabs are over-represented, the other two being construction (by
194 percent) and agriculture (by 146 percent).
In interpreting this pattern of labor, average wage may be a factor.
Personal services are in the very bottom of the country's wage structure.
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service employees. Of course, this is not a homogeneous labor force, in
terms of neither the concrete nor the social form of labor they perform.
Personal services generate mainly manual labor categories while pub-
lic/community and business services generate mainly mental labor categories.
While personal and public services contribute mainly to the sphere of re-
production of the labor force, business services and financing belong di-
rectly to the sphere of circulation.
In cases where collective consumption (services; education, health,
etc.) is centrally subsidized or socialized, then such public services
are not commodities and those employees engaged in the production of these
community services are not engaged in commodity production, hence, the
creation of surplus value, and in this sense, the labor categories gener-
ated in this service branch are not productive, and the employees do not
belong to proletariat class-locations.
Unlike the service employee in a hotel or a restaurant, who (even
if he performs the same concrete forms of labor performed by a personal
service employee in a household) is engaged in the production of a com-
modity that has an exchange value and the selling of which (performed by
the waitress) is realizing the profit for the employer. The cook hired
by the capitalist owner of the restaurant is therefore engaged in material
production, that is, performs a productive labor category; hence, belongs
to proletariat class-location. In the latter case, the labor of the cook/
servant is exchanged against capital, while in the household it is ex-
changed against revenue.
In distinguishing between the social and concrete forms of labor and
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The average monthly salary per employee's post reached 963 IL. in 1974,
when the country's average monthly wage was 1,542 IL. Included in this
branch are cultural-recreational services, garage repair services for house-
holds, services in households and institutions. Except maybe for the first
category, most likely performed by Jewish labor, it generates the most
menial jobs, hence masking unemployment by means of subemployment. Despite
the alienation from the means of production that forces people into these
labor categories, and the fact that it is basically manual, non-supervisory
labor that is performed in this context, and above all, the relation of
ideological/political subordination involved in the employee's relation to
the employer, still the penetration into these labor categories does not
represent a proletarianization process; the reason being that of not pro-
ducing surplus-value. And therefore, they are referred to as subprole-
tariats. It is so because in the case of hiring a personal service em-
ployee, the employer does not make a profit directly through this employ-
ment; on the contrary, for the household employing a personal service
some additional consumption is implied, hence the potential depletion of
savings that could otherwise be profitably invested. The fact that em-
ployees in personal services are not directly engaged in the production
of surplus value and given the isolation the concrete form of labor they
perform imposes on them, makes them most vulnerable, deprived from the
revolutionary potential the modern proletariat have, and even from the
ability to organize merely for economic demands. In 1975, the number of
personal service employees in Israel totaled 68,000. One can say this
labor force is engaged mainly in an economic activity related to the re-
production of labor power on a daily basis, as is the essential function
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on a generational basis. Health and education for the generational re-
production of the labor force, both mentally and physically; public admin-
istration and defense to reproduce the status quo; research and scientific
services to reproduce the dominant ideology, the internationally hegemonic
knowledge. In sum, the fundamental function of this economic branch is
the reproduction of the local system of accumulation.
It is important to recall here that in the Jewish occupational struc-
ture of employment it is Oriental-Jews who seem to be the most highly
represented in this occupational chapter, and to recall also from a pre-
vious chapter that the generational reproduction of Western Jews, specifi-
cally their training, takes place somewhere else exogenous to the Israeli
system.
It is mainly Oriental-Jewish and partly Sabra segments of the labor
force whose generational reproduction is endogenous to the system. This
may explain the predominance of Oriental as opposed to Western Jews in
this branch. We have already explained how residential and institutional
separation increase the penetration of Arab citizens into community and
public service occupations. It is important, however, to point out that
Arab citizens who belong to professional, academic, technical, and scien-
tific occupations fall almost invariably into this economic branch, while
in the case of Jews the largest portion may fall into industry itself.3 7
The latter is especially true since the post-1967 shift into high tech-
nology production. We will come back soon to discuss this most strategic
economic branch. Before going into that it is of special relevance to
our analysis to point out the controversy regarding the class-location of
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rectly to the sphere of circulation.
In cases where collective consumption (services; education, health,
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are not commodities and those employees engaged in the production of these
community services are not engaged in commodity production, hence, the
creation of surplus value, and in this sense, the labor categories gener-
ated in this service branch are not productive, and the employees do not
belong to proletariat class-locations.
Unlike the service employee in a hotel or a restaurant, who (even
if he performs the same concrete forms of labor performed by a personal
service employee in a household) is engaged in the production of a com-
modity that has an exchange value and the selling of which (performed by
the waitress) is realizing the profit for the employer. The cook hired
by the capitalist owner of the restaurant is therefore engaged in material
production, that is, performs a productive labor category; hence, belongs
to proletariat class-location. In the latter case, the labor of the cook/
servant is exchanged against capital, while in the household it is ex-
changed against revenue.
In distinguishing between the social and concrete forms of labor and
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and what is productive and non-productive service, Harry Braverman argues:
"...to hire the neighbor's boy to cut the lawn is to set in
motion unproductive labor; to call a gardening firm which
sends out a boy to do the job (perhaps even the same boy) is
another thing entirely....The change in the social form of
labor from that which is, from the capitalist standpoint,
unproductive to that which is productive means the transfor-
mation from... simple commodity production to capitalist com-
modity production from relations between persons to relations
between things." 39
Braverman maintains that
"...labor which is put to work in production of goods is not
thereby sharply divided from labor applied to the production
of services, since both are forms of production of commodi-
ties and of prodcution on a capitalist bases, the object of
which is the production not only of value-in-exchange, but
of surplus value for the capitalist. The various forms of
labor which produce commodities for the capitalist are all
to be counted as productive labor." 40
As far as the class-location of clerical labor is concerned, he
concludes:
"...while the working class in production is the result of
several centuries of capitalist development, clerical labor
is largely the product of the period of monopoly capitalism."
Braverman, thus, views clerical work as a capitalist labor process, and
clerical workers as proletariat in new form.41
If we accept this argument as well as the notion of contradictory
class-locations developed by Erik Olin Wright, as discussed in an earlier
chapter, then we can reach the conclusion that the recently increasing
labor mobility from industry and agricultural wage work into the service
sector does not necessarily indicate a deproletarianization process. If
so, the joint penetration of Arab and Jewish labor into services may in
some ways (by sharing proletariat or contradictory class-locations) still
promote the prospects for cross-national proletariat alliances.
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Other Marxists like Nicos Poulantzas disagree with Braverman's in-
terpretation of the Marxist definition of capitalist productive labor,
and therefore disagree with his conclusion regarding the class location
of service employees,4 2
Poulantzas argues that service employees (along with other new wage-
earning groupings that are organically linked to the emergence and re-
production of monopoly capitalism) are unproductive workers. They are so
regardless of the fact that they have overwhelmingly become employees of
capital and that they, too, sell their labor-power for wages that roughly
correspond to the cost of reproduction of their labor-power and even pro-
vide a portion of their labor without payment. Despite the above, they
have not become productive labor because services belong to circulation
capital, not to productive capital. Even when the service performed has
both use and exchange value, ie., represents a commodity, the service
wage-workers, whether performing in mental or manual labor categories, are
yet unproductive laborers, since they are not engaged in the creation of
surplus value. They are rather engaged in redistribution within the sphere
of capital, that is in the transfer of surplus value that is produced by
productive capital in favor of the capital that appropriates their labor-
power. Their exploitation is therefore similar to that of wage-earners in
the sphere of capital circulation. Poulantzas recalls from Marx himself
that products can assume the "price form" and the "commodity form" without
thereby possessing value. Due to the generalization of the commodity form
under capitalism, labor can take the commodity form without producing sur-
plus value for capital, Although all capitalist productive labor takes
the commodity form, not all commodities represent productive labor,43
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In his re-interpretation of Marx, Poulantzas defines productive
labor in the capitalist mode of production as
"...labour that produces surplus-value while directly
reproducing the material elements that serve as the sub-
stratum of the relation of exploitation: labour that is
directly involved in material production by producing use-
values that increases material wealth...that valorizes
capital and is exchanged against capital.. .Labor with the
same content may be productive or unproductive. And what
is productive under one mode of production may not be so
for another...The concrete content of labor and its use-
value are completely indifferent for productive labor."
In Marx's own words:
"...Every time that labour is purchased, not in order to
substitute it as the living factor in the value of variable
capital, but in order to consume it as a use value, i.e., a
service, this labour is not productive labour and the wage-
labourer is not a productive worker... the capitalist does
not confront him as a capitalist, as the representative of
capital; what he exchanges for the labour is not his capi-
tal, but his revenue, in the form of money." 44
According to these theoretical arguments, wage-earners in commerce,
advertising, accounting, insurance, and all financing and business services,
are not directly exploited in the form of the dominant capitalist relations
of exploitation, the creation of surplus value, and therefore, do not form
part of the working class.
Even service employees who contribute to the reproduction of labor
power (hairdressers, lawyers, teachers, doctors, etc.) remain unproductive
labor outside the boundaries of the working class. The same applies to
public and community service employees who greatly contribute to the re-
production of capitalist social relations (agents of the State apparatus,
civil servants, teachers of State schools, and medical personnel of the
public sector, etc.)
In the case of the latter, capital does not intervene directly to
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subsume labor power as the case in personal services. It rather inter-
venes indirectly, by way of the State, and subjects them to the extortion
of surplus labor in order to achieve economies of revenue, thus to increase
the surplus-value accumulated. The exploitation of public service employees
is essentially a function of the unequal situation in the exchange between
them and capital, having a dominant position on the market.
According to Poulantzas, service employees, as the rest of the new
wage-earning groupings who are unproductive laborers, belong to a specific
class, resulting from the process of class polarization. To this emerging
class he refers as the "New" petty bourgeoisie--new in the sense that it is
in no way destined to follow the petty bourgeoisie threatened with extinc-
tion, and that its development and expansion are conditioned precisely by
the extended reproduction of capitalism itself, and the latter's transition
into the stage of monopoly capitalism.45
Following Poulantzas, one concludes that the increased mobility of
citizen Arabs and Jews in the service sector does not necessarily indicate
an embourgeoisement trend. Further, the majority of Arab and Jewish em-
ployees, regardless of what service branch they enter (personal services,
public and community, or financing and business), this is to say, regardless
of the difference in their locations within the technical division of labor,
are jointly entering into the same class-locations, becoming the "New"
petty bourgeoisie. They are joining neither the bourgeoisie nor the prole-
tariat classes.
Two comments are necessary here. First, the self-employed in the
service sector of course do not belong to the new petty bourgeoisie. They
rather form a part either of the bourgeoisie itself or the traditional
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petty bourgeoisie. This point does not apply to all those employed in
public and community services. However, in the case of financing, real
estate and business services, this is more likely to apply to Jews than to
Arabs, while in the personal services, especially in cases of lawyers and
medical doctors, and even more recently, advertising services, it applies
to Arabs alike; the increasing mobility of Arab citizens into personal
self-employment services is partly a transformation or return into petty
bourgeois class-locations. While petty bourgeois Jews, especially Orien-
tals, are moving from self-employment in agriculture and retail trade into
public services, hence transforming their class-location, becoming the
"New" petty bourgeoisie.
Second, although we agree with Poulantzas that not all commodity pro-
duction involves productive labor (his argument against Braverman's), we
disagree with him, however, on his assertion that service is exchangeable
only against revenue, and that within the sphere of circulation there can
be no productive labor categories. We insist that the cook as personal
service employee in a restaurant, which is unlike the cook service in the
household, and even unlike the waitress in the same restaurant, is a pro-
ductive laborer. Engaged in the creation of surplus value, her labor-
power is exchanged against capital. So is, also, the laundry-
woman/man in the hotel. Both are engaged not in transfer of surplus
value through service delivery. In fact, they do not themselves deliver
the service directly; they are engaged only in its production, their ex-
ploitation promotes accumulation, not realization of surplus value already
accumulated. The garage repair service employee is engaged simultaneously
both in the production and delivery of the service, in the creation of
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surplus value and in the realization process, and in this sense he belongs
to what Wright conceptualizes as a "contradictory class-location". It is
mainly Arabs who perform such labor categories in Israel and if our analy-
sis is correct, they may belong to proletariat class-locations.
In sum, although we may not entirely agree with Poulantzas, using his
economic criteria for class-location, being the most conservative one, it
is much safer for our purposes. For example, if according to Poulantzas we
find that the number of Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Jews in proletariat
class-location is tending to increase in the post-1967 era, it means even
more so if assessed by criteria of other Marxists.
H. Despite the rapid and constant mushrooming of the service sector
and the becoming of community and public services the leading economic
branch in terms of the proportional size of the labor force it employs,
hence its share in the Gross National Income, industry has, in the post-
1967 era, maintained the leading position in terms of its share in the
Gross National Product and contribution to foreign exchange. As mentioned
earlier, soon after the war, industry replaced agriculture in the Israeli
export market. In 1975, 24.3 percent (268,600 persons) of the total citi-
zen labor force were employed in industry, compared to 26.9 percent
(296,700) in public and community services. In the same year, only 6.9
percent (or 18,500) of the citizens employed in industry were Arabs. Con-
trary to Jews, Arabs are represented more highly in industry (17.2 percent)
than in community and public services (14.5 percent). In the 1975 indus-
trial structure of employment, industry comes as the second largest em-
ployer of Arabs after construction, and of Jews after community and public
services (see Table K-3).
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Table K-3. The Proportion of Arabs of All Employed Persons by Economic Branch (average 1975).
Economic Branch Proportional Arab Proportion Proportional Absolute Absolute
Distribution of Total Employed Distribution Distribution Distribution
of All Em- Persons of Total Em- of All Em- of Arab Em-
ployed Persons ployed Arabs ployed Persons ployed Persons
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fishing 6.4 23.9 15.8 71.0 17.0
Industry 24.3 6.9 17.2 268.6 18.5
Electricity and
Water 1.0 4.5 0.4 11.2 0.5
Construction 8.0 28.5 23.5 88.7 25.3
Commerce, Restaurants
and Hotels 12.3 7.9 9.9 135.8 10.7
Transportation,
Communication and
Storage 7.3 9.5 7.1 80.7 7.7
Financing and
Business Services 6.9 2.6 1.8 75.6 2.0
Public and Community
Services 26.9 5.2 14.8 296.7 15.6
Personal Services 6.1 11.3 7.1 68.1 7.7
Not Known 0.6 0.0 0.0 6.2 2.6
TOTAL 100.0 9.7 100.0 1,102.6 107.6
Source: Computed from Y. Harary, The Arabs in Israel: Facts and Figures, Geva'at Harera, 1976.
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A comparison with 1967 when there were only 9,500 Arabs and 194,835
Jews employed in this economic branch, we can say that the citizen indus-
trial labor force grew by 31.1 percent, or in absolute terms has increased
by 64,265 persons, compared to an increase of 95,762 persons in public
and community services. A more detailed analysis of the figures in Table
K indicates that the greater penetration into the public and community
service as opposed to industry is peculiar to the post 1973 economic crisis
and the latter is particularly true in the case of Jews. In the period
between 1967 and 1973, the rate of growth in the size of the Jewish indus-
trial labor force was higher than that in the public and community service
(30.1 percent as compared to 28.1 percent). The latter is also true in
absolute terms, in-between the two wars, 58,765 Jews entered industry,
compared to 54,896 who then entered public services.
In the case of Arab citizens, the situation seems reversed. During
that same period the Arab industrial labor force grew by 70.5 percent
(6,700 additional members), while the size of public and community service
grew by 190.6 percent (10,167 additional members).
During Israel's major industrial boom, industry became attractive to
Jewish citizens who moved from public and community services and other
branches into industry, while Arabs, in turn, moved in larger numbers into
public and community services, following the route of Jewish citizens.
This pattern of mobility seems to take place simultaneously as the demand
for unskilled labor in industry was met by cheaper labor power imported
from the occupied territories.
After the October War, the direction of Arab-Jewish labor mobility
changes again. Between 1973 and 1975, the size of the Jewish labor force
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employed in industry declines by 1 percent and grows in public and com-
munity services by 11 percent, while in the meantime, the size of the
Arab labor force in industry grows by 12 percent compared to only 1 per-
cent in public and community services.
As demonstrated in Table U by the rate of change in the size of the
Arab versus the Jewish labor force in each economic branch, in light of
the latter's rate of expansion or decline we notice the following patterns
of labor mobility:
(a) In industry the pattern is that of Arabs replacing Jews in a
declining economic branch (declining in terms of the size of
the size of the labor force employed in that branch).
(b) In agriculture and construction, both Arabs and Jews jointly
moving-off declining economic branches.
(c) In commerce, however, Jews are replacing Arabs in a declining
economic branch.
(d) In personal services, Arabs are replacing Jews in an expanding
economic branch.
(e) In transport and communication, finance and business services,
as well as public and community services, Arabs and Jews are
joining expanding economic branches.
In interpreting these replacement/joining trends, we must keep in
mind three important points: first, the relatively small size of Arabs
versus Jews in the total citizen labor force, as well as in the various
economic branches. The latter makes a real difference in such interpreta-
tion. In 1975, for example, the citizen Arab labor force formed only 9.7
percent of the total citizen labor force in the country. The 17,000
1W 1W M ww
Table U. Expansion and Decline Trends in the Employment Structure, 1973-1975 (Period of Crisis)
1 2 3
Economic Branch Arab Employment Jewish Employment Total Employment
by Economic Branch
Absolute Rate of Absolute Rate of Absolute Rate of
Distribution Change Distribution Change Distribution Change
1973 1975 1973 1975 1973 1975
a b c a b c a b c
Agriculture 20.6 17.0 -17.5 60.8 54.0 -11.2 81.4 71.0 -12.8
Industry 16.2 18.5 +14.2 253.6 250.1 -1.4 269.8 268.6 -0.4
Electricity 0.5 0.5 0.0 9.9 10.7 +8.1 10.4 11.2 +7.7
Construction 26.8 25.3 -5.6 69.3 63.4 -8.5 96.1 88.7 -7.7
Commerce 14.0 10.7 -23.6 124.9 125.1 +0.2 138.9 135.8 -2.2
Transportation 6.9 7.7 +11.6 72.0 73.0 +1.4 78.9 80.7 +2.3
Finance and
Business Services 1.5 2.0 +33.3 66.5 73.6 +10.7 68.0 75.6 +11.2
Public Services 15.5 15.6 +0.6 250.4 281.1 +0.3 265.9 296.7 +11.6
Personal Service 5.3 7.7 +45.3 70.4 60.4 -14.2 68.1 75.7 +11.2
Not Known 3.3 6.2
Source: Computed from Table 3, Y. Harari, The Arabs in Israel, 1976, Giva'at Haviva, 1976, p. 15.
The rate of change, "c", is computed as the following: a-b * 100, i.e., the absolute
a
growth or decline between 1973 and 1975 divided by the base year (1973) multiplied by 100.
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Arabs employed in agriculture constituted 23.9 percent of Israel's total
agricultural labor force, while 18,500 Arabs constituted only 6.9 percent
of the country's industrial labor force and 25,300 Arab workers constitu-
ted 28.5 percent of the entire construction labor force, 15,600 constitu-
ted only 5.2 percent of the total public and community service employees,
while only 7,700 of them constituted 11.3 percent of the total personal
service employees, etc., as in Table K-3.
On the level of the individual economic branch, we see, for example,
that in absolute terms the additional 2,300 Arab citizens entering the
industrial labor force in-between 1973 and 1975 do not even suffice to
fill in the gap left by the 3,500 Jewish citizens who moved-off industry
during that period. A loss of 1,200 persons in the citizen industrial
labor force remains unreplaced.
The continuing decline in Jewish employment in industry may be a re-
sult of an increased productivity in high technology production, hence a
decline in the demand for skilled Jewish labor, who in turn moves into
public administration and defense, education, research, and scientific
services (the latter might be directly linked to military-industrial pro-
duction; for example, industrial research and development precisely for
the furthering of industrial productivity). Between 1967 and 1976, Israel
seems to maintain the fastest industrial production growth even in com-
parison with the most advanced capitalist countries like the United
States, West Germany and Japan, as in Illustration I-G.
For further evidence on the increased share of industrial production
in Israel's GNP, the New York Times (December 19, 1976) reports that in
1976 Israel arms exports were said to be $300 million compared to $40
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million in 1974. According to Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 14,
1976),
S... approximately 60 percent of the total sales value last
year [1975] was from products developed and manufactured
by I.M.I. [Israeli Military Industry] ...partly as a result
of spin-off from defense projects and partly from the ever-
increasing need for high-value exports to bring in foreign
exchange, Israel has developed a good infrastructure of
science and technology-based industries whose input is
growing in real terms at the rate of 20-40 percent a year."
These figures certify for industrial growth merely in the realm of high
technology production, let alone diamond products and consumer goods
manufacturing. In sum, these figures are to certify further that the de-
cline in the size of the industrial labor force is more likely to be the
result of higher productivity than a sign of stagnation in this economic
branch.
Kochavi, the Director of Israel's Employment Service, blames the de-
cline in industrial employment on the supply side, not the demand side of
labor:
"As far as industry is concerned, the Employment Service
has found it hard to find sufficient workers for this
vital sector; and although we cannot compel a laborer to
work where we want him to, the Government will have to
find some means of economizing workers to move to areas
where they are most needed...branches such as textiles...
have filed demands for additional manpower, both in
skilled and unskilled. There is a large demand for
workers in the metal works sector, in agriculture and
in food industries..."
Viewed from the supply side of labor, Jewish labor mobility from industry
into services may be interpreted as a mobility from manual blue-collar
jobs into mental white-collar jobs with higher average income. And it is
in this sense more likely to be applicable to Oriental than to Western
Jews, running after higher revenue in order to be able to compete in the
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world of consumption with inflationary prices and devaluation of the Is-
raeli lira increasingly reducing their purchasing power.
Second, we must keep in mind that this information regarding Arab-
Jewish labor mobility across economic branches lacks very important de-
tails, not only regarding cross-tabulation by occupational mobility, and
social forms of labor being performed in the previous versus the recent
locations in the technical divisionof labor, but also regarding the spe-
cific industries within the industrial sector, into which Arab and Jewish
citizens are jointly or separately moving in or out. Are the particular
industries into which Arabs, and off which Jews, are moving related or
unrelated to military production?
Are those Jews who are shunning the industrial branch of Western or
Oriental background? Are the entering Palestinian (citizens and/or non-
citizens) industrial labor force joining or replacing Oriental-Jews in
the various industrial labor categories? etc.
An analysis on such a micro-level requires information that is un-
available in official statistical sources. It is very hard to assess the
number of wage-earners in military industries for reasons already dis-
cussed in a previous chapter, as well as because it is likely to be clas-
sified information. From scattered sources we are informed, by the Wall
Street Journal, that by 1969 a minimum of 13,000 were already employed in
Israel's military and aircraft industries.46 The New York Times reports
the number of Israelis that are said to be employed in the arms industry
to reach 17,000 by 1976.47 These figures clearly underestimate reality.
Aviation Week & Space Technology points out that in 1976 Israel's air-
craft industry alone has employed 18,000 skilled persons. Also, that
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Elbit, a major software producing industry, was already "manned by 1,150
employees". Similarly, AEL Israel, Ltd., a military electronic industry
with over 900 employees, and CLAL Industries, Ltd., Israel's biggest pri-
vate industrial conglomerate in aerospace production, with 10,000 employ-
ees.49 There is no evidence or counter-evidence regarding demand for
Oriental-Jews in military industrial production. Arabs, however, are not
likely to be employed in such industries, specifically in skilled labor
categories that are directly related to arms production. The evidence on
this is the import of non-Jewish skilled manual labor from France, Yugo-
slavia, and other European countries to replace Jews in metal products
manufacturing.
Third, and final point, is the lack of detailed industrial structure
of employment with cross-tabulation by occupation and population groups.
Owing to this problem, one can tell very little here about the nature of
class transformation involved in the mobility of Jewish industrial labor
force into services. Based on a previous analysis, it is clear that this
portion of the Jewish labor force that have shunned industry and moved
mainly into public and community services are currently unproductive wage-
earners forming a part of the "New" petty bourgeoisie. We do not know,
however, what labor categories they have previously performed in industry.
Were they self-employed craftsmen in their workshops and upon concen-
tration of industry their small enterprises were swallowed by factories?
In such a case, becoming public service employees implies mobility not
only across economic branches but also across labor categories and class-
locations. From small-scale commodity productive labor into capitalist
unproductive wage-earners; that is, a transformation from the petty bour-
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geoisie into the "New" petty bourgeoisie.
In the case of those members of the Jewish industrial labor force
who have previously performed capitalist productive labor categories and
formed a part of the working class, they are then definitely going through
a deproletarianization process by entering public service and becoming a
part of the "New" petty bourgeoisie.
Although industrial capital is essentially productive capital, capi-
talist industrial production generates also unproductive labor categories
and therefore unproductive wage-earning laborers, such as the case in
foremenship, a labor category that becomes necessary precisely to promote
the productivity of productive labor, especially in the case of concentra-
ted industries. Although they are employees of productive capital, these
wage-earners perform unproductive labor and therefore do not form a part of
the working class. They, also, belong to the "New" petty bourgeoisie.
Therefore, in cases where Jews who are becoming public service employees
have previously performed unproductive wage-earning labor categories in
industry, their mobility within the technical division of labor is not
accompanied by any transformation in their class-location. They were and
have managed to remain a part of the "New" petty bourgeoisie. Such cases
are more likely to apply to Jews of Western origins, including Sabras.
In sum, Jewish labor mobility from industry into services does not
necessarily signify a deproletarianization trend; since not every member
of the industrial labor force has been a proletariat. Definitely no de-
proletarianization is involved in the mobility of self-employed agricul-
tural workers into service as the case among many Oriental-Jews and
Palestinian Arabs, specifically women.
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Despite Jewish labor mobility off industry and the decline of Jewish
employment in this branch, industry remains to be the economic branch with
the highest potential both for proletarianization of Arabs as well as
Jews, hence for increasing the number of those from both national groups
who are joining the Israeli working class. The essential concentration
of industrial capital (necessitated by the two fundamental tendencies of
capitalist accumulation, namely the tendency of the falling rate of pro-
fit and that of the rising organic composition of capital) results in a
constant decline in the size of the industrial bourgeoisie and enlarge-
ment in the mass of productive wage workers who form the modern proletar-
iat. This is so despite the mental-supervisory unproductive labor cate-
gories that concentration does simultaneously generate. In fact, it is
precisely the control of this enlarged mass of labor that forces produc-
tive capital to employ unproductive wage-earners to supervise produc-
tive labor, and on behalf of capital to maximize the latter's produc-
tivity, i.e., creation of surplus value for capital.
The unproductive supervisory labor force tends to be smaller
than the supervised productive labor force. It is in this sense that
the great majority of wage-earners in industry are productive laborers
and therefore likely but not certainly belong to the working class, the
proletariat. The fact that Palestinians constitute a relatively very
small percent of Israel's industrial labor means that even though cur-
rently they seem to be replacing Jews, who are moving off industry, in
effect an increasing number of Palestinian-Arabs are joining the larger
portion of the Jewish industrial labor force remaining within the boun-
daries of the working class. This means that the cases of Arab-Jewish
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joinings in proletariat locations are increasing. Again, given the pro-
portional size of Palestinians in Israel's labor force, it is the penetra-
tion of the former into proletariat class-locations that makes a more cru-
cial effect on the prospects for cross-national proletariat alliances.
The militarization of Israel's civilian industry, and the security
considerations implied makes it even more imperative that Jews remain to
form the core of Israel's industrial labor force, especially in the
sphere of high technology production. Security considerations will con-
stitute a serious barrier for the penetration of Palestinian-Arabs into
Israeli military production, becoming politically and economically the
most strategic branch in the economy. Furthermore, Israel commits a
political mistake if it continues to import non-Jewish European labor to
replace Jews on a massive scale in military-production related labor
categories that are unattractive to the Jewish labor force. Such consi-
derations are likely to prevent large-scale deproletarianization of the
Jewish industrial proletariat.
The questions that remain to be posed and examined here regard the
extent to which high technology industry (being the main form of military
industrial production prevalent in Israel today), including software pro-
duction, involves productive labor despite the predomination of the mental
element. This question is relevant to our analysis only in so far as it
helps in identifying the class-location of the employees who perform
these labor categories. In this sense, the formulation is incomplete.
We need to examine not only the extent to which high technology industry
generates productive labor categories, but also the extent to which pro-
ductive laborers in high technology production belong to the working
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class. The latter formulation assumes that although all those who belong
to proletariat class-locations do necessarily perform productive labor,
not all productive laborers belong to proletariat class-locations. In
this sense, our question is essentially two-fold, combining both the pro-
ductive/unproductive division and the manual/mental division of labor.
The latter thus goes beyond the economic criteria for class determination
and enters the domain of structural determination of class-location, where
the criteria are politico-ideological relations of subordination/domina-
tion in and beyond the social division of labor. This domain was cogently
developed for the first time by Nicos Poulantzas, whose novel contribution
lies precisely in seeing the three criteria (economic, political, and
ideological) to inseparably determine the boundaries of social classes.
According to Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran, arms have no use-value.
Therefore, armament is unproductive and employees in the arms industries
are necessarily unproductive laborers. This is to say that military (in-
cluding high technology) production involves no productive labor. This is,
indeed, missing the whole point regarding what is productive labor for the
capitalist mode of production, which is essentially indifferent to the
utility of the product. Because utility of commodity is irrelevant to
the creation of surplus value.50
Examining the first dimension of the question we have posed above
requires a far more rigorous understanding of Marxism than the one pro-
vided above by Sweezy and Baran. To do so, however, is to break this
dimension into two further questions:
(a) the extent to which mental labor can be productive labor;
(b) the extent to which labor categories performed in high tech-
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nology production are predominantly mental.
(a) "Marx never reduced mental labor to non-material production,"
says Poulantzas.51 Marx's main discussions of the capitalist division of
mental and manual labor are situated in the context of the capitalist
socialization of labor, of machinery and large-scale industry:
"...as the co-operative character of the labor process
becomes more and more marked, so, as a necessary conse-
quence, does our notion of productive labor, and of its
agent, the productive laborer, become extended. In order
to labor productively, it is no longer necessary for you
to do manual work yourself; enough if you are an organ
of the collective laborer and perform one of its subor-
dinate functions..." 52
The sophisticated technicians and engineers (unlike the foremen, for
example) do tend to form part of capitalist productive labor because they
directly valorize capital in the production of surplus-value. The labor
of the technician and engineer in industry represents the appropriation
of scientific discoveries by capital in the process of material produc-
tion.53 The latter is nothing but innovation, and innovation is the very
appropriation of invention by capital in furthering the development of
its productive forces. The appropriation of science (and more specifi-
cally, its applications, i.e., the technique or the know-how) by capital
in the development of the forces of production is the most distinctive
feature of military production; specifically, its high technology forms.
In this sense, armament is therefore a very productive industry and,
concluding the first issue, is to affirm that mental labor can be produc-
tive labor, specifically in the cases of possessing the technique.
(b) The extent to which labor categories performed in high techno-
logy production are predominantly mental can be simply answered by a
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concrete example from the Israeli reality. Take, for example, Elbit
Companies, Ltd., a major supplier of computer-based military systems for
the country's defense forces, which assumes full system responsibility
from conception, through development, to final production. It is well
known for the high percentage of engineers among its employees. Refer-
ence is to 250 engineers, programmers and system analysts who constitute
22 percent of its total employees.54 Of course, this figure does not ac-
count for all mental labor categories but for the major portion of pro-
ductive mental laborers. Certainly, there are also unproductive mental
laborers involved in supervision, such as quality-control foremen and
also in clerical work. Still, even in this most software-like producing
company the majority of the employees are definitely directly engaged in
hardware material production, not mental productive laborers in the soft-
ware material production.
Another concrete evidence to reinforce the point (that proportion-
ately, mental labor is not the predominant form of labor even in high
technology industries) is the fact that a large portion of the 10,000
employees in Israel's CLAL aerospace industries are, in fact, vehicle
assembly and textile semi-skilled and unskilled workers.5 5
We must remember that besides the predominance of high technology in
Israeli military production, Israel is also an exporter of military goods,
the production of which is even more likely to be manual-productive labor-
intensive and low technology. An example of this is the military helmets
industry. In an article titled, "Military Helmets from Mishman Ha'emek to
South America," Al-Hamishmar reports:
"'Tama' industries of kibbutz Mishmar Ha'emek won an
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international contract for providing military helmets
to one of the South American countries for the sum of
300,000 dollars. Ya'acov Selek, the director of Tama
Factory, who has reported this, said that in Tama there
is a special department which specializes in producing
military helmets, which are regarded with a great deal
of interest in Israel and outside." 56
Military-related metal products enterprises are booming in Israel today.
Such establishments are being erected even in Jewish settlements recently
transplanted in the West Bank.5 7
For summing the first part of our question, we may confidently con-
clude, regardless of mental laborers, that a large portion of the Jewish
labor force employed by the arms industry belongs to proletariat class-
locations; this is even true in high technology manufacturing industries.
The second part of the question that remains to be examined here is
whether productive mental laborers in high technology industry belong to
the working class. According to Poulantzas, it does not, even though it
creates surplus value directly. His reason being that it is not by eco-
nomic criteria alone that class locations are determined. "For Marxism,"
says Poulantzas, "the division between manual and mental labor in no way
coincides with the division between productive and unproductive labor in
the capitalist mode of production...."
In examining the structural class determination of the engineers and
the technicians directly involved in material production (examples of
productive mental laborers), Poulantzas asserts:
".,.not only is this division between mental and manual
labor not simply a technical division of labor, but it
actually forms in every mode of production divided into
classes, the concentrated expression of the relation-
ship between political and ideological relations in
their articulation to the relations of production; that
is to say, as these exist and reproduce themselves, in
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the particular form of their relationship (politico-
ideological), both within the production process it-
self, and beyond this in the social formation as a
whole... this division is thus directly bound up with
the monopolization of knowledge, the capitalist form
of appropriation of scientific discoveries and of the
reproduction of ideological relations of domination/
subordination, by the permanent exclusion on the sub- 58
ordinate side of those who are deemed not to 'know how'"
If technicians and engineers who valorize capital in the production
of surplus value "do not belong as a group to the working class, this is
because," Poulantzas concludes, "in their place within the social divi-
sion of labour they maintain political and ideological relations of sub-
ordination of the working class to capital [the division of mental and
manual] and because this aspect of their class determination is the domi-
nant one." 5 9
In the last analysis, Poulantzas maintains that such capitalist pro-
ductive mental laborers, technicians, and subaltern engineers belong
rather to the petty bourgeoisie. And disagreeing with Poulantzas, Olin
Wright places them in "contradictory class-locations," this is to say,
belonging simultaneously to the proletariat and to the bourgeoisie.60 This
is a controversial debate that, in the present, remains unresolved.
We must emphasize that neither party views science as a means of
production, hence scientists as owners of means of production and there-
fore belonging to the bourgeoisie. Whether entering petty bourgeois or
contradictory class-locations, Europe-America Jewish immigrants are likely
to constitute the large majority of the latter, and this way even those
of them who are productive still further the steepening of Israel's social
division of labor and the reproduction of capitalist relations of produc-
tion, as suggested in a previous chapter.
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We must emphasize also that this productive mental labor force is
not the same as the labor aristocracy. The latter, although enjoying
special material privileges, still form a fraction of the working class;
they belong to proletariat class-locations. It is most likely that within
the military industries is where the majority of Israel's labor aristo-
cracy is concentrated. Maintaining a labor aristocracy at the expense of
other segments of the labor force is a ruling class strategy to guarantee
a conjunctural alliance with a portion of the working class. In Israel,
this labor aristocracy largely consists of the Sabras, the indigenous
Israeli-Jews.
The large differential between Sabras and Palestinian-Arab citizens
demonstrated by our index of differentiation of the occupational struc-
ture of employment is probably related to the concentration of the former
in and the isolation of the latter from, this labor aristocracy.
To come back to the initial question we posed much earlier: whether
Palestinian-Arabs and Oriental-Jews are or are not admitted into high
technology arms industries controlled largely by foreign capital is less
a question of joining Western Jewish proletariat in the Israeli working
class, and more a question of joining in a particular fraction of the
working class, namely, the labor aristocracy.
Poulantzas' emphasis on the structural determination of class-loca-
tion in terms of politico-ideological relations of subordination/domina-
tion in the social division of labor and beyond it, in the social forma-
tion as a whole has special significance in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
text, however, is the subject of the following chapter.
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Table W. Size of the Israeli Proletariat Using Poulantzas' Criteria
1972 - 1974
Year Proletariat Proletariat All Citizen
Arab Employees Jewish Employees Proletariat
Employees
1972 64.5% 37% 39.6%
(46,440) (265,000) (311,440)
1973 61% 35.4% 37.8%
(48,739) (261,000) (309,739)
1974 63.9% 33.5% 36.3%
(50,098) (250,000) (300,098)
Source: Computed from Table 48 (with 36 major and sub-occupational cate-
gories) in CBS, Labour Force Survey, 1974, Jerusalem, 1976, Special Series
No. , p. 109. Absolute total employees and Jewish employees total from
Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975.
Definition: Proletariat refers to employees who perform simultaneously
productive, manual, non-supervisory labor categories. Concretely, these
include: agricultural workers in packing houses and farm laborers; metal
processors, tinsmiths, and workers in finished metal products; assemblers,
fitters, and repairers of machinery and transport vehicles; electricians,
producers and assemblers of electronic equipment; precision instrument
workers; skilled workers in food, beverages and tobacco processing; wood-
workers, carpenters and related workers; weavers, spinners, knitters, and
finishers of textiles; tailors and sewers; shoemakers and other leather
workers; printing workers; miners, quarrymen, and workers on heavy mechani-
cal equipment; drivers; longshoremen and freight handlers; unskilled work-
ers in rubber, plastic, food and beverages industry, and unskilled workers
in industry and building.
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The purpose of this chapter, however, is to identify proletarian
locations only on the basis of places agents occupy in the production pro-
cess. This is using Poulantzas' economic but not structural criteria.
Accordingly, the size of the citizen proletariat before and after the 1973
war is presented in Table W. The figures in Table W indicate the follow-
ing:
(a) The tendency of Arab and Jewish citizens to join proletariat
class locations is highest during a rapid economic growth (1972) and so is
the size of the working class.
(b) Arabs are much more highly represented in proletariat locations
than Jews.
(c) Economic and political crises tend to intensify proletarianiza-
tion among Arab employees and deproletarianization among Jewish employees.
(d) Although during economic crises Arab citizens entering the labor
force tend to replace Jews in proletariat locations they have shunned,
Arabs, however, can never replace all proletariat Jews due to their pro-
portionately small size in the country's labor force.
(e) In 1973, the size of the Jewish proletariat seems to decrease
both in relative and absolute terms; this is probably the result of mili-
tary mobilization during the war. Decline is noticed also in the relative
size of the Arab proletariat, despite increase in absolute terms. This is
the indirect effect of the war. Arab citizens seem to be mobilized to
fill in proletarian and non-proletarian vacancies created by military
mobilization of Jewish labor.
(f) The 1974 figures indicate a continued decline in the size of the
Jewish proletariat, both in relative and absolute terms.
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The absence of such data for following years makes it difficult to
know whether this decline is temporary, the result of the long-lasting
military mobilization that distinguished the October War from the Six Day
War, or that it signifies a more permanent tendency of the size of the
Jewish proletariat to decline.
During this year, the relative size of the Arab proletariat almost
levels up with the pre-war estimates. This, however, is despite the fact
that the size of the Arab proletariat grew at a lower rate between 1973-
1974 than between 1972-1973. This may imply that Arab labor continued
then to replace Jewish labor only in proletarian, but not other labor
categories. It may thus signify a Jewish deproletarianization tendency
concomitant with Arab proletarianization. Despite the latter, however,
shared proletarian locations continue to increase owing to the relatively
very small size of the Arab labor force in Israel compared to the Jewish.
(g) Even these most conservative estimates based on Poulantzas'
criteria show that the great majority (more than 60 percent) of citizen
Palestinian wage-earners in Israel occupy proletarian locations in the
production process. Among Jewish wage-earners, the proletarians are the
minority (around 35 percent). Together, citizen Arab and Jewish proletar-
iats constitute, as of 1974, 36.3 percent of all wage-earners. Still a
small minority. In the United States, for example, and by the same cri-
teria, this compares to 19.7 percent.60
Can the minority size of the proletariat be simply attributed to the
criteria used? Insofar as the United States is concerned, a more satis-
factory explanation lies in the internationalization of capital and the
oneness of the international division of labor, only segmented on national
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and other grounds; that is, the "global reach" of the unit of monopoly
capital, the so-called "multi-national" which is so (i.e., multi-national)
insofar as it employs a multi-national labor force, specifically in prole-
tarian social forms of labor (productive, manual, non-supervisory). It is
wrong, therefore, to talk in terms of an "American" working class and its
size compared with the bourgeoisie, for example, which is an essentially
U.S.-based international monopoly controlling the labor process of an inter-
national labor force engaged in production for United States companies
within the United States (immigrant workers, especially illegal aliens) and
within very many other national boundaries. The latter may explain the
underlying reason behind the objectively small size of the American working
class; and it may also explain the incredibly large portion of the American
labor force that occupies supervisory positions in the social division of
labor.
According to Wright himself, almost half of the economically active
population in the United States are supervisors; only 51.9 percent are
non-supervisory wage-earners.61 Maintaining only a small working class as
a privileged labor aristocracy is likely to be the ultimate bourgeois stra-
tegy to prevent the imposition of a socialist alternative at home, unless
through immigrant workers.
One may suggest, in light of the above, that the minority size of the
working class (the actual proletariat in Poulantzas' criteria) is peculiar
to the centers, as compared to the peripheries of world capitalism; to ad-
vanced capitalism as compared to dependent capitalist peripheries. This
is only an hypothesis for future research,
In Israel's social formation, the proletariat are the great majority
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of Palestinian wage-earners in Israel. The fact that the proletariat con-
stitute a minority among Jewish wage-earners in Israel may point out the
place of Israel as a partner in central capitalism or as a subimperialism
and not as the typical dependent capitalist periphery, If we include the
60,000 non-citizen Palestinians employed during 1974 in Israeli productive,
manual, non-supervisory labor categories, the size of Palestinian-Arab
proletariat employees then more than doubles, reaching 110,098, or 75.2
percent, of all officially registered Palestinian-Arab wage-earners in Is-
rael, totalling in that year 146,400.62 This segment of the labor force
enlarges the size of the proletariat among all employees inside Israel
from 36.3 percent to 44.3 percent.
In 1974, 30.6 percent of all proletarian wage-earners in Israel were
Palestinian. Palestinians then constituted only 15 percent of the labor
force. They were thus over-represented in the working class. Over-repre-
sentation in proletarian locations applies not only when non-citizen Pales-
tinians are included. To a lesser degree, it applies also to citizens who
in that year constituted 9.6 percent of Israel's citizen labor force, yet
16.7 percent of its citizen proletarian employees.
The figures on Palestinian proletarian employees in Israel include
only officially registered workers. They exclude labor smuggled in with
no work permits from labor exchange offices and who, therefore, do not ap-
pear in official statistics. It is not clear, however, whether Palestin-
ian workers smuggled by Israeli employers represents free wage-labor or
non-wage slave-labor, in which case it is not proletarian.
Moreover, if we are to assess the contribution of non-citizen Pales-
tinians to the size of the proletariat within the boundaries of !'Greater
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Israel", we must include not only the labor force commuting into work
places inside the Green Line (and for that matter, the illegally smuggled-
in workers who, therefore, cannot commute, hence are kept locked inside
the factory overnight by the Israeli employer), but also those employed
by Israeli capital in the occupied territories themselves. If these wage-
earners are included, and to the extent they are employed by productive
capital, they are most likely to increase the size of the Palestinian
proletariat significantly in absolute and relative terms.
If we use criteria less conservative than Poulantzas', say Braverman's,
and thus include clerical workers in the proletariat, the relative size of
the Palestinian proletariat may decline, because most clerical work is per-
formed by Jews, This, however, will still increase, not decrease, the num-
ber of shared proletarian locations. In that case, the mobility of Jewish
labor into community and public, even business, services will not represent
a Jewish deproletarianization tendency.
If manual blue-collar service employees are included, the large num-
ber of Arab personal service employees in garages, restaurants, etc. will
belong to the proletariat and, further, the number of shared proletarian
locations. For a detailed breakdown of the service workers, see Table Y.
This detailed table is not useful for our class analysis, because it does
not distinguish between self-employed and employees (wage-laborers).
With ending this chapter, we answer positively a central question in
our study: that is, whether or not the penetration of Palestinian-Arabs
into the Israeli labor market results in a greater number of Israeli-Jews
and Palestinian-Arabs jointly placed within the boundaries of the working
class. We conclude that as far as the objective conditions, penetration
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Table Y. Detailed Occupational Structure of All Employed Citizen Arabs and
Jews -- Average (1974).
Detailed Occupation Jews b) Arabs Arabs by
% % thousands
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 104.5
SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC WORKERS 6.9 1.0 1.0
Academic workers in life sciences (0.2) 0.0 0.0
Academic workers in sciences 0.3 0.0 0.0
Engineers and architects 1.6 0.1 0.1
Medical doctors, dentists, dental assistants 0.9 0.0 0.0
Pharmicists and Veterinarians (0.1) 0.0 0.0
Jurists 0.5 0.0 0.0
Academic workers in social sciences 0.5 0.0 0.0
Academic workers in humanities
(including Jewish studies) 0.3 0.1 0.1
Teachers in post-primary and post-secondary
schools 0.6 0.0 0.0
Teachers and principals in secondary and
post-secondary institutions 1.8 0.8 0.8
OTHER PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND
RELATED WORKERS 12.7 8.2 8.6
Teachers and principals in intermediate
schools, primary schools, kindergartens
and other 4.2 6.4 6.7
Auditors and cost accountants 0.3 0.0 0.0
Workers in religious services (0.1) 0.2 0.2
Authors, artists, composers and journalists 1.1 0.2 0.2
Social workers and probation officers 0.7 0.2 0.2
Nurses and other para-medical workers 2.6 1.8 1.1
Physical sciences technicians 0.6 0.0 0.0
Engineering technicians and practical
engineers 2.6 0.1 0.1
System analysts and computer programmers 0.3 0.0 0.0
Other professional, technical and related
workers, n.e.s. 0.3 0.1 0.1
MANAGERS 3.5 0.4 0.4
Elected members of legislative and adminis-
trative authorities (-) - 0.0
Managers--administrators in government and
municipal services and in national insti-
tutions 0.8 0.1 0.1
Managers, professional government, public
and municipal authorities (institutions
and institutes) in sciences, life sciences,
engineering, etc. (-) - 0.0
Managers, professional government, public
and municipal authorities (institutions
and institutes) in humanities, social
sciences and law (-) - 0.0
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Table (continued-2)
Detailed Occupation Jews Arabs Arabs by
% % thousands
Other managers (inclusive of non-profit
institutions) 2.6 0.3 0.3
CLERICAL AND RELATED WORKERS 18.2 3.4 3.6
Supervising clerks 0.9 0.1 0.1
Bookkeepers 4.9 1.1 1.2
Typists and office-machine operators 3.3 1.2 0.2
Stock clerks and repairmen (filing clerks) 1.8 0.0 0.0
Telephone, telegraph, radio operators and
related workers 0.4 0.0 0.0
Inspectors in transport and communication (0.2) 0.0 0.0
Postmen messengers 0.5 0.3 0.3
General office clerks 5.4 1.6 1.7
Clerical workers, n.s. 0.7 0.1 0.1
SALES WORKERS 8.0 7.2 7.6
Working proprietors in wholesale trade 0.3 0.1 0.1
Working owners in retail trade 3.1 4.2 4.4
Technical salesmen, commercial travellers,
buyers and sales supervisors 1.0 0.1 0.1
Insurance, real estate, securities agents
and assessors 0.4 0.3 0.3
Sales workers 2.9 2.4 2.5
Street vendors, news vendors and other
vendors (0.2) 0.2 0.2
SERVICE WORKERS 11.9 9.0 9.4
Working owners in hotels and restaurants 0.6 0.6 0.6
Cooks 0.5 0.5 0.5
Waiters and bartenders 0.7 1.4 1.5
Housekeeping supervisors and chambermaids 0.3 0.0 0.0
Domestic help 1.9 0.3 0.3
Launderers, dry-cleaners and related workers 0.5 0.5 0.5
Barbers, hairdressers, beauticians and
related workers 0.8 0.6 0.6
Policemen, guardsmen and firemen 1.4 2.9 3.0
Guides, stewards, and dentists' assistants 0.7 0.4 0.4
Other 4.5 2.9 3.0
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 5.5 15.0 15.7
Farm owners 1.9 6.0 6.3
Farm managers (0.2) 0.0 0.0
Skilled workers in agriculture 2.5 3.6 3.8
Fishermen (0.1) 0.1 0.1
Mechanical equipment operators (0.1) 0.3 0.3
Packers (0.2) 0.1 0.1
Farm hands 0.5 4.0 4.2
Agriculture, n.e.s. - (0.9) (0.9)
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Table (continued-3)
Detailed Occupation Jews Arabs Arabs by
% % thousands
SKILLED WORKERS IN INDUSTRY, MINING,
BUILDING AND TRANSPORT AND OTHER
SKILLED WORKERS 27.9 37.0 38.7
Raw metal processors 0.3 0.1 0.1
Tinsmiths, welders, blacksmiths and workers
in finished metal products 4.5 5.2 5.4
Assemblers, installers, and repairmen of
machines and transport vehicles 2.1 2.8 2.9
Plumbers 0.7 1.3 1.4
Electricians, and electronic fitters 2.6 1.5 1.6
Fitters of precision instruments and
goldsmiths 0.4 0.2 0.2
Diamond workers 1.1 0.0 0.0
Skilled workers in food, beverages and tobacco
production 0.7 0.9 0.9
Wood workers and carpenters 2.5 7.7 8.0
Spinners, knitters, weavers and finishers 1.3 0.8 0.8
Foremen in industry, n.e.s. (-) 0.0 0.0
Tailors, sewers and related workers 2.4 2.1 2.2
Shoemakers, and other leather goods makers
(excluding leather wear) 0.5 0.8 0.8
Printers 0.7 0.3 0.3
Other craftsmen in industry 0.5 0.2 0.2
Miners, quarrymen and related workers (0.2) 0.1 0.1
Construction workers 1.7 5.1 5.3
Operators of digging, building and road
construction equipment 0.7 0.3 0.3
Crewsmen and engine rooms workers in ships
and railroads (0.2) 0.0 0.0
Drivers 3.9 6.0 6.3
Painters and whitewashers 0.7 1.8 1.9
OTHER WORKERS IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT AND
BUILDING AND UNSKILLED WORKERS 5.3 15.8 16.5
Longshoremen and freight handlers 1.0 2.1 2.2
Unskilled workers in chemicals and in non-
metallic minerals production process 0.3 0.5 0.5
Unskilled workers in rubber and plastics
industry 0.6 0.3 0.3
Unskilled workers in production process of
food, beverages and tobacco industry 0.5 1.4 1.5
Engines and pump operators (0.1) 0.2 0.2
Packers in industry 0.6 0.1 0.1
Non-metallic minerals production workers (0.1) 0.9 0.9
Other workers in industry and production, n.e.s.(0.2) 0.0 0.0
Construction labourers, n.e.s. (0.2) 1.2 1.3
Unskilled workers, n.e.s. 1.6 9.1 9.5
NOT KNOWN 0.0 2.9 3.0
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Table (continued-4)
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Survey, 1974, Jerusalem,
1976. Special Series No. , p. 11.
aArab citizens computed from total.
bJews total: 984,400.
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of Palestinians tends to promote the prospects for cross-national prole-
tariat alliance.
Conclusions
Examining comparatively the dynamics of pre-1967 and post-1967 employ-
ment structures of Palestinian-Arabs and Jews in Israel was very informa-
tive.
First, it showed very clearly that 1967 was a turning point in terms
of the rate of increase in Palestinian-Arab employment in Israel as well
as scale. This is true even for citizen.Palestinians.
Second, in pre-1967 years, the employment of Palestinian-Arab citi-
zens was subject to extreme fluctuations in demand, this is, if they were
employed in the first place. Their integration into Israel's employment
structure was merely responding to ups and downs in the economy. The
duration of their employment was vulnerable and unpredictable.
Contrasted with this is a more stable presence in Israel's production
process, witnessed since the 1967 war. In this era, it is no longer the
very employment of Palestinian citizens in Israel that fluctuates accor-
ding to crises and booms, but only the forms of labor they perform, i.e.,
the places they occupy in the production process but not their integration
into it. This reflects a more constant demand for Palestinian labor in
the Israeli economy, applying to a lesser degree to non-citizen Palestin-
ians.
In the previous era, Arab labor was mobilized only during the con-
struction boom, Now their active participation in production continues
and even increases in the post-1973 crisis period, characterized by de-
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cline in the construction industry. Arabst labor is being now increasing-
ly integrated into industry, the leading sector of the economy. Figures
on post-1967 employment suggest more permanence, that Arab labor is no
longer a transitory labor in Israel's economy. This is important for our
inquiry regarding proletariat class formation and the potential for al-
liances. It is necessary to examine the extent to which these statistical
indicators are, in fact, reflections of structural changes, a question
that will be examined in a following chapter.
Third, as far as the class meaning of these employment dynamics, find-
ings indicate:
(a) Not all recent penetration of Palestinians into the Israeli labor
market is into productive, manual, non-supervisory labor categories. Pro-
letarianization is, therefore, not the only pattern of class transforma-
tion among Palestinian-Arabs, specifically citizens. A large portion of
the latter is joining the new petty bourgeoisie, and even a larger portion,
despite radical changes in the concrete forms of labor they perform, main-
tain petty bourgeois class locations.
(b) Proletarianization in the post-19 67 era is not restricted to
Palestinian-Arabs. It also involves Israeli-Jews, probably owing to con-
centration of capital and capitalist transformation of petty industrial
production.
(c) Proletarianization in both cases, of Palestinian-Arabs and Is-
raeli-Jews, is a transformation from petty bourgeois class locations.
Among Palestinian-Arabs, it is predominantly from peasantry; and among
Jews, mainly from crafts shops,
(d) While proletarianization is the predominant pattern in the post-
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1967 class transformation of Palestinian-Arabs, among Israeli-Jews it is
rather transformation from the traditional petty bourgeoisie into the new
petty bourgeoisie that predominates.
(e) Military high technology industrialization seems positively cor-
related with Palestinian proletarianization replacing Jews in the techni-
cal but not social division of labor.
Fourth, as far as the magnitude of proletarianization and effects on
the objective conditions for potential cross-national proletarian allian-
ces. Findings that are based on the most conservative criteria of prole-
tarian locations indicate that the great majority (an average of 70 per-
cent) is entering proletarian class locations, and that they represent an
increase in the number of proletarian locations shared by Arabs and Jews.
These findings thus suggest that the integration of Palestinians into Is-
rael's employment structure tends to promote, not impede, the development
of commonality of proletarian class interest.
More than 30 percent of the proletarian employees in Israel in 1974
were Palestinians. These are underestimates of the actual size of the
Palestinian proletariat. One can then say that the massive penetration
of Palestinians into Israel's labor market represents predominantly a
proletarianization process. Can one conclude from this chapter that the
formation of a Palestinian working class is essentially a post-1967 phe-
nomenon?
The answer to this question is positive, despite the absence of de-
tailed data to estimate the number of Palestinian citizens who occupied,
on a non-temporary basis, proletarian class locations, This answer de-
pends at least on three facts; (1) that in 1963, only 39 percent of the
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citizen Palestinian labor force was wage-labor, compared to 84 percent in
1974; (2) half of the proletarian Palestinian employees in Israel today
are from territories occupied in 1967; (3) that major structural changes
responsible for this proletarianization process are characteristic of the
post-1967 period, as demonstrated later in Chapter VII.
Fifth, in this chapter we identified the places Palestinian-Arabs, in
comparison with Israeli-Jews, occupy both in the technical and the social
divisions of labor, and the number of all those who belong to the working
class. They are still a minority among wage-earners, constituting about
45 percent of all employees in Israel. Although they share identical pro-
letarian locations in the production process, they may not constitute a
homogeneous class once their places in the social formation as a whole
are considered. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Youram Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, 1964, p. 35.
2. Simple calculations show that the 15.9 percent of the Arab labor force
released from farming have contributed to the enlargement of the ser-
vice occupations by 4.4 percent, compared with enlargement by 4.1
percent in the traders/salesmen category, by 1.6 percent in both ad-
ministrative and professional categories, and by 0.6 percent in trans-
port and communication. Among Jews, the largest portion of the 5.3
percent of the labor force released from previous occupations seems
to contribute to the enlargement of the professional/scientific/
technical occupation by 2.9 percent, compared with 1.6 percent in
the case of administrative/managerial, 0.3 percent in the craftsmen
category and in the services, and 0.2 percent in transport and com-
munication.
3. In the post-1967 average occupational distribution, the proportion
of the Arab labor force who are salesmen, traders, is equal to that
of Jews (8.3 percent); in transport and communication, the proportion
of Arabs even exceeds that of Jews (5.8 percent, as compared with
5.2 percent). In the latter, Arabs are likely to be replacing Jews.
4. The ratio of Jewish professional/scientific to managerial/adminis-
trative is 1 : 1.3 before and 1 : 1.2 after 1967, and of Arabs,
2.3 : 1 before and 1.7 : 1 after 1967.
5. In this sense, although rural, the traditional Arab sector in Israel
has a similar function to that of the urban black ghetto in the
United States. As expressed by Harold Baron, "the dual labor market
operates to create an urban-based industrial labor reserve that pro-
vides a ready supply of workers in a period of labor shortage and can
be politically isolated in times of relatively high unemployment."
Harold Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor: Historical Notes on the
Political Economy of Racism," a Reprint from Radical America, Vol. 5,
No. 2, March-April, 1971, p. 36.
6. Exceptional to this feature is the farmers/fishermen occupation,
constantly declining at a higher rate in the Jewish than in the Arab
structure of employment, regardless of economic crisis or boom.
7. Harold M. Baron, "The Demand for Black Labor: Historical Notes on the
Political Economy of Racism," op.cit., p. 37.
8. Ibid., p. 36.
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9. Central Bureau of Statistics, Labor Force Survey 1974, Special Ser-
vices No. , Jerusalem, 1976, p. 141.
10. Examples of the best known studies on the segmentation and non-
neutrality of the U.S. labor market are:
Bennett Harrison, Education, Training, and the Urban Ghetto (Balti-
more, John Hopkins, 1972).
Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Man-
power Analysis (Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath, 1971).
David Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment (Lexington,
Mass., D.C. Heath, 1972).
Richard Edwards, David Gordon, and Michael Reich (eds), Labor Market
Segmentation (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1976).
Glen Cain, "The Challenge of Dual and Radical Theories of the Labor
Market to Orthodox Theory," American Economic Review, May, 1975.
11. Y. Ben-Porath, Op.cit., pp. 20, 22, 23.
12. In a statement made by Prime Minister Rabin during one of the Labor
Party conferences condemning the failure of the Party to develop the
manual-work morality during its twenty-eight-year hegemony; he
pointed out the presence of French workers imported to do the manual
work in the Histadrut-owned Koor industrial complex in Holon because
they could not find Israeli [Jewish] labor to do that work [probably
military-related metal products]. For a reference, see Jerusalem
Post, November 18, 1976.
13. Reference is to Israel's systematic policy of maintaining open-
bridges between the West and the East Banks of the Jordan River that
serve a two-fold objective: politically, to facilitate the transfer
of Palestinians from the West Bank into the other side of the river,
hence, providing better conditions for the Judiazation of the West
Bank, and alleviating the demographic threat. Economically, to
facilitate the transfer of Israeli surpluses into the East Bank,
hence, expanding its market frontiers. Israel's need for surplus-
dumping frontiers was further intensified during the period of rapid
economic growth following the 1967 War. According to the P.L.O.
Department of Information and National Guidance,
"...The volume of Israeli exports to occupied territories increased
very rapidly to reach in 1973 and 1974 the value of 803 million and
1,339.4 million Israeli pounds, respectively. While in 1968, it did
not exceed 187.4 million and in 1971, no more than 383.9, the value
of Israeli exports to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip more than
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doubled between 1971 and 1973 and reached over one-third billion in
1974. It is not surprising, therefore, that the occupied territories
became the largest market for Israeli goods in 1973, if we exclude
Israeli exports of polished diamonds... .The occupied territories
became the largest market for Israeli goods, as the following table
indicates:
Value of Israeli Exports to Major Markets in 1973 (million dollars)
U.S.A. 267.0
(excluding polished diamonds) 132.1
Britain 140.8
(excluding polished diamonds) 121.4
West Germany 137.6
(excluding polished diamonds) 105.6
West Bank and Gaza Strip 189.0
That is, in 1973 Israel exported to the West Bank and Gaza Strip a
quarter of all its exports for that year, excluding polished diamonds.
The West Bank and Gaza imported in 1973 and 1974 90 percent of the
value of their total imports from Israel. While Israeli imports
from both in 1973 did not exceed 2.3 percent of total Israeli im-
ports. See Jamil Hilal, The Palestinians of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip: Social and Economic Conditions under Israeli Occupation
(P.L.O. Department of Information and National Guidance--Studies and
Publication Section, May, 1976), pp. 9-10.
14. These skilled and unskilled productive labor categories relate to
workers in industry: mining, building, transport and other workers.
In assessing under/over representation factors, we divided the pro-
portion of each particular group that falls into a particular labor
category by the proportionate size of that group in the labor force
(not in the population-at-large) minus one.
In 1972, for example, total labor force employed in Israel, including
workers from occupied territories, reached 1,099,800 persons. Of
these, 34 percent were Europe-America immigrants, 29 percent (Orien-
tal) Asia-Africa immigrants, 23 percent born-in-Israel Sabras, 9 per-
cent citizen Palestinians, and 5 percent non-citizen Palestinians
from occupied territories. All Palestinian workers constituted 14
percent of Israel's labor force.
15. I. Oweiss, The Israeli Economy: A War Economy, op.cit., p. 43.
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16. Ben-Porath, op.cit., p. 34. Refer to Table 2-14.
(a) Since 1963 Labor Force Surveys do not provide data necessary
for computing the index of differentiation in the industrial struc-
ture of Oriental-Jews and citizen Palestinian-Arabs, which would
otherwise be of special significance for our analysis of the post-
1967 War period and whether the militarization of the economy tends
to increase or decrease differentiation in this particular case.
(b) Although both use occupational and industrial categories of the
1961 classification, we cannot compare Ben-Porath's Table 2-14 with
ours because he restricted his analysis to employed men, excluding
women, and also to mobile, i.e., commuter Arab labor only, excluding
those employed in their place of residence. He did so in order to
reduce biases of agricultural employment of women and low rates of
participation in the labor course.
In order to be able to compare ours with his index, it will be neces-
sary to apply the same adjustments to our analysis. This, in turn,
will be unrealistic, in light of objective changes such as the in-
creased mobilization of women into the labor force, the dramatic de-
cline in the traditional agricultural employment, and the penetra-
tion of Jewish industrial capital into Arab residential villages--
so the distinction between the sexes, and between mobile and non-
mobile labor is no longer valid in the post-1967 era.
17. Most of the service labor force is probably employed by UNWRA (Uni-
ted Nations Work and Relief Association), associated with its
bureaucracy.
18. Refer to Footnote in Chapter
19. We must remember that the figure 18 percent in Table FF, as the
portion of the Israeli-Arab male labor force employed in construc-
tion, refers to the recession period. In 1966 it was 22.1 percent
and in 1965, the peak of the construction boom, it reached 24.2
percent. Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 2, 1969,
p. 259.
20. Jamil Hilal, The West Bank: Its Economic and Social Structure
(1948-1974), P.L.O. Research Center, Palestine Books No. 60,
Beirut, 1975 (Arabic).
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21. The 1974 elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip resulted,
despite repression, in a full support for the P.L.O. leadership and
the defeat of an alternative local administration.
22. These figures are computed from Arie Bregman, The Economy of the Ad-
ministered Areas 1974-75, Jerusalem, 1976, p. 25. (Hebrew). Hilal,
2p. cit., gives more conservative estimates of these figures, thus
likely to be wrong.
23. The Rand Report on The Economic Structure and Development Prospects
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, by Haim Ben-Shahar, etc., 1971,
documents Israel's attempts to penetrate into the European agricul-
tural commodity market since the 1967 War, trying to compete speci-
fically with labor-intensive products, of which vegetables are the
most prominent, utilizing the abundant reservoir of cheap labor in
the occupied territories (for further details, see pp. 56-99 of the
same reference). Since the 1973 War, agriculture employment de-
clines, probably in part due to increased productivity, but mainly
to the more easy and profitable penetration into international mar-
kets, including the European Common Market, with competitive high
technology products. Israel's industrial products became the lead-
ing export sector. See Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 14,
1976.
24. A personal interview (May 17, 1976).
25. Quoted from the proposal for the project on the housing industry in
Israel prepared by Professors Robert Logcher and Albert Dietz of
MIT.
26. Ibid., p. 22.
27. A. Bregman, Economic Growth in the Administered Areas 1968-1973,
Jerusalem, 1974, p. 35.
28. The Economists' Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review - Israel,
No. I, 1976, p. 8.
29. For example, Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly, a publi-
cation of Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. Israel Defense
Forces - Labor Force and Other Surveys. The Bank of Israel Surveys,
etc.
30. See Table XII/28 (enclosed) from Statistical Abstract of Israel,
1975, pp. 330-331. The table presents average number of years of
schooling, cross-tabulated by economic branch, occupation, and popu-
lation group, but does not show the distribution of the Jewish and
non-Jewish populations in each occupation within a particular indus-
try or economic branch. The latter can otherwise be most significant
to our analysis.
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31. Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975, pp. 336-7, Table XII/31 (en-
closed).
32. Ibid., p. 337. Remember that the average wage of the Arab worker
is still lower than the general average wage in an economic branch,
since in all economic branches the average year of schooling (an
important determinant of wage level) is much higher among Jewish
than Arab labor in all economic branches. The differentials in
years of schooling are the lowest, however, in the service sector;
as evident in Table XII/28, mentioned in footnote No. 30.
33. The Palestinian-Arabs represent 25 percent of the productive labor
force employed in Israel, as estimated by M. Eter, the Economic
Editor of the Jerusalem Post. It is not clear, however, whether
or not his use of "productive" labor refers to the same definition
as ours; that is, labor engaged directly in the production of surplus
value, or simply all those employed in productive economic branches.
34. Although the use of an alternative migratory labor force has already
begun to replace Jews in industry, as mentioned previously, this is
not likely to be done on a massive scale in the near future, and if
it does happen, it will, anyway, shake up the class foundations of
the Jewish State--its material base--as is happening today in South
Africa. A national proletariat is strategically imperative for the
survival of settler-colonial regimes.
35. Recall the type of industries mentioned already in Chapter IV, p. 47.
And for the Kibbutz Regional Factory, p. 49.
36. Quoted from "Arabs Who Work in Israel," by Ami Shamir, Israel Maga-
zine, Vol. 4, No. 17, 1972, pp. 20-26.
37. Arab students at the Technion (Haifa Institute of Technology) can at
best be trained as construction engineers. Usually, they are not
admitted to industrial engineering fields, chemical, mechanical,
electrical, nuclear, etc. When, in recent years, a few were admitted
to such fields or merely to the natural sciences, they were restric-
ted to theoretical training and denied, however, the practical
training. The Techneon students' newspaper ( ) reports
the discontent of the Arab students' committee over the crossing-out
from the lists of students approved for field trips into factories
for observation and practice.
38. Although the controversy regarding the class-location of the new
wage-earning groupings, including service employees, exists not only
among Marxists, as presented in the text, but also among bourgeois
social scientists, the essence of the controversy is entirely differ-
ent within each of the two groups. All Marxists agree that these
employees are not bourgeoisie. The controversy lies in whether these
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wage-earners perform productive or unproductive labor, hence do or
do not belong to the proletariat class. For bourgeois social scien-
tists, who agree on denying the class specificity of these new wage-
earning groupings, the controversy lies in how to dissolve the latter
among existing social classes. Renner, Croner, Bendix and others,
for example, dissolve them into the bourgeoisie. T. Geiger, C.
Wright-Mills, and others, place them within the boundaries of the
working class. Dahrendorf divides them into bourgeoisie and working
class, depending on their relation to the exercise of power and
authority. Others like Fossaet 1961 and Praderie 1968 consider them
a "Third Force", members of the "Tertiary" sector, and therefore be-
long to the traditional petty bourgeoisie. In our analysis, we
choose to ignore these considerations simply as irrelevant because
bourgeois social scientists are incapable of relating to real social
class, since by definition they cannot conceive of social classes as
existing and being defined only in class struggle. The latter is
precisely the paradigm they essentially oppose. Prominent examples
of the incorrect conception of social classes as they exist in reality
are: the concept of the "service class" in Industrial Man (ed., T.
Burns), 1969; and the more recently developed concept of the "welfare
class" by M. Rien, 1977, in his article, "Is There a Welfare Class?".
Not only that both see social classes as external to the production
process itself and its social division of labor, but also that, as
is the first case, they define class in terms of the concrete content
or form (service) but not social form of the labor performed by these
wage-earners. In the second case, class is even indifferent to labor
regardless of its form; it is rather defined by the form or source
of revenue for subsistence.
All "social stratification" categories derived by bourgeois social
scientists from the surface-structure of society, from the technical
division of labor, and unilaterally from the sphere of distribution
have indeed nothing to do with social classes as real social forces
in the real world. Therefore, we cannot take seriously either, their
controversy regarding the class-location of service employees.
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62. 78,400 citizen Palestinian wage earners computed by sustracting Jewish
employees from total employees, as appears in statistical abstract of
Israel, 1975. And 68,000 non-citizen Palestinian employees -in Israel
from table A, Approximately 8,000 of whom are engaged in unproductive
labor in sals and transport most likely of workers.
CHAPTER VI
THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORKING CLASS
SUBJECT TO DIFFERENTIAL LOCATION IN THE SOCIAL FORMATION
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I. Introduction
This chapter examines the internal structure of the working class sub-
ject to differential locations in the social formation. We assume that in
Israel, as elsewhere in the world, the proletariat, like the bourgeoisie, is
not an internally homogeneous class. Ruling classes are constantly compelled
to segment the proletariat as a measure of discipline and control. These
segmentations are precisely to impede proletarian alliances against the rul-
ing class. Examining the internal structure of the working class is, there-
fore, a way of assessing the material conditions for and against proletarian
alliances. This is built on the findings of the previous chapter, where we
identified segments of the Jewish and Arab labor force who, in terms of
their locations in the division of labor, belong to the proletariat.
In this chapter, we try to examine whether this segment of the labor
force who, in the production process, occupy common proletarian class loca-
tions, are segmented on the basis of arrangements beyond the division of
labor in the social formation as a whole.
We are especially concerned to answer two questions: (a) whether seg-
ments of the working class benefit directly or indirectly from surplus val-
ue produced by other segments of the same class; and (b) whether the differ-
ential relation of Jewish versus Arab workers to the Zionist political/ideo-
logical superstructure undermines the commonality of their class interest.
We must keep in mind that the Israeli social formation, unlike any
other in the world, is a pre-planned one. It is not the outcome of the
historical course of class struggle as social formations naturally evolve.
We try to identify tentative features of its planned organization of pro-
duction, consumption, and reproduction.
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II. Segmentations of the Working Class by Differential Locations in the
Social Formation
In the previous chapter we tried to identify the class location of the
Palestinian labor force currently employed in Israel. We did so by trans-
lating locations in the technical division of labor into locations in the
social division of labor. We defined the boundaries of the working class
using Poulantzas' criteria. Accordingly, only those who perform productive,
manual, non-supervisory labor categories belonged to the working class. By
these criteria only positions in the division of labor were considered.
But as debated earlier, class locations are determined not only by loca-
tions in the division of labor, alone. They are determined also by rela-
tions of political/ideological domination/subordination inherent in posi-
tions in the social formation as a whole. This is what Poulantzas refers
to as "structural determination of class location" (recall preceding argu-
ments in Chapter I).
In the previous chapter, we argued that locations in the technical
division of labor are determined by locations in the social division of
labor. In the present analysis, we argue that locations in the social di-
vision of labor are, to a large extent, reproduced by positions in the
social formation as a whole.
This so-called "structural criterion for determination of class loca-
tion" is especially relevant in the case of settler colonialism, where a
relation of settlers' domination and natives' subordination usually prevails
and is generalized across class lines.
Our study is concerned only with cross-national/ethnic proletarian
alliances (not with alliances on other class lines, say petty bourgeois or
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bourgeois alliances). We therefore focus only on that portion of the
various segments of the labor force (identified in Chapter IV) who perform
proletarian labor categories in the labor process. Where, in the Israeli
social formation, those Arab and Jewish productive, manual, non-supervisory
wage-workers are located in relation to the means of production, consump-
tion, and reproduction at the disposal of Israel? An investigation of
this question suggests a pyramidical structure (Chart I) with four hori-
zontally-integrated dimensions and five vertically differentiated dimen-
sions. This is an abstraction of major features in Israel's social forma-
tion as exist in actuality. It is essential, however, that these features
be viewed not statically, but rather dynamically, in constant transforma-
tion; transformation through struggle between social classes. It is also
a rough abstraction of the differential locations of the various segments
of the working class in the social formation. This includes and goes be-
yond their locations in the division of labor. It reflects differential
locations in relation to the means of production, consumption, and repro-
duction. These involve relations to the economic "base" as well as the
political/ideological "superstructure" which together make up the social
formation.
We must remember that in Israel the "superstructure" consists not only
of the usual apparatuses of the State (legislative, army, ideological or-
gans, etc.), but also of the Zionist institutions of the Yishuv which have
remained operative after the establishment of the State and were further
empowered by the State to play far more important roles.
Tentative as it is, Chart I reveals an important fact. The proletarian
labor force in Israel does not share common locations in the social forma-
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tion. The various segments of the working class tend to be hierarchically
positioned at much deeper and more comprehensive levels than can be revealed
by the employment structure; the working class seems segmented not only by
division of labor (technical and social), but also by divisions external
to the labor process.
To elaborate more on this, it requires further specification of this
tentative "model" presented in the chart. We observe five hierarchically
differentiated arrangements by which the working class is internally seg-
mented. These are: ethnic, habitat, capital, industry, and occupation-
related subsystems. Each subsystem consists of four hierarchical levels.
They are hierarchical by a specific ranking criterion, as shown below:
Vertical Dimension Ranking Criterion
1. Occupational hierarchy ++ Years of schooling, level of in-
vestment in human capital
2. Industrial hierarchy ++ Level of production (primary --
finishing) and "forward-linkages"
3. Habitat hierarchy ++ Standards of living or subsis-
tence cost
4. Ethnic/national hierarchy ++ Political and ideological domina-
tion/subordination
5. Employer or capital hierarchy ++ Rate of exploitation
The various segments of the working class ranked on all these five
normative scales make up four horizontally-integrated clusters. These are
specifically revealing of the extent to which the segmentation of the work-
ing class is comprehensive and systematic. Each segment of the working
class belongs consistently to one of the four hierarchical levels in all
five dimensions. European-American proletariat are located on the top levels
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of the ethnic, habitat, industrial, occupational, and capital hierarchies.
Simultaneously, Arab citizens are located in the bottom level of all five
hierarchies, respectively. Each segment of the proletarian labor force
does not belong to a different level in each hierarchy. The hierarchical
location of the various segments of the proletariat is very comprehensive.
It applies to all major dimensions of their material life. With such pre-
cision these arrangements are guaranteed to reproduce the segmentation of
the working class (as it mirrors the segmentation of society at large)
over and over again.
This intricate system of segmentation is undoubtedly not accidental,
but the result of deliberate efforts to distort the commonality of class
interest and to prevent proletarian alliances against the ruling class.
One of the tasks in the preceding analysis is to provide the theore-
tical rationale for the specified ranking criteria. Another task is to
examine whether this intricate system of segmentation forces some segments
of the working class to indirectly benefit from the exploitation of another
segment of the working class. These arrangements suggest that some members
of the proletariat indirectly benefit from surplus value created by other
members of the same class. It is possible for the ruling class to do so
by maintaining two systems of labor: a "labor aristocracy", on the one
hand, and a labor force subjected to the extraction of super profit, on the
other. The former can be maintained only at the expense of the latter. In
effect, the commonality of class interest can be distorted and falsely re-
placed by competing (not antagonistic) interests among factions of the
working class.
To do the above it is necessary to illustrate the nature of these ar-
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rangements individually and in relation to the whole. This way, to spe-
cify the content of our "model" of the segmentation of the proletariat on
levels deeper than mere labor-market segmentations. Once we disaggregate
Chart I into its five components and their theoretical rationale, we will
expose the concrete background observations that led into identifying this
structure as a whole. It is not the individual hierarchies, but rather
the horizontal interlocking relationships between their various levels
that are most revealing of the nature of working class segmentation, as will
be demonstrated.
A. The Occupational Hierarchy
In the previous chapter, we identified the differential locations of
the various segments of the labor force in the occupational structure of
employment. In the present analysis, we focus only on differentiations
among those workers who perform manual productive, non-supervisory labor
categories. They seem to rank hierarchically according to the level of
skill and/or investment in human capital. This criterion can be measured
quantitatively in terms of years of schooling and/or on-the-job-training
(the socially-necessary labor time to produce the particular labor commod-
ity).
In terms of years of schooling, evidence from Annual Reports of the
Employment Service (1964) indicates that Sabras have historically consti-
tuted the smallest portion of Jewish unskilled work-seekers. Then come
European-American immigrants, and the highest representation is among
Oriental-Jews. Evidence, however, shows also that over time the size of
unskilled work-seekers among European-American immigrants tends to de-
crease, and among Sabras to increase, and among Orientals to stay the same.
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The ratio of distribution among Sabras, Orientals, and European-American
immigrants is 2.2 : 66.1 : 31.7 (in 1953), as compared to 12.2 : 65.5 :
22.3 (in 1962), respectively.1 European-American immigrants seem to be
competitors to Sabras in the occupational structure.
By 1974, evidence from Israel Monthly Bulletin of Statistics indicates
that Oriental-Jews continue to be the most highly represented among Jewish
wage-workers in unskilled productive occupations: representing 55.2 per-
cent of all Jewish unskilled industrial and construction workers and 70.9
percent of agricultural cash-croppers (also unskilled labor).2 They also
represent the largest portion of skilled workers in industry and construc-
tion.
The representations of Arab and Oriental-Jewish proletariat in skilled
occupational categories is more likely to be the result of on-the-job-
training than formal schooling, and the fact that they are the least mobile
in the employment structure. They become skillful over time. This is, for
example, how Arab workers become skillful in construction. It has nothing
to do with years of schooling.
Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1975 provides data on occupational
structure, by population group and average years of schooling per occupa-
tional post. This reference, together with information above, suggest an
occupational hierarchy; a hierarchy that reflects the predominant locations
of the various ethnic/national segments of the working class (Scale 1).
On the basis of the scale presented on the following page, Western (Euro-
pean-American immigrant) Jews rank the highest in the occupational hier-
archy; second come Sabras, then Oriental-Jews, and then Arabs.
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Scale 1. Occupational Scale (by average level of skill and years of
schooling)
Highest
Western Jews 1
Sabras 2
Oriental Jews 3
Citizen Palestinian-Arabs 4
Jews' average high-skilled in-
dustrial work (probably arms-
related)
(8.7) Average years of schooling
Combined Jews' average of skilled
and unskilled industrial work
(7.9) Average years of schooling
Jews' average of skilled and un-
skilled construction work; un-
skilled industrial and agricul-
tural work
(6.9 - 7.5) Average years of
schooling
Non-Jews' average skilled and
unskilled construction work;
unskilled industrial and agricul-
tural work
(5.4 - 5.6) Average years of
schooling
Lowest
B. The Industrial Hierarchy
Industries are ranked here by the level of their contribution to the
reproduction of labor power in other industries, which I will call "forward-
linkages", the greater the linkage, the lower the industry ranks. This
criterion can be expressed also by the level of production: whether it is
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primary, i.e., production of raw material (mining, agricultural planta-
tions), or intermediate level, i.e., the production of consumer goods
(food processing, textiles, construction, etc.), or finishing levels, like
in the production of luxury goods (diamond products, arms machinery, etc.).
These levels of production, in fact, relate to the ratio of dead labor to
live labor in production inputs. The greater the dead-live labor ratio
in an industry, the higher it ranks. This index may also be an index of
"exploitation".
Most relevant to what we mean by "forward-linkage" ranking criterion
is the extent to which an industry produces commodities that determine
subsistence cost, the cost of reproduction of labor power of the country's
proletariat, or some segments of it. This may help us identify in what
industries labor is subjected to the extraction of super profits by the
capitalist class, and therefore in what industries workers indirectly bene-
fit from surplus value created hy the former.
Another way of looking at the same thing is from the point of labor's
work conditions and vulnerability. More strategic and basic industry, such
as arms products, exercise higher stabilizing effects on the economy at
large and can undermine mass consumer goods production (as happened in the
Massachusetts economy, for example). Work conditions from the point of
view of labor are likely to be better in the more than in the less strate-
gic industries, at least for reducing labor instability and high risk. In
these terms, we identify the industrial hierarchy (Scale 2).
Again, on the industrial scale predominantly Western Jews rank highest,
Sabras second, then Oriental-Jews, followed by Arabs on the bottom of the
scale. The location of the various population groups in the industrial
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hierarchy suggests that Western and Sabra Jews rely for their basic con-
sumption (housing, clothing, food, the determinants of urban-workers' wage)
on commodities produced by Oriental-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs. Western
and Sabra-Jews are not engaged in basic consumer goods' production for the
local market. They are, rather, engaged in luxury consumer goods and high
technology military commodities for the international market.
This arrangement has important implications with regard to relation
to surplus value and will be interpreted in its full implication as we pro-
ceed in discussing the habitat and capital hierarchies; that is, the site
of reproduction of labor power, and the site in which this labor power is
situated in the process of production itself.
Scale 2. Industrial Hierarchy by "Forward-linkages"
Highest
Finishing levels, high technology
arms products for international
market (electronics, avionics,
etc.)
Intermediary and finishing heavy
Sabras 2 and light luxury consumer goods
(diamonds and leather), metallic
arms products, mainly for export
Light intermediary basic consumer
goods (food processing and tex-Oriental-Jews 3 tiles), primary agricultural pro-
duction and mining; arms-related
metal products
Primary and intermediary levels
Citizen Palestinian- 4 construction, agricultural and
Arabs food/textile industries
Lowest
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C. The Habitat Hierarchy
Habitat refers here to human settlements. A distinctive feature of
Jewish settlement in Palestine is the innovative approach to spatial organ-
ization and settlement patterns. This is especially true in the rural
sector. Utopian and new forms of habitat have been important factors for
the recruitment and absorption of Aliyah and for stimulating land coloni-
zation. Settlement innovation has been, since the Yishuv and continues
to be today, most instrumental for this goal.
In this analysis, we are concerned with the question of habitat, not
from an environmental design perspective in the physical articulation of
the built form; we are rather looking at habitat mainly as a reproduction
site. The site on which the labor force is reproduced on daily and gener-
ational bases.
Of course, each spatial form for human settlement is distinguished by
a peculiar set of relations of production, consumption, and reproduction.
Spatial organization of society, specifically its built forms, are not ac-
cidental nor neutral developments. They are reflections of the social or-
ganization of production which, in turn, determines the organization of
consumption and reproduction.
Under capitalist relations of production, labor itself becomes a com-
modity that has an exchange value determined by the socially necessary
labor time for maintaining it in working condition. Therefore, it makes a
real difference to wage and profit where the worker lives, where his/her
power is reproduced.
In Israel, spatial organization is very much the function of rational
planning and management, not evolution. Spatial management that corres-
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ponds to the objectives of the Zionist movement: Jewish proletarianiza-
tion/capitalization, and the creation of a Jewish capitalist social forma-
tion through colonial settlement; Jewish relations of production and Jewish
class struggle for the reproduction of the State superstructure. These
considerations seem to be articulated in settlement patterns since the
Yishuv. It is, therefore, a very important aspect of the political econ-
omy of Israel where the various segments of the working class reside. This
question overlaps with the following discussion regarding type of employer
(capital) and relations to the political/ideological superstructure to be
further discussed later on.
We identify a hierarchical relationship among the various habitat
forms. Hierarchical in terms of "standards of living", as a ranking cri-
terion. Standards of living is regarded here as an indicator of the dif-
ferential cost of reproduction of labor power of the residents of a parti-
cular habitat. This ranking criterion reflects people's positions in the
worlds of both production and consumption. Standards of living cannot be
measured by income alone, it must also include public services, access or
lack of access to development opportunities, the quality of education,
health (preventive and curative services), environmental quality, recrea-
tional facilities, etc. One can also use per capita municipal budget as a
measurement of standards of living of the different habitat forms.
In these terms, habitat forms in Israel rank as reflected on Scale 3,
shown on the following page. Note that we excluded the kibbutz, because
we are concerned only with the location of proletarian labor force in the
various habitat. Kibbutznic labor, owing to its relation to the means of
production through its share in the communal ownership, is not part of the
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proletariat. This issue will be discussed again more thoroughly in
the following chapter.
Scale 3. Habitat Hierarchy in Terms of Standards of Living
Highest
1
2
3
4
Metropolitan and Suburbs
Veteran Town and Moshav-Shetuffee
Development Town, Family Unit,
Agricultural Settlements
Arab Village
Lowest
D. The Ethnic/National Hierarchy
In settler-colonial formation, like Israel, it is obvious that the
settler segment of the proletariat and the native segment exercise entirely
different relations to the ideological/political superstructure. This is
an important and strategic issue from the point of view of the ruling class.
The settler-colonial ruling class, more than ruling classes in a more typi-
cal social formation, is compelled to maintain allies among the proletarian
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workers, citizens and non-citizens of Israel. They are members of a nation-
ally oppressed people, oppressed precisely by the ideological/political
superstructure to which their Jewish co-workers belong. They are denied
not only their political rights for national self-determination, but also
many civil rights except for the ones that legitimize the existing system
of power (voting, for example). Owing to their different relation to the
State superstructure, they cannot form independent political organizations,
not even labor unions.
These relations are reproduced in the division of labor, in terms of
relations of ideological and political domination/subordination between Jew-
ish and Arab workers.
Ideological and political domination/subordination is the criterion for
what Poulantzas identifies as the structural determination of class loca-
tion (recall discussion on the boundaries of social classes in Chapter III).
It seems an appropriate criterion for ranking the ethnic/national com-
position of the proletariat in Israel. In general, one can say that in the
Jewish State the relation of Jews to Arabs (even among the working class)
is one of domination/subordination. This, however, must not be taken to
imply that Jewish citizens are homogeneous in their relations to the ideo-
logical/political superstructure and, therefore, in the relation of domina-
tion/subordination with regard to the Palestinian-Arab citizens.
Until the sixties, seniority in the country was a determinant of poli-
tical power and social status. The early settlers, once the vanguards of
Zionism, and therefore by virtue of their special relation to the State,
have exercised more political power than Oriental-Jews and recent Western
immigrants. They ranked highest on the scale of political/ideological
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domination. In the current phase of Israeli development, distinguished by
the dominance of the economic and by the subordination of the national
bourgeoisie to international monopolies, and of the Jewish State itself to
requirements of monopoly capital; and finally, with a shift into high tech-
nology military production based on U.S. technology, recent Jewish immi-
grants are moving higher up on the ladder than early settlers and their
Sabra generation. Accordingly, the various population groups rank as indi-
cated by Scale 4.
Scale 4. Ethnic/National Hierarchy by Ideological-Political
Subordination/Domination
Domination
1 Western Jews
2 Sabra Jews
3 Oriental Jews
4 Palestinian Arabs
Subordination
Taking Poulantzas' criterion of structural determination of class loca-
tion seriously raises a question regarding the actual existence of an Is-
raeli-Jewish proletariat. Until now, we have assumed this and took it for
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masses; and to appeal to them ideologically and politically.
In Israel, the "security of the State" has become internalized by the
Israeli masses as an ultimate objective to be fanatically optimized. This
is especially true among the old-timers (Vatikim) and their Israeli genera-
tion (the Sabras). The Labor-Zionist ideology, the dominant ideology of
the ruling class, has been so effectively filtered down through the Hista-
drut, the Labor Party, the left-Zionist Parties, and the kibbutz and co-
operative organizations. For a remarkable expression of how the Israeli-
Jewish toilers have internalized the ideological/political appeal of the
ruling class, recall the heated debate in Moshav Beer Tuvia (Chapter III).
By virtue of their relation to the superstructure, including also the Zion-
ist institution of the Yishuv, which is still operative within the modern
State; Jews get access to material and non-material (education, political
participation, bargaining power in the work place) benefits. This is especi-
ally true with respect to the world of consumption of public goods, The rela-
tionship to the ideological/political superstructure affects also, to some
extent, their location in the spatial habitat system.
Metropolitan residents enjoy the greatest share in public consumption:
better quality social services, health, education, recreation, etc. This,
in turn, implies greater subsistence cost, hence higher wages. By virtue
of their affiliation to the ideological/political superstructure, they have
also more access to information, thus more power. They also speak the lan-
guage of the ruling class. Their patterns of consumption, especially of
"cultural goods", are flavored with their relation to the ideological/poli-
tical superstructure. They enjoy more civil freedoms, like geographic
mobility, right to State subsidies, lesser subjection to the repressive ap-
paratuses. The opposite is true with regard to the native Palestinian
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granted. It is not only by positions in the division of labor, but also
in the social formation as a whole that objective class locations are de-
termined, then can there be a Jewish proletariat as a part of Zionist set-
tler-colonial formation? This is like asking whether or not white settler
workers who produce surplus value belong to the proletariat. More precise-
ly, it is asking the following question: do Jewish workers who perform
productive, manual, non-supervisory labor categories not belong to the same
class location to which Palestinian-Arabs who perform the same labor cate-
gories belong because a relation of domination/subordination derives from
their differential positions in the social formation that distinguishes the
two groupings?
For a clearer and more adequate expression of this question, see
Chart II.
The seriousness of this question and its relevance to our analysis
gets more exposed as we recall from Chapter III the theoretical discussion
on: (a) proletarianization, specifically the "free" labor as condition for
wage-labor -- for proletarianization; and (b) land use and control law re-
garding the inalienable right of the Jew in the Jewish State to possession
of land; and under the annexationist program of the Likud to land conquest
or, more precisely, "liberation".
Of course, the above impede the development of a Jewish proletariat in
Israel as a class for itself. The question being raised above is whether
it also undermines its formation even as a class in itself. I do not know
whether this question is answerable and how it can be answered; I only re-
cognize its political and theoretical importance. It is now proposed for
a future study.
1W
Chart IT Relations of Politico-ideological Subordination/Domination of Arab and Jewish Productive
Labor Within and Beyond the Production Process in the Context of Zionist Settler-colonialism in
Palestine
Structural Class Determination in the Social Formation at Large
Western Jews
Sabra Jews
Oriental Jews
Citizen Palestinians
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In the Social Division of Labor
Proletariat Class-location by
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Does the differential relations of Israeli-Jews versus Palestinian-Arabs to the Zionist settler-colonial
superstructure, hence, the relations of political-ideological subordination/domination that mark the
place of each national/ethnic group in the social formation predominate the economic/structural deter-
mination of their class-location within the social division of labor?
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One way of dealing with this question in the present study is to recog-
nize some important transformations that are currently taking place in Is-
raeli social formation which are likely to radically alter the conditions
mentioned above. These transformations involve land speculations -- the
emergence of land market; which is likely to stimulate the privitization of
land ownership, hence the transformation of the existing land use policy
with regard to "national" land, which will eventually undermine the inalien-
able right of the Jew to land possession. Furthermore, it may lead to con-
centration in private land holdings, hence displacement of Jewish farmers
and their coersive drift into proletarianization.
Another process which is likely to bring about "genuine" Jewish prole-
tarianization in Israel is the increasing concentration of Israeli capital
displacing the petty commodity producer and small capitalist.
These processes suggest at least the beginning, if not the continua-
tion, of actual Jewish proletarian class formation, through "real" class
struggle.
All these are tendencies that signify "secularization" in the relation
of production in Israel. Secularization subject to the state of develop-
ment and requirements of its productive forces, which are increasingly
interwoven with the internationalization of capital. Theoretically, these
processes secularize also the Jewish State, and therefore are likely to
transform the conditions underlying the relation of political-ideological
domination/subordination between Arab and Jewish proletariat.
These secularization tendencies get more clearly illustrated by anal-
yzing the sources of capital by which the various segments of the working
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class is employed.
E. The Employer or Capital Hierarchy
The sources of capital operative in Israel today are: foreign private
capital, foreign public capital (State capital), co-operative (mainly Hista-
drut and kibbutz) capital, and local small private capital.
During its "nation-building" phase, Israel depended heavily on trans-
fers of foreign public capital (as opposed to foreign private investment
capital). The main sources of these transfers were three:
1. Philanthropic Capital: mobilized from world Jewry by world Zionist
organizations, specifically Keren Hayesod-United Israel Appeal, the financial
arm of the Jewish Agency, through which world Jewry in 69 countries has
helped to create the State of Israel and continues to share the heavy finan-
cial burden of the country. The amount raised by this institution between
1948 and 1972 exceeds two billion dollars. 5
2. German Reparations Funds: paid directly to the State and accom-
panied by personal restitutions from Germany to individuals who suffered
under Nazism. This has been an important source of foreign capital for the
State during the nation-building phase; "they probably saved Israel from
bankruptcy during the crucial financial difficulties of 1953," as Segre
concludes, and later provided the base for Israel's industrial infrastruc-
ture, specifically the naval and railway communications, telephone and
electricity, and regular supplies of essential raw materials.6
3. Foreign Aid and Grants: mainly from the United States, and later
French loans and credits, and floating Development Bonds in most Western
countries.
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According to V.0. Segre:
"..total capital transfers between 1949 and 1966 amounted to
7 billion dollars (almost double the amount offered by the Mar-
shall Plan to Europe). Over $4.5 billion came from unilateral
transfers from Jewish institutions, from German reparations to
the State ($775 m.), American grants ($315 m.), German restitu-
tions to individuals ($1.1 billion) and private transfers
($835 m.). The remaining $2.5 billion came from loans ($1.650
m.) and private investment ($880 m.)." 7
In Israel, this inflow of capital was then put into operation through govern-
ment and public channels (specifically the Histadrut, the Jewish Agency and
the Jewish National Fund), thus strengthening considerably their positions
against that of private capital, within the economy.
State sector and public sector are not identical in Israel. The public
sector refers to Yishuv institutions of colonization mentioned above. Al-
though they have independent sources, they function as instruments of the
State.
The Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund are, since the establish-
ment of the State, responsible mainly for Jewish settlement, Aliyah recruit-
ment and absorption. These two public institutions serve exclusively Jewish
citizens of Israel.
The Histadrut is different. First, it allows for Arab membership
(since 1953). Around 70 percent of citizen Arab employees hold Histadrut
membership; mainly to get access to the only National Health Care System
(Kupat Holim), which is entirely monopolized by the Histadrut.
Second, and more relevant to the discussion, is the fact that the
Histadrut is also an industrialist; the largest capitalist (although pub-
licized as a socialist institution) employer in the country. The Hista-
8
drut operates in accordance with the profitability imperative.
In the previous chapter we have seen the Histadrut mainly as a trade
union. This chapter exposes the Histadrut as employer. 509
Histadrut's enterprises are actually patterned on private joint-stock
companies.9 The American researcher, M. Plunkett concludes they "in part
operate in accordance with cooperative principles, and in part in accordance
with strictly capitalist methods." 1 0
The Histadrut owns and supervises huge tracting, heavy industry, mining,
quarrying, wholesale and retail commerce, and the marketing of agricultural
produce. It controls cooperative enterprises in agriculture, industry, and
transportation, and generally exerts strong economic and political influ-
ence.11
Most of the big industrial concerns, such as Nesher cement and Shemen
vegetable oil plants, are owned by the Histadrut through its holding company,
Hevrat Ovdim, or in partnership with private investors. Recently, the His-
tadrut has been trying to get a hold in new industrial fields, particularly
heavy industry, and it is buying out some private owners. Mergers are en-
couraged between firms with a view to improving competitiveness overseas.
Many firms are seeking commercial link-ups or know-how agreements with for-
eign companies, especially in northwest Europe and the United States. 1 2
The Histadrut's partnership with private capital in mixed enterprises
may be demonstrated in the example of Solel Boneh, Ltd. In thirty mixed
building enterprises, Solel Boneh's share was:13
- with private capital on a 50-50 basis in 15 enterprises;
- with State capital -- over 50 percent in 7 enterprises;
- with foreign capital -- under 50 percent in 8 enterprises.
Thus, where foreign capital is invested the Histadrut enterprises tend to
be controlled by foreign monopolies, as, for example, the case with the
Koor group enterprises, where American-German capital is invested.1
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On account of the foreign capital imports, chiefly through government
channels, the State sector's share in the economy is large. The share of
State capital in investment in industry is smaller than that of the Hista-
drut.
State capital is mainly for investment in infrastructure. This role
becomes increasingly important since the shift into high technology military
production as the main exporting sector of the civilian economy. This is
especially true in the sphere of Research and Development. The State in
this way socializes the cost of production for foreign and national private
capital. The State investment in industry is mainly indirect, through pro-
visions of subsidies and other incentives. In the sixties, from 30-50 per-
cent of the development budget was loaned out to private enterprises, thus
helping to enlarge the private sector. This was especially true for direc-
ting private investment into New Development Towns, where State-subsidized
private industry is still predominant.
The private sector (1961/62 Census) embraces nearly three-fourths of
the industrial enterprises and about two-thirds of the workers employed in
industry (while the State-cooperative sector, including the Histadrut, has
15
26.7 percent of the factories with 37.5 percent of the workers). The
private sector dominates the light and medium size industry, commerce,
citrus plantations, and the building trade, as well as traditional indus-
tries such as textile and diamond working.16 These are basically inter-
mediary-level consumer industries, and the above probably represents the
national private capital sector.
Since the 1967 military and political victory, Israel has started to
attract foreign private investment capital on a scale unknown before. Re-
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ference is mainly to U.S. subsidiaries. By 1977, more than 200 U.S. sub-
sidiaries were already operating from Israel, investing mainly in high tech-
nology military industry.17
In Israel, unlike the other developing countries, foreign capital in-
vests not in the production of primary goods (agricultural plantations and
extraction of minerals, etc.), as in the case of Latin American countries,
Asia and Africa. It rather invests mainly in the production of capital
goods (weapons production) and other high technology finishing levels of
production that require very technically trained labor (similar to the case
of U.S. investment in West European countries). Therefore, foreign capital
in Israel tends to employ mainly the more skilled Jewish labor, particularly
European-American immigrants who are more familiar with Western technology.
It is less likely to employ Asian-African immigrant Jews and unlikely to em-
ploy Palestinian-Arabs. There is a high degree of compatibility between
the mobilization and absorption of European-American Jewish immigrants and
the penetration of foreign capital.
Having surveyed the various sources of capital or sectors of employ-
ment, we are now going to rank them by a specific criterion. Clearly, as
our concern is the segmentation of the proletariat (productive workers), we
are considering only productive capital, ignoring commercial and other capi-
tal in circulation.
The rate of exploitation (the rate of surplus value, profit) is an
appropriate criterion for ranking employment sectors (sources of capital),
especially so if the ranking is done from the point of view of labor. It
is appropriate specifically for our attempt to answer the question regard-
ing the possibility of segments of the working class benefiting from sur-
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plus value created by other segments of the same class.
The rate of exploitation is an appropriate criterion for ranking pro-
ductive capital because this criterion represents the essential relation
between capital and wage-labor. By this criterion, the main capital sec-
tors rank as illustrated by Scale 5.
Scale 5. Capital Hierarchy by Rate of Exploitation
Lowest
1 Foreign Capital
2 Co-operative Capital
(kibbutz and Histadrut)
3 State-subsidized Local
Private Capital
4 Local Private Capital
Highest
In order to comprehend why these sources of capital rank in this way
it is necessary to clarify two things: (1) profit/wage determination in
theory: profit and wage stand in inverse proportion to each other. The
share of profit increases in the same proportion in which the share of la-
bor falls, and vice versa. Wages are not the share of the worker in the
commodities produced by him. They are rather that part of already existing
commodities with which the capitalist buys a certain amount of productive
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labor power. Wages are the price of a certain commodity, labor power. Wages,
therefore, are determined by the same laws that determine the price of every
other commodity. The actual price of commodity fluctuation always above
and below the cost of production; but the rise and fall reciprocally balance
each other. The fluctuation of wages cor'responds to the flucuation in price
of commodities in general. But within the limits of these fluctuations the
price of labor power will be determined by the cost of production, in this
case, by the labor time necessary for production of this commodity: labor
power. The cost of reproduction of labor power is the cost required for the
maintenance of the laborer as a laborer, and for his education and training as
a laborer. Therefore, the shorter the time required for training, up to a par-
ticular sort of work, the smaller is the cost of production of the worker,
the lower is the price of his labor power, his wage. In those branches of
industry in which hardly any period of apprenticeship is necessary and the
mere bodily existence of the worker is sufficient, the cost of his production
is limited almost exclusively to the commodities necessary for keeping him
in working condition. The price of his work will, therefore, be determined
by the price of the necessary means of subsistence. The cost of reproduction
of simple labor power amounts to the cost of the existence and propagation
of the worker. The price of this cost of existence and propagation consti-
tutes wages. The wages thus determined are the minimum wages. This minimum
wage, like the determination of the price of commodities in general by cost
of production, does not hold good for the single individual, but only for
the race. Individual workers, great numbers of them, do not receive enough
to be able to exist and to propagate themselves; but the wages of the whole
working class adjust themselves, within the limits of their fluctuations,
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to this minimum.
(2) Uneven cost of reproduction on daily and generational bases:
the rate of exploitation is not intrinsic to the source of capital. It de-
pends on the social organization of production in society at large, and on
features peculiar to the social formation, the site of production, consump-
tion, and reproduction. We can illustrate this point by attempting to ex-
plain why in Israel foreign capital ranks lowest in terms of "rate of ex-
ploitation". Unlike the case in most situations, and given the peculiarity
of Israel's social formation, wages and profits do not in all cases have to
stand in an inverse relation with each other. This is so because Israel
consists basically of an imported population and continues to depend heavily
on Jewish immigration. Israel is a net importer, not only of capital but
also of wage and non-wage labor force, both of very high skill and very low
skill, and therefore, the cost of reproduction of labor power in Israeli
industrial production is almost invariably exogenous to the system. To be
more precise, the exogenousness of the cost of reproduction of labor power
applies more directly to European-American Jewish immigrants, who represent
the most highly trained proportion of the labor force with sophisticated
technical and scientific backgrounds, whose labor power is the most costly
to reproduce, as we have argued in Chapter IV.
Capital, therefore, can afford higher wages without altering the wage-
profit ratio, without lowering the rates of profit. This is made possible
partially by the fact that the capitalist employer of this labor in Israel
does not have to include in his cost of production the cost of propagation
and training for the reasons indicated above, and can, therefore, afford
higher wages and maintain the same or higher rate of profit simultaneously
515
(higher than the one he could afford if the cost of reproduction were done
otherwise).
This explanation is, however, inadequate. It does not take into con-
sideration anything except determinants inherent in the cost of reproduc-
tion on a generational basis. It also treats the determinants of the rate
of exploitation unilaterally, not in the context of overlapping arrange-
ments in the social formation, the site of production, consumption and re-
production. By overlapping arrangements, we refer to the facts that for-
eign capital is associated predominantly not only with European-American
immigrants, but also with metropolitan habitat, high level of skill, high
technology industries distinguished by final levels of production for the
export market and, therefore, with minimal "Forward Linkages".
Considering these associations reveals far deeper dynamics and pro-
vides for a more adequate explanation. This simultaneous rise in wages
and profits is then explainable partially by the resulting increase in pro-
ductivity, and partially by the following fact: that the basic consumer
goods (housing, food, clothing) in urban and metropolitan centers are mainly
produced by labor from settlements with lower standards of living, or more
precisely, whose labor power is less costly to reproduce. This, in turn,
lowers the price of those commodities that determine subsistence cost of
urban workers. Consequently, the latter can be kept down at the expense
of worker-producers of these subsistence commodities, not at the expense of
the high technology producer. This is to say, by means of over-exploita-
tion of workers engaged in the mass consumer goods production, not only the
foreign employer of those workers is guaranteed greater realization of
profit (the sale of goods under conditions in which all surplus value pro-
duced by the worker is actually paid for by their purchasers), but also the
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workers of the metropolitan foreign-owned industry indirectly benefits from
surplus value created by the workers employed in the production of basic
consumer goods. This fact allows for the lowering of the relative rate of
exploitation of the Western segment of the proletariat without lowering the
actual rate of profit. This is an illustration of how both "labor aristo-
cracy" and super-profit co-exist in the economy at large.
It is following this analytical logic that we have concluded the above
ranking; and that we try further to identify who tends to belong to the
"labor aristocracy" and who tends to be victimized by super-profit.
Second in this hierarchy comes co-operative (kibbutz and Histadrut)
capital. It is increasingly merging with foreign capital; predominant in
the kibbutz, veteran towns and moshav shitoufi; associated mainly with the
early settlers and their Israeli-born generation, and with heavy industry
and skilled labor. Within this cluster of relationships and by the rate of
exploitation, this sector ranks as second-highest in the capital hierarchy,
as its rate of exploitation is the second-lowest in the country. The fact
that the rate of exploitation in the co-operative sector is lower than that
of other State and local private capital, yet higher than in employment by
foreign capital, can be explained in the following terms:
(a) Because a large portion of the labor force belongs to forms of
habitat where subsistence cost is relatively low, owing to their co-opera-
tive or communal organization and/or subsidies from the public sector.
This is as far as simple reproduction of labor power is concerned:
(b) Unlike the case in foreign capital-owned industries, the training
of this labor force and the generational reproduction of its labor power
is predominantly endogenous, not exogenous, to the system.
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Third in this hierarchy is State-subsidized local private capital.
State-subsidized private capital is invested mainly in "developing areas"
where a national development strategy is undertaken, specifically in New
Development Towns, in which Oriental-Jews are overrepresented. Light indus-
try for the production of mass consumer goods (textiles, food and construc-
tion) are the habitat's industrial specialty, and low skilled/unskilled oc-
cupational categories predominate. For the residents of this habitat, the
relative rate of exploitation is higher than that in the kibbutz and metro-
politan populations, as they produce mainly subsistence commodities. Yet,
it is lower than that of the Arab traditional village, because the reproduc-
tion of the resident labor power is compensated by the State: this reduces
operation cost of all private enterprises as an incentive provision for firms
to invest in these areas, hence promote the political objective of "popula-
tion dispersion".
Two other factors that indirectly reduce the reproduction of cost of
the labor power employed in this sector are: (a) the fact that housing in
New Development Towns is produced by cheaper Arab labor force and housing is
a major determinant of urban wage; and (b) that land which houses this labor
force is essentially rural, not urban, land forcefully expropriated from
Palestinian citizens: not purchased in market exchange. By the very imple-
mentation of this urbanization scheme (N.D.T.), it is then converted into
urban land for industrial development, a much cheaper commodity than other
urban land.
These two processes provide for investment incentives in the form of
lessening operation cost and cost of reproduction. Capital then can af-
ford lower rates under these conditions of exploitation than in the absence
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of (a) and (b) invested elsewhere.
In the bottom of the hierarchy, and with the highest rate of exploi-
tation, comes local private capital as employer of Arab labor, be it inside
Israel or in territories occupied in the 1967 War. This is true both in
industrial and agricultural enterprises that produce basic consumer goods
for local market and agricultural vegetable plantations for the European
market. This reaps super-profits, especially by employing Arab females.
Highest rates of exploitation apply also to the small-scale textile and
embroidery factories recently penetrating traditional Arab villages and
small towns, appropriating female labor on the very site of reproduction of
their labor power, and without altering the cheap basis for the reproduction
of male labor power. Arab female workers are then forced to continue to
contribute directly to the creation of commodity labor power through domes-
tic labor, while they are directly engaged in the creation of surplus value.
In order to further comprehend how and why Israeli private capitsl
reaps super-profits form Palestinian labor, we have to examine the use of
two systems of labor: (a) the commuter labor system: Palestinian-Arab labor
(from within or across the Green Line) in Jewish work places is almost in-
19
variably commuter labor. This is directly related to locations in the so-
cial formation as a whole; to the question of habitat. In the basis of the
commuter labor system is the "essential" Jewish/Arab residential segrega-
tion of workers in the country. This applies both to citizen and non-citizen
Palestinians alike. Habitat segregation is essential in the sense that
historically the Jewish Yishuv was formed as a "closed" community; Jewish
colonial settlements were obviously for Jews only. New Development Towns
were transplanted in the heart of Arab-populated regions on Arab land,
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explicitly for population dispersion, not integration. The current settle-
ment schemes in the Galilee the West Bank and Gaza Strip are essentially
"Judiazation" programs.
Another rationale of special relevance to the commuting of citizen
Arab workers into work places in Jewish settlements, such as Development
Towns, is the fact that these settlements are almost invariably built on
land that is legally defined as "National Land", restricted by law to an
exclusively Jewish use, as documented previously. This, in effect, consti-
tutes a guarantee against the leaking of Jewish philanthropic capital (in-
vested exclusively in Jewish communities) into non-Jewish beneficiaries.
Jewish settlements are constructed for the absorption of Jewish immigrants,
and the housing of Arab citizens by these projects is "detrimental for ab-
sorption", as the Jewish Agency has often explicitly expressed. Moreover,
the security of the State has been always the explicit rationale under-
lying habitat segregation.
Eventually, however, this segregation has asserted its economic signi-
ficance. Arab villages in the Galilee, the Small Triangle, the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip are increasingly playing the role of Bantustans in South
Africa; sites for the creation and reproduction of cheap labor power commod-
ity for the Israeli capitalist. This was, a large portion of the reproduc-
tion cost falls on the Arab community of residence which in turn is increas-
ingly underdeveloped through expropriation of land for more Judiazation
schemes.
Through commuting, value created in the Arab community is transferred
into the Jewish sector. The commuters' labor power is exchanged for below
the minimum wage. On the basis of low standards of living as determinants
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of wage, neither the State nor the public sector invest in Arab community
services or subsidize reproduction cost. Jewish citizens enjoy free com-
munity infrastructural facilities. Arab citizens pay for even installa-
tion costs of infrastructural projects. The Government budget allocation
among Jewish versus Arab municipal councils is most indicative of how un-
even development in standards of living, reproduction cost, hence wage al-
location, is reproduced by differential locations of Arabs and Jews in re-
lation to the State superstructure.20
With the commuter labor system on the basis of habitat segregation,
it is in the direct interest of Israeli private capital to underdevelop the
Arab villages.
Commuter labor can be even more profitable than the typical migratory
labor system. As in the former case, capital can rely on the commuters'
community for even the daily reproduction of the commuters' labor power.
This is especially so in daily commuting systems, as the case with Pales-
tinian labor in Israel. The Israeli capitalists, the buyers of labor power
from Palestinian commuter sellers, save not only propagation cost -- the
cost of reproduction of the labor force on a generational basis -- but the
Israeli capitalist can also rid himself of a large portion of the commuters'
daily subsistence cost. Consequently, the Israeli capitalist reaps super-
profits. Daily commuting applies even more strictly to Palestinian workers
from Gaza and the West Bank.
In conclusion, economically speaking, commuting of Arab labor from
communities of lower standards of living into Jewish work places in commun-
ities of higher standards of living, and more recently, the commuting ot
Israeli private capital into these very communities to reach out for female
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labor that is not allowed to commute (due to patriarchal subjegation) does
subjegate this segment of the working class to the highest relative rates
of exploitation. In this sense, this source of capital ranks in the bottom
of the employer's hierarchy.
For labor from the occupied territories, daily commuting is compulsory
for reducing security risk. But daily commuting from under occupation
generates further security risks. To regulate and control commuter labor/
mobility labor, the military administration imposes the requirement of a
work permit.2 Palestinian workers can legally commute across the Green
Line borders only with a permit from the military administration -- an ap-
paratus of the State of Israel. Israeli employers supposedly purchase
these permits so that the State is reimbursed for the cost of occupation.
To get themselves reimbursed for the cost of work permits and prevent a
decline in the rate of profit, Israeli capitalists resorted to the use of
a new system: "smuggled labor".
(b) the smuggled labor system: even greater profits are reaped by
Israeli capitalists who employ illegally-smuggled Palestinian labor from
the West Bank and Gaza. This is another system of labor made operative in
Israel precisely through the collaboration of Palestinian labor contractors
(citizens and non-citizens) known as Raises (recall Chapter III, last sec-
tion). Earlier in this thesis we have documented the illegal commuting of
this labor force, specifically female agricultural cash-croppers, into
moshav farms through the Raises. We also documented the fact that they
often stay overnight in rural work places. It is expected that in urban
centers smuggled labor is politically more risky, but less exposed than
in rural areas. Recent reports, however, have revealed smuggled Palestin-
522
ian labor is used and often locked into the factory overnight.
According to a letter to the New York Review written by Noam Chomsky
on the basis of Israeli and international sources:
"The Israeli press reports the arrest of Arab workers from the
occupied territories who were found living in rented apart-
ments without a permit (Maariv, December 15, 1977). Earlier
this year, the press reported that thousands of Arab workers
from occupied territories are locked into factories at night.
This fact allegedly known to the authorities, became public
knowledge when the bodies of three dead Arab workers from
Gaza were discovered in a locked room after the destruction
of a small Tel-Aviv factory by fire. Employees report that
workers were locked into the factories because they are not
permitted on the streets at night.. .when work permits have
often not been obtained because they are costly to the em-
ployer." 22
On April 20, 1977, similar revelations were made when Davar reported
the success of the Israeli police in rescuing three Arab workers who were
found locked into a Tel-Aviv clothing factory when fire exploded in the
factory at 1 A.M.23
It is unnecessary to examine the rate of exploitation of this segment
of the labor force. The point is to see how it is determined by the location
of this labor force in the social formation; their relation to the politi-
cal/ideological superstructure -- to the type of employer. For example,
it is less likely that smuggled labor be employed by State, foreign, or co-
operative capital, although their reasons may differ.
III. Conclusions
It is by virtue of extracting super-profit from one segment of the
working class that the ruling class can maintain a labor-aristocracy as a
strategic ally. Now we have identified what segments of the working class
tend to belong to the labor-aristocracy and what segment tends to pay the
523
price of maintaining it.
The labor-aristocracy still belongs to the proletariat, however, as a
"privileged" faction that indirectly benefits from surplus value created by
other members of the proletariat. Labor-aristocracy versus the rest is not
the only segmentation in Israel's working class. The working class is seg-
mented on ethnic/national lines into four groupings:
1. European-American immigrants;
2. Early settler Sabras;
3. Oriental-Jews;
4. Palestinian-Arabs.
These groupings constitute, respectively, the hierarchical structure of
the working class itself. This internal structure of the working class
seems comprehensively and systematically designed to guarantee its self-
reproduction.
The internal segmentation of the working class on national/ethnic
lines is observable in the spheres of production, consumption, and repro-
duction. The differential relative rate of exploitation to which the vari-
ous segments of the working class are subjegated is function and indica-
tive of the role each segment plays in these three spheres respectively.
The internal structure of the proletariat suggests the possibility of in-
direct economic exploitation within the working class in the sense that
some segments of the proletariat benefit indirectly from surplus value
created by other segments of this class. This is a result precisely from
the differential locations of the various segments of the Israeli labor
force within the five dimensions we identified in the social formation.
There is a five-dimensional hierarchical variation in the economic
524
structure. These five dimensions are: (1) ethnic composition; (2) spa-
tial form (habitat); (3) industry affiliation; (4) occupational structure;
(5) employer (type of capital).
Although vertically differentiated, horizontally they seem to be in
correspondence. Western early settlers and new immigrant Jews do indirectly
benefit from surplus value created by Asian-African Jewish and Arab workers
as cheap producers of subsistence commodities. This indirect exploitation
corresponds to "West-East" dichotomy of the sources of labor. Palestinian
Arab labor nd Oriental-Jewish workers reside in settlements where standards
of living are relatively lower. The Oriental and Arab labor force is also
overrepresented in light industries of consumer goods and/or primary pro-
duction (agriculture and mining). This does indirectly reduce the cost of
production avid reproduction in the finishing and high technology levels of
production, where Western settler and new immigrant Jews are overrepresented.
The over-exploitation of the former provides the conditions for lowering
the rate of exploitation of the latter not at the expense of capital.
Benefitting from these arrangements, Western Jews in Israel, likely
to be co-opted by the system and used in perpetuating the status quo, op-
pose the imposition of proletariat alternative because they do have some-
thing to lose. They probably have a stake in the existing arrangements.
This is to be taken into consideration in assessing the conjunctural impedi-
ments of cross-ethnic/national proletariat alliance.
Oriental Jews who are, like Arabs, overrepresented in the production
of basic consumption goods, and unlike the latter, they are engaged neither
directly nor indirectly in sharing surplus value created by Arab labor
(with the exception of the exploitation of farm labor from the occupied
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territories made possible by the political privilege of the former as
part of the oppressor nation). In this sense, both Eastern segments of the
working class are jointly subjected not only to direct exploitation by the
capitalist class, but also to indirect exploitation by the Western segments
of the working class (the labor-aristocracy). Therefore, material impedi-
ments of proletarian alliance are likely to be less between Palestinian-Arab
workers and Oriental-Jewish workers than between the latter and Western-
Jewish workers. Similarity in the cultural backgrounds, hence the consump-
tion patterns of the Oriental-Jews and the Palestinian-Arabs are likely to
reinforce the commonality of their class interests and, consequently, their
political class positions. Proletarian alliance is seen here as an expres-
sion of class position and not necessarily class interest dictated by the
objective location within the social division of labor and social formation.
The structure of the proletariat is characterized by horizontal inte-
gration/vertical differentiation that cuts across various spheres of so-
ciety. The importance of these horizontal segmentations lies in the genera-
tion and reproduction of the vertical differentiations. These are, in turn,
most functional for not only political stability, but also and simultaneous-
ly productivity of capital through cheaper reproduction of labor power for
the dominant capital. This concrete case illustrates the instrumentality
of uneven development for growth under capitalist relations of production.
We must recall again that Israel's social formation is a pre-planned
one. That these arrangements that we have identified and expressed on
Chart I are not accidental, but rather the by-product of a very deliberate
planning effort, carried out mainly by the Yishuv institutions of the State
and the State itself for specific economic/political objectives. Initially,
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(as argued earlier in this thesis), these objectives were the formation and
reproduction of Jewish social classes, as a material base for a bourgeois
Jewish State. Then the State itself was to carry on this task through the
essential internationalization of capital. As the State has a specific role
in the process of extended reproduction of social classes, it intervenes,
on the one hand, "in the training and subjection of agents to render them
suitable for occupying these places, and, on the other, in the distribution
of agents among these places". Does not this explain Chart I?
We must not forget the anarchistic nature of capitalist development.
How the essential competitiveness of capitalism constantly generates con-
tradictions that may alter all pre-planned arrangements, even the condi-
tions that were necessary for initiating the very process of its accumula-
tion. This is entering a deeper level of analysis, the subject of the fol-
lowing chapter: the relation between planning in class society and class
struggle!
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Chapter VI: Footnotes
1. Manpower in Israel/1964 - Annual Report, State of Israel, Ministry of
Labor, Manpower Planning Authority, Jerusalem, August, 1964, p. 77.
2. Israel Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Supplement 26, July-December,
1975, pp. 48-50.
3. Spatial organization of the country during the Yishuv period seems to
be nothing but an expression of the struggle between big Jewish capi-
tal and petty Jewish capital of the pioneering settlers themselves,
between the private sector dominating the urban sphere and the co-op-
erative sector dominating the rural sphere. It is a struggle for domi-
nation between primitive accumulation of petty capital and that of
modern accumulation.
"The co-operative and collective settlements developed under the aus-
pices of the Histadrut, created central co-operative for marketing
(tnuva) and supplies (hamashbir) with 'direct links' between the cen-
tral moshavim or kibbutzim to the three major cities with almost com-
plete elimination of the intermediate stage of small- and medium-sized
urban centers."
In Israel, the central-place movement won over the opposition of the
rural petty bourgeoisie. The central-place hierarchical model of spa-
tial organization was, according to Brutzkus, advocated by big capi-
tal and physical planners already in the Yishuv but defeated by the
opposition of the kibbutz and co-operative movements that insisted on
strict separation between rural/urban sectors and on rejecting any
integration through mediating settlements.
When the State was established, reconciliating this conflict between
the urban and rural factions of the ruling class became possible,
being by definition the central role of the bourgeois State. The
implementation of the central-place spatial model resulted from the
State intervention on behalf of the urban bourgeoisie and in the form
of a national urban growth strategy (the New Development Towns)
rationalized by the objective of population dispersion for the secur-
ity of the State. Later, in the form of regional plans based on cen-
tral-place theory, the best example of which is the internationally-
known (and exported) Lachish Regional Plan. These central-place-orien-
ted forms being inserted into the former rural-urban spatial dichotomy
shaped the hierarchical character of the spatial form of the country.
That this spatial organization is the function of the social organi-
zation of production can be concluded also from the functioning of
this hierarchical structure in the reproduction of the dominant capi-
tal.
On the advocacy of hierarchical models, see Eliezer Brutzkus, Regional
Policy in Israel, op.cit., p. 18. We must keep in mind that Israel is
the only developing country in the world that applied urban capitalist
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CHAPTER VII
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SETTLER-COLONIAL FORMATION:
NEW FORCES OF ARAB AND JEWISH PROLETARIANIZATION
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I. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate transformations in the
social formation that are likely to further the proletarianization process
not only among Palestinian-Arabs but also among Israeli-Jews. These are
also transformations that are likely to alter early planned arrangements and
features of the social formation that we identified in the previous chapter.
They are, therefore, expected to offset the effects of segmentation of the
working class on the material conditions of proletarian alliances. Speci-
fically, this analysis focuses on the following processes:
A. Concentration of Israeli private capital as manifested in the shift
from small-scale to large-scale production. This includes also the sweeping
capitalist transformation of petty commodity forms of production.
B. Transformations in the rural sector:
(a) the kibbutz economy;
(b) the non-agricultural moshav;
(c) Israeli private and kibbutz capital, including Arab villages:
the industrialization of the Palestinian-Arab community;
(d) from mechanized to high technology agriculture.
C. Secularization of the relations of production:
(a) secularization of land;
(b) Jewish class struggle;
(c) re-establishing the abnormalities of Diaspora;
(e) secularization of the Jewish State;
(f) better material conditions for cross-national proletarian
alliances.
These processes represent the structural forceful tendencies underlying
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demand for Arab labor in the present phase. They also suggest further pro-
letarianization in the long-run. They express the urge for a more direct
and permanent integration of the Palestinian labor force into the Israeli-
Jewish economy.
We try to demonstrate how these processes are the outcome of the essen-
tial internationalization of capital which necessarily distorts the basic
character of the settler-colonial formation; being only a transitional for-
mation.
II. Concentration of Production
A. Theoretical Background
It refers to the increase in quantity of capital under one's control;
this, in turn, makes possible an enlarged scale of production and is neces-
sarily the result of accumulation. Concentration of production in ever-
larger enterprises represents one of the most characteristic features of
capitalism. It is precisely the result of its own opposite feature (also
essential to capitalism), competition. Concentration of production is much
more intense than the concentration of workers, since labor in the large
enterprises is much more productive. This is another way of referring to
the ratio of dead to live labor, or of constant to variable capital -- to
the organic composition of capital.
In general, the greater the organic composition of capital in an in-
dustrial branch, the greater is the concentrarion of capital, and conversely,
the smaller the organic composition of capital, the smaller is the concen-
tration of capital. Why? "Because the smaller the organic composition of
capital the less capital is required at the beginning in order to enter
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this branch and establish a new venture. It is far easier to put together
the million or two million dollars necessary for building a new textile
plant than to assemble the hundreds of millions needed to set up even a rela-
tively small steel work."2
The organic composition of capital is determined by unsuccessive ac-
cumulation of surplus value. Accumulated surplus value is that entire part
of surplus value which is not unproductively consumed, and which is trans-
formed into supplementary constant capital (more quantity of raw materials,
machines, etc.), or into supplementary variable capital (means for hiring
more workers), Furthermore, in the ratio between constant capital and vari-
able capital which is the organic composition of capital, , c tends toLv
increase; and the process of growth in the organic composition of capital
represents succession of capitalization processes.
The organic composition of capital increases antagonistically by way
of competitive struggle governed by the law of "the big fish eats the lit-
tle". The competitive struggle is, therefore, accompanied by a continuous
concentration of capital, by the displacement of a large number of business-
men by a smaller number and by the transformation of certain number of in-
dependent business people into technicians, managers, foremen, and even
simple subordinate office personnel and workers. As put by Marx, "capital
grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand because it has in another
place been lost by many."3
The concentration of capital is a permanent law of capitalist society
and is accompanied by the proletarianization of a part of the bourgeois
class, the expropriation of a certain number of the bourgeoisie by a smaller
number of the bourgeoisie. This seems an aspect of what is happening in
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Israel today. To be more specific, concentration of capital in Israel
today signifies not only the expropriation of small bourgeoisie by bigger
bourgeoisie, but also the expropriation of petty Jewish capitalists by
Jewish and foreign capitalists. Two processes are taking place simultan-
eously: the transformation of some petty industrial production (workshops)
into capitalist production (factories) and the replacement of many smaller
factories by few larger factories, specifically foreign subsidiaries.
This theoretical introduction focuses our attention on the possible
relation between the concentration and proletarianization processes.
B. Concrete Illustrations
Viewed historically in Israel, petty capital seems to have paved the
road for productive capital. Kibbutz and co-operative capital are now
paving the road for the penetration of foreign capital and, in many cases,
are merging with it. How petty Jewish capital paved the road for factory
production and the emergence of local industrial capital is similar to the
concentration processes of the present phase, but on a narrower scale and
slower pace. This is not to imply that all local industrial capital have
emerged from local petty capital. Another source of local private capital
is the "naturalization" of foreign private capital through Jewish immigra-
tion. Many Jewish immigrants came with small productive capital and estab-
lished small factories.
Historically, the petty commodity form and low-capacity, small-scale
production predominated in the pre-1967 War period. Most factories were
small, semi-primitive enterprises employing from 1 to 49 workers. Accor-
ding to 1963/1964 statistics, these comprised 94.2 percent of all factories
and employed 52.8 percent of the industrial workers. This should not be
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Concentration for higher productivity, for economies of scale and as the
inevitable consequence of the essential capitalist competition. This
process was further stimulated by the requirements of military industriali-
zation for the international market.
With this military industrialization, the Great Transformation in
Israel's economy begins, a turning point in the development of Israel's
social formation.
In light of dynamics in this larger context, including the crisis of
Aliyah, of Jewish labor supply (Chapter IV), that concentration, its causes
and implications, can be comprehended.
Concentration of production is illustrated here by comparing the 1963
structure of industry (Table S) with that of 1972/1973 (Table SS). The
comparison of the two tables indicates that total number of industrial
establishments has decreased from 10,430 in 1963 to 6,600 in 1972/1973 (a
decline of 37 percent), while the number of workers engaged in industrial
production increased from 166.5 thousands in 1963 to 234 thousands in 1972/
1973 (29 percent increase).
(a) The food industry:
In the food, tobacco and beverage industry, for example, the number of
establishments decreased during the same period from 1,199 to 785, while
the number of persons employed increased from 248,001 to 338,000. This is
the leading industry in terms of both its share in the gross output as well
as its share of total revenue and labor force.
(b) The textile industry:
Similarly, the number of establishments in the textile industry has
declined by 40 percent, from 203 to 422, with slight increase in the number
of workers.
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Table S. Structure of Industry in 1963.
Number of % Number of % Average Gross %
Factories Workers Number Output
of IL
Workers
Total 10,430 100.0 166.5 100.0 15.9 4,188 100.0
Mining and Quarrying 92 0.9 3.7 2.2 40 104 2.5
Food (including
Tobacco and
Beverages) 1,199 11.6 24.8 14.9 20.6 995 23.8
Textiles 703 6.7 21.9 13.2 31.1 460 11.0
Clothing 779 7.4 6.9 4.1 7.5 119 2.8
Woodworking and
Furniture 1,507 14.5 11.9 7.1 7.9 258 6.1
Paper and Paper
Products 149 1.4 3.1 1.8 20 101 2.4
Printing and
Publishing 521 5.0 7.5 4.5 9.2 119 2.8
Leather 568 5.4 3.5 2.1 4.4 64 1.5
Rubber and Plastic
Products 188 1.8 5.2 3.2 27 143 3.4
Chemical and Petro-
leum Products 251 2.5 7.8 4.7 51 249 6.0
Non-metallic Minerals 472 4.5 10.6 6.3 22 288 6.9
Diamond Industry 351 3.3 7.6 4.5 22 214 5.1
Basic Metals 103 1.0 4.0 2.4 39
Metal Products 1,115 10.7 12.0 7.2 11 550 13.1
Machinery 604 5.7 7.3 4.3 12
Electrical Equipment 340 3.2 7.7 4.6 22.7 171 4.1
Transport Equipment 1,112 10.6 17.7 10.6 16 306 7.3
Miscellaneous
Manufacturing 376 3.7 3.3 2.3 9 48 1.2
Source: Galina Nikitina, The State of Israel,
p. 243.
Table SS. Structure of Industry in 1972/73 (establishments
more persons).
engaging 5 or
'000 Gross Percentage
Number of persons output share of
establishments engaged IfCmn total revenue
Mining and Quarrying 61 4.2 397 2.4
Food, Beverages and
Tobacco 785 33.8 3,373 20.1
Textiles 422 24.0 1,486 8.9
Clothing 855 22.7 914 5.4
Wood and Furniture 641 10.0 644 3.8
Paper and Products 115 4.8 423 2.5
Printing and Publishing 458 8.4 439 2.6
Leather and Products 225 3.1 158 0.9
Rubber and Plastics 229 9.3 720 4.3
Chemicals and Oil
Products 182 10.3 1,138 6.3
Non-metallic Minerals 302 9.9 780 4.7
Diamond Industry 440 8.0 810 4.8
Basic Metals 73 5.5 541 3.2
Metal Products 1,030 26.5 1,665 9.9
Machinery 225 10.3 722 4.3
Electrical and Electronic
Equipment 247 20.1 1,317 7.9
Transport Equipment 120 18.9 1,048 6.3
Miscellaneous Manufac-
turing 190 4.0 207 1.2
TOTAL 6,600 234.0 16,782 100.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel No.
Economic Review, 1976.
26, 1975, in Quarterly
537
538
taken to imply that large-scale industry did not at all exist in Israel.
As we recall from Chapter III, a few large-scale mining industries already
existed in the Yishuv (British Mandatory concession industries). Large-
scale industry, however, has been the exception not the rule in Israel.
Only 2 percent of the enterprises employ from 100-300 and more workers.
Moreover, 73, or 0.7 percent, of the factories have over 300 workers. They
together employ about 20 percent of the industrial workers. Most of these
big factories are foreign-owned. 5
During the Yishuv, the emphasis on small-scale production derived from
a political rationale: the imperative of Jewish capitalization/proletarian-
ization and the requirements of this process. It was, in a sense, determined
by the state of development, and the requirements of, the productive forces
at the disposal of the Yishuv as an essentially "closed" economy.
In the nation-building phase, a top national development priority was
the absorption of masses of Jewish immigrants; their dispersion on the new
territorial base acquired in the aftermath of the 1947-48 War. Small-scale
production was then encouraged by the Government as it well suited the popu-
lation dispersal objective and Aliyah absorption needs. Until then, policy
requirements were still overriding profitability considerations.
The 1967 War has paved the way for the penetration of foreign invest-
ment capital. The well-established nation-state was then to serve the
internationalizaiton of capital to encourage penetration of monopoly capi-
tal with foreign firms.
The state of development, and requirements of, the productive forces
(at the disposal of Greater Israel, so victoriously emerging from only a
six-day war) resulted in the indispensible tendency towards concentration.
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(c) The electrical industry:
In the electrical equipment industry (which in 1972/1973 included
also electronics), the number of establishments decreased by 27 percent
(from 340 to 247), while the number of employees increased by 161 percent
(from 7,700 to 20,100). This industry, which is related directly to arms
production, shows more concentration of workers. This is important, as in
high technology production the human capital "engineering" component is the
most intensive input.
(d) The metal industry:
The metal industry requires high-skill technical labor categories and
is directly related to the arms industry; therefore, it is both a politi-
cally and economically strategic industry, and although it requires physical
strength, it employs Jewish, not Arab, labor, unlike the case in other hard
work; construction, for example. Though small in scale, metal establish-
ments are capital-intensive, with high productivity and greater organic
composition of capital than large-scale mass consumer goods production
factories such as textile and food production, where cheaper Arab and Orien-
tal-Jewish labor is absorbed, and it is cheaper to add more of it than to
add machines. It is also consistent that metal production is owned by co-
operative (Histadrut and kibbutz capital) and possibly State capital and/
or State-compensated foreign capital.
In metal products industry, the number of establishments increased
only slightly (1,015-1,030), while the number of workers more than doubled
(12,000-26,500). By 1972/1973, in terms of its gross outputs and number
of workers, the metal products industry was the second largest in the
country (second to food, beverages and tobacco branch). It is, however,
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the very leading industry as far as number of establishments; the average
size of a metal products factory grew from 10 workers in 1963 to 25 work-
ers in 1972/1973. It has probably increased further in more recent years,
despite the post-1973 crisis.
The Economic Quarterly - Israel reports: "a very rapid growth since
the wars in 1967 and 1973 in metal-using industries and electronics, espe-
cially in the field of military equipment."6 The growth in the workers/
establishment ratio probably signifies not a pure concentration tendency
but also capitalist transformation of the petty commodity form. This is
unlike the change from 38 to 75 workers in the average size of basic metals.
7
This latter signifies mere concentration. In the former, we are speaking
about finished level of production; essentially a high-skill craft work,
more characteristic of the workshop, as compared to the factory labor pro-
cess. It has probably been transformed into mass production in response to
increased demand on the international market, as in the case of the kibbutz
helmet industry, mentioned earlier in this thesis. The fact that despite
some concentration it is still a relatively small-scale production is per-
haps related to being traditionally the specialty of the kibbutz.
The development of metal finish-products industry in the kibbutz
goes back to the Yishuv phase,8 specializing then in rifles, however, for
merely national consumption. It is only recently that it has become a
major export industry.
Other traditional industries which produce luxury consumer goods for
export show a different pattern of transformation.
(e) The diamond industry:
In the diamond industry (known in the past as Israel's main export
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industry). We notice a considerable increase (25 percent) in the number of
establishments compared with only 5 percent in the size of the labor force.
The average size of the establishment declined from 22 workers in 1963 to
18 workers in 1972/1973. The latter is most likely the result of productivity
hence concentration of capital, not workers -- capital deepening.
(f) The clothing industry:
A different pattern of transformation seems to occur in clothing,
another major traditional industry in Israel. Here, also, we notice expan-
sion of 9 percent in the number of establishments; however, of 229 percent
in the number of workers. The average size of the establishment increased
from 9 to 27 workers. This is probably indicative more of a capitalist trans-
formation of the petty commodity form than of concentration per se. Expan-
sion in this industry after 1967 has probably been stimulated by the Israeli
popularization of traditional Palestinian embroidery (as Tozeret-Ha'aretz)
in the international market, and the abundance of skilled and cheap Pales-
tinian female labor to produce it. Israeli-Jewish owned embroidery estab-
lishments (with workshop appearance and factory essence) are increasing
transplanted in the Arab area inside and across the Green Line. This is
converting a Palestinian craft into mass production. This transformation
applies also to the traditional Israeli clothing craft. This may be a way
for this traditional Jewish industry to survive the increasing competition
of other industries and the resulting concentration.
The increase in the number of establishments in the clothing and dia-
mond industries, the two traditional Jewish industries also in Diaspora,
may be taken to signify something else: the possibility that after the Six-
Day War, some Westernized Jewish petty bourgeoisie immigrated to Israel,
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transferring with them their small diamond/clothing business, where the
likelihood to transform them into productive capital through state or pub-
lic subsidies is greater. In that case, much of the original Israeli clo-
thing industry controlled by early settlers can maintain its competitive
position on the international market without conversion into large-scale
mass production. As the products of this industry of the early pioneer
settlers may still have symbolic value among Diaspora Jewry asa guarantee
for profit realization.
The majority of the examples above (except for metal products) are in-
dustries that belong predominantly to the local private sector. This con-
centration process applies to all sources of capital.
(g) The regionalization of kibbutz industry:
According to Yediot Aharonot, April 13, 1977, "Regional Factories" of
all the kibbutzim which are composed of ten groups with 165 subsidiary fac-
tories, and employing 5,000 workers, among whom only 1,000 are members of
the kibbutzim, have recently emerged. This is one indicator of concentra-
tion of the kibbutz capital, probably in response to the penetration of for-
eign monopolies and their merger with the compradore and even public (mainly
Histadrut) capital.
(h) High technology military industry:
In the sphere of high technology military production for export foreign
capital or joint ventures of foreign and State or public capital are inves-
ted in large-scale production. In these industries a more complex form of
transformation is occurring, centralization.
Centralization, known also as "combined production", can be defined as
"the grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry,
543
which either represent the consecutive stages in the working up of raw
materials.. .or are auxiliary to one another."9 This can be best exemplified
by the avionic industry containing also its auxiliary textile factories, as
already documented in Chapter IV.
To sum, in this presentation we have identified seven patterns of trans-
formation currently taking place in Israel's industry. These are:
(1) Capitalist transformation of petty commodity forms of production
exemplifed by the clothing industry.
(2) A dual process of capitalist transformation and concentration
(metal products).
(3) Concentration of workers (textiles and food-processing industries).
(4) Concentration of capital, not workers -- capital deepening (dia-
mond industry).
(5) Concentration of human capital of high technology know-how (the
electronics industry). This is a new and most sophisticated form of concen-
tration of production.
(6) A kind of conglomeration exemplified by the combination or regional-
ization of kibbutz industry and contracting work with dependent subsidiary-
like plants located in Arab villages.
(7) Centralization or combined production in the sector dominated by
foreign monopoly capital (avionics).
For linking the previous chapter with the present analysis, notice
the high concentration of workers (not capital) in the textile and food
processing industries. Workers in these industries are predominantly Orien-
tal-Jews, Palestinian Arabs, and overwhelmingly females. It seems cheaper
for the owners of these industries to add more workers than more machines
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for higher productivity.
Contrasted with this is the diamonds industry, where only Jewish work-
ers, predominantly Western and early settlers, are employed. It seems
cheaper to introduce technological innovation and expel (lay off) labor.
This is only an observation that can reinforce our earlier conclusion re-
garding the differential rates of exploitation affiliated with different
sources of capital, industries, ethnic groups, and their reproduction sites.
A more relevant point to the objective of the proceeding chapter is
that these transformations seem, by and large, to intensify the proletarian-
ization process; the number of industrial wage workers is growing, not de-
creasing; the size of the working class is expanding, not shrinking. One
can infer from these processes that these transformations are increasingly
proletarianizing not only Arabs but also Jews. This inference is especially
valid in light of capitalist transformation of the pre-commodity forms of
production previously prevailing in Israel. This analysis therefore re-
veals findings that are complementary to those in Chapter V.
We must keep in mind that this presentation is based mainly on pre-
1973 statistics and reflects features of the economic boom. It does not re-
flect the effects of the post-1973 economic crisis. More recent transforma-
tions in other aspects of Israel are following and may reveal some of those
effects.
A final point is to recall that these transformations that are taking
place in Israel today are very similar to the ones that were taking place
in Diaspora and eventually gave birth to proletarian Zionism, the theoreti-
cal-ideological basis of this social formation.
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III. Transformations in Rural Israel
Rural Israel is historically the planned sector of the economy, since
the Yishuv planning applied only to the Jewish part. Jewish rural Israel is
often referred to as the stronghold of Labor-Zionism and as a residual of
the socialist Yishuv community.
Earlier in this thesis we tried to argue that it was, in fact, the non-
capitalist sector of the Jewish economy based on the petty commodity form
of production (the moshav) and primitive capitalist accumulation (the kib-
butz). The latter is viewed not in light of the internal structure of the
kibbutz community, but rather from its place in the social formation and the
indispensable historical role it played in the development of Jewish capi-
talism, specifically the "closed" Jewish capitalist economy of the Yishuv.
We argue that it played the equivalent role of the "traditional" (pre-capi-
talist) sector in the development of capitalism elsewhere in the world.
These pre-capitalist forms of production are now being swept away by
the advancement of capitalist development in Israel. Most prominent in this
process are the following features:
(a) Transformation in the economy of the kibbutz.
(b) The introduction of utopian settlement with high technology pro-
duction: the case of the non-agricultural moshav.
(c) The industrialization of the Palestinian-Arab community.
(d) The transformation of land.
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A. Transformation in the Kibbutz Economy
Most striking is the emergence of "Regional Factories" of all the
kibbutzim. A "Regional Factory" is a factory belonging to several kibbutzim
im partnership, sometimes together with the Government or a private investor
in addition. Such a factory is built outside the boundaries of any of the
kibbutzim that own it, probably in order to "resolve" the contradiction of
10
"hired" labor within the kibbutz by transferring it outside its boundaries.
According to Yediot Aharonot (April 13, 1977), the "Regional Factories" of
all the kibbutzim consist of ten groups with 165 subsidiary factories, em-
ploying 5,000 workers, of which only 1,000 are members of kibbutzim.
On the emergence of this phenomenon, Davar (April 22, 1977) reports:
the "kibbutz organization of industry" has decided, with the approval of
the Histadrut, to subcontract the work "which is not appropriate to the
character of the kibbutz" to special factories, which will be situated in
Arab villages of Israel, and which will not be allowed to become complete
plants, but which will be limited only to such work of subcontracting as
will be given to them by the kibbutz industries.
This innovative idea of Regional Factories of the kibbutzim must be
seen in the context not only of furthering the reliance of Palestinian-Arab
labor to replace, hence release, kibbutznik labor into managerial or productive
labor categories in more strategic kibbutz and non-kibbutz industry. Rather,
it must be also seen in the context of adaptation of utopian socialist forms
to the capitalist transformation of the economy-at-large and in the midst
of concentration and centralization processes.
Of course, the use of these Regional Factories makes invisible the
violation of Labor-Zionist ideals, specifically the principle of Hebrew
labor. These Regional Factories are indicative of the kibbutz' transformation
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into a collective management and/or bourgeoisie. This transformation, how-
ever, is likely to promote proletarianization among both Arabs and non-kib-
butznik Jews who are now to replace the members of the kibbutzim who are
ceasing to be non-capitalist.productive manual/mental laborers and are be-
coming unproductive capitalists.
Another significant development in the political economy of the kibbutz
is the recent decision by the Kibbutz Organization of Industry, with the
approval of the Histadrut, to subcontract the work "which is not appropriate
to the character of the kibbutz" to special factories, which are to be situ-
ated in the Arab villages of Israel. This development is expected to in-
crease the localized proletarianization of citizen Palestinians in a direct
way.
These two developments in the political economy of the kibbutz have
special bearing on our analysis:
First, they signify an explicit legitimization of the kibbutz as essen-
tially an employer, contrary to its known image as a self-labor-based unit
of production.
Second, through the Regional Factory being located external to the social
boundaries of any single kibbutz, and through subcontracting to factories
located in Arab villages, the kibbutz community rids itself of the visibility
of the social, political and ideological contradictions involved in the use
of hired labor, specifically Arab. Removing hired labor from the kibbutz
dining room has also an economic dimension. The development of Regional
Factories rids the individual kibbutz of the daily cost of feeding its hired
labor force, which can otherwise be (at least morally) unavoidable, given the
employer's communal form of subsistence. The subcontracting of work to fac-
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tories placed in Arab villages is even more effective; it transfers the en-
tire subsistence cost of the hired labor to the Arab village.
To point out the relevance of the above to our central analysis is to
argue that the externalization of the problem of hired labor removes socio-
ideological and economic constraints, hence the encouragement of the kibbutz
capital to hire more and more labor. This, in effect, may imply furthering
the proletarianization process, specifically among citizen Palestinians.
The latter is emphasized in light of the urge to maintain higher rates of
profit in the face of the persisting economic crisis. This is probably why
subcontracting, which originally developed as a form of inter-kibbutz co-
operation, is now being applied to factories in Arab villages. In this
case, it is the subcontracting of work "which is not appropriate to the
character of the kibbutz." We interpret the latter as being work which in-
volves the extraction of a higher rate of surplus-value and industries that
generate mainly unskilled labor categories, such as plastic products and
food processing.
Moreover, we tend to think that both of these recent developments in the
kibbutz are linked to the militarization of the kibbutz economy, specifically
the introduction of high technology and arms-related metal industries. This
is to say, the integration of the kibbutz economy into the country's leading
export sector. The regionalization of the kibbutz industrial production
seems more directly related to efficiency measures and infrastructural com-
plexity as prerequisites for high technology industry. The Regional Factor-
ies of all the kibbutzim located on "national land" not in Arab villages are
most likely to employ non-kibbutznic Jewish labor force. The profitability
imperative underlying the emphasis on non-kibbutznic labor, and the security
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imperative underlying the emphasis on Jewish, or at least non-Arab, labor
force.
It is in the latter sense that subcontracting to factories located in
Arab villages seems related (although indirectly) to the militarization of
the kibbutz industry; it helps avoid the exposure of military production to
Palestinian-Arabs, because through subcontracting, Arab labor stops commuting
into the kibbutz and continues to productively labor for the kibbutz capital
in the Arab village itself. The transfer of the traditional industries of
the kibbutz into Arab villages does, in effect, release the kibbutznic labor
force for managing the new and more strategic industry. Traditional kibbutz
industries, which are mainly related to agricultural produce and generate
only unskilled, low-paid labor categories, can no longer attract Israeli-
Jewish labor. Maybe in this sense such work is "not appropriate to the
character of the kibbutz" and is therefore subcontracted to factories in
Arab villages.
In this sense, appropriate to the character of the kibbutz is only work
that has potential to attract Jewish labor. Of course, neither agriculture
nor agricultural produce has such potential. Only skilled labor in strate-
gic, i.e., military, industries is likely to redirect Jewish labor mobility
from services into industries. Military production is thus most promising
as far as the hiring of Jewish labor, which conforms with the principle of
self-labor, the ideological basis of the kibbutz, that gives it its peculiar
socialist-Zionist character. Without the subcontracting of unskilled indus-
trial work to factories situated in Arab villages, massive penetration of
Arab labor into the kibbutz would result, as has been happening on a wide
scale since 1967. This way, the kibbutz violates not only its principle of
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self-labor, its original interpretation of labor-Zionism, but also the prin-
ciple of Hebrew work by hiring non-Jews. This is to say, the hiring of
Arab labor in the kibbutz does entirely distort the socialist-Zionist charac-
ter of the kibbutz. Subcontracting, which reduces merely the visibility of
this distortion, is therefore a form of remedy to restore the kibbutz poten-
tial to serve the Aliyah objective. This, indeed, exposes the essentially
exclusivist character of the kibbutz as a socialist-Zionist institution, let
alone the mythology of its socialism. To be more precise, subcontracting
to factories in Arab villages represents an adaptation to accommodate the
troublesome conflict between its ideologically and politically-based exclu-
sivism, on the one hand, and the urge for profit, for hiring the cheaper
Arab labor, on the other. Notice, however, the predominance of the economic
instance over the ideological and political ones in this phase of the kibbutz
development, as a micro-cosmic picture of what is happening in the Israeli
social formation as a whole.
The development of the Regional Factories of all the kibbutzim and the
subcontracting to factories situated in Arab villages is consistent with
the current conflict between the economic instance and the political/ideo-
logical instances. Furthermore, it simultaneously represents the institu-
tionalization of the violation of the two-fold principle of self-labor/
Hebrew-work, through the use of hired labor in the Regional Factories, and
the hiring of Arab labor by means of subcontracting, on the one hand, and
the masking of these two-fold violations by externalizing the contradictions,
pretending no distortion in its socialist-Zionist character, on the other.
Since its very inception, the kibbutz as a configuration of labor-Zion-
ism has had to constantly and innovatively cope with its internal contradic-
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tion, inherent in the combination of opposites of: socialist appearance
and capitalist essence. In retrospect, the kibbutz in its concrete form
and real experience refutes the essential unity of Zionism and socialism
claimed by Borochov, the founding father of Labor-Zionism. It highlights
the essential antagonism between socialism as a proletariat alternative,
and Zionism, being ultimately a bourgeois alternative.
This is different from arguing about the kibbutz' internal contradic-
tions as being a function of incongruities between its intrinsically social-
ist character and the essentially capitalist environment into which it was
transplanted. The latter argument is misleading; it is historically inac-
curate, in the sense of misinterpreting the actual role of the kibbutz in
the creation of a settler-colonial social formation, and precisely in the
formation of Jewish social classes -- using Borochov's term -- in the "nor-
malization" of the Jewish society of Diaspora, which consisted of a "one-
people class", as Abram Leon documents.
This is different, also, from arguing that the contradictions facing
the kibbutz today are the result of inconsistencies between the theory and
practice of socialist Zionism, or the effects of Statehood, which has cen-
tralized the Jewish socio-economic existence in Palestine, resulting finally
in the current bankruptcy of the kibbutz. The kibbutz, we emphasize again,
must be viewed in the proper historical context, in terms of its role in
the creation of a Jewish social formation in Palestine and not in isola-
tion from the latter. In this sense, the kibbutz community, which formed
the core of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie in Palestine, played a major role
in the development of a Jewish social formation and, currently, in the for-
mation of Jewish proletariat and bourgeoisie; this is to say, in furthering
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the essentially uneven development of capitalism in Palestine.
Transformations in the class nature of the kibbutz community can occur
only in the embourgeoisment direction: kibbutznics becoming a faction of
the bourgeoisie, representing more the national and less the compradore
Israeli bourgeoisie.
It is a well known claim that, owing to its essentially labor-Zionist
ideological base, the kibbutz possesses an immunity against embourgeoisment;
transformation into the bourgeoisie itself. However, the contrary is evident
in retrospect, the kibbutznic labor force seems immuned precisely against
prletarianization. It is by virtue of their equal share in the collective
ownership or possession of the means of production and consumption that the
latter type of immunity prevails. Once the principle of self-labor is trans-
lated into Hebrew work, hired labor is legitimized and the kibbutz is trans-
formed into a bourgeois collective. This is to say, eventually it becomes a
collective capitalist enterprise.
Since its very inception, the kibbutz has had to cope with this paradox
of hiring labor without an embourgeoisment effect. In kibbutz Hazore'a, for
example, one of the early industrialized kibbutzim, an interesting resolution
was concluded: to use hired labor in construction, arguing that in the kib-
butz, housing is not a commodity; therefore, construction labor does not in-
volve creation of surplus-value. It can, however, replace the kibbutznics,
whose labor can then be more fully devoted to industrial production not for
direct consumption.1 1
It is important to remember that such ingenious adaptation was possible
only earlier, when the kibbutznics were still proficient in Marxism and when
the ideological-political instances still predominated the economic.
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More importantly is to point out that the hiring of labor in the case
above was not yet to free kibbutznic labor force for capitalist commodity
production, but only in pre-capitalist small-scale commodity production as
a self-employed petty bourgeoisie not in the creation of surplus-value.
Kibbutz members are, by definition, incapable of performing capitalist pro-
ductive labor. They can either labor productively in the context of pre-
capitalist relations of production, or be unproductive capitalists. This
point leads us into the imperative of hired labor in the extended self-re-
production of kibbutz capital.
We argue that as an integral part of the essentially capitalist settler-
colonial social formation in Palestine, the kibbutz, specifically for its
extended self-reproduction must hire non-kibbutznic capitalist productive
labor. It is so because kibbutz members cannot labor as wage-workers in
their own kibbutz, given the nature of their relation to the collective
means of production. The kibbutznic labor force can increase the surplus-
product but not create surplus-value. This is another way of pointing out
the inconceivability of proletarianization of kibbutznics as long as they
are kibbutz members; this membership does, by definition, give them access
to the means of production, and prevent their alienation from the latter.
It is in this sense that the kibbutz as the institutional configuration of
left-wing socialist-Zionism have played a crucial role in extending the pre-
valence of the petty bourgeoisie in Israel, and in the formation of its prin-
cipal capitalist classes; providing for reproduction of capitalist relations.
Many people view the current transformation in the political economy
of the kibbutz, specifically the use of hired labor on a massive scale, sub-
contracting and the regionalization of its industrial production, etc., as
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a capitalist transformation of an essentially socialist relations of produc-
tion. This is also misleading; since the kibbutz cannot be said to offer a
socialist alternative when its main role and reason for existence as a con-
figuration of labor-Zionism is precisely to create a Jewish class society.
A socialist alternative is one which promotes the emergence of a classless
society. The current change in the economy of the kibbutz represents rather
a capitalist transformation of pre-capitalist relations of production. The
capitalist mode of production is predominating the petty bourgeois small-
scale commodity mode, a shift from primitive into modern accumulation.
A closer look at the dynamics of social change currently occurring in
the kibbutz reveals a greater complexity with regard to objective class
locations of different kibbutz communities and sometimes of different seg-
ments of the labor force in the individual kibbutz; this is especially true
in the cases of merger with other sources of capital. For example, the
kibbutznic labor force increasingly combining management and economic owner-
ship positions in the social division of labor within the kibbutz production
process. The kibbutz, in other words, is becoming simultaneously a self-
employed collective management and an employer. Management is itself an
essentially capitalist labor category, but self-employed management, whose
labor is exchanged neither against capital nor against revenue, is external
to the realm of capitalist relations of production. The comprehension of
such reality does, indeed, call for Olin Wright's conceptualization of the
obiectively contradictory class locations. (Recall debate in Chapter I.)
Equally complex is the determination of the objective class-location
of kibbutznics who are laboring productively or unproductively in another
kibbutz or even non-kibbutznic capitalist enterprise: a phenomenon that is
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increasing in recent years, owing to labor shortages (as kibbutznics consti-
tute the core of Israel's defense army), as well as to the tendency of kib-
butz capital to concentrate for economies of scale and other considerations.
Kibbutznics as wage earners outside their own kibbutz represent a very
complex phenomenon. Simultaneously, they form a part of the bourgeoisie/
petty bourgeoisie as members in their kibbutz and perhaps part of the prole-
tariat outside its boundaries. Their situation presents a challenge to the
accepted criteria of class determination. The apparent ambiguity in their
class-location may simulate what Olin Wright refers to as "contradictory
location between the petty bourgeoisie and proletariat in the process of the
proletarianization of the petty bourgeoisie." If so, it refutes our argu-
ment regarding the immunity against proletarianization implied in kibbutz
membership. Otherwise, it raises questions regarding the ceasing of the
kibbutz to be; that is, regarding the withering-away of the kibbutz essence
and the remaining of its mere appearance.
The latter is not a question to remain in the realm of theoretical de-
bate. In reality, specifically following the 1967 War, employment of kib-
butznic labor by another kibbutz has been widely practiced in the context of
two modes of inter-kibbutz cooperation:
(1) cooperation based on manpower and capital investment;
(2) inter-kibbutz cooperation based on manpower alone.
Both forms of inter-kibbutz manpower-based cooperation are to be viewed as
the result of the increased industrialization of the kibbutz, and/or the con-
centration of kibbutz industrial capital in the post-1967 period.
A concrete example of the first type of cooperation is the Hazore'a
wood industry in kibbutz Hazore'a. It started in partnership with a private
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entrepreneur and hired labor. In recent years, kibbutz Hazore'a decided to
set up an inter-kibbutz partnership with the neighboring kibbutz Giva'at-Oz.
Kibbutz Hazore'a holds two-thirds of the investment capital and manpower,
while kibbutz Giva'at-Oz has one-third of each. Profits are divided in the
12
same proportion, two-thiras to Hazore'a, and one-third to Giva'at-Oz.
Another example is Arad plant in kibbutz Dalia going into partnership
with kibbutz Ramot Menashe, both in manpower and capital investment. Some
of the latter's members travel daily to work in the plant in kibbutz Dalia.
Ramot Menashe in this case supplies 20 percent of capital investment and
manpower in the Arad plant in kibbutz Dalia.13
As far as their objective class-location, we argue that the labor force
of kibbutz Giva'at-Oz employed in kibbutz Hazore'a wood industry and that of
kibbutz Ramot Menashe employed in kibbutz Dalia'a Arad plant are not prole-
tariat. They are more likely to fall within the boundaries of the petty
bourgeoisie, since they are essentially self-employed by the capital share
of their own kibbutzim in those industries. In this sense, they do not
create surplus-value for either kibbutz.
In the second system of cooperation, based on manpower alone, "the in-
dustrial plant is owned by one of the kibbutzim and members of a neighboring
kibbutz go to work there. The neighboring kibbutz only participates in the
plant insofar as manpower is concerned, and in return, the workers are paid
wages and their kibbutz is allocated a certain share of the profit after de-
duction of profits on capital investment."14
An example is the Nirim Electronics Israel plant for military production.
Until 1967, both kibbutz Nirim and kibbutz Megan had an electronics factory.
Now, labor flows from kibbutz Magen into Nirim Electronics Israel plant.
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In this form of employment outside one's own kibbutz, the employees at
best mobilize revenue but do not contribute to the accumulation process in
their own kibbutz. In kibbutz Nirim, however, they seem to perform capital-
ist productive and most likely manual non-supervisory social forms of labor.
Unlike the former example, in this case the wage earning kibbutznics are
closer to proletariat class-location. But can they belong to the working
class while they still, as members of kibbutz Magen, exercise an
economic ownership or possession over some means of production. They are
not separated from their means of labor, at least land, even in the worst
situation, say for instance, their own kibbutz industry going bankrupt.
It is this latter example that may lead to the questioning of the
theoretical inconceivability of the proletarianization of kibbutznic labor
force, and it is to this situation that the latter conceptualization by Olin
Wright may be applied.
In such cases, does not the Magen community constitute merely the
shell of a kibbutz reality? Does not it liken a "Bantu", a communal semi-
subsistence community whose primary function is to reproduce labor power to
be productively utilized in another collective capitalist enterprise (kib-
butz Nirim)? Does this differ from the "big fish swallowing the little" in
the process of capital accumulation being inevitably also a process of con-
centration? Does not this phenomenon also simulate the essential unevenness
of capitalist transformation and the inseparability of development and under-
development in capitalist accumulation?
Manpower merger in the case of these two kibbutzim, which is becoming
a common practice among all kibbutzim, seems clearly to simulate, both con-
tradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie and proletariat in the
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process of the proletarianization of the petty bourgeoisie (in the case of
kibbutz Magen) and a contradictory location between the petty bourgeoisie
and bourgeoisie in the process of embourgeoisment of the petty bourgeoisie
(in the case of kibbutz Nirim). It is more likely that objectively contra-
dictory locations be only conjunctural; kibbutzim may end forming either
part of the bourgeoisie or of the working class. Such class polarization is
promoted by the merger of kibbutz capital with other sources of capital,
especially foreign investment capital and national cooperative (mainly His-
tadrut) and private capital. Abraham Yassour, a well-known kibbutznic
theoretician indicates that the financing of industrialization has derived
only in part from sources within the kibbutz itself.
1 5
The merger with external sources of capital is, undoubtedly, a prerequi-
site for this large-scale, high technology, and rapidly growing industriali-
zation. According to the same source, this process has resulted in the
establishment of some 200 very modern (most likely military-related) indus-
trial plants in a period of ten to fifteen years. What is taking place in
the kibbutz today seems an irreversible transformation that negates all poten-
tial restoration of self-labor. This merger of capital can only intensify
the dependence on non-kibbutznic labor force to create surplus-value. A
situation that promises further proletarianization of Palestinian Arabs and
Israeli-Jews and, in effect, promotes the material conditions for cross-
national proletariat alliances.
According to Samuel Pohoryles, while the number of workers in kibbutz
industry rose by 184 percent in the years 1960-74, the increase in the whole
of Israeli industry rose by about 56 percent. Consequently, the percentage
of workers in kibbutz industry, as against the country's overall industrial
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labor force rose from 4 percent to 7.2 percent. From 1952 to 1974, the num-
ber of those employed in industry in the kibbutz increased nearly five-fold.
Pohoryles also states, "among the various settlement forms in Israel, the
most rapid rate of industrial growth took place in the kibbutz.' 6
These figures are somehow to substantiate the relative effect of kibbutz
industrialization on the proletarianization process. To sum up, several
studies have examined intra-kibbutz and inter-kibbutz stratification, but
none has examined the possibilities of class-transformation. This is propo-
sing an important subject for future research that emerges from our present
study. A future research must also focus on whether, in cases similar to
kibbutz Magen, the entire kibbutz community is drifting as a unity into pro-
letariat class-location or becoming, itself, internally segmented by class;
a proletariat employed in external enterprises, and a self-employed petty
bourgeois farmer or craftsman. Once a kibbutz community is proletarianized,
or transformed into a collective modern employer or into a class society, the
kibbutz, essentially, does no longer exist; even if the appearance may be
conserved as a living museum, commemorating the early settlers' egalitarian-
pioneerism in the route to advanced capitalism, a situation not unlike the
living museum in the town of Plymouth, Sturbridge, etc. of Massachusetts,
commemorating the primitive habitat of the early Pilgrims in their very road
to technological America.
The regionalization of the kibbutz industrial production and the subcon-
tracting to small subsidiaries situated in Arab villages and which are system-
atically maintained as incomplete plants, seem to represent the beginning of
conglomeration of kibbutz capital.
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B. The Non-agricultural Moshav: A High Technology Utopia
Modern industrialization of Israel's rural frontiers is not confined
to the kibbutz. It is also penetrating the co-operative moshav. A pre-
vious chapter gives an account of the non-agricultural rural co-opera-
tives, mainly based on high technology production and populated by recent
Western immigrants with sophisticated training in science and engineering.
Again, in the case of moshav industrial development, regional industrial
development is a high priority, as especially recommended by Raanan Wietz,
Israel's internationally-known regional-rural planner.
We have already discussed the penetration of Israeli investment capi-
tal into Arab villages in Israel and in occupied territories, since the
persisting of the country's economic crisis. We emphasized how the latter
is likely to speed up proletarianization among Arabs and the former among
Jews. Concomitant to this rapid industrialization of the rural frontiers
is the capitalist transformation of Jewish agriculture. The latter has
special bearing on Palestinian proletarianization and carries a peculiar
political significance in the context of Zionist settler-colonialism.
Chapter III provides a detailed descriptive account of the penetration
of citizen and non-citizen Palestinians as cash-croppers, even into the co-
operative and collective Jewish farms in the moshav and the kibbutz, the
strongholds of Labor-Zionism, the articulate symbols of the "Return to the
Soil", and restoration of the "Bond with the Land", the very basis of the
territorial solution to the Jewish question.
It is only in these forms of settlement, where agricultural work is so
politically/ideologically loaded, that capitalist transformation in the post-
1967 period had such dramatic impact on the Israeli society. Capitalist
agricultural production elsewhere in the country was neither new nor carried
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political/ideological significance.
"Non-agricultural co-operative villages could constitute such a chal-
lenge. They could be populated with communities that are homogeneous as
regards their culture, way of living and even their occupations. They com-
prise a social challenge of the highest degree of employment in creating
socially valuable cells of a new type of community organization. They
can prove suited to educational and professional backgrounds of immigrants
from advanced countries, whose training and educational background can
find adequate outlet in forms of employment with which they are familiar
J,7and experienced from their countries of origin. If implemented, the pro-
posal outlined here may result in the creation of communities based on a
set of special values without precluding the utilization of modern tecno-
logical and scientific advantages. The structure of these proposed settle-
ments is based on three points:
First, they will be run according to the rules of a co-operative
community.
Second, they will constitute closed communities, entry into which
will be dependent upon acceptance by an elected committee of the settle-
ment. Enlistment of prospective members from abroad ought to be carried
out, as far as possible, in their countries of origin.
Third, the size of the settlement will be limited. The choice of
enterprises must ensure, among other things, economies of scale in the
present and future, and the level of education, professional training and
personal inclinations of the candidate.
These non-agricultural co-operative villages are different from the
kibbutz, moshav shitoufi and moshav ovdim -- the traditional strongholds
of Labor-Zionism. Unlike the former, they are to be an integral part of
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the international division of labor, an extension of metropolitan production
increasingly concentrating on high technology military export products; hence
lacking the petty bourgeoisie Labor-Zionist ideological element that cannot co-
exist with modern technology, the economic base of the new co-operatives.
Given their simpler infrastructure, compared with the metropolitan and
given the co-operative character of the daily reproduction of their labor
power, subsistence cost, hence the cost of production, may decline, thus be-
coming a more profitable site for foreign investment. And while still repre-
senting an exciting experimental form of life, may attract the immigration of
the very manpower in demand within military production; consequently, fulfill-
ing both the economic and political objectives.
Weitz identifies three kinds of non-agricultural co-operative villages
to be presently in existence: (1) Nevei Ilan group, consisting mainly of mem-
bers of Yehuda Hatsair youth movement, active in the United States. The first
members of this group arrived in Israel in 1969. The enterprises envisaged are
to correspond to the qualifications of the members, most of whom have academic
training in the natural sciences, social sciences and the fine arts. Thus,
projects proposed included industrial plants, services, and consultancies.
Already in operation is a plant for manufacture of electronic appliances,
a computer service and consultation center and an agricultural branch. (2)
The Aliyah 70 group, composed of immigrants from the Soviet Union, mainly
from Kiev. They are academicians, for the main part engineers, who arrived
in the country after 1970. The group consists of twenty members who have
formed a limited liability company. Projected industries are electronic and
optical industries and chemical laboratories. (3) Yahdav (Kfar Etzion C.)
is a group composed of 25 young religious families from the United States.
The heads of these families are in the process of completing M.A.s or doctor-
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ates. They include electronic engineers, programmers, chemists, psycholo-
gists, and the like. In consideration of the qualifications of the members,
industrial and chemical plants, etc.
These examples are very indicative of the purpose of this brilliant
rural industrialization scheme and the role it plays in furthering the ac-
cumulation of the dominant capital; in this case, joint ventures of public
(Histadrut) capital and foreign investment capital. Equally important is
the potential this scheme has for accommodating the currently conflicting
but non-contradictory interests of the traditional national bourgeoisie
(represented by the Likud Party) regarding Jewish settlement and coloniza-
tion, hence national independence, and the interests of the modern national
bourgeoisie (represented by RAFI and the Democratic Movement for Change --
DMC) regarding the internationalization of capital and interdependence be-
tween Israeli capital and international monopoly, from which big Jewish
capital has become irreversibly indivisible.
These high technology-based utopian settlements are linked to the mili-
tary industrialization in the country at large. Military industrialization
applies not only to the metropolitan habitat, but also to new and old habi-
tat forms that house old and new Western Jews. The transformation in the
kibbutz economy illustrated earlier is probably a symptom of the same pro-
cess.
Military industrialization of the rural frontiers is part and parcel
of the "Judiazation" programs, a new name for Jewish settlement, for the
"conquest of land"; that is, Judiazation through absorption of Jewish immi-
grants. This must not be interpreted in terms of value inherent in land
acquisition per se (except for the case in the occupied territories). In
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the Galilee in particular the Judiazation schemes are motivated primarily
by the imperative of Jewish demographic superiority.
Military industrialization of the rural frontiers is, therefore, pro-
vision of material incentives for Aliyah, for population dispersion, and
for readjustment of the demographic map to new political and economic re-
quirements.
An illustration of a more recent adjustment is a proposal by Defense
Minister Shimon Peres (presented in the Government meeting on May 8, 1977)
to transfer 11 military factories with their 3,000 workers from central
locations in the country into the Negev and transfer of other military fac-
tories and training school with their 4,000 employees from Haifa into the
Galilee; a relocation scheme with an initial cost of 60 million I.L. Minis-
ter Peres added that a new additional arms factory will be erected in Segif
(a Jewish settlement) near Sakhnin (an Arab village).
Concomitant with the transplantation of military industrial plants in
rural Jewish settlements is the transfer of the supplanted traditional
industries of these settlements into Arab villages. Military industriali-
zation of Jewish rural settlements is, therefore, resulting in non-military
industrialization of the Arab community.
C. The Industrialization of the Arab Community: Development or Plunder?
For small local Israeli private capital to accumulate in the face of
more competitive capital in the country, the Arab community represents the
indispensable fertile investment site. Only in the least developed com-
munities where subsistence cost is lowest can this form of capital reap
super-profit. And only with super-profit can this capital increase its
organic composition and expand.
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The penetration of Israeli-Jewish capital into the Arab village is,
indeed, the transfer of the effects of the main contradiction of the "cen-
ter" to the "periphery". One aspect of the main contradiction is the high-
priced Jewish labor commodity being historically organized and in demand
against the penetration of Arab labor into Jewish enterprises. The histori-
cal practices of Labor-Zionism apply more to the Arab community with post-
1948 borders. The other aspect of the main contradictions is in the cur-
rent requirements of the highly developed productive forces and under in-
tensified competition to offset the falling tendency of the rate of profit,
hence the urge for higher relative surplus value in the form of super-profit,
through dynamic integration of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover,
in the face of the concentration tendencies reviewed earlier in this chap-
ter, the vulnerable material conditions prevalent today in the Arab-Pales-
tinian community specifically under occupation provide probably a last
chance for petty Jewish capital in Israel to become productive capital;
hence to avoid extinction through the massive wave of concentration.
Through concentration of cheap workers, this petty capital can expand
its constant capital and survive the "Great Transformation" occurring in
the Israeli economy. As mentioned earlier, this very concentration pro-
cess is as much the effect as the cause of penetrating the indigenous rural
frontiers.
It is no longer satisfying to the development requirements of the Is-
raeli economy to mobilize this cheap labor into the work place; the Pales-
tinian labor power commodity becomes more expensive upon crossing the
Green Line into Israel. Plus, the cost of work permit and Raise share.
Exchanging Palestinian labor power at the very site of its reproduction
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is conducive to a high rate of profit.
With the Likud political/economic program, local Israeli capital is
given the "green light" to cross the "Green Line". One of the most re-
cent studies that document the increasing investment in, and industrializa-
tion of, the occupied territories is a 1977 Carnegie Report by Brian Van
18Arkadie.
This process is likely to increase the proletarianization of Pales-
tinians by Israeli capital. This phenomenon has not only recently emerged,
but only recently it became more of a rule than an exception. Since the
earlier years of occupation, the West Bank has had industrial workers and
agricultural cash-croppers in enterprises owned by members of the Israeli
national bourgeoisie or jointly with Palestinian feudal landlords, who are
thus merging into the bourgeoisie itself. The actual size of wage earners
employed in a proletariat capacity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is un-
known. According to Jamil Hilal, in 1973 there were 59,700 wage workers
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working in the territories, compared to 70,800 in 1969. Although Hilal re-
fers to these as proletariat simply because they are wage earners, it is
still unclear to us how many of them are actually involved in productive,
manual, non-supervisory labor, and therefore objectively belong to prole-
tariat locations.
The size of Palestinian proletariat locally employed in the occupied
territories and Arab villages in Israel is definitely expected to grow in
response to the increasing penetration of Israeli investment capital into
the traditional Palestinian community.
The localization of Palestinian proletarianization (through the mobil-
ity of Israeli-Jewish capital into the very site of self-reproduction of
567
Palestinian-Arab labor power) is new. It represents a special phase in
the integration of the indigenous population into the settlers' economy
and more precisely into the dominant mode of accumulation, currently being
advanced capitalism.
This type of integration through the transplanting of agricultural and
industrial enterprises by the Israeli national capital is considered by
some Israeli officials as community development for the absorption of
Palestinian refugees, hence the settlement of their national question. We
argue that this tendency of Israeli investment capital to move into tradi-
tional Palestinian communities is essentially related to the intensifica-
tion of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall with the persistence of
the economic crisis since the 1973 October War. The intensification of this
structural tendency of a falling rate of profit in turn urges capital to
extract a higher relative rate of surplus value. The latter is economically
more feasible and politically more appealing through the mobility of Is-
raeli-Jewish capital into Arab communities than in the case of Palestinian-
Arab labor mobility into Jewish work places. This way, the Israeli national
bourgeoisie:
(a) rids itself of paying for work permits when the employed are non-
citizen Palestinians;
(b) reduces the cost of production because subsistence cost is lower
in Arab villages and falls mainly on the extended family and the traditional
sector of production;
(c) increases the realized profit from accumulated surplus value
through centrally-provided tax exemption incentives for investment in rural
frontiers;
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(d) gets access to Arab female labor, whose mobilization into capi-
talist production in Jewish work places may otherwise be impossible, owing
to their subjegation to patriarchal oppression. This implies, therefore,
an access to a more vulnerable labor force, hence conducive to the creation
of higher surplus value;
(e) moreover, by investing its small capital in Palestinian-Arab com-
munities, the Israeli national bourgeoisie temporarily avoids the competi-
tion with the compradore and international bourgeoisie, whose merging big
capital is invested in Jewish rural and urban communities and mainly in
high technology products for export. That is why (as we have documented in
a previous chapter) Israeli small capital is reviving indigenous tradition-
al industries like olive oil soap and other small-scale manufacturing.
The industrialization of traditional rural settlements is, therefore,
consistent with the survival and profit imperatives of the Israeli national
bourgeoisie. Whether or not it leads to economic development of the "tra-
ditional" Arab sector depends not on the employment multiplier effect such
investment generates in these localities, but rather on the extent to which
the inhabitants of these villages share in the economic ownership of these
enterprises, hence the extent to which they exercise control over their own
sources of employment. The central issue, however, is to emphasize that
the considerations identified above can promise only to enlarge the size of
the proletariat, even though the penetration of non-citizen Palestinians
across the Green Line border seems to be declining.
Further enlargement in the size of the proletariat is expected to be
the result of capitalist transformation of agriculture.
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D. The Transformation of Agriculture
This is mainly capitalist transformation of predominantly petty commo-
dity agriculture production. Reference is to the co-operative/collective
sector of agriculture; not to traditionally commercial agriculture (citrus
plantations) in the coastal region of Israel.
As the case in the transformation of the petty commodity forms of in-
dustrial production, this process was also stimulated by the advanced capi-
talist transformation of the entire economy, especially its militarization,
on the one hand, and the abundance of cheap Palestinian labor, on the other.
Transformations in the relations of production and the productive for-
ces after the Six-Day War affected transformation in land tenure and use.
This applies both to Palestinian land in the occupied territories and to
Israel "National Land".
Nothing is unique about the pattern of transformation in the tradi-
tional Palestinian land tenure upon the integration of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip to the Israeli branch of central capitalism. It is very
much the same process prevalent in dependent capitalist peripheries the
world over: landlords becoming absentee capitalists, mainly money capital-
ists; concentration of land for commercialized agritultural production --
plantations. Tenants and share-croppers transformed into cash-croppers,
agricultural proletariat.
In a plan published in Al-Hamishmar, October 7, 1976, Raanan Wietz
proposed the introduction of a Green Revolution technology, specifically
high-yield grain-seed varieties to the West Bank. If implemented, this
plan will further the transformation of both land tenure and use.
What is unique, indeed, is the transformation of land tenure and use
in the Jewish co-operative rural sector; the moshav shitufee and the kib-
butz. In these cases, land is essentially the inalienable property of the
Jewish State. A Jew, by Israeli law, has an inalienable right to use this
so-called "national land". Put differently, the Israeli-Jew is implicitly,
by definition, and explicitly, by law, entitled at least to possession of
land. "Possession" is the capacity to put the means of production into
operation. This is slightly different from "economic ownership", which is
the real control of the means of production, i.e., the power to assign the
means of production to given uses and so to dispose of the products ob-
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tained.
Economic ownership and possession are the two aspects of the double
relationship of which the relations of production in a class society con-
sist. The double relationship refers to: (a) the relationship between
the non-worker (the owner) and the object and means of labor; (b) the re-
lationship between the immediate producer (the direct worker) and the ob-
ject and means of labor.
In every class society it is the owners who have real control over the
means of production and exploit the direct producers by extorting surplus
labor from them in various forms (like surplus-value, Fund-of-Rent, etc.),
depending on the particular mode of production.
This ownership, the real economic, is to be distinguished from "legal
ownership", which is sanctioned by law and belongs to the superstructure.
The law generally ratifies economic ownership, but it is possible for the
forms of legal ownership not to coincide with real economic ownership. In
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this case it is the latter which is determined in defining the places of
social classes, that is to say, the places of the dominant and exploiting
class.2 1
In Jewish rural Israel there is an ambiguity as to who really owns
the land. The kibbutz and the co-operative moshav lease the land from the
superstructure for ninety-five years. During this period of time they
have possession over their parcels of land. This way they are entrusted
by the State to put these leased parcels of land into use exclusively by
Jews.
Prior to the 1967 war, many Jewish farms, be they collective (kibbutz),
co-operative (moshav shitufi), or family units (non-co-operative moshavs
inhabited mainly by Oriental-Jews), used hired labor especially during
harvest. In most cases, hired labor was then similar to domestic service,
mainly in the form of extra consumption on the part of the household, be
it family unit, co-operative, or collective. It did not necessarily in-
volve profit-making. This is because agriculture was primarily for sub-
sistence and secondarily for exchange. Hired labor, in many of those
cases, was not engaged in commodity production and it was mainly exchanged
against revenue not capital. The Jewish employer in these cases was still
a direct producer himself. In such cases, hired labor was not employed
in the context of capitalist relations of production.
In the post-1967 era, with the availability of abundant reservoirs
of dispossessed Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories and an
increasing number of landless citizen-Palestinians, this very land in the
possession of self-employed Jewish farmers turned overnight into capital;
capital as a social relation, not a thing.
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What is peculiar about this process is that by virtue of mere posses-
sion of land and not actual economic ownership of the means of production
Jewish "farmers" are now hiring labor for profit, for capital accumulation;
a situation not much different from processes occurring during the land en-
closures in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe.
It was then the rentiers, not the propertiers, who were first to make
a profit in the process of primitive accumulation by means of employing non-
family labor on that rented land. It can be said in both cases, of these
rentiers and these Jewish leasers, that it was precisely the time-limitness
of access (in the form of possession) to the land underlying the urge to
maximize its use through profit-making. It is, in other words, the fear of
proletarianization that the consolidation of capitalism generates, that
urged Jewish farmers in that critical moment (1967, which represents a
turning point in the capitalist transformation of the Israeli economy) to
redefine their relation to the "national land" they possessed as one of
ownership, in an attempt to form part of the bourgeoisie.
This strategic move obviously represents a choice of a particular
class transformation. Unlike that, proletarianization is never the result
of one's own choice. How did this capitalist transformation of semi-sub-
sistence Jewish rural Israel occur? And what has transformed co-operative
land from a means of subsistence into capital? To answer these questions
is to recall Karl Marx on primitive accumulation, in which the transforma-
tion of the means of subsistence into capital takes place, and how through
capital surplus-value is made and from surplus-value, more capital. Marx
writes:
"This transformation can only take place under certain
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circumstances that centre in this, viz., that two very
different kinds of commodity-possessors must come face-to-
face into contace; on the one hand, the owners of money,
means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager
to increase the sum of values they possess by buying other
people's labor power; on the other hand, free laborers, the
sellers of their own labor power, and therefore, the sellers
of labor.. .With this polarisation of the market for commodi-
ties, the fundamental conditions of capitalist production
are given. The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete
separation of the laborers from all property in the means
by which they can realise their labor. As soon as capital-
ist production is on its own legs, it not only maintains this
separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale.
The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist
system can be none other than the process which takes away
from the laborer the possession of his means of production,
a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means
of subsistence and of production into capital; on the other
hand the immediate producer into wage laborer. The so-called
primitive accumulation is, therefore, nothing else than the
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of
production...The starting point of the development that gave
rise to the wage laborer as well as to the capitalist was the
servitude of the laborer." 22
The analysis Marx provides explains how the 1967 military occupation
intensified the capitalist transformation of the Israeli economy, including
even its co-operative and collective semi-subsistence agriculture. How,
consequently, the simultaneous availability of Palestinian sellers of labor
for any price, and of Jewish possessors of rural "national" land resulted
in capitalist relations of production; these Palestinians (as the case in
transformation of all producers into wage workers) became "free" sellers
of themselves only after they have been robbed of all their own means of
production and all other guarantees of subsistence. This is another way
of saying that proletarianization is essentially the alternative for no
other choice. It is the entire separation of the direct producer from the
object and means of labor. It is this decisive modification of the place
of the direct producer in the capitalist (as compared to pre-capitalist)
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relations of production which makes labor itself into a commodity; and
this determines the generalization of the commodity form.
This raises again the question regarding the inconceivability of the
proletarianization of Israeli-Jews, given that a Jew is automatically en-
titled to the use of land, the property of the Jewish State, and by defini-
tion has an inalienable right to land possession. Unlike the Palestinian-
Arabs, for Israeli-Jews mobility and/or immobility off the land is ultimate-
ly a matter of choice; laboring productively as manual, non-supervisory
wage earners is thus still a matter of choice. Does the latter, therefore,
objectively signify an actual proletarianization?
Unlike the question raised earlier regarding the inconceivability of
a settler-colonial proletariat, this question relates specifically to the
Zionist settler-colonial context, distinguished by its unsecular character.
Both questions, however, point out a conjunctural conflict between the
laws of capital accumulation and the laws of Zionist colonization. The
former are most likely to enforce the secularization of the Jewish State.
This is probably linked to the victory of the Likud against Yadin's Move-
ment for Change in the recent elections. The former, with their allies
the fanatic religious orthodoxy, are the most committed to rescuing the
Jewish State from secularization through capitalist transformation. Their
success to do so will inevitably result in the rise of fascism.
To sum up this point is to point out the unsecular character of the
superstructure as an objective impediment for Israeli-Jewish-Palestinian-
Arab proletariat alliance. The secularization of the "base" theoretically
transforms the superstructure, rsulting therefore, in turn, in material
conditions more favorable to such alliances.
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As demonstrated by Chapter III, State and public institutions are fail-
ing to control their sectarian land use policy. Legal sanctions imposed on
Jewish land leasees who are employing Arab labor are proved to be ineffec-
tive. They resulted in discrete forms of transfer back to Arab hands the
tilling of their land; discrete methods that are ironically not different
from those used in the Yishuv to transfer Arab land to Jewish tillers.
Most striking of all is the emergence of a land market in which land
becomes merely a secular commodity, transferable freely, subject to market
exchange relations.
This process is an aspect of liberalization policy as investment in-
centive to facilitate penetration and accumulation of capital, foreign and
local.
IV. Conclusions
The process of concentration of production as well as the transforma-
tions in rural Israel represent secularization of the relations of produc-
tion. Transformation of the sectarian impositions of Labor-Zionism, secu-
larization in the sense that the relations of production are no longer pre-
dominantly Jewish. Jewish labor is increasingly employed by foreign monopoly
capital. Israeli Jewish capital (private and co-operative) is increasingly
employing Palestinian-Arab labor. The Jewish petty bourgeoisie is increas-
ingly transformed into capitalist employer of Palestinian labor. State and
public capital in high technology, as we recall from other parts of this
thesis, employ also non-Jewish European migratory labor. This means class
struggle in Israel is no longer Jewish, i.e., internal to Jewish life, as
it was planned to be by proletarian Zionists.
The historical material prerequisites for the Jewishness of the State
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superstructure have been secularized. Israel's material "base" is
no longer purely or even predominantly Jewish as far as struggling forces,
class forces. This may imply that the State of Israel is theoretically no
longer a Jewish State. It is no longer a relation of struggling Jewish
classes; a manifestation of class antagonism peculiar to and internal to
Jewish society. The principal contradictions are increasingly located be-
tween Israeli-Jewish labor and foreign monopoly capital, on the one hand,
and Israeli-Jewish capital and Palestinian-Arab labor, on the other.
In the current phase, the State of Israel manifests the culmination of
the contradiction inherent in Labor-Zionism: its closed Jewish sectarian-
ism versus its open capitalist secularism. Conflict is thus emerging
today between Zionism and the essential internationalization of capital.
The coincidence once existing between the two is over. It was seemingly
only a transitional coincidence. In this sense, not only the unique fea-
tures of this settler-colonial formation have transformed. There is also
a functional transformation, as is happening in other settler-colonial for-
mations. Perhaps settler-colonial formations are essentially transitional
formations.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
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This thesis was an attempt to examine forces that have finally culmi-
nated in the integration of Palestinian-Arab labor into productive, manual
and non-supervisory employment by Israeli-Jewish capital -- the formation
of a Palestinian proletariat in Israel.
These forces were examined against ones that in the past have impeded
the proletarianization of Palestinian labor.
Examining the above was motivated by the purpose of assessing material
conditions impeding and promoting the possibility of cross-national prole-
tarian alliances between Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs.
Using the most conservative criteria for defining the boundaries of
the working class, it was found that by 1974 more than 75 percent of all
officially registered Palestinian wage-earners employed by Israeli capital
were, in fact, proletariat. They constituted 30.6 percent of the entire
wage-earners in Israel. All together, 44 percent of all Israeli-Jewish
and Palestinian-Arab wage-earners in Israel were engaged in productive,
manual, non-supervisory labor categories and, therefore, jointly belonged
to the proletariat class and shared a common class interest.
For the first time in the history of the Israeli social formation
Jewish proletarianization and Palestinian-Arab proletarianization were no
longer mutually-exclusive processes.
This was a firat material prerequisite for the potential development
of cross-national proletarian alliance. It therefore represents a turning
point in the Israeli-Palestinian history. Only when the imperative of
exclusive Jewish proletarianization in Palestine was undermined could Arab
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and Jewish labor develop a common class interest.
Historical evidence from this study suggests that undermining the impera-
tive of exclusive Jewish proletarianization and, consequently, the proletar-
ianization of Palestinians in Israel, were changes in the relations of pro-
duction and the state of development and requirements of the productive for-
ces at the disposal of Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 war,
To be more precise, the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel
resulted from the interaction between the forces and relations of production
in this transitional phase: transition from the stage of competitive Jewish
capitalism to that of concentration through direct integration of the Israeli
social formation to the international division of labor, when the State of
Israel was urged to intervene directly in the essential internationalization
of capital.
The internationalization of capital involves the integration and subor-
dination of pre-capitalist economic formations that until then were preva-
lent in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The integration and subordination
of these pre-capitalist formations as a marketplace and as a source of cheap
labor power were indispensible for accumulation and reproduction of Israel's
local productive capital and the capitalization of its petty capital.
These two forms of capital were forced to expand the site of their re-
production if they were to survive the competition inflicted by the massive
inflow of foreign investment capital.
The 1967 War represents a turning point in the historical development
of Israel. It was an expression of transformation of the relations of pro-
duction and thus the beginning of a new historical phase.
The victory won by Israel in the Six-Day War resulted in mobilizing
foreign monopolies to invest in Israel's high technology arms industry. This
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investment is another level of the essential internationalization of capital
undertaken by the Jewish State on behalf of big Jewish capital as an integral
part of international monopoly capital.
Investment in high technology military industry was the optimal choice
of development strategy capable of stabilizing the crisis-ridden economy of
Israel and of furthering the development of its productive forces. This was
an optimal development strategy for Israel in the sense of having a compara-
tive advantage in this field of production, as well as a competitive
position in the international commodity market.
Israel possessed very little national resources and local market possi-
bilities. However, Israel constituted a pool of scientifically trained immi-
grant labor force whose cost of training was therefore exogenous; it falls,
by-and-large, on the immigrants' countries of origin -- a condition that re-
duces the cost of high technology production in Israel, and consequently,
promotes Israel's position in the sphere of circulation. The arms industry,
therefore, soon became the leading exporting sector in Israel's civilian
economy. The requirements for, and the effects of, high productivity
in this sector stimulated concentration of production and further division
of labor in the country at large.
These are features of stabilization effects necessarily inflicted by
military industrialization.
In the face of concentration resulting from higher productivity, small
capital had either to get engulfed by bigger capital or to increase the con-
centration of workers and reap super profits. This is the only way for
small capital to accumulate and increase its organic composition in the ini-
tial stages. Local capital thus moved into Arab communities.
On the other hand, the increased division of labor necessary for effi-
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ciency and discipline of the labor force resulted in increasing the number
of unskilled categories in the labor process.
Both consequences implied greater demand for unskilled labor in Israel.
If for nothing but political and security considerations, unskilled
labor categories in arms and arms-related industries are likely to be per-
formed by Oriental-Jews, not by Palestinian-Arabs. The latter, therefore,
became increasingly in demand in non-military industries, primarily where
consumer goods predominates.
For the first time in the history of Palestine, demand for both Arab
and Jewish labor simultaneously became consistent with the requirement of
reproduction of the dominant relations of production in the country and the
development of its productive forces. This is another way of identifying a
basic transformation of the social relations historically prevalent in the
Israeli social formation and derived from its labor or proletarian Zionist
tradition. This basic transformation was the result of the essential inter-
nationalization of capital by which the process of Palestinian proletariani-
zation was unfettered.
The essential internationalization of capital is related to the essen-
tial unevenness of capitalist accumulation inherent in the fundamental ten-
dency of the organic composition of capital to increase.
Consequently, the essential unevenness of capitalist development is
represented in the urge of higher forms of capital to integrate less develop-
ed forms of production as a condition and site for the reproduction of domi-
nant capital.
In "Greater Israel" the requirements for reproduction of the dominant
capital, as well as the essentially Jewish relations of production, had to
clash, transforming the initial conditions dictated by Labor-Zionism.
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Labor-Zionism, the condition necessary to the initiation of the pro-
cess of exclusive Jewish capitalist formation in Palestine, was destroyed
by the process itself. This is an example of the dialectics of develop-
ment. Similarly, the settler-colonial social formation, transplanted
once in Palestine to replace the indigenous Palestinian social formation,
is increasingly urged by the requirements of its extended self-reproduc-
tion to reintegrate the remnants of the Palestinian social formation,
This reintegration is socially expressing itself in the formation of
a joint social force. This is the proletariat class -- combined Israeli-
Jews and Palestinian-Arabs -- who are located in the bottom of Israel's
social division of labor, identically performing productive, manual and
non-supervisory labor categories. Owing to their identical objective
place in the production process, they share common class location and
class interest. This commonality of class location and interest is a
necessary material condition but not a sufficient prerequisite for an
actual proletarian alliance. Two types of impediments against actual
alliance prevail in the present:
(a) Material impediments. Central to these impediments is the in-
ternal segmentation of the proletariat subject to differential locations
in the social formation as a whole, specifically in relation to the State
apparatuses. This structural segmentation distorts their unifying essential
antagonism as the exploited class against the ruling class objectively
dictated by the commonality of their place in the production process and,
instead, highlights their relatively contradictory interests as class
fractions: the "super-exploited" and the "labor aristocracy",
Contrasted with these segmentations, however, are structural trans-
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formations that tend to offset their effects. Specifically, through
secularization trends in the economic "base" and, consequently, in the
political-ideological "superstructure". This involves secularization of
what initially was Jewish relations of production and class struggle:
local Israeli-Jewish capital is now increasingly employing Palestinian-
Arab labor and foreign monopoly capital is increasingly employing Israeli
Jewish labor. The relations of production are thus no longer Jewish.
Class antagonism which was systematically internalized to Jewish
life through the policy of exclusive Jewish proletarianization by Jewish
capital in Palestine, and in order to give content to the Jewish State
as a relation of struggling Jewish classes, is no longer present princi-
pally between Jewish labor and Jewish capital. Rather, it has been in-
creasingly externalized through the intervention of the State in the es-
sential internationalization of capital. The principal class antago-
nisms are, nowadays, between Israeli-Jewish capital and Palestinian-Arab
labor, on the one hand, and Israeli-Jewish labor and foreign monopoly
capital, on the other. The "abnormalities" of Diaspora are being thus
reproduced in Israel itself. Those abnormalities are most likely to al-
ter the existing relations to the State apparatus underlying the segmen-
tation of the working class, resulting in material conditions more favor-
able for proletarian alliances. Furthermore, the emerging new material
conditions may give rise to forms of consciousness that are alien to
Zionism and more favorable for the development of revolutionary proletar-
ian consciousness, These are only hypotheses for future research.
It should be indicated here that only through historical analysis
based on the dialectical materialist method did it become possible to
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comprehend the proletarianization process, specifically the structural
transformations in Israel's settler-colonial social formation, which
constitutes the dynamics underlying the demand for Palestinian labor.
(b) Non-material conditions. These are the subjective conditions
in the sphere of consciousness which are imperative for an- actual alli-
ance.
Nationalism and other forms of false consciousness prevalent among
the various segments of this proletariat is an absolute barrier against
actual cross-national proletarian alliances today, even between Oriental
Jews and Palestinians, who share more commonality of material conditions.
In conjunction with the issue of nationalism, it is not clear from
this study whether the proletarianization of Palestinians in Israel repre-
sents the formation of an essentially Palestinian working class, or merely
a Palestinian fraction of an essentially Israeli working class. It is
not clear how one answers this question. Does the answer lie in the
sphere of the objective determination of class location by economic and
structural criteria, or to the subjective sphere of position and conscious-
ness.
Without a revolutionary politicization of common objective proletar-
iat interest, proletarian alliances will not be actualized. This dimen-
sion, however, is beyond academia in general and beyond the scope of this
thesis in particular.
This thesis was only meant and able to point out that material pre-
requisites for cross-national proletarian alliance, which have never
existed before, are beginning to emerge.
